Papers updated in last 183 days (2708 results)

Last updated:  2026-11-15
Toward Efficient Post-Quantum Bitcoin Bridges
Stephen Duan, Vanhger Pham, Blake Hou, Ethan Zhu, and Jingping Yin
BitVM-style protocols verify succinct proofs on Bitcoin by garbling a proof verifier off-chain. What reaches the chain in a dispute is the proof itself: its bits under one-time keys, the scripts that authenticate them and the signatures that bind them to transactions. Existing designs garble elliptic-curve succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) verifiers, which a quantum adversary breaks. Our goal is a post-quantum alternative: a hash-based scalable transparent argument of knowledge (STARK) verifier, garbled and fed with hash-based one-time keys, with no number-theoretic assumption anywhere in the verifier; its price is a far larger proof, and this paper measures and reduces that on-chain data. We compile the complete verifier for WHIR-based STARK proofs from Ziren into a Boolean circuit using free-XOR gadgets for binary-tower arithmetic and Blake3. Our implementation uses Ziren’s binary-field proof stage and narrow recursion. For an Ethereum block proved through four recursion levels, the finalrecursive WHIR-proof verifier has 174.5M non-free gates and 504,240 input bits, corresponding to 2.79 GB of garbled tables, and publishing that input with translated Winternitz keys takes 3.81 million virtual bytes (MvB) for one key set, in 39 standard transactions. The costs are coupled: on-chain cost grows linearly with the input bits, off-chain storage with the gate count, and proving time exponentially with the grinding that shortens the input. The WHIR schedule, the Merkle cap depth and the input encoding trade these costs against one another, and a model of proof size and proving time selects the setting, a step toward practical post-quantum Bitcoin bridges.
Last updated:  2026-11-15
Shuffling is Universal: Statistical Additive Randomized Encodings for All Functions
Nir Bitansky, Saroja Erabelli, Rachit Garg, and Yuval Ishai
The shuffle model is a widely used abstraction for non-interactive anonymous communication. It allows $n$ parties holding private inputs $x_1,\dots,x_n$ to simultaneously send messages to an evaluator, so that the messages are received in a random order. The evaluator can then compute a joint function $f(x_1,\dots,x_n)$, ideally while learning nothing else about the private inputs. The model has become increasingly popular both in cryptography, as an alternative to non-interactive secure computation in trusted setup models, and even more so in differential privacy, as an intermediate between the high-privacy, little-utility local model and the little-privacy, high-utility central curator model. The main open question in this context is which functions $f$ can be computed in the shuffle model with statistical security. While general feasibility results were obtained using public-key cryptography, the question of statistical security has remained elusive. The common conjecture has been that even relatively simple functions cannot be computed with statistical security in the shuffle model. We refute this conjecture, showing that all functions can be computed in the shuffle model with statistical security. In particular, any differentially private mechanism in the central curator model can also be realized in the shuffle model with essentially the same utility, and while the evaluator learns nothing beyond the central model result. This feasibility result is obtained by constructing a statistically secure additive randomized encoding (ARE) for any function. An ARE randomly maps individual inputs to group elements whose sum only reveals the function output. Similarly to other types of randomized encoding of functions, our statistical ARE is efficient for functions in $NC^1$ or $NL$. Alternatively, we get computationally secure ARE for all polynomial-time functions using a one-way function. More generally, we can convert any (information-theoretic or computational) ``garbling scheme'' to an ARE with a constant-factor size overhead.
Last updated:  2026-11-15
Ideal Pseudorandom Code, Revisited
Ganyuan Cao
Pseudorandom error-correcting codes (PRCs), introduced by Christ and Gunn at CRYPTO’24, combine pseudorandomness with error correction, providing a natural abstraction for robust watermarking and steganography on generative AI models. Subsequent standalone notions, which are ideal security for secret-key PRCs and CCA-style security for public-key PRCs, are oracle-based and do not capture composable use with explicit parties, sessions, and corruption. We give a UC treatment of PRCs via corruption-aware ideal functionalities for both settings. Under non-adaptive corruption, the UC notions recover the standalone ones. Under adaptive corruption, we identify a common obstruction: dummy codewords sampled before corruption, together with their neighborhoods, must later be opened as valid PRC codewords. We formalize this as a decoder-non-committing code (NC-PRC), which any adaptively UC-secure realization must induce. We then capture failures of such openings via targeted low opening capacity, show it rules out robust NC-PRCs, and prove that LDPC-based PRCs have this property hence do not admit a NC-PRC. On the positive side, we sketch two heuristic compilers to lift error-correcting codes to admit NC-PRCs: a secret-key one from a puncturable PRF and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), and a public-key one from a smooth projective hash function (SPHF), both evading the barrier via programmable acceptance. Finally, we identify a fresh-codeword explanation barrier for public-key PRCs: accepted unseen codewords cannot be explained from public information without violating pseudorandomness, hence public-key UC realizations require a trapdoor or an idealized setup, and PRC-based watermark detection is inherently designated-verifier.
Last updated:  2026-11-15
Vectorised Hashing Based on Bernstein-Rabin-Winograd Polynomials over Prime Order Fields
Kaushik Nath and Palash Sarkar
We introduce the new AXU hash function decBRWHash, which is parameterised by the positive integer $c$ and is based on Bernstein-Rabin-Winograd (BRW) polynomials. Choosing $c>1$ gives a hash function which can be implemented using $c$-way single instruction multiple data (SIMD) instructions. We report a set of very comprehensive hand optimised assembly implementations of 4-decBRWHash using avx2 SIMD instructions available on modern Intel processors. For comparison, we also report similar carefully optimised avx2 assembly implementations of polyHash, an AXU hash function based on usual polynomials. Our implementations are over prime order fields, specifically the primes $2^{127}-1$ and $2^{130}-5$. For the prime $2^{130}-5$, for avx2 implementations, compared to the famous Poly1305 hash function, 4-decBRWHash is faster for messages which are a few hundred bytes long and achieves a speed-up of about 16% for message lengths in a few kilobytes range and improves to a speed-up of about 23% for message lengths in a few megabytes range.
Last updated:  2026-11-15
Connecting Cryptanalytic Distinguishers through Divisibility
Hosein Hadipour
Integral distinguishers can reveal more than a zero-sum property: the number of ones in an output component may be divisible by a high power of $2$, rather than merely being even. To exploit this divisibility, we relate linear, integral, differential-linear, and restricted differential sums through two-way conversions with explicit divisibility guarantees and data complexity, recovering established links as special cases. We derive exact random-permutation probabilities and rigorous bounds to quantify the distinguishing strength while accounting for dependencies between output conditions. To discover these properties, we develop automated MILP/SAT models that use complete-round Walsh coefficients or combine Walsh and ultrametric representations to obtain stronger bounds. These weighted models prove finite divisibility even when compatible trails exist, beyond what trail-existence tests alone can establish. For differential-linear sums, we show that combining differential and linear propagation with local zeros in a differential-linear connectivity table (DLCT) can give false zero-correlation claims. We address this limitation with exact mix-basis models that establish zero correlation and finite divisibility. To complement these symbolic methods, we provide a black-box algorithm using exact histograms and the fast Walsh-Hadamard transform to search all output masks for selected input conditions and identify zeros and finite divisibility properties. Our MILP/SAT models significantly improve the divisibility bounds reported by Beyne and Verbauwhede in 674 cases across the SIMON family, as well as for PRESENT, without trail enumeration and at unchanged data complexity. For example, we raise the bounds from $2^5$ to $2^{11}$ on 9-round SIMON32 and from $2^6$ to $2^{22}$ on 10-round SIMON48. To our knowledge, we are the first to prove higher divisibility for 8-round SPECK and for BEANIE, with new bounds for GIFT-64 and Ascon and exact counts for SKINNY-64. Our black-box searches reveal new properties on RC5, ChiLow-32, KeeLoq, and KATAN32, including output-bit combinations missed by single-bit searches, and lead us to introduce probabilistic divisibility: conditions that hold more often than for a random permutation.
Last updated:  2026-11-15
Just How Secure is SRP, Really?
Jiayu Xu and Zhiyuan Zhao
An asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocol allows a client and a server to agree upon a cryptographic key, with the only information shared in advance being a low-entropy password (memorized by the client) and a corresponding password file (stored in the server). The standard security definition for aPAKE is in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. Since aPAKE does not rely on a PKI, such protocols have received much attention in recent years due to their potential of replacing the traditional “password-over-TLS” approach for client-server authentication on the Internet. One of the only two aPAKE protocols currently deployed in practice is Secure Remote Password (SRP) (Wu, NDSS 1998), which is used by millions of users on the Internet. A formal security analysis of SRP has long been elusive; the only security proof to date is the one by Dayanikli and Lehmann (CSF 2024) which is in a (somewhat non-standard) variant of UC called UC with angels. This framework allows the simulator access to an additional oracle that solves certain hard cryptographic problems. In this work, we present a comprehensive new analysis of SRP, and clarify a number of ambiguities about its security: 1. We formally prove that the SRP is UC-secure if and only if one computational problem in the field is hard and one decisional problem is easy. As the decisional problem is likely hard in the field, this strongly suggests that SRP is not UC-secure and hence justifies the usage of UC with angels in the security analysis; 2. On the other hand, we show that the “angel” given to the simulator in the Dayanikli–Lehmann analysis is stronger than necessary, and can be replaced by a weaker oracle; 3. Finally, we prove that UC-with-angels-security is still stronger than the game-based security for aPAKE, i.e., SRP is still game-based secure under some reasonable assumptions. Overall, we pinpoint the exact conditions under which SRP can be proven secure, reducing its security to a number of underlying hardness problems. Along the way we also identify and bridge multiple gaps in the Dayanikli–Lehmann analysis — most notably, the concrete security bound — and apply novel proof techniques that might find application in other contexts.
Last updated:  2026-11-15
One More Pair, More Information Gained: Improved Attacks on LowMC with Full S-box Layers Using Two Plaintext/Ciphertext Pairs
Yimeng Sun, Jiamin Cui, Shiyao Chen, Meiqin Wang, Longzheng Cui, and Chao Niu
Motivated by LowMC cryptanalysis challenge, research in recent years focuses more on attacking LowMC in \PICNIC application setting, \ie an attacker can see only a single plaintext/ciphertext pair. It can be noted that in the security proof of \PICNIC, LowMC is required to be secure under two plaintexts, it is thus meaningful to investigate the security of LowMC in this direction. Pioneered by Liu, Isobe and Meier at Crypto 2021, they combined algebraic techniques with difference enumeration attack, which could attack all three 4-round LowMC instances adopting full S-Box layers in \PICNIC with only two chosen plaintexts. However, the research on cryptanalysis of LowMC using two plaintext/ciphertext pairs is yet far from complete. Previous works using a single known plaintext are better than those with two plaintexts in terms of attack complexity or attacked rounds when considering a comparable success probability. In this paper, to address such counter-intuitive gaps between existing attacks on LowMC with full S-box layers using a single and two plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we first develop an algebraic key-derived attack framework, where an algebraic property of the key-derived difference is utilized to build an equation system with lower algebraic degree. This directly contributes to less cost for solving equation system and naturally works under known-plaintext setting, which can be further enhanced with chosen-plaintext attack setting. We then present an improved difference enumeration attack framework. Instead of enumerating all possible differences in the second round, variables for part of S-boxes in the second and third rounds are introduced to derive cubic equations, which will lead to fewer variables for the last round. Finally, applying our new attack frameworks to LowMC, we propose \text{8-round} attacks on LowMC for the very first time, which remain under known-plaintext setting. Moreover, we give the first attacks on three LowMC instances, \ie 129-bit block size of 6 rounds and 129-/192-bit block size of 7 rounds, which cannot be obtained using previous attacking methods. Also, previous attacks on LowMC from 4 to 7 rounds could be improved for almost all three LowMC instances in this paper. All these results, we believe, could be a positive answer that given one more pair, more information indeed can be gained to improve attacks on LowMC when compared to those using only a single plaintext. As well as our newly proposed algebraic key-derived attack framework, we hope that, could provide more insights into the cryptanalysis of LowMC with low allowable data complexity.
Last updated:  2026-11-14
MODDIV-WC: Unit-Anchored Toeplitz/Hankel Rounding with Exact Binary-LWE Masking and an IND-CCA Security Route
Samir Bouftass
\begin{abstract} We present MODDIV-WC, a public-key encryption and key-encapsulation candidate based on a widened Hankel linear map followed by deterministic integer division, together with an implicit-rejection Fujisaki--Okamoto wrapper, MODDIV-WC-FO. The construction uses a secret vector whose first coordinate is fixed to one and whose remaining coordinates are sampled from a positive interval. This unit anchor makes the Hankel map surjective for every admissible secret, a property that is central to the proof. The security analysis has four layers. First, we give an exact embedding of binary-secret LWE into the widened Hankel map using a parity mask that reproduces the MODDIV-WC secret distribution without statistical loss. Second, in an ideal public-key hybrid, a strong leftover-hash argument hides the challenge key. Third, adapting the Renyi-divergence boundary method of prior LWR and MP-LWR work, we prove a transfer lemma for the unit-anchored MODDIV-WC secret distribution. This avoids the earlier requirement that the probability of crossing a rounding boundary be negligible and instead preserves one-way success probabilities with a multiplicative Renyi loss. Fourth, we combine one-way chosen-plaintext security with the implicit-rejection modular Fujisaki--Okamoto analysis of Hofheinz, Hovelmanns, and Kiltz to derive IND-CCA security in the classical random-oracle model. For an explicit asymptotic family, the correctness, Renyi, leftover-hash, binary-secret-LWE, and random-oracle losses are simultaneously negligible, while the source LWE noise remains inverse-polynomial. Together with classical worst-case-to-LWE reductions and the binary-secret/modulus transformations of Brakerski, Langlois, Peikert, Regev, and Stehle, this yields an internally audited candidate route from polynomial-factor worst-case lattice hardness to IND-CCA security. No practical 128-bit parameters, QROM proof, or deployment claim is made. \end{abstract}
Last updated:  2026-11-14
Attacking UOV-based Signatures over divided power algebras
Peigen Li and Siyong Tao
We introduce a family of divided power wedge attacks on UOV-type systems over finite fields of arbitrary characteristic. The construction extends the characteristic-two exterior-algebra construction of Merz and Ran to the $p$-truncated polynomial ring, where $p$ is the field characteristic. An attack level controls which divided-power relations are adjoined, balancing a lower solving degree against increased average Macaulay row weight. These relations remain in the ideal defining the hidden oil space and can remove extraneous kernel elements, including those obstructing the classical attack when $v\geq 2m$, where $v$ and $m$ denote the numbers of vinegar variables and public equations. We establish an oil-space recovery criterion and use conjectural Hilbert-series predictions to estimate solving degrees and attack costs. A multigraded extension accommodates lifted SNOVA systems. We evaluate the framework on UOV, MAYO, QR-UOV, and SNOVA. Relative to the comparison baselines reported in this paper, our conditional estimates yield reductions of $2$ bits for three UOV parameter sets, $3$--$14$ bits for selected additional MAYO parameter sets, and $2$--$24$ bits for three selected additional SNOVA parameter sets. No improvement is obtained for the QR-UOV parameter sets studied.
Last updated:  2026-11-14
Affine Combiners for Reed-Solomon Proximity Gaps
Alessandro Chiesa, Guy Weissenberg, Eylon Yogev, and Kai Zhe Zheng
Reed–Solomon proximity gaps establish soundness guarantees for protocols that test received words through random combinations. For length-$n$ codes over $\mathbb{F}_q$, classical scalar combiners achieve error $O(n/q)$ in the unique-decoding regime, with larger known bounds near the Johnson radius. We prove smaller error bounds using affine combiners, which combine two received words $f,g$ as $f(x)+(\alpha+\beta x)g(x)$, where $\alpha,\beta$ are independent uniform elements of $\mathbb{F}_q$. For output degree bound $d=\rho n$, fixed $\rho\in(0,1)$ and $0<\eta<1-\sqrt{\rho}$, and sufficiently large block length $n$, we prove mutual correlated agreement (MCA) with one coordinate of agreement loss at threshold $A=\lceil(\sqrt{\rho}+\eta)n\rceil$, with error $O_{\rho,\eta}\left(\frac{1}{q}+\frac{n^2}{q^2}\right)$. The result holds over arbitrary evaluation domains in every finite field, including prime and binary extension fields. The agreement threshold can approach the Johnson threshold, beyond unique decoding. For $q\ge n^2$, our error is $O_{\rho,\eta}(1/q)$, an asymptotic factor-$n$ separation from scalar combiners: we prove that their worst-case MCA error is $\Omega_{\rho,\eta}(n/q)$ at the same agreement threshold and with the same one-coordinate loss. We also prove that affine combiners incur worst-case error $\Omega_{\rho,\eta}(n/q)$ when no agreement loss is allowed. Thus one coordinate of agreement loss is necessary for our guarantee; this relaxation of standard MCA reduces the guaranteed common agreement fraction by at most $1/n$. We also extend the result to $k$-variate Reed–Muller codes on subfield grids, obtaining MCA error $O_{\rho,\eta,k}(q^{-k})$ for fixed $\rho,\eta,k$, sufficiently large $n$, and $q\ge n^{k+1}$, with agreement loss $n^{1-1/k}$.
Last updated:  2026-11-13
ECLIPSE: Strongly Unforgeable Isogeny Signatures from the Prime-Degree Variant of PRISM
Dustin Ray
ECLIPSE is the prime-degree signature construction the PRISM authors describe beside their salted scheme, with that salt, implemented. It exists because a two-dimensional isogeny signature carries an auxiliary isogeny the hash does not bind: the SQIsign round-3 specification says SQIsign cannot be strongly unforgeable for that reason, and PRISM's prime-degree variant has no auxiliary isogeny but was published without parameters, code or a running verifier. This paper is the first implementation, on the SQIsign round-3 primes: a verifier that evaluates the paper's criterion through one isogeny chain and a pull-back, a canonical wire format whose strict decoder recovers one coefficient from two Weil pairings, randomisable keys, two independent implementations that accept each other's signatures, and one key in both roles: a MIKE key pair at the level I prime is an ECLIPSE key pair, the public curve re-encoded and the signing key derived from the MIKE secret alone, with MIKE's code untouched. The only post-quantum precedent is CSIDH with CSI-FiSh, a group action; this is the first shared key in the SQIsign family. Signatures are 206 bytes at NIST level I, within 15 bytes of SQIsign at every matched state. In one session against the SQIsign reference's assembly build, signing is 2.6 times faster and verification costs twice as much, 1.6 times with the public key prepared once. Strong unforgeability is proved in the random oracle model under the PRISM authors' Problem 4, and the verifier's soundness is proved.
Last updated:  2026-11-13
On the Pitfalls of Modeling Individual Knowledge
Wojciech Ciszewski, Stefan Dziembowski, Tomasz Lizurej, and Marcin Mielniczuk
The concept of knowledge has been central in cryptography, especially within cryptographic proof systems. Traditionally, research in this area considers an abstract \emph{prover} defending a claim that it knows a message $M$. Recently, a stronger concept—termed ``individual'' (Dziembowski et al., CRYPTO'23) or ``complete'' (Kelkar et al., CCS'24) knowledge—has emerged. This notion ensures the prover physically stores $M$ on a machine that it controls. As we argue in the paper, this concept also appears in earlier work on ``non-outsourceable puzzles'' (Miller et al., CCS'15), which implicitly assumes that performing quickly complex computation on a string $M$ implies storing it on a single machine. In this line of work, the authors typically rely on the algorithms whose computation requires a massive number of queries to a hash function $H$. This paper highlights a subtle issue in the modeling used in some of these papers, more concretely, the assumption that H can be modeled as an atomic random oracle on long messages. Unfortunately, this does not correspond well to how the hash functions are constructed in practice. For example, the real-world hash functions (e.g., Merkle-Damgard or sponge-based) allow partial evaluation on long inputs, violating this assumption. Another example is the hashing used in Bitcoin mining, which permits similar precomputation. This undermines some protocols relying on individual knowledge. We demonstrate practical attacks against Miller et al.'s and Kelkar et al.'s schemes based on this observation, and discuss secure alternatives. Our alternative constructions, which are modifications of the original ones, avoid reliance on the random oracle behavior of hash functions on long messages. In the full version of this paper, we will provide their formal security analysis in the individual cryptography model of Dziembowski et al. (CRYPTO'23).
Last updated:  2026-11-13
New Designs of Multivariate-Polynomial Universal Hash Functions
Jean Paul Degabriele, Jan Gilcher, Jérôme Govinden, and Kenneth G. Paterson
Universal hash functions (UHFs) are basic building blocks in cryptography, making the topic of designing secure, fast UHFs of longstanding interest. This paper presents an exploration of the design space for multivariate UHFs, that is UHFs that involve the evaluation of a multivariate polynomial over a finite field. We focus on two-level designs, wherein a lower-level hash function produces intermediate values that are consumed by a higher-level one, and where both hash functions are based on either univariate or multivariate polynomials. This approach allows designs to benefit from the desirable features of both components and thereby strike new trade-offs between key size, security level, and amenability to optimization techniques. We extend the recent UHF code generation and benchmarking framework of Degabriele et al. (IEEE S&P 2024) to accommodate our multivariate designs (and also to support binary field arithmetic). We then use the framework to study the performance of a large collection of new two-level designs. This is done by first conducting a statistical factor analysis to determine which design features (and combinations of those features) most influence performance, and then using it to identify particular combinations of lower-level and higher-level hash functions offering particularly good performance/security trade-offs. We present new designs for both binary and prime fields, at two different security levels (corresponding to roughly 128 and 256 bits of security). Our best designs have performance that significantly outperforms state-of-the-art UHFs in the research literature and as deployed in mainstream cryptography libraries by up to 25%, resulting in 0.3 cycles/byte for 128-bit binary fields. We expect further gains from optimizations such as vectorization, as our benchmarks rely purely on auto-generated code from the extended framework, while state-of-the-art implementations typically use hand-optimized implementation strategies. We conclude with a brief inquiry into the performance implications of employing our best UHF design in the AEAD and Accordion mode designs currently under consideration for standardization by NIST.
Last updated:  2026-11-13
Extending Distinguishing to Key Recovery for Subfield Subcodes of GRS codes
Kirill Vedenev
The McEliece cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes has resisted both classical and quantum cryptanalysis for nearly 50 years. Recently, Ghoshal, Ishai, Jain, and Sun proposed an efficient algorithm that distinguishes generator matrices of subcodes of generalized Reed--Solomon (GRS) codes, including Goppa codes, from random ones. From all columns but one, this distinguisher finds a set of multivariate polynomials, called a hold-out kernel, that must vanish at the held-out column if the tested code is indeed a subcode of a GRS code. In this paper, we propose a full key-recovery attack working essentially from a single run of this distinguisher. The attack takes a relatively small sample of polynomials from the hold-out kernel and recovers a local jet (i.e., a truncated Hasse expansion up to reparametrization and scaling) of the hidden curve associated with the code. This jet can then be used in one of two finishing routes proposed in the paper. The first route uses the jet to obtain the quadratic forms vanishing on the curve and recover the tangent planes at all columns. From them, it builds a special auxiliary code, called the minor code, which turns out to be a full GRS code with the same secret support, allowing the standard Sidelnikov--Shestakov attack to recover it. The second route seeks two special quadratic forms and recovers the support from them directly. From this support, simple linear algebra recovers the rest of the secret key. The attack relies on heuristic assumptions, mainly the stated sufficient rank conditions, which we test experimentally. We solved the McEliece challenges TII-173, TII-249, and TII-253, the first two previously unsolved. We also successfully tested the attack on randomly generated small binary Goppa codes, wild Goppa codes, alternant codes, and GRS subcodes. Under these assumptions, the cost of key recovery is dominated by the single distinguisher run (about $2^{90}$ to $2^{101}$ bit operations for Classic McEliece, excluding memory access, depending on the parameter set and the employed sparse solver).
Last updated:  2026-11-13
Adaptor Signature Schemes with Deniable Presignatures
Adrian Cinal and Oliwer Sobolewski
An adaptor signature scheme can be seen as committing to a signature using an NP statement, in such a way that (1) the commitment, called a presignature, is verifiable, (2) the corresponding witness enables opening the commitment (adapting the presignature), and (3) seeing a valid commitment-opening (presignature-signature) pair leaks the witness. In the blockchain space, where signed transactions must be broadcast in order to take effect, this last property allows "forcing" a party to leak a witness for possibly multiple presignatures issued for the same NP statement. This then gives rise to many applications such as atomic swaps or payment channels. Importantly, in prevailing adaptor signature schemes, presignatures may already technically be signatures, in that only the party with the secret signing key could have produced them. In this case, the presignature alone constitutes evidence of intent to participate in a protocol based on adaptor signatures. Perhaps surprisingly, however, for many practical applications, this strong "binding" of presignatures turns out to be non-essential. We revisit the definitions of adaptor signature schemes and demonstrate that prevailing security requirements are often too strict. To this end, we formally define fair signature exchange (FSE) and abandon the assumption implicit in prior work that adaptor-based FSE must be "symmetric" with both parties using the same adaptor signature scheme. The resulting relaxation of security requirements leads us to the notion of presignature deniability, an extension to adaptor signature schemes that we define formally and construct from various assumptions.
Last updated:  2026-11-13
OblivDGL: Oblivious Deep Graph Learning Made Practical
Yiming Qin, Xiaoning Liu, Shangqi Lai, Joseph K. Liu, and Xingliang Yuan
The rapid deployment of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) within Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has opened up new privacy concerns. Both sensitive graph data and proprietary GNN models are submitted to and processed in third-party MLaaS platform for training and inference. To alleviate those concerns, recent efforts have been made to design tailored secure computation protocols for GNNs. Unfortunately, existing designs cannot accomplish security, functionality, and scalability simultaneously. They leak a certain degree of graph information, offer limited support on secure training of GNNs, and can hardly scale to large graphs. In this paper, we design and implement OblivDGL, an oblivious deep graph learning framework for secure GNN inference and training. Our design is inspired by Deep Graph Library (DGL), an industrial practice for graph learning. At its core, we distill the secure computational patterns of GNNs into a generalized form, and empower both secure GNN training and inference through a novel oblivious message passing paradigm. To realize such a paradigm, we design a new oblivious graph representation, and realize it by function secret sharing (FSS), a lightweight secure computation technique with low latency. Compared to prior secure GNN systems, OblivDGL achieves the most stringent privacy guarantees, i.e., revealing no private information except for the total number of edges and nodes. One standout feature of OblivDGL is the scalability of processing encrypted graphs by carefully tailored parallelization designs. Extensive evaluations on four benchmark graph datasets demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art secure GNN frameworks, OblivDGL reduces communication cost by up to 1024x and achieves up to 14.3x speedup in runtime during secure training. For secure inference, OblivDGL achieves up to 754x lower communication and a 4.19x speedup.
Last updated:  2026-11-13
From $\textsf{TS-SUF-2}$ to $\textsf{TS-SUF-4}$: Practical Security Enhancements for $\textsf{FROST2}$ Threshold Signatures
Will Wang, Syh-Yuan Tan, Ryan Chow, Chanson Chan, and Martin Zhao
Threshold signature schemes play a vital role in securing digital assets within blockchain and distributed systems. $\textsf{FROST2}$ stands out as a practical threshold Schnorr signature scheme, noted for its efficiency and compatibility with standard verification processes. However, under the one-more discrete logarithm assumption, with static corruption and centralized key generation settings, $\textsf{FROST2}$ has been shown by Bellare et al. (in CRYPTO 2022) to achieve only $\textsf{TS-SUF-2}$ security, which is a consequence of its vulnerability to $\textsf{TS-UF-3}$ attacks. In this paper, we address this security limitation by presenting an enhanced variant of $\textsf{FROST2}$, namely, $\textsf{FROST2}\texttt{+}$ which achieves the $\textsf{TS-SUF-4}$ security level under the same computational assumptions as the original $\textsf{FROST2}$. $\textsf{FROST2}\texttt{+}$ strengthens $\textsf{FROST2}$ by integrating additional pre-processing token verifications that help mitigate $\textsf{TS-UF-3}$ and $\textsf{TS-UF-4}$ vulnerabilities while maintaining practical efficiency. We show that $\textsf{FROST2}\texttt{+}$ can achieve $\textsf{TS-SUF-4}$ security not only under the same conditions as the original $\textsf{FROST2}$ analysis, but also when initialized with a distributed key generation protocol such as $\textsf{PedPoP}$. Our benchmark using ZCash's $\textsf{FROST}$ library shows that the performance of $\textsf{FROST2}\texttt{+}$ is comparable to $\textsf{FROST2}$ and about $64-79\%$ faster than \textsf{FROST} when precomputation is enabled
Last updated:  2026-11-13
Multi-Hop Functional Encryption
Pratish Datta, Jiaxin Guan, Alexis Korb, and Amit Sahai
In this paper, we initiate the study of multi-hop functional encryption ($\mathsf{MHFE}$), a new primitive for computing over encrypted data in recursive and multi-stage workflows while enabling controlled release of intermediate outputs. $\mathsf{MHFE}$ supports dynamic directed-acyclic computation graphs in which each node is labeled by a function and is equipped with a restricted secret key that reveals only that node's output, yet the computation can continue downstream on a forwardable encrypted state. In doing so, $\mathsf{MHFE}$ simultaneously overcomes (i) multi-hop fully homomorphic encryption's need for a globally trusted, always-online decryption key to reveal intermediate values, (ii) standard FE's lack of a native mechanism for forwarding reusable encrypted state across stages and handling evolving datasets without a fresh recomputation, and (iii) Multi Party Computation's deployment friction stemming from interaction and liveness/coordination requirements (at the cost of a central key-issuing authority). We formalize $\mathsf{MHFE}$ security via the simulation paradigm extending standard FE collusion resistance to the multi-hop setting; this simulation-based notion captures the intended information flow in recursive computations most accurately by characterizing an adversary's entire view as simulatable given only the authorized intermediate outputs. Our security games impose a natural topological-order on queries: a hop key for a node may be requested only after the ciphertexts/keys on all incoming edges to that node have been fixed. We then give the first generic simulation-secure construction of public-key $\mathsf{MHFE}$ for all polynomial-size circuits from any IND-secure standard FE for circuits.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
A Tutorial on Oblivious Random Access Memory
Elaine Shi and Srinivas Devadas
Abstract—Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a key technique for pro- tecting memory access patterns in systems with untrusted mem- ory, including secure processors, trusted execution environments, and multi-party computation. This article presents a tutorial overview of ORAM concepts and designs from an algorithmic and cryptographic perspective. We review the security goals and threat models underlying ORAM, describe the most popular ORAM constructions and their core mechanisms, and discuss practical considerations for implementing ORAM. The tutorial aims to provide readers with a clear foundation for understanding ORAM-based memory protection and its applications.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Sharing a Secret Anamorphically: Secret Shares Disguised as Signatures
Gennaro Avitabile, Vincenzo Botta, and Daniele Friolo
Anamorphic Encryption (Persiano, Phan and Yung, Eurocrypt '22) allows private communication in a challenging setting where encryption is severely controlled by a central authority (henceforth the dictator) who can demand the users to surrender their secret keys. Anamorphic Signatures (AS) (Kutylowski, Persiano, Phan, Yung, Zawada, Crypto '23) face the even more restrictive world where only authentication is allowed but users still want to send secret messages despite the repressive control of the dictator holding their signing key. Several constructions have been proposed so far, but they all come with some limitations. We propose a new flexible setting where digital signatures are used to covertly embed secret shares that $t$ out of $N$ designated receivers can combine to recover a covert secret. We formalize this new primitive called Anamorphic Secret Sharing Signatures (ASSS) together with new robustness, forward/backward secrecy, and private unforgeability notions and we give a construction for Schnorr-like signatures overcoming the limitations of previous constructions. ASSS additionally imply (regular single-receiver) AS, but two signatures (instead of one) are needed to recover the covert message.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Beyond Optimal Fault-Tolerance
Andrew Lewis-Pye and Tim Roughgarden
One of the most basic properties of a consensus protocol is its fault-tolerance--the maximum fraction of faulty participants that the protocol can tolerate without losing fundamental guarantees such as safety and liveness. Because of its importance, the optimal fault-tolerance achievable by any protocol has been characterized in a wide range of settings. For example, for state machine replication (SMR) protocols operating in the partially synchronous setting, it is possible to simultaneously guarantee consistency against $\alpha$-bounded adversaries (i.e., adversaries that control less than an $\alpha$ fraction of the participants) and liveness against $\beta$-bounded adversaries if and only if $\alpha + 2\beta \leq 1$. This paper characterizes to what extent ``better-than-optimal'' fault-tolerance guarantees are possible for SMR protocols when the standard consistency requirement is relaxed to allow a bounded number $r$ of consistency violations, each potentially leading to the rollback of recently finalized transactions. We prove that bounding rollback is impossible without additional timing assumptions and investigate protocols that tolerate and recover from consistency violations whenever message delays around the time of an attack are bounded by a parameter $\Delta^*$ (which may be arbitrarily larger than the parameter $\Delta$ that bounds post-GST message delays in the partially synchronous model). Here, a protocol's fault-tolerance can be a non-constant function of $r$, and we prove, for each $r$, matching upper and lower bounds on the optimal ``recoverable fault-tolerance'' achievable by any SMR protocol. For example, for protocols that guarantee liveness against 1/3-bounded adversaries in the partially synchronous setting, a 5/9-bounded adversary can always cause one consistency violation but not two, and a 2/3-bounded adversary can always cause two consistency violations but not three. Our positive results are achieved through a generic ``recovery procedure'' that can be grafted on to any accountable SMR protocol and restores consistency following a violation while rolling back only transactions that were finalized in the previous $2\Delta^*$ timesteps.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Practical Silent Threshold Signatures and Silent Threshold Encryption for Dynamic Committees
Yifei He, Zheng Zhou, Yu Chen, Zhi Guan, and Zhong Chen
Silent threshold signatures (STS) and encryption (STE) enable threshold cryptography without interactive distributed key generation, allowing a group of $N$ parties to non-interactively generate a joint public signature verification key or an encryption key. However, modern distributed systems (such as Ethereum) rely on small, dynamically changing committees of size $n \ll N$ for efficiency, and existing silent threshold schemes either fail to support this dynamic setting or suffer from severe scalability issues. To the best of our knowledge, the only prior STS construction for dynamic committees, Dyna-hinTS, requires an aggregation time of $O(N\log N)$ per epoch, tightly coupling the cost to the global system size rather than the small active committee. Furthermore, no STE scheme for dynamic committees has been proposed yet. In this work, we present practical silent threshold signature and encryption schemes for dynamic committees, reducing the aggregation cost so that it depends only on the committee size $n$. For signatures, we redesign the Dyna-hinTS framework by replacing its Plonk-style SNARKs with linear pairing checks and a new polynomial commitment for representing the committee, yielding an aggregation time of $O(n\log^2n)$. We also introduce the first silent threshold encryption scheme for dynamic committees with matching efficiency. We further significantly optimize the silent setup phase common to prior STS and STE schemes, reducing each party's one-time setup (i.e., generating the setup data, referred to as a "hint") cost from $O(N^2)$ to $O(N)$. We implement our schemes in Rust, and the results demonstrate practicality at scale. For a system parameterized with $N = 2^{20}$ and $n = 2^{10}$, the per-party hint generation takes 97.5 seconds, and signature aggregation takes 0.145 seconds, achieving a $>140\times$ improvement over Dyna-hinTS. At the same time, our aggregated signature size, verification key size, and verification time (with access to the epoch committee representation) remain constant.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Beyond the Event Horizon of Keccak, Extending the Observation from 2011 and applications
Danilo Gligoroski
In 2011 we observed that a single path in the Keccak sponge from a state whose capacity has all zero bits back to such a state yields an explicit, infinite family of second preimages for every message of at least one full rate block. Finding such a path costs about 2^(c/2), which lies "beyond the event horizon" for SHA3-256 (c = 512). In this paper we give four novel theorems around that observation. First, the capacity can have any value x: a two-block meet-in-the-middle loop from x back to x, found at heuristic cost ≈ sqrt(π)·2^(c/2), gives the same unlimited family of second preimages requiring no further search, with connectors to and from x at the same expected cost each (Theorem 1). Theorem 2 extends this to k-block loops and to cycles of the capacity map. A single-state bridge, a state S with cap(f(S)) = cap(f^(-1)(S)), where cap denotes the capacity part of the state, also gives such a family but costs ≈ 2^c. Theorem 3 gives cheap collisions and a bridge-amplified multicollision: one inner collision and one connector yield equal-length Joux-style 2^k-multicollisions for every k, instead of Joux's k collision searches. Given a prefix reaching x and k bridges on x with pairwise-distinct first rate inputs, Theorem 4 gives k^L distinct equal-length messages of 2L+1 blocks reaching one full state, for every L; in the balanced search model, finding the bridges costs about sqrt(4k)·2^(c/2) calls for large k, independently of L. A binary Joux construction producing at least as many messages needs about ⌈L·log2(k)⌉ collision searches, each of generic order 2^(c/2). To our knowledge, the k^L count of equal-length messages from k > 1 bridges at an arbitrary x is new. We give a verified full-round Keccak-f[1600] bridge with c = 80 and a full-round c = 80 example from the standard IV: an IV transition and three bridges (2^42.61 calls in total) give 3^3 = 27 distinct 1710-byte messages with a common digest. At c = 88 we found four bridges on one generalized capacity; two are published, and the other two are posed as one-sided forgery challenges, in which only the forward half of a bridge is public, with heuristic generic completion cost about 2^88 (and 2^92 for one of them, read at its larger effective capacity). Lemma 5 shows that a bridge at capacity c is a bridge at every smaller capacity. The bridges were found by an incremental distinguished-point search that resumes from its stored table; the soundness of its output and the distinctness of the first halves of the bridges it reports are machine-checked in Lean 4. The second part of the paper offers novel protocols built on the asymmetry between minting and forging Keccak bridges. They include proof of work with hardness-adaptive capacity, dual-capacity commitments anchored by the real SHA3-256 digest, bridges as zero-knowledge-committed tokens, and a self-enforcing bounty market for reduced-round security. To our knowledge, these are the first unkeyed Keccak-based protocols that deliberately set the capacity so that the generic bridge cost is a feasible, tunable hardness parameter. We give a list of 13 further protocol ideas for application of Keccak bridges. We prove the four theorems, machine-check the stated algebraic results in Lean 4, and provide reproducible experiments and open-source proof-of-concept code. The applications are design proposals whose end-to-end security remains open.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Smaller Share Size for Evolving Secret Sharing: General Thresholds and Threshold Three
Xiaozheng Wang and Tianren Liu
Evolving secret sharing allows participants to join indefinitely without modifying previously distributed shares. We study the share size of perfectly secure evolving threshold secret sharing schemes and obtain two results. For general thresholds, we introduce a polynomial sharing method that shares two secrets with adjacent reconstruction thresholds using one polynomial. Combining this method with the evolving scheme of Cheng et al.\ (ASIACRYPT 2025), we obtain an evolving $k$-threshold scheme whose $t$-th share has size \[ \left\lfloor \frac{k}{2} \right\rfloor \log_2 t + O_k\!\left(\ell+\log_2\log_2 t\right) \] bits for an $\ell$-bit secret. This reduces the leading coefficient of their general construction from $k-1$ to $\lfloor k/2\rfloor$. For threshold three, we give a separate construction that reduces the lower-order terms of the scheme of Cheng et al. We mask the short shares in all generations with the same random $\ell$-bit value $R$, which is shared through an evolving $2$-threshold scheme, we obtain \[ \log_2 t+(2+o(1))\log_2\log_2 t \] bits per share for fixed $\ell$. Both constructions satisfy correctness and perfect information-theoretic security.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Encrypted Authorship Attribution for Fraud Detection
Zita Baronnet and Leonard Schild
Authorship attribution techniques are routinely used to re- late anonymous or disputed texts to known authors through characteris- tic writing styles. Within the financial sector, such techniques may sup- port investigations of phishing campaigns, impersonation attempts, in- vestment scams, or other forms of fraud. More concretely, these methods can be leveraged to determine whether newly observed communications are linked to previously identified actors. In practice, however, both the communications under investigation and the intelligence databases used for attribution may contain sensitive information that cannot be shared across organizational boundaries. In this work, we investigate the privacy-preserving evaluation of sty- lometric authorship attribution through fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We focus on Burrows’ Delta, a widely studied authorship attribu- tion method based on token frequency statistics and z-score comparisons. We present a homomorphic implementation of Burrows’ Delta, describe a motivating fraud-analysis scenario together with its threat model and trust assumptions, and then analyze the resulting computational com- plexity. Finally, we evaluate the practicality of the proposed approach us- ing the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme and show that the com- plete pipeline can be executed without bootstrapping while maintaining high numerical accuracy. Our results demonstrate that stylometric au- thorship attribution constitutes a realistic target for privacy-preserving outsourced analytics and illustrate how homomorphic encryption can support confidential fraud investigations.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Security Analysis of Anonymous Authentication in Apple's Private Cloud Compute
Callista Gratz, Anja Lehmann, and Andrey Sidorenko
Apple's Private Cloud Compute (PCC) offloads on-device computation, such as large language-model prompts, to the cloud while seeking to preserve the privacy users expect from local processing. At its core lies a custom authentication protocol that must reconcile three competing goals: restricting access to registered users within a rate limit, doing so without revealing user identities or linking their requests, and nonetheless retaining the ability to hold misbehaving users accountable. Apple's protocol combines blind RSA signatures in a hierarchical issuance with a salted-hash binding trick, but ships without any formal statement -- let alone proof -- of the guarantees it is meant to provide. In this work we close this gap by abstracting the desired authentication protocol as PORTA -- pseudonymously openable, rate-limited tokens for anonymous authentication. We formally define the desired privacy, security, and abuse-mitigation properties such a protocol should satisfy, including a new binding notion specific to the protocol's two-step issuance. We then cast Apple's protocol in this model and show that it achieves the rate-limiting goal and, with a small modification, all privacy goals. Its abuse-mitigation mechanism, which is not yet active in the deployed system, would however not provide the desired accountability guarantees even once enabled. Finally, we present an alternative construction based on anonymous credentials that provably achieves all properties and verifies the binding of tokens already at the gateway, so that a user's pseudonym is only revealed in case of abuse.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Revisiting Witness-Succinct UC-lifting Compilers
Davide Li Calsi, Luigi Russo, Dominique Schröder, and Federico Valbusa
Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zkSNARKs) are increasingly used within larger cryptographic protocols, making security under composition essential. Generic compilation to Universal Composability (UC) requires straight-line, black-box extraction while preserving succinctness and controlling prover cost. We introduce verifiable reconstructible straightline codes (VRSCs), a primitive that separates public hiding, transcript-based reconstruction, binding, and proof non-rerandomizability. This abstraction exposes a missing security requirement in the witness-succinct UC compiler of Ganesh et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023). Permuting previously revealed evaluation openings produces a fresh accepting proof with non-negligible probability without violating non-extrapolation, invalidating the claimed simulation argument. Proof non-rerandomizability captures this attack at the certificate level. Our construction prevents transfers between repetitions through verifier-enforced disjoint evaluation domains. We formulate a generic UC lifting theorem in terms of VRSCs and give a pairing-based instantiation using a Fischlin-style search over authenticated codeword symbols. Structured Reed--Solomon encoding and jointly computed KZG openings reduce certificate-generation work from quadratic to \(O_{\lambda}(n\log n)\), where \(n\) is the witness size. Only a linear-time encoding check enters the underlying SNARK circuit. To our knowledge, this is the first generic UC lifting compiler that simultaneously achieves quasi-linear prover overhead and constant additional proof size and verification work with respect to the witness size.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Triads below the ISA: Optimizing Cryptographic Software in CPU Microcode
Sabrina Manickam, Rowan Fimmano, Peter Schwabe, and Yuval Yarom
Cryptographic software is typically optimized for the instruction set architecture exposed by the processor. Modern processors, however, contain deeper execution layers with computational capabilities and constraints that differ from those of the instruction set architecture (ISA). This work explores the programmable microcode layer in x86 as an implementation target. We characterize the microcode domain as a distinct target architecture for cryptographic computation and adapt implementations to the state, operations, invocation interface, capacity, and scheduling resources it exposes. We instantiate this methodology on Intel Goldmont with Keccak f [1600] and X25519, two case studies with substantially different computational structures. Our Keccak implementation reduces permutation latency by 7.36% relative to the fastest native implementation in our comparison, with the improvement remaining visible in incomplete SHA3-256 computations. For X25519, our microcode multiplication and squaring kernels free the multiplier from fixed operand registers and restrictive carry-flag semantics, outperforming the native implementations we evaluate. The resulting complete X25519 implementation requires 7.3% fewer cycles than s2n-bignum and 9.8% fewer cycles than OpenSSL. Together, these results demonstrate that looking below the ISA exposes a distinct design space for cryptographic implementation and provide a systematic methodology for exploring it.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
Optimized Solving Strategy and Two-Step Estimator for LWE with Hints
Hanbin Yang, Jinzheng Cao, Risheng Yin, and Qingfeng Cheng
Side-channel hints can reduce the cost of solving the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. We optimize a two-step strategy for LWE with hints that uses BKZ reduction followed by final lattice sieving. Given a lattice constructed from the hints and a specified pair of reduction and sieving algorithms, the strategy jointly selects BKZ block sizes, tour counts, and a final sieving configuration. We also introduce a two-step estimator that predicts the reduced-basis profile and estimates the probability of secret recovery. We combine these estimates with cost models to select a strategy that meets the success-probability and resource constraints. Experiments show that our strategy significantly outperforms the methods of Cao et al. (CRYPTO 2025) and May and Nowakowski (ASIACRYPT 2023). For example, using BLASterBKZ for lattice reduction and the BGJ sieve for final sieving, our strategy recovers the secret for a CRYSTALS-KYBER 512 instance with 190 perfect hints in 7 minutes, compared with 1.6 hours reported by Cao et al. and 7.4 hours reported by May and Nowakowski. With 64 threads, our strategy recovers the secret with 170 perfect hints in 82 minutes. These results highlight the importance of accounting for side-channel leakage when assessing lattice-based cryptographic schemes.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
More Keys, Less Commitment: Key-Committing Attacks on BBB Accordions via Encode-then-Encipher and a Key-Committing Transform
Donghoon Chang, Yukihito Hiraga, Yusuke Naito, Yu Sasaki, and Takeshi Sugawara
Cryptographic accordions with beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security are being actively studied in connection with NIST’s ongoing standardization effort. We show that BBB security of an accordion does not necessarily strengthen key commitment of AE built from it: in many BBB accordions, additional keys introduced for BBB security give an adversary extra degrees of freedom. Exploiting this observation, we present $O(1)$ key-committing attacks on a broad range of AE schemes built from BBB accordions, mostly via the Encode-then-Encipher (EtE) paradigm, including CHCTR2, eCTR-based accordions, THCTR, HCTR+, TCT2, and bbb-ddd-AES under a natural polynomial-hash instantiation. To address this issue, we propose CACH, a black-box transform from BBB-secure accordions to robust AE (RAE) with key-committing security. CACH achieves BBB multi-user RAE security and achieves $t/2$-bit key-committing security with a $t$-bit tag for $n \le t \le 2n$ in the ideal-cipher model. CACH uses only AES-based components and supports all AES key sizes, making it compatible with NIST’s design goals. We instantiate CACH with CHCTR2. CACH-CHCTR2 with AES-256 outperforms EtE-HCTR2 with Rijndael-256 and EtE-CHCTR2 for short messages.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
A Note on the Security of Changing of the Guards
Feng Zhou, Gehui Yang, Junhuai Yang, Hua Chen, and Limin Fan
Masking stands as one of the most effective countermeasures against side-channel attacks. The Changing of the Guards (COTG) technique reduces online fresh randomness by reusing masks and borrowing shares across nonlinear computations. We identify a security flaw in the round-based AES Design I of Askeland et al. at CARDIS 2022. When the subsequent linear layer combines outputs from different masked S-boxes, a single glitch-extended probe can observe internal registered terms from several S-boxes. We show that reused random masks can cancel across these observations, leaving a value whose distribution depends on the secret inputs. This note documents the flaw in this particular implementation without proposing a corrected construction.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
PERSEPHONE: Zero-Knowledge Multiplicative Non-Negative Proof for Sequential Private Range Verification
Ivan Tjuawinata, Yann Fraboni, Jun Jie Sim, Darian Gunamardi, Zhenghao Wu, Hasventhran Baskaran, Chi-Hung Chi, Yujing Sun, Pu Duan, and Kwok-Yan Lam
Privacy is a fundamental requirement of modern digital payment systems, which process highly sensitive financial data, including account balances and transaction amounts. Unauthorized disclosure of this information can compromise users’ financial privacy and expose them to fraud or other forms of financial abuse. A key challenge in this setting is to verify that a payment amount does not exceed the payer’s available balance without revealing either the payment amount or the balance. A common approach is to employ zero-knowledge range proofs (ZKRPs). However, because conventional ZKRPs require public bounds, verifying a private value against private bounds requires multiple ZKRP instances, resulting in substantial computational and communication overhead that can increase latency and lead to cascading failures at scale. Motivated by the sequential nature of transactions in real-world payment systems, we formalize the problem of Sequential Private Range Verification (SPRV) and propose a framework, Persephone, that exploits the sequential structure of linked verifications rather than treating each verification independently. Within Persephone, we design and leverage a novel zero-knowledge proof primitive, ZK-MultNNP, to solve SPRV efficiently. Experimental results demonstrate that Persephone reduces total proving time by at least 3× compared to a ZKRP-based baseline. Furthermore, in a digital payment scenario, Persephone completes all transaction verifications within the 400 ms Doherty threshold, compared to only 30% of verifications for the ZKRP-based baseline.
Last updated:  2026-11-12
On the Security of the Cubic UOV Variant CML
Manit Gupta
CML is a cubic multivariate signature scheme proposed over $\mathbb{F}_q$ with $q = 2^8$. Earlier cubic Oil--Vinegar variants such as CUOV and CSSv were broken by differential and high-rank attacks. CML adds an $\ell$-invertible cycle system and a secret position-hiding map to hide the cubic positions. We show that the cubic homogeneous parts of the public key span a space of dimension at most two, so a publicly derived output combination has degree at most two. After restriction to the oil-direction space, the polar matrices of the publicly derived quadratic components span rank-two matrices associated with the edges of a path. This structure yields a procedure for recovering an equivalent key. Our implementation recovered an equivalent key in under 5~minutes for each tested parameter set, including the set targeting 256-bit security.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
The Price of Geometry for Private Distance-Sensitive Filters: $\ell_\infty$ versus $\ell_2$
Paul Cesaretti
A distance-sensitive set representation stores a set $S$ in a metric space and must accept points within distance $r$ of $S$ and reject points farther than $cr$, each with error probability at most $\alpha$. Under differential privacy, even exact membership costs a privacy loss of $\ln(1/\alpha)$; we ask how much \emph{more} the geometry of the space forces. Earlier lower bounds cover only restricted mechanisms, such as partition-based ones or those whose outputs contain no scattered false positives (``dust''). We prove lower bounds for every mechanism. In $\ell_\infty^d$ with $c<3$ the extra cost is $\Theta_c(d)$, which proves a recent conjecture in this range; when $\lfloor cr\rfloor-r+1$ divides $2r$, a randomly shifted grid is optimal up to $\tilde O(\alpha)$ per dimension. In $\ell_2^d$ the extra cost is instead $\Theta_c(\min(d,\ln(1/\alpha)))$: a new mechanism that outputs a single very large ball shows that dimensions beyond about $\ln(1/\alpha)$ are free, so partition-based constructions are optimal in $\ell_\infty$ but not in $\ell_2$. The same arguments bound the space of every correct representation of $k$-sets, private or not: $\Omega(k(\log(1/\alpha)+d))$ bits in $\ell_\infty^d$ with $c<3$, and $\Omega_c(k(\log(1/\alpha)+\min(d,\log(1/\alpha))))$ bits in every $\ell_p^d$.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Pufferfish: DAG-Guided Speculative Execution for Low-Latency BFT SMR
Jianting Zhang, Alberto Sonnino, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias, and Aniket Kate
Modern Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication (BFT SMR) systems increasingly decouple data dissemination from transaction ordering, but typically execute transactions only after consensus finalizes their order. This execution-after-consensus design serializes ordering and execution on the confirmation path, so transactions incur both costs even under normal network conditions. Decoupling enables dissemination to continue during ordering stalls, but amplifies the same bottleneck: disseminated transactions accumulate into an execution backlog that replicas must drain after ordering recovers. This paper presents Pufferfish, a BFT SMR design that uses speculative execution to move execution off the post-consensus critical path. Replicas speculatively execute transactions according to a predicted pre-commit order derived from a DAG-based consensus substrate. To make this work reusable, Pufferfish combines adaptive probabilistic speculation, which predicts the most likely final order from the local DAG view, with commit-aware snapshots, which preserve selected prefix states to reduce replay when speculation is wrong. In the common case, Pufferfish overlaps execution with consensus to reduce confirmation latency. When ordering is delayed, the same mechanism converts otherwise idle time into useful execution work, limits backlog growth, and shortens recovery. We implement Pufferfish and evaluate it in a geo-distributed AWS deployment across five regions. At 80,000 transactions per second (TPS) with 10 replicas, Pufferfish reduces p99 confirmation latency from 681ms to 430ms (36.9%) relative to an execution-after-consensus baseline. With 49 replicas at 25,000 TPS near the baseline's saturation point, Pufferfish achieves a p99 latency of 306 ms, compared with 724 ms for the baseline. Under induced consecutive ordering stalls, it reduces latency from 17.1 s to 9.8 s, a 42.7% decrease.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
AuditPay: Anonymous Payments with Controlled Oversight
Elkana Tovey, Yossi Gilad, and Aviv Zohar
This paper introduces AuditPay, a novel mechanism for blockchain mixers that enables controlled oversight through an ``auditing budget.’’ Auditors may monitor up to a budgeted number of addresses per epoch (e.g., an hour or a day), without revealing to users which addresses are monitored. Unlike traditional approaches that require users to voluntarily disclose viewing keys to trusted gatekeepers, AuditPay cryptographically enforces auditing compliance while preserving privacy for non-monitored user addresses and without introducing additional trust assumptions. At the core of AuditPay’s design is a selective encryption mechanism coupled with an efficient audit-key encoding scheme, enforced by a lightweight zero-knowledge proof. Users encrypt audit-relevant information under an audit key, which permits decryption only if the payment is to (or, alternatively, from) an address selected by the auditor for monitoring. We implement AuditPay as an Ethereum-based payment mixer and show through experiments on our prototype that its performance and gas-cost overheads are modest, providing a practical solution for balancing payment oversight with user privacy.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
BMRaccoon: Blind Multi-Signatures from Lattices
Keerthi Aiswarya Varshini, Kanchan Bisht, Palkesh Jain, Maria Francis, and R. Kabaleeshwaran
Blind multi-signatures (BMS) allow a user to obtain a compact signature on a hidden message through the joint participation of multiple signers, providing a basis for decentralized issuance of anonymous tokens.We present BMRaccoon, the first lattice-based post-quantum BMS construction, with a two-round signing protocol secure under concurrent sessions and signatures syntactically compatible with Raccoon under the sum of the signers' verification keys. As a building block, we introduce MRaccoon, the first Raccoon-based multi-signature and prove its strong unforgeability under the Algebraic One-More MISIS (AOM-MISIS) and MSIS assumptions in the random oracle and and knowledge-of-secret-key (KOSK) model. Our modular security analysis establishes one-more unforgeability of BMRaccoon via a straight-line reduction to the strong unforgeability of MRaccoon, modelling the user's blinding contribution as an auxiliary signer with a zero verification key. We additionally prove blindness against malicious, colluding signers. For up to $q_s = 2^{32}$ signing sessions and $n = 32$ signers, our concrete instantiation yields signatures of approximately $67$ KB and verification keys of approximately $15$ KB.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
From Dependent Ciphertexts to Sharp Bounds for Polynomial Evaluation in BGV
Chiara Marcolla, Nadir Murru, and Matilda Urani
A central challenge in Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is the selection of ciphertext moduli, which depends on accurately estimating noise growth during homomorphic evaluation. Choosing excessively large moduli reduces the efficiency and scalability of the scheme, whereas underestimating noise can result in decryption failures and potential security vulnerabilities. Average-case analyses have provided promising probabilistic estimates of noise growth in practical FHE computations. However, recent studies indicate that reliable estimates must account for dependencies among ciphertext errors, as neglecting these correlations can systematically underestimate noise. This work presents the first average-case analysis for the BGV scheme that accounts for both correlations induced by secret/public keys and ciphertext dependencies. We propose new variance estimates for the noise coefficients in homomorphic additions and multiplications involving dependent ciphertexts, and extend our framework to the homomorphic evaluation of polynomial functions, which is widely employed in FHE applications. Our theoretical estimates closely align with experimental observations, exhibiting discrepancies smaller than 1.2 bits. Finally, these estimates are adopted to choose the initial BGV parameters, leading to significantly smaller ciphertext moduli compared to those currently adopted in widely used FHE libraries, thus improving the efficiency of the scheme. Compared to OpenFHE, we obtain an average reduction of about 11.5% in the ciphertext modulus size, while relative to HElib, we reduce the ratio between consecutive moduli up to 23 bits per level in practical settings.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Bulletproofs are Optimal: Lower Bounds for Vector Commitments from Fiat-Shamir in Pairing-Free Groups
Marian Dietz and Emanuele Giunta
Vector Commitments allow parties to commit to an (ordered) vector and to later succinctly open it at any desired position. In plain (i.e., known order and pairing-free) prime-order groups, all state-of-the-art constructions rely on the combination of a generalized Pedersen commitment and an inner product argument. This includes the celebrated constructions of Bootle et al. (EUROCRYPT 2016) and Bünz et al. (S&P 2018), and subsequent improvements. All of these achieve proofs consisting of $\Theta(\log n)$ group elements, and further provide useful properties including malleability, subvector opening and transparent setup. However, breaking the $O(\log n)$ barrier in the plain discrete logarithm setting has proven to be a hard problem. This is in stark contrast with other settings, e.g. from pairing-friendly groups or groups of unknown order, where constructions with constant-size commitment and openings have been known for over a decade. In this work we investigate whether this limitation is inherent to constructions based on prime-order groups. Specifically we prove new lower bounds for any accumulator (a weaker object than vector commitments, thus making our result more general), with interactive public-coin membership proof in Maurer's Generic Group Model. An implication of our result is that in such setting at least one of the following must occur: (i) the commitment has super-constant size; (ii) the opening proof contains $\Omega(\log n)$ group elements; (iii) the opening proof has length $n^{1-o(1)}$. Our bound further extends to primitives that directly imply accumulators/VCs including polynomial/functional commitments and inner product arguments.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
FiltrumVote: Scalable, Verifiable, and Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting
Leonardo Kimura, Dimitri Leskow, Diego F. Aranha, Roberto Araújo, and Marcos Simplicio
Internet voting can increase voter turnout and reduce operational costs; however, it also facilitates voter coercion. One compelling approach to address this issue is deniable vote updating, which allows voters to cast multiple ballots while counting only their final vote. Despite its intuitive appeal, achieving deniable vote updating together with verifiability and scalability has proven challenging. Therefore, we present FiltrumVote, a scalable, publicly verifiable, and coercion-resistant Internet voting system based on deniable vote updating. It has a quasi-linear cleansing phase, and it is built mainly from zero-knowledge proofs with standard $\Sigma-$protocol techniques. As a result, FiltrumVote is highly scalable: a standard computer takes less than 5 hours to prove all zero-knowledge proofs for one million votes.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Collision Attacks on SHA-2: 39-Step SHA-256 below the Birthday Bound
Jiaying Gong, Yongzhuang Wei, Fengrong Zhang, and Bohua Wei
SHA-2 is the most widely deployed family of hash functions, and its security margin is measured by the number of steps collision attacks reach. Li et al. gave the first classical collision attack on 38-step SHA-256, with an estimated complexity of $2^{104.3}$. The challenge is to extend the attack to more steps while retaining its advantage over generic collision search. In this paper, we show that collisions for 39-step SHA-256 can be found at an estimated cost below the $2^{128}$ birthday bound. We keep the published 39-step characteristic and change how its conditions are satisfied. We introduce joint message-word pinning, a technique that fixes two expanded message words, $W_{16}$ and $W_{17}$, to the values prescribed by the characteristic. For each chaining value, we solve for assignments to two state words that carry no direct condition, and every assignment returned gives both message words their prescribed values. To find these assignments, we first fix the value of a function with a small image and then solve the coupled equations for $W_{16}$ and $W_{17}$ in sequence. On 39-step SHA-256, pinning $W_{16}$ alone gives an estimated cost of $2^{123.4}$ scalar compressions per expected collision, and pinning both words reduces it by 14.6 bits to $2^{108.8}$. Under the uniform-chaining-value model, the measured probabilities and the cost of processing one first block give an upper bound of approximately $2^{124.6}$ on the expected cost of finding the first collision, even under worst-case clustering. For 38-step SHA-256, we reduce the estimated cost per expected collision from $2^{104.3}$ to $2^{90.9}$ by using a new differential characteristic and pinning $W_{16}$ alone. On SHA-512, pinning $W_{16}$ alone reduces this cost from $2^{125.4}$ to $2^{100.7}$ for 38 steps and from $2^{178}$ to $2^{131.3}$ for 39 steps.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Constructions of Efficiently Implementable Boolean Functions with Provable Nonlinearity/Resiliency/Algebraic Immunity Trade-Offs
Palash Sarkar
We describe new families of efficiently implementable Boolean functions achieving provable trade-offs between resiliency, nonlinearity, and algebraic immunity. Compared to one direction of research on balanced and 1-resilient functions with optimal algebraic immunity, the new functions provide lower algebraic immunity, but much lower -- in fact, almost optimal -- linear bias and importantly are much more efficient to implement. Compared to another direction of research based on constructions using direct sum, the new functions while achieving similar efficiency, has less number of variables for the same order of resiliency, same lower bound on algebraic immunity, and similar nonlinearity.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Authenticated Outsourced Incrementally Verifiable MPC
Anders Dalskov, Anders Kallesøe, and Hamidreza Khoshakhlagh
Many privacy-preserving applications such as iterative machine learning training require executing ongoing computations over a secret state for long periods of time. While MPC enables secure computation, long-lived secret state is vulnerable to adaptive corruptions, requiring periodic share refreshes and committee rotation. In many settings, it is desirable for external parties to be able to verify that these state updates and rotations are performed correctly, but existing approaches for such public verifiability incur high overhead as they require MPC nodes to generate expensive proofs over secret-shared data. We propose Authenticated Outsourced Incrementally Verifiable MPC (IV-MPC), a framework for efficient public verification of long-running MPC computation. Our approach decouples private proof computation (run by MPC nodes) from public tasks within the proof generation that can be delegated to a single external prover $P^*$. To realize this architecture, we introduce three main components: (1) a Private-opening Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PoPCS) that lets an incoming committee prove they received the correct state shares without revealing the underlying data; (2) an efficient distributed proof system based on the sumcheck protocol and compressed $\Sigma$-protocols to verify state updates; and (3) a stateless handover technique that anchors committee transfers to a fixed state commitment, preventing proof sizes from growing over time. Combined with an incrementally verifiable computation (IVC) proof run by the external prover $P^*$, IV-MPC enables external auditors to verify correctness of MPC computation at every round with verification time asymptotically independent of the total number of epochs.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Anamorphic NIZK: Definition, Construction and More
Wenhui Kong, Gongxian Zeng, and Zhengan Huang
Anamorphic encryption enables covert communication despite disclosure of ordinary decryption keys~\cite{PersianoPY22}. Work on anamorphic signatures extends this capability to settings permitting only authentication and shows that Fiat-Shamir preserves anamorphism~\cite{kutylowski2023anamorphicSignatures,fiat1986prove}. However, this result assumes an already anamorphic protocol and does not by itself ensure witness privacy against the recipient, motivating anamorphism directly in non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs). We introduce anamorphic NIZK (ANIZK), in which publicly verifiable proofs carry covert messages recoverable with a double key. The framework formalizes anamorphic security, strong robustness, and recipient anamorphic zero knowledge and simulation extractability. A generic construction in the random oracle model combines suitable Sigma protocols with authenticated encryption with associated data through a salted Fiat-Shamir transform. Applying ANIZK within the Naor-Yung paradigm \cite{NaorYung90} yields recipient anamorphic encryption satisfying STE-xCCA1, SIND-aCCA1, and SIND-nCCA security under the notions of~\cite{choi2026unified}. Finally, an asymmetric variant of ANIZK, termed ASY-ANIZK, combines a labeled NIZK with public-key encryption satisfying ciphertext pseudorandomness and random ciphertext rejection. It separates public embedding from secret recovery and achieves weak robustness, as public embedding precludes strong robustness.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
HIT: Single-Pass Inference for Single-Trace NTT Side-Channel Attacks
Yihan Nie, Yuxuan Wang, Yubo Zhao, Zixin He, Wenjing Zheng, Jintong Yu, Shifeng Sun, Chi Zhang, Pei Cao, and Dawu Gu
In physical implementations of the post-quantum standards ML-KEM and ML-DSA, the Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) directly processes secret polynomials and is a primary target for single-trace side-channel key recovery. Existing Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA) apply loopy Belief Propagation (BP) over cyclic $\mathbb{Z}_q$ factor graphs, where BP fails under high noise and $O(q^2)$ updates make ML-DSA infeasible. We present the Hierarchical Inference Tree (HIT), a framework built on the insight that small secret inputs deterministically fix all NTT intermediates across the recursive butterfly network. Instead of loopy BP, HIT merges and prunes candidate inputs from leaves to root in a single pass on an acyclic binary tree. This approach eliminates belief oscillation, guarantees a constant runtime, and decouples complexity from $q$. On ML-KEM-768, HIT runs over $900\times$ faster than state-of-the-art SASCA and more than doubles noise tolerance. HIT also enables the first single-trace analytical attack on the ML-DSA NTT and recovers each polynomial in under one second. On physical ARM Cortex-M4 targets, HIT achieves over 98% polynomial recovery across both standards with only 20 to 80 profiling traces.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
The Maximum Possible Nonlinearity for a Balanced Boolean Function in 10 Variables is 492
Youle Xu and Qichun Wang
Determining the maximum nonlinearity of 10-variable balanced Boolean functions has been a long-standing open problem. In this paper, we resolve it by proving that the maximum nonlinearity is exactly 492, thereby confirming Dobbertin’s conjecture in dimension 10. To exclude nonlinearity 494, we derive a quadratic residue for the Walsh spectrum and refine a local energy table from four-block concatenation by retaining the signs of the Walsh coefficients. The resulting bounds exclude all but the largest polar rank; a product inequality and a parity argument eliminate the remaining case.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Cryptanalysis of Goldreich's PRGs with MAJ–XOR Predicates
Tianning Wang, Haoyang Wang, Fukang Liu, and Willi Meier
Goldreich's pseudorandom generators (PRGs) expand a secret \(n\)-bit seed into \(m\) output bits by applying the same local predicate to each selected subset of seed bits. We develop a pooled recovery framework for \(\mathrm{MAJ}\)–\(\mathrm{XOR}\) predicates. The method guesses that a set of seed bits has the same value and pools outputs whose majority inputs sufficiently overlap this set. Under a correct guess, Bias-Amplified Pooled Recovery (BAPR) exploits the amplified bias of the resulting noisy XOR equations. When the guessed bits force the selected majority outputs to a constant, its noiseless special case, Deterministic Pooled Recovery (DPR), uses exact equations. For \(m=n^s\) with fixed \(s>1\), majority locality \(a\in\omega(1)\cap O(\log n)\), and fixed XOR locality \(b\ge3\), we establish a worst-case \(2^{o(n)}\)-time recovery bound for BAPR when the input sets are sampled uniformly and independently across outputs. Under the stated cost models, our concrete recovery estimates for balanced seeds fall below the claimed security levels for the \(\mathrm{MAJ}_7\oplus\mathrm{XOR}_4\) challenge and selected \(\mathrm{THR}_{64,32}\oplus\mathrm{XOR}_{10}\) instances collected by Boura et al. (ToSC 2025), as well as selected challenge instances proposed by Fu et al. (EUROCRYPT 2026). We then generalize DPR to fixed predicates satisfying explicit affine-restriction conditions and prove subexponential recovery without an additional rank assumption. Our analysis of alternative predicates highlights the potential use of exact or approximate affine relations in attacks, suggesting that such structure should also be considered in predicate design.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Tightly Secure and Modular Post-Quantum TLS Handshakes
Biming Zhou, Jinrong Chen, Haodong Jiang, Rongmao Chen, and Yunlei Zhao
In the post-quantum (PQ) migration of the TLS~1.3 handshake, the classical Diffie--Hellman key exchange is replaced with a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Furthermore, KEMTLS builds upon PQ TLS~1.3 by replacing signature-based authentication with KEM-based authentication. However, all existing analyses of PQ TLS~1.3 and KEMTLS incur at least quadratic reduction losses in the number of sessions, and achieving a tightly secure construction remains an open problem. To address this gap, we present the first unified, tight, and modular reduction framework for PQ TLS~1.3 in the standard model and KEMTLS in the random oracle model (ROM). Our framework tightly reduces the security of these protocols to the security of three core components: (i) the MUC-IND-1RCCA or MUC-IND-1CCA security of the underlying ephemeral KEM, (ii) the MU-(dual)-PRF security of HKDF (for PQ~TLS~1.3), and (iii) the MU-EUF-CMA$^c$ security of the signature scheme (for PQ TLS~1.3) or the MUC-OW-ChCCA$^*$ security of the static KEM (for KEMTLS). Furthermore, we establish the first concrete MU-(dual)-PRF bounds for HMAC and HKDF in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM). Instantiating this framework with tightly secure LWE-based KEM and signature schemes yields the first (almost) tightly secure constructions of PQ TLS~1.3 and KEMTLS under the LWE assumption. Moreover, our framework demonstrates that the weaker IND-1RCCA security notion for the ephemeral KEM already suffices to achieve security for both PQ TLS~1.3 and KEMTLS, thereby enabling simpler instantiations.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
A gentle introduction to lattice-based cryptography
Alfred Menezes
We present four quantum-safe schemes: the Kyber (ML-KEM) and FrodoKEM key encapsulation mechanisms, and the Dilithium (ML-DSA) and Falcon (FN-DSA) signature schemes. We also develop the mathematical background on lattices needed to understand why Kyber, FrodoKEM, Dilithium and Falcon are regarded as lattice-based cryptosystems, and we provide insight into the computational hardness of the underlying lattice problems. The exposition is intended to be accessible to senior undergraduate students and beginning graduate students.
Last updated:  2026-11-11
Constructions of Boolean Correctors with Optimal Nonlinearity and Vectorial Correctors Beyond Optimal Linear Correction Order
Zhaole Li and Deng Tang
Correctors are postprocessing functions that reduce or eliminate statistical bias in raw bitstreams produced by physical noise sources in true random number generators. In this paper, we develop a framework based on binary Krawtchouk polynomials for analyzing and constructing Boolean and vectorial correctors. This framework reformulates the Walsh-layer criterion into finite moment constraints on support-layer counts and preimage-layer counts. We also establish universal upper bounds on the nonlinearity of correctors, and necessary conditions on the achievable correction order. For Boolean functions, we prove that $(n-1)$-correctors are either the parity function or its complement. Then we characterize the support-layer profiles of $(n-2)$- and $(n-3)$-correctors and establish upper bounds on nonlinearity. For $n=2^k\ge 8$, a self-addressing construction yields $(n-2)$-correctors achieving the optimal nonlinearity $2^{n-1}-2^{n-1}/n$ with resiliency $n/2-2$ and algebraic degree $k+1$. Notably, this provides the first known infinite family of nonlinear correctors achieving both optimal correction order and optimal nonlinearity for that order, while having a resiliency strictly lower than the correction order. Furthermore, using constant-weight addressing, we construct $(n-d-1)$-correctors that asymptotically meet the nonlinearity upper bounds for every fixed $d\ge 1$. Our profile characterization also reveals inherent limitations of injective Maiorana--McFarland constructions at correction order $n-3$. For vectorial functions, we construct nonlinear $(s(2^m-1),m,s2^{m-1}+\ell-1)$-correctors for every $m\ge 2$ under certain conditions on $s$ and $\ell$, with resiliency at most $s2^{m-1}-2$. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first infinite family of nonlinear correctors whose correction order simultaneously exceeds that of optimal linear corrector and its own resiliency. Finally, we introduce a secondary construction that lifts these vectorial correctors to larger input dimensions while preserving their correction-order advantage. This approach yields a nonlinearity of $2^{n-1}-2^{n-n_0-1}$, where $n_0$ is the input dimension of the base corrector, along with explicit resiliency and a flexible algebraic degree.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Toward Optimal-Complexity Hash-Based Asynchronous MVBA with Optimal Resilience
Uncategorized
Jovan Komatovic, Joachim Neu, and Tim Roughgarden
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Uncategorized
Multi-valued validated Byzantine agreement (MVBA), a fundamental primitive of distributed computing, allows $n$ processes to agree on a valid $\ell$-bit value, despite $t$ faulty processes behaving maliciously. Among hash-based solutions for the asynchronous setting with adaptive faults, the state-of-the-art HMVBA protocol achieves optimal $O(n^2)$ message complexity, (near-)optimal $O(n \ell + n^2 \lambda \log n)$ bit complexity, and optimal $O(1)$ time complexity. However, it only tolerates $t < \frac15 n$ failures. In contrast, the best-known optimally-resilient protocol, SQ, incurs a higher bit complexity of $O(n^2 \ell + n^3 \lambda)$. This poses a fundamental question: Can a hash-based protocol be designed for the asynchronous setting with adaptive faults that simultaneously achieves optimal complexity and optimal resilience? This paper takes a significant step toward answering this question. Namely, we introduce Reducer, an MVBA protocol that retains HMVBA's optimal complexity while improving its resilience to $t < \frac14 n$. Like HMVBA and SQ, Reducer relies exclusively on collision-resistant hash functions. A key innovation in Reducer's design is its internal use of strong multi-valued Byzantine agreement (SMBA), a new variant of Byzantine agreement we introduce and construct, which ensures that the decided value was proposed by a correct process. To further advance resilience toward the optimal one-third bound, we then propose Reducer++, an MVBA protocol that tolerates up to $t < (\frac13 - \epsilon)n$ adaptive failures, for any fixed constant $\epsilon > 0$. Unlike Reducer, Reducer++ does not rely on SMBA. Instead, it employs a novel approach involving hash functions modeled as random oracles to ensure termination. Reducer++ maintains constant time complexity, quadratic message complexity, and quasi-quadratic bit complexity, with constants dependent on $\epsilon$.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Correction of parameters in ``Computing Optimal Ate Pairings on Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 9, 15 and 27''
Walid Haddaji
We correct two errors in Section~8 of the above-mentioned paper concerning the seed parameters proposed for BLS27 elliptic curves (embedding degree \(k=27\)) at the 256-bit and 192-bit security levels. In both instances, the disclosed seeds produce a composite \(r(x)\), violating the primality condition essential for constructing pairing-friendly curves. Additionally, for the 192-bit seed, the characteristic \(p(x)\) is also composite. We provide verified corrected seeds for each security level, obtained by exhaustive search, and confirm with SageMath that both \(p(x)\) and \(r(x)\) are prime in each case. Furthermore, we correct the formula for the final exponentiation cost that was adopted from Zhang et al. in the original paper.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Differentially Private Distance-Sensitive Representations for General Metrics
Paul Cesaretti
A distance-sensitive set representation stores a set $S$ from a metric space $(U,d)$ and answers queries of the form "is some element of $S$ within distance $r$ of $q$?''. Existing differentially private constructions are confined to Hamming space, because they route the query through a signature map built for that metric. We give a framework that removes this restriction. The released object records only the occupancy of a fixed public partition of $U$, so privacy transfers unchanged from an off-the-shelf private membership structure, and the entire metric dependence collapses into one packing quantity, the straddle number $\kappa$: the largest number of cells a ball of radius $r$ can meet. Any metric admitting a partition of width at most $(c-1)r$ and straddlenumber $\kappa$ then has an $\varepsilon$-differentially private $(c,r)$-representation with $\varepsilon =\ln(2\kappa/\alpha)$ in $O(k\log(\kappa/\alpha))$ bits. Instantiating $\kappa$ gives matching upper and lower bounds in $\ell_\infty$ for partition-based constructions ($\varepsilon=O(\log d)$ at $c=\Theta(d)$, against $\varepsilon=\Omega(d)$ at constant $c$), and a randomized, dimension-free construction for every $\ell_p$ (one probe and $\varepsilon=\ln(2/\alpha)$ regardless of $d$) at the cost of a weaker, non-oblivious guarantee whose price is exactly this $\log d$ gap. For metrics available only through a distance oracle, we build the partition from a public net and a public navigable graph, and show that greedy search on that graph both locates and enumerates the cells a query must probe; on a $\lambda$-doubling metric this gives $\varepsilon\le 5\ln\lambda+\ln(2/\alpha)$. We further show that the per-query form of the guarantee is forced rather than chosen: any representation correct on all queries simultaneously requires $\varepsilon\ge\ln M+\ln(1/\alpha)-O(1)$ for $M$ the packing number of the whole space, and on doubling metrics this is achievable up to an additive $O(dim_D\log\frac{c}{c-1})$. Finally, the space bound is optimal in $k$ and $\alpha$.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
BAKSHEESH: Similar Yet Different From GIFT
Anubhab Baksi, Jakub Breier, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Tomáš Gerlich, Sylvain Guilley, Naina Gupta, Takanori Isobe, Arpan Jati, Petr Jedlicka, Hyunjun Kim, Fukang Liu, Zdeněk Martinásek, Kosei Sakamoto, Hwajeong Seo, Rentaro Shiba, and Ritu Ranjan Shrivastwa
We propose a lightweight block cipher named BAKSHEESH, which draws inspiration from GIFT (CHES'17). BAKSHEESH runs for 35 rounds, which is 12.5 per cent fewer rounds compared to GIFT-128 whilst maintaining the same security claims against classical attacks. However, we also present an alternate (but equivalent) angle of BAKSHEESH that follows the heritage of ZORRO (CHES'13). In the GIFT heritage version, BAKSHEESH uses a 4-bit SBox that has a non-trivial Linear Structure (LS). In the alternate ZORRO heritage specification, it employs a 3-bit SBox and realises a partial non-linear layer. BAKSHEESH is suitable for efficient hardware and software implementations, and also offers an edge on side channel countermeasures and other niche applications. For instance, our study on the threshold implementation shows that BAKSHEESH offers a few-fold advantage over other lightweight ciphers. We therefore create a new paradigm of lightweight ciphers through adequate deliberation on the design choice and solidify it with appropriate security analysis and ample implementation/benchmark.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Minimizing Mempool Dependency in PoW Mining on Blockchain: Scaling Blockchain Throughput via Asynchronous Pipeline Consensus
Gyu Chol Kim
Traditional Proof-of-Work protocols face structural limits in transaction throughput, as scaling block capacity within a serial verification model introduces severe propagation delays and elevates orphan block rates. To address this classical constraint, this paper proposes an asynchronous pipeline consensus architecture that decouples mining initiation from full transaction verification. By embedding a 6-byte compressed UTXO identifier list within an agile Compact Block, nodes can initiate mining on subsequent blocks with reduced delay. This mechanism shifts data latency from a rigid physical bottleneck to a configurable declaration status, introducing a flexible validation framework. Network designers can thereby adjust the dissemination window—defined by the pipeline depth k and mining interval—to adapt to varying block sizes under the Nakamoto security model. Furthermore, we introduce a Dual-Coinbase mechanism that removes mandatory inter-block freezing, thereby unlocking the full potential of the pipeline parameter k and demonstrating applicability to alternative consensus architectures such as PoS, BFT, and DAG. This study establishes a backward-compatible upgrade path for high-performance decentralized ledgers by demonstrating that blockchain scalability can be optimized through the strategic configuration of its minimal consensus payload.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
An improvement to the KLPT2 algorithm
Abel Laval
In this short note, we present a tweak to the KLPT2 algorithm that reduces the size of the output from $O(p^{15.5})$ to $\tilde O(p^{14.5})$.Then, we show that the recent improvement by Nakagawa, Yoshizumi and Onuki to the KLPT algorithm is compatible with the Hermitian module splitting approach, further lowering the reduced degree bound to $\tilde O(p^{14})$.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
SVP Is NP-Hard for Some Rank-2 Cyclotomic Modules
Jiaqi Liu, Yansong Feng, and Yanbin Pan
Let $q$ be an odd prime. Let $\zeta_q$ be a primitive $q$th root of unity, and put $K=\mathbb{Q}(\zeta_q)$, with ring of integers $\mathcal{O}_K=\mathbb{Z}[\zeta_q]$. As $q$ ranges over odd primes, we prove that the decision version of the Shortest Vector Problem ($\mathsf{SVP}$) in the canonical $\ell_2$-norm is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete on full-rank free submodules of $\mathcal{O}_K^2$ by giving a deterministic polynomial-time many-one reduction from Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C). The module rank is fixed at two. The main obstacle is closure under the action of $\mathcal{O}_K$. A module containing a nonzero vector also contains every scalar multiple of that vector by a nonzero element of $\mathcal{O}_K$, and some of these multiples may be shorter. Three ideas overcome this obstacle. First, we map the Bennett--Peikert Reed--Solomon lattice to a principal cyclotomic ideal and use Wan's point-count estimates to prove that a coset of this ideal contains many binary coefficient representatives. Second, we construct a checker whose canonical squared norm encodes the X3C equations, with a controlled nonnegative error term. Third, the checker and a second module coordinate combine with a separation bound for ideal cosets to rule out short vectors in NO instances. Each constructed instance consists of an odd prime $q$, two integral generators whose $2\times2$ generator matrix has nonzero determinant, and an integer squared threshold. The construction also gives $\mathsf{NP}$-hardness of search-$\mathsf{SVP}$ under deterministic polynomial-time Turing reductions with at most one oracle call.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
$\mathsf{SVP}_\infty$ Is NP-Hard for Power-of-two Cyclotomic Ideals
Yansong Feng, Jiaqi Liu, Hengyi Luo, and Yanbin Pan
We prove that exact decision-$\mathsf{SVP}$ in the coefficient $\ell_\infty$-norm is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete for principal ideals and free modules of rank two over the cyclotomic rings $R_n=\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n+1)$, where $n$ ranges over powers of two. For each case, we give a deterministic polynomial-time many-one reduction from the Subset Sum problem. For an instance with $s$ positive input integers, the output lattice has dimension $O(s)$. A solution to the original Subset Sum instance can be recovered in polynomial time from any nonzero output lattice vector of norm at most the specified bound. We also transfer these reductions from $R_n$ to the power-of-two cyclic rings $S_{2n}=\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^{2n}-1)$. This gives $\mathsf{NP}$-completeness of decision-$\mathsf{SVP}$ in the coefficient $\ell_\infty$-norm for principal ideals and free modules of any fixed positive rank over these rings.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
An $n^{n+o(n)}$-Time Algorithm for the Lattice Isomorphism Problem
Divesh Aggarwal, Kaijie Jiang, Zihan Li, and Yinchen Liu
The Lattice Isomorphism Problem asks whether two given lattices $\mathcal L_1$ and $\mathcal L_2$ are related by an orthogonal linear transformation. Haviv and Regev gave a seminal $n^{O(n)}$-time algorithm for this problem based on an isolation lemma (SODA~2014). We give randomized algorithms for the decision, search, and all-isomorphisms versions of the problem running in $O(n\sqrt{\log n})^n\le n^{n+o(n)}$ time, up to polynomial factors in the input size. We first reduce general instances to the well-rounded case. In this setting, our main new ingredient is a Gaussian heat-comparison argument on polytopes generated by shortest vectors: for a suitable parameter $s$, a sample $w\sim D_{\mathcal L^*,s}$ canonically determines $n-o(n)$ independent shortest vectors with constant probability, leaving a residual instance of rank $o(n)$. We handle this residual instance using an $n^{o(n)}$-time canonicalizer obtained by adapting the Haviv--Regev algorithm. We then combine this canonicalizer with a birthday collision argument to recover all isomorphisms. In the QRAM model, we also give a quantum variant running in time $O(n^2\log n)^{\frac n3}$. It outputs one isomorphism together with generators for the automorphism group, giving a compact description of the entire isomorphism coset.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Delegatable Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials
Omid Mirzamohammadi, Varesh Mishra, Jan Bobolz, Emad Heydari Beni, Aysajan Abidin, Dave Singelée, and Bart Preneel
Keyed-verification anonymous credentials (KVACs) are a variant of anonymous credentials (ACs) in which the issuer and the verifier are either the same entity or mutually trusted entities. Due to this design, KVACs can avoid some of the practical burdens of publicly verifiable ACs, such as requiring bilinear pairings, making them more practical in certain settings. Delegation of credentials is a powerful feature that enables applications where users, holding a credential, can delegate a restricted version of their credential to another user. This paper proposes the first delegatable keyed-verification anonymous credentials (DKVAC). We provide formal definitions of DKVAC, we design two pairing-free DKVAC constructions with delegation capability, we prove them secure, and we demonstrate their practicality with implementation benchmarks. Our two constructions present trade-offs between expressiveness and performance.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Implementing Predicate Encryption for Branching Programs: Private Computation over Key-Homomorphic Encodings Without FHE
Sora Suegami
Predicate encryption (PE) encrypts a message under an attribute that the ciphertext hides, allowing a secret key for a predicate to recover the message only when the attribute satisfies the predicate. Existing public-key implementations support useful specialized predicates, but enforcing heterogeneous conditions with one key requires an attribute representation fixed before encryption, which grows with the supported types of conditions and cannot express types it does not anticipate, such as regular expressions. Lattice-based PE for general circuits is far more expressive, but existing constructions rely on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), typically evaluated as a Boolean circuit over key-homomorphic encodings, which expands the computation and amplifies noise growth and leads to impractically large parameters. Existing PE thus offers either practicality for restricted predicates or expressiveness at an impractical cost. We present a lattice-based PE scheme for branching programs that avoids FHE entirely and combines heterogeneous conditions in a single predicate over a common attribute representation. It rests on two techniques: asymmetric multiplication, which multiplies a hidden program state by an encrypted attribute symbol through decryption inside an encoding, and lookup tables over exponents, which evaluate arbitrary state transitions on a single encoding by ring automorphisms. Under circular Ring-LWE, the scheme is selectively weakly attribute-hiding against polynomially many colluding unauthorized keys. We give, to our knowledge, the first implementation of PE for a predicate class as expressive as branching programs. On a single NVIDIA A100 GPU, for a predicate that combines a range check and a regular-expression check on a $10$-bit attribute, with parameters targeting $128$-bit security against known Ring-LWE attacks, encryption takes $4.06$ hours, key generation $4.70$ hours, and decryption $4.23$ hours, with $342.25$ GB ciphertexts. These costs remain large, but compared with a single FHE multiplication evaluated as a Boolean circuit over encodings, the basic step of PE that evaluates FHE over encodings, whose ciphertexts alone occupy tens of exabytes per attribute bit, our ciphertexts are at least $2\times10^9$ times smaller per attribute bit, and our decryption needs at least $2\times10^{16}$ times fewer $64$-bit integer multiplications. This work was carried out with the assistance of GPT-6 Astra and Claude Opus 5.5, as detailed at the end of the introduction.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
A Survey of Pseudorandom Codes
Miranda Christ
A pseudorandom code (PRC) is a cryptographic primitive combining pseudorandom encryption and error-correcting codes (Christ and Gunn, CRYPTO 2024). That is, any polynomial number of codewords are pseudorandom, and decryption tolerates a constant rate of bit-flips. Although this might seem like a natural combination of standard properties, it is a fundamentally new object: PRCs are black-box separated from many primitives, including one-way functions, public-key encryption, and even virtual black-box obfuscation (Döttling et al., Garg et al., TCC 2025). Pseudorandom codes were introduced to build watermarks for AI-generated content. In particular, they imply watermarks that preserve the model's quality in a strong sense and withstand modification of the content. This relationship makes pseudorandom codes an inviting area for researchers: improvements to this simple theoretical object yield better watermarks. Beyond watermarks, PRCs have been used to construct error-correcting codes against computationally bounded channels (Lu et al., CRYPTO 2026), and techniques underlying them have led to new public-key encryption schemes (Döttling et al., CRYPTO 2026, Dyseryn et al. ASIACRYPT 2026). This survey aims to equip the interested researcher with tools to make progress in the area. We detail the current landscape of definitions, techniques, and applications. A main contribution is introducing new tricks and assembling existing tricks to generically strengthen PRCs (e.g., from substitution-robustness to random-deletion-robustness). We also show natural weakenings of PRCs that can be constructed from OWFs or even unconditionally. We conclude with a number of concrete open questions.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Lattice-Based Proxy Re-Encryption: Reconstruction Attacks and HRA-Secure Constructions
Haotian Yin, Jie Zhang, Yuji Dong, Dominik Wojtczak, and Eng Gee Lim
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext under one user's public key into a ciphertext under another user's public key without learning the message. Honest re-encryption attack (HRA) security requires message indistinguishability even when an adversary observes many honestly generated re-encryptions. Reusing a re-encryption key can create correlations that are invisible in a single response. We show how these correlations permit functional reconstruction in the schemes of Susilo et al.\ (ESORICS~2021) and Fan--Liu (ACNS~2019) under persistent key reuse, with additional noise and modulus conditions for Fan--Liu. Building on pads fixed for each source ciphertext, we then construct public-key, unidirectional PRE for any fixed constant number of hops under Gaussian search-LWE (with uniform secrets and discrete Gaussian errors) and PRF security. The construction first achieves HRA security when delegations between honest users follow a fixed order. A generic key-separation compiler removes this order by giving each user an independent key pair at each depth: two pairs for one hop and $t+1$ for $t$ hops. Users may delegate along cycles while all key dependencies remain acyclic. Security holds in a stateful HRA model with static corruption, and both the noise widths and ciphertext modulus are polynomial.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
On the Provable Dual Attack for LWE by Modulus Switching
Hongyuan Qu and Guangwu Xu
As a theoretical cornerstone of post-quantum cryptography, the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem serves as the security foundation for standardized algorithms such as Kyber and Dilithium. Recently, a framework for provable dual attacks on LWE has been proposed by Pouly et al. in Eurocrypt 2024, addressing the limitations in effectiveness caused by existing methods' reliance on heuristic assumptions in LWE dual attacks. Their paper also poses an open problem on how to formally integrate modulus switching into this framework to reduce attack costs. The main purpose of this paper is to give a solution of this open problem by presenting an improved provable dual attack method that incorporates modulus switching and Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) techniques. First, we design a modulus switching mechanism that eliminates practical errors via the Poisson summation formula. By embedding the inherent noise from modulus switching into a rational lattice framework, our approach effectively preventing the risk of attack failure caused by the merging of such errors with LWE noise. Theoretical guarantees (Theorems \ref{main_theorem} and \ref{main_theorem_entire}) rigorously quantify the parameter ranges for successful attacks. Second, we introduce a CRT-based secret recovery method that aggregates partial secrets from independent sub-attacks. By leveraging the Chinese Remainder Theorem to reconstruct full secrets from congruence relations, our method adapts to arbitrary secret distributions. Furthermore, by using a tighter variant of Banaszczyk's measure inequality, we obtain a precise parameter range for the dual attack's efficacy through rigorous mathematical proof, and achieve the same complementary gap with the contradictory regime (proposed by Ducas et al.) as in Pouly et al.'s work. Following the parameter update in the May 2026 version of Pouly et al.'s ePrint paper, we revised our experimental evaluation accordingly, as our original experiments had used the parameter settings from the earlier version. The updated evaluation shows that, under the revised settings, incorporating our modulus switching approach does not lead to a reduction in the estimated attack cost. These results suggest that the practical benefits of modulus switching are limited under the parameter settings considered in this work. Nevertheless, this parameter update does not affect the theoretical results established in this paper.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
A Single-Trace Side-Channel Attack on the KpqC Digital Signature Scheme AIMer v3
Jinnuo Li, Yiteng Sun, Chi Cheng, Weijia Wang, and Hao Cheng
The Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition selected AIMer, a post-quantum digital signature scheme based on the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm, as one of its final algorithms in 2025. However, detailed side-channel analysis (SCA) of AIMer remains limited, particularly for its latest version, AIMer v3. In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first side-channel attack on AIMer v3. Specifically, we demonstrate a single-trace power analysis attack using deep learning to exploit power leakage from bits of the secret preimage during the computation of AIM3's input affine layer. Using a ChipWhisperer-HuskyPlus, we recover the full secret key from a single signature on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor with a success rate of 100%. We further evaluate the attack performance under different noise levels and propose potential countermeasures.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Revisiting Fiat-Shamir NIZKPs and Signatures from Seed-Friendly Sigma Protocols
Andrea Flamini, Federico Pintore, and Edoardo Signorini
Seed-friendly sigma protocols have a small challenge space, and when compiled into NIZKP, they require parallel repetition to reduce extraction error. Fiat-Shamir proofs obtained from seed-friendly Sigma protocols can be made more compact with fixed-weight parallel repetitions, and seed-tree compression. So far, these have been presented as compression techniques for the proof size, but standard analysis of the extraction property of NIZKP still relies on the Forking Lemma and rewinding. In this work, we show that not only fixed-weight parallel repetition and seed-tree compression improve the compactness of the proofs, but also improve their security. Interestingly, when the prover randomness is generated from a salted seed tree, interacting with a random oracle, the standard Fiat-Shamir compilation is straight-line extractable in the classical random-oracle model, without any additional proof field or proof-of-work. We further show that the Fiat-Shamir NIZKP from seed-friendly Sigma protocols satisfies multi-proof zero knowledge, and that its straight-line extractability does not require the underlying seed-friendly Sigma protocol to have unique responses.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
When One Bit Is (Almost) Enough: A Low Leakage Chosen Plaintext Side Channel Attack on AES
Antoine Wurcker
In order to thwart Side Channel Attacks (SCA) and keep secret safe, countermeasures such as masking can be implemented to hide information. However, when a defect occurs in software or in hardware, a portion of the information may still leak. If the leak is sufficient, the state-of-the-art techniques can still be performed up to a potential brute force search to cover a missing part. However, if only a short portion of the information leaks, the completion of the attack can be hard, and considered as failed. In this paper, we describe a new chosen plaintext strategy on AES algorithm to recover the secret key even in very low leakage condition. As an example, but not limited to, we describe the methodology adapted to one of the worst case scenario: only one bit position leaks over the 128-bit output of SubBytes AES sub-operation along rounds. As a drawback, a heavier cost in terms of number of traces is required due to the chosen plaintext approach.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
KORD: Breaking the Key-Generation Bottleneck in Dealerless Function Secret Sharing via Protocol–Hardware Co-Design
Yijing Peng, Lin Liu, Yujie Xue, Shaojing Fu, Shaoqing Li, Yaohua Wang, Rongmao Chen, and Yang Guo
Function secret sharing (FSS) has emerged as a promising technique for secure multi-party computation (MPC), offering a lightweight online phase. However, existing FSS-based private inference frameworks typically rely on trusted dealers to generate and distribute large amounts of offline key material (e.g., 16.8 GiB for BERT-base), incurring substantial overhead in key generation, transfer, storage, and parsing. Cryptographic dealer-free FSS eliminates the trusted dealer but introduces costly interaction during key generation. To address these challenges, we propose KORD, a high-throughput FSS key-supply architecture that replaces bulk-key transfers with compact, authenticated parameter-share exchanges between paired trusted hardware modules. KORD combines a generate–authenticate–deliver pipeline with an optimized AES engine to improve key-supply throughput. Compared with LLAMA’s dealer, KORD achieves 11.5× faster key supply with 99.2% less network traffic, and accelerates SIGMA’s BERT-base inference by 11.0× end to end. Under a paired trusted-hardware assumption, a model-based comparison with Xing et al.’s dealerless FSS shows at least 988× lower latency and 1,475× less communication per direction.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
A New Class of PRFs and Efficient VRFs from Isogeny-based Group Actions
Junbo Yang, Willy Susilo, Dung Hoang Duong, Partha Sarathi Roy, Yannan Li, Kazuhide Fukushima, and Shinsaku Kiyomoto
Polynomial-in-exponent pseudorandom functions (Poly-style PRFs) based on group actions have recently emerged as a promising framework for post-quantum cryptography, offering compact keys and efficient verifiability. However, the security of these constructions over composite-order class groups remains poorly understood. Prior work suggested that security is governed by the largest prime factor of the group order. In this work, we show that this intuition is flawed. We present two generic attacks demonstrating that the effective security of Poly-style PRFs is determined instead by the smallest prime factor of the group order. As a consequence, existing parameter choices, including CSIDH-512 and SCALLOP-based settings used in recent VRF constructions, are insecure. Our enhanced attack achieves advantage close to one with complexity $O(\sqrt{p})$, where $p$ is the smallest prime factor of the group order. To address this inherent vulnerability, we introduce a new design paradigm, {\em restrict-then-expand}, and formalize a general class of multivariate polynomial PRFs (\textsf{MP}-PRFs) from group actions. The key idea is to eliminate exploitable structure via carefully restricted input domains, and then recover expressiveness through a provably secure expansion technique. We show that \textsf{MP}-PRFs unify and generalize existing constructions, including Naor-Reingold-style and Poly-style PRFs (with restricted input domains), while achieving security in the generic group action model with twists ($\mathrm{GGAM}^{\mathsf{T}}$) for arbitrary composite-order groups. In addition to this, our construction supports flexible polynomial-size input spaces with fixed output length and admits efficient and compact proofs of correct evaluation. Building on this framework, we obtain new group-action-based VRFs that are both practical and provably secure. At a proof-soundness level close to 128 bits, our VRF instantiation requires 320 group-action evaluations for either proof generation or verification, compared with approximately 69,000--109,500 group-action evaluations in prior work, while retaining short keys and proofs. Overall, our results establish a robust and efficient approach to constructing post-quantum PRFs and VRFs from group actions, resolving fundamental limitations of existing Poly-style designs.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
DetTreeChain: Parallel Block Production on an N-ary Block Tree with Bounded Lane Divergence
Mahesh Karri and Nikhileswara Rao Sulake
Nakamoto-style blockchains append one block at a time to a single chain, and raising the block rate increases forking and weakens security. We present DetTreeChain, a ledger in which up to $N$ blocks are produced in parallel and placed without later merging or reordering. Blocks form an $N$-ary tree in which each block's slot follows from its parent and its lane. A locally derived Parent Queue Pool lets only two consecutive parents receive children, so lanes never drift more than one parent apart, and links between consecutive blocks of a lane make each lane a hash chain. As in several earlier designs, transactions are routed by what they spend, here a hash of the spent locking scripts, so blocks of different lanes cannot conflict and payments to other lanes need no cross-lane protocol. The rules are consensus-agnostic. Under proof of work, miners choose their lane, and an adversary with more than $1/(N+1)$ of the total hash power can outpace one lane. In a 25-minute run of our Rust prototype, six nodes converged on identical trees and difficulty targets, and 65% of slots were filled against 63% predicted. In simulation with delays of 5% of the lane interval, a single chain at the same block rate wasted 1.7 to 3.3 times as much work as 2 to 8 lanes, although nodes more often held later-discarded blocks. Among Bitcoin transactions whose spent scripts could be rebuilt, about 95% kept their inputs in one lane, mostly because they spend a single output.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Homomorphism in Expectation: Leveled Homomorphic Encryption with Range-Relative Correctness
Zeyu Liu, Xianhui Lu, Ruida Wang, and Xinxuan Zhang
Lattices have dominated the development of homomorphic encryption for deep computation. We introduce $\textit{Homomorphism in Expectation (HIE)}$, a new construction showing that encrypted addition suffices for both addition and multiplication in deep real-valued computation. Given any additively homomorphic encryption scheme over $\mathbb{Z}_2$, we construct range-relatively correct leveled homomorphic encryption for arithmetic circuits $C$ of $\textit{arbitrary}$ polynomial depth. For depth bound $d$ and any chosen public input bound $r>0$, our scheme supports inputs in $[-r,r]$. Outputs lie in $[-\eta_C,\eta_C]$, where $\eta_C=C(r,\ldots,r)$ is the circuit's maximum output range magnitude over this input range. Decryption returns an answer with error at most $\varepsilon\cdot\eta_C$ except with probability $\delta$. Each input requires $\ell_{\mathsf{in}}=O(d+\log(1/\varepsilon))$ base ciphertexts, and each output requires $\ell_{\mathsf{out}}=O(\varepsilon^{-2}\log(1/\delta))$ base ciphertexts. For $n$ inputs, online evaluation uses only ${\sim}\ell_{\mathsf{out}}\cdot n\cdot\ell_{\mathsf{in}}$ ciphertext additions and ${\sim}\ell_{\mathsf{out}}\cdot |C|\cdot\ell_{\mathsf{in}}$ memory accesses. Our construction begins by encoding real-valued inputs as encrypted bitstreams, allowing multiplication through encrypted bit addition. The direct approach incurs costs exponential in circuit depth, limiting efficient evaluation to logarithmic depth and requiring non-compact input ciphertexts. We overcome these limitations with new encoding and circuit evaluation techniques, which eliminate the exponential overhead, enabling compact homomorphic arithmetic at arbitrary polynomial depth from additive encryption alone.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
ASCENT: Algebraic Structured Compilation of Exact Norms for Succinct Lattice Proofs
Lizhen Zhang, Shang Gao, and Bin Xiao
Norm bounds are semantic constraints in lattice cryptography: satisfying the modular equations is not enough unless the witness also satisfies the prescribed shortness bound. Existing norm reductions either introduce slack, or rely on general sumcheck style machinery whose transcript cost grows with the witness length. We introduce a reduction-of-knowledge compiler for exact $\ell_2$-norm constraints. It compiles the original norm language for a committed lattice witness into a narrow structured relation consisting only of commitment-opening constraints, tensor-structured witness-public inner-product claims, and relaxed admissible shortness bounds. Exact norm soundness is enforced inside the reduction, so the remaining proof obligation is structured and algebraic. The compiler adds only $O(1)$ prover-to-verifier communication, measured in ring and field elements, independent of the witness length $N$, and requires only $O(\log N)$ verifier work. The same techniques can also extend to a folding mechanism for broader quadratic relations, including R1CS-type circuits. At $128$-bit security, our concrete estimates give transcripts of about $27.69\mathrm{KB}$ for exact norm reduction and $27.75\mathrm{KB}$ for the R1CS folding application. This is about $3$--$4\times$ smaller than LatticeFold+, about $2$--$3\times$ smaller than SALSAA, and remains close to the compact estimates reported for Cyclo.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Bounding the security of the Bromberg-Shpilrain-Vdovina hash function
Eilidh McKemmie
The Bromberg-Shpilrain-Vdovina hash functions are a family of Cayley hash functions indexed by an integer parameter $k\ge 2$. Hashes are matrices in $SL_2(p)$ where $p$ is a large prime. We present an attack which finds collisions of length $O(\log p)$ whose average-case time complexity is $O(p^{0.28})$ when $k=2$ and $O(p^{0.36})$ when $k=3$ under an assumption in the spirit of Zaremba's Conjecture on continued fractions. This is an improvement on the more general attacks of Mullan-Tsaban and Slaughter which have average-case time complexity $O(\sqrt{p})$. For any $k$, the average-case time complexity of our attack is $O(p^{1-\delta_k+o(1)})$ where $\delta_k$ is the Hausdorff dimension of a certain Cantor set. This tends to $O(\sqrt{p})$ as $k\to\infty$, so our attack has time complexity comparable to Mullan-Tsaban and Slaughter's attacks as $k$ grows. We give examples of collisions for large primes found by our attack when $k=2, 3$.
Last updated:  2026-11-10
Neural Cipher Bench: Cost and Portability of Corner-ReLU Cipher Implementation
Siwoo Eum, Minwoo Lee, Gyeongju Song, Seungwon Lee, Uijae Kim, Doyun Park, Minseo Kim, Wai Kong Lee, Zhe Liu, Anupam Chattopadhyay, and Hwajeong Seo
Edge and Internet of Things (IoT) devices run neural networks on GPUs, neural processing units (NPUs), and microcontrollers (MCUs) through machine learning (ML) runtimes. Deep Neural Cryptography (DNC, EUROCRYPT 2026) expressed AES as a bit-exact ReLU network with fixed weights, using a corner-ReLU construction that keeps the cipher inside the affine+ReLU operators such runtimes execute. What this construction costs on edge and IoT hardware, and whether real ML backends execute it correctly, had not been measured. We implement SM4, ARIA, Camellia, and ChaCha20 (spanning substitution–permutation, Feistel, and add–rotate–XOR structures) alongside AES on a shared corner-ReLU core under one construction policy, derive a cost model for width, depth, and neuron count, and measure five execution paths on four platforms. All ciphers admit bit-exact networks whose width and depth diverge with cipher structure, and the model's width predicted where GPU throughput drops. Every configuration passing the correctness check fell below its classical baseline (best 0.80×, SM4 on the GPU), by hundreds to thousands of times for the S-box ciphers on the MCU, and keeping the activations on chip through fusion raised throughput 1.4–3.5× and moved the peak past the predicted cache limit without closing the gap. Some AES configurations on the Apple Neural Engine returned valid-looking but incorrect outputs with no error or warning, a failure reproduced in a minimal graph without project code. Mathematical bit-exactness therefore does not guarantee backend-level bit-exactness, and exact workloads offloaded to edge NPUs require output validation.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Independent Leakage Does Not Save Evasive LWE: Refuting Folklore Fixes in the Private-Coin Setting
Yao-Ching Hsieh
The evasive learning with errors (evasive LWE) assumption has enabled a wide range of advanced cryptographic constructions from lattices in the past few years. The simple intuition that LWE remains secure even when additional ``non-zeroizing'' short preimages are given has proved highly versatile in applications. Unfortunately, recent counterexamples have refuted its general private-coin formulations, showing that having the short preimages along with arbitrary auxiliary leakage about the secret and target matrices can invalidate this intuition. To preserve important applications, particularly witness encryption, the community has sought to repair the assumption by restricting the allowed leakage. One folklore proposal requires the secret and target matrices, together with their respective leakage, to be generated independently. This restriction appears to preserve the application to witness encryption while ruling out all previously known counterexamples. In this work, we refute this proposal. Assuming LWE and indistinguishability obfuscation, we show that both the binding and hiding variants of private-coin evasive LWE are false even with the independent sampler restriction. Our counterexamples exploit only auxiliary leakage about the target matrix. We sample the secret honestly from a standard uniform or Gaussian distribution, independently of the target and its leakage, and we use no auxiliary information about the secret.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Superlattice methods for the shortest vector problem and discrete Gaussian sampling
Minki Hhan, Jiseung Kim, Sunyeop Kim, and Thijs Laarhoven
We give worst-case algorithms for the shortest vector problem (SVP) and discrete Gaussian sampling (DGS) at arbitrary widths. Both algorithms generate lists on a dense superlattice and combine vectors along a chain down to the input lattice. Random shifts let us control the expected number of representations of a vector regardless of the lattice. For SVP we balance these counts with a novel midpoint-shell test to ensure output distributions are sufficiently uniform. For DGS we use Gaussian weights and correct the probabilities of selecting entries from the final list. For SVP, our optimized algorithm runs in time $2^{0.409 n+o(n)}$ and space $2^{0.259 n+o(n)}$, improving the best $2^{n/2 + o(n)}$ worst-case SVP complexities of Hhan [ePrint, 2026]. For Haar-random lattices, or assuming a natural upper bound on the kissing constant, the costs of the algorithm match the $2^{0.292 n+o(n)}$ time and $2^{0.208 n+o(n)}$ space of Becker-Ducas-Gama-Laarhoven [SODA 2016]. For quantum SVP, through a series of refinements and generalizations we obtain worst-case time and space $2^{0.247n+o(n)}$. This improves the best known heuristic quantum SVP time complexity of $2^{0.256n+o(n)}$ due to Bonnetain-Chailloux-Schrottenloher-Shen [Eurocrypt 2023], without requiring any heuristic assumptions. For discrete Gaussian sampling, we provide a sampling algorithm at any width with distribution error $2^{-\kappa}$, running in worst-case time $2^{0.292 n+o(n)} \operatorname{poly}(\kappa)$ and space $2^{0.208 n+o(n)} \operatorname{poly}(\kappa)$, improving upon the previous best $2^{n + o(n)}$ cost for sampling at arbitrary widths of Aggarwal-Dadush-Regev-Stephens-Davidowitz [STOC 2015]. As further applications, we obtain fast algorithms for approximate-SVP/CVP, bounded distance decoding, and estimating the Gaussian mass and smoothing parameter of any lattice.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
TUTTI: Parallel CKKS Bootstrapping in under 3 ms on CPU
Robin Köstler and Antonio Guimarães
This paper introduces TUTTI, a new CKKS bootstrapping procedure that outperforms previous low-latency solutions in multi-threaded latency for any number of messages and, most notably, has a lower latency than TFHE when bootstrapping a single one. Our bootstrapping builds upon SPRU (CK, TCHES 2027), improving it with new methods for exploiting parallelism and increasing the number of messages, as well as with a refined security analysis, of independent interest, of the block-binary secret keys of LMSS (AsiaCCS 2023). \tutti bootstraps $4096$ real-number messages in $46$ to $83.4$ ms on $192$ threads to restore $1$ to $9$ multiplicative levels, outperforming SHIP (CHKS, Eurocrypt 2025) by a factor of up to $3$ on the same machine. Unlike SHIP, TUTTI gains immediately from bootstrapping fewer messages, with a $256$-message bootstrapping taking just $15$ to $34$ ms on $32$ threads. For a single message, TUTTI takes $4.6$ ms on $32$ threads, whereas TFHE-rs needs $7.3$ ms for a $4$-bit bootstrapping on the same machine and thread count. We show that this advantage persists across different architectures: on an Apple M5 Pro laptop (ARM), TUTTI takes $2.4$ ms on $14$ threads, against $4.5$ ms for TFHE-rs. Differences between CKKS and lightweight schemes such as TFHE remain on several fronts, from functionality to key sizes and security assumptions, but our work shows that multi-threaded latency is no longer one of them, closing a long-standing gap in the practical FHE literature.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Access Cost Tradeoffs in Mixed-Mode Oblivious RAM
Wojciech Ciszewski and Emanuele Ragnoli
A mixed-mode oblivious RAM (ORAM) lets each memory request be marked public or private: public requests disclose their addresses, private requests hide them. We ask how much work such a scheme must do, and which requests must do it, in the cell-probe model—with a passive server that only reads and overwrites addressed words. We examine the expected amortized per-request cost on randomized workloads with independent modes and uniformly random addresses. For array size $n$ and client memory $m\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ words, let $H=\log_2(2+n/(m+1))$. Our main result is a tight tradeoff between the cost of public reads and private writes. We show that if a request is private with probability $0<p\le1/2$ and private requests cost at most $Q$ probes on average, then every scheme with $m\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ has expected public-read cost\[ \Omega\!\left(\max\left\{1, \frac{H}{\log_2(2+1/p+Q/H)}\right\}\right), \]even when the server learns the kind (read/write) of each private request. For polynomial $m$, we provide constructions that match this bound whenever $Q$ exceeds a threshold that we identify for both $Q$ treated as an expectation over the workload and as the average cost for the worst-case workload. In particular, at constant private frequency $p$ a logarithmic private budget forces logarithmic public-read cost, and constant public-read cost requires private cost $(n/(m+1))^{\Omega(1)}$. This answers, for passive servers, the question posed by Zhang, Wang, and Weng, whose PIR-based scheme achieves constant public and logarithmic private bandwidth with server computation. Our lower bound proof fixes the public query and changes its private history; crucially, we charge them separately. Our constructions combine a public cache with linear merges of hash tables. Two further groups of results concern public writes and total work. Firstly, we give a cost tradeoff between public writes and private reads. Secondly, for workloads mixing private operations, public reads, and public writes with probabilities $p,r,a$, we show that every scheme with $m\le n^{1-\varepsilon}$ has total cost per request $\Omega(\max\{1,H/\log_2(2+1/p)\})$ when private request kinds are hidden, and a construction with polynomial client memory matches this bound with a constant independent of $p,r,a$. We also separately bound the costs of reads and writes in this workload. Lastly, public requests can in some cases be made cheaper by offloading their cost to preparation in earlier requests or cleanup in later ones. For both public reads and writes, we show localized tradeoffs constrained to a subset of requests, which demonstrate some of the limitations of such offloading.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
On the Number of Restricted Solutions to Constrained Systems and their Applications
Benoît Cogliati, Jordan Ethan, Ashwin Jha, Mridul Nandi, and Abishanka Saha
In this paper, we formulate a special class of systems of linear equations over finite fields that appears naturally in the provable security analysis of several MAC and PRF modes of operation. We derive lower bounds on the number of solutions for such systems adhering to some predefined restrictions, and apply these lower bounds to derive tight PRF security for several constructions. We show security up to $2^{3n/4}$ queries for the single-keyed variant of the Double-block Hash-then-Sum (DBHtS) construction, called 1k-DBHtS, under appropriate assumptions on the underlying hash function. We show that the single-key variants of PMAC+ and LightMAC+, called 1k-PMAC+ and 1k-LightMAC+ achieve the required hash function properties, and thus, achieve $3n/4$-bit security. Additionally, we show that the sum of $r$ independent copies of the Even-Mansour cipher is a secure PRF up to $2^{\frac{r}{r+1}n}$ queries.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
The isodual constant of the LLL potential: exact values and structure
Nick Howgrave-Graham
The LLL potential $\Psi^2(B)=\prod_k\det\mathrm{Gram}(b_1,\dots,b_k)$, minimized over the bases of a lattice $L$ and normalized by its determinant, defines an isodual lattice invariant $\eta(L)$. Its supremum $\eta_n$ over $n$-dimensional lattices, introduced in ePrint 2007/105, is the staircase case of the generalized Hermite constants of Watanabe and Meyer, for which explicit values were known only for $n\le4$. We prove that $\eta_5=6$, attained only by $D_5$ and its dual: the flag analogue of Korkine and Zolotarev's value of $\gamma_5$. The natural reduction to four-dimensional lattices, through a function $\Phi_5$, does not suffice: the global maximum of $\Phi_5$ is $2^{16}/(3^4\cdot5^3)\approx6.4727$, attained not at $D_4$ but at an even $135$-modular lattice $M_*$, which we have not found in the literature. A second stage, over the lifts of the remaining region, completes the proof; both stages are computer-assisted, with about $9\times10^9$ leaves, each re-proved in interval arithmetic by a separately written checker; code and data are public. We also prove $\eta_8=2304$, attained by $E_8$, and show that $E_6$, $E_7$, $E_8$ and their duals are strict local maxima of $\eta$ (for $n=6,7$ these are the conjectured extremal lattices). Asymptotically, $\log\eta_n=(\frac14+o(1))\,n^2\log n$. For lattice reduction we introduce the $\Psi$-Hermite constant $\mu_m$, the largest first Gram–Schmidt norm in a potential-minimal basis of an $m$-dimensional lattice, and bound it through $\eta_m$. This gives $\mu_m=\gamma_m$, Hermite's constant, for $m\le5$, and $\mu_m\le\exp(O(\log^2 m))$ in general.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Masked Solving of Linear Equations System and Application to UOV Signatures
Jean-Sébastien Coron, François Gérard, and Bowen Zhang
In response to the looming quantum threat, NIST has selected four algorithms for standardization (i.e., ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, and FN-DSA), yet three of the four schemes are based on Euclidean lattices, which raises concerns about the mathematical diversity of post-quantum algorithms. NIST has therefore announced an additional call for post-quantum signatures with a preference for schemes constructed from assumptions other than lattices. Among such candidates, the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) signature over the multivariate quadratic (MQ) problem is attractive for its short signature and security against quantum cryptanalysis. However, the practical implementations of UOV remain vulnerable to power side-channel attacks. In this paper, we address this issue by presenting two improved techniques for masking linear equations system solving at arbitrary order, with a proof of security in the $t$-probing model. We show that in the masked setting, our inversion-based techniques outperform Gaussian elimination, unlike the unmasked setting where Gaussian elimination is typically more efficient. As an application, we develop a complete C implementation of the fully masked UOV signing using our improved techniques. Compared to masked Gaussian elimination, our techniques achieve at least $2.2$ times speedup at high-order. Against Kundu's latest implementation (CCS 2025), our masked UOV signing is faster by an average factor of $4.0$ at higher masking orders.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Practical SNARGs for Matrix Multiplications over Encrypted Data
Louis Tremblay Thibault, Michael Walter, and Jiapeng Zhang
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computations to be performed directly on encrypted data, without ever requiring decryption. This capability is particularly crucial for privacy-preserving outsourced computation in sensitive fields such as healthcare and finance. While FHE ensures data confidentiality under the honest-but-curious adversarial model, achieving full malicious security, encompassing both integrity and privacy, requires an additional layer of verifiability. To address this, a growing body of research has explored combining FHE with techniques from verifiable computation, leading to the notion of verifiable FHE (vFHE). However, the integration of these two paradigms often results in substantial computational overhead, making existing approaches largely impractical for real-world deployment. Although there are many approaches, there remain major challenges that make the efficiency of vFHE impractical. Among these barriers, one of the most severe challenges is the algebraic gap between cyclotomic rings, which are mainly used in FHE encryption, and finite fields, which are mainly used by SNARGs. In this paper, we rely on a novel solution called ring switching to bridge this gap, making significant progress toward efficient vFHE. To highlight the efficiency of ring switching, we provide an open-source implementation of its application to homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication. Experimental results demonstrate high efficiency.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
On Composing Oracle Separations
Willy Quach and Felix Rohrbach
Black-box separations constitute very powerful technical barriers against constructing primitives from specific building blocks. However, they give surprisingly little indication on the usefulness of \emph{combining} several such building blocks in a single construction. We propose a set of technical conditions, under which (fully) black-box separations compose with each other. That is, if two black-box separations $P_1 \stackrel{BB}{\nRightarrow} Q$ and $P_2 \stackrel{BB}{\nRightarrow} Q$ satisfy our conditions, then $Q$ is also separated from black-box combinations of $P_1$ and $P_2$. When applicable, these conditions can be established without unpacking the full technical details of the base separations. As our main application, we show that combining indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) with collision resistant hash functions is unlikely to yield hard problems in the complexity class $SZK$, and thus unlikely to suffice for primitives such as lossy functions or fully homomorphic encryption. Previous lower bounds on iO only applied to combinations of iO with one-way permutations (Asharov-Segev, FOCS '15 and Bitansky-Degwekar-Vaikuntanathan, SIAM Journal on Computing '21).
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Antipodal necessity for rotation symmetric bent functions of degree at most three
Filipe Martins Vono
The conjecture that every homogeneous rotation symmetric bent Boolean function has degree two remains open in general. We prove a necessary condition that settles the degree-three case of this conjecture. Let $n>0$ be even. If a rotation symmetric Boolean function of degree at most three in $n$ variables is bent, then its algebraic normal form contains the antipodal quadratic orbit $\sum_{i<n/2} x_i x_{i+n/2}$. A homogeneous cubic has no quadratic terms, so no homogeneous rotation symmetric cubic Boolean function is bent, in any even number of variables. The condition also applies to nonhomogeneous functions with arbitrary lower-degree terms compatible with rotation symmetry; it neither classifies these functions nor addresses degree four and higher. The proof uses only finite Fourier analysis and linear algebra over the binary field. Restriction to the fixed space of a rotation of odd order reduces the problem to a power-of-two number of variables. There, Parseval's identity and a rigidity property of rotation symmetric quadratic forms impose incompatible conditions on a single fiber of the function. A second proof replaces the final fiber argument by descent through a single unipotent Jordan block. Examples illustrate the hypotheses. A Lean formalization of the original proof is provided as supplementary material; the Jordan proof has not been formalized.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Adaptively Secure (Threshold) Batched IBE from Static Assumptions
Sourav Das, Pratish Datta, Aditi Partap, and Swagata Sasmal
Batched identity-based encryption (batched IBE) lets a key authority release one short decryption key for a set of identities and a batch label/epoch. It has been used to mitigate maximal extractable value (MEV) attacks on public blockchains. Existing constructions either use the generic-group and/or random-oracle models, or rely on $q$-type assumptions whose size grows with the batch-size bound. In this paper, we present the first adaptively secure batched IBE scheme from static assumptions. Our scheme supports an exponential identity space and an exponential epoch space, and its ciphertexts, digests, and batch keys consist of a constant number of group elements independent of the batch size. Our scheme relies on composite-order bilinear groups, and we prove its adaptive security assuming hardness of static subgroup decision assumptions and a static pairing assumption, with a security loss polynomial in the security parameter $\lambda$ and the number of key queries. Our proof does not rely on $q$-type assumptions, random oracles, generic-group arguments, or complexity leveraging. We also present a threshold version with adaptive challenge security under static corruption, and translate our scheme to prime-order bilinear groups under the static MDDH assumption.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Enabling Memory Encryption Using Ascon Derivatives
Sergej Deutsch, Christoph Dobraunig, David Durham, Simon Johnson, Krystian Matusiewicz, Carlos Rozas, and Alexander Tereschenko
Keeping data stored in memory confidential is a tough challenge when assuming an adversary with physical access to it. First, we have fine-grained access to typically 256 to 512 bits at once, so nonces or tags of the typical sizes used for authenticated encryption would lead to a sizeable overhead. Second, we have stringent performance requirements, including low latency that directly impacts CPU performance and, more generally, strict area and energy constraints, especially for the high bandwidth of memory interfaces. Currently, memory encryption solutions typically rely on the AES block cipher. In this paper, we explore ways of using Ascon as a building block for memory encryption. Our analysis shows that Ascon-based constructions achieve better performance than AES-based HCTR2 and can also compete with XTS-AES while providing larger block sizes.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
How To Track Qubits Through Space and Time (Or: Sailing in a Quantum Boat)
James Bartusek, Zikuan Huang, Leo Orshansky, and Henry Yuen
While quantum position verification aims to certify a prover's location using quantum information, existing security definitions only guarantee that part of the successful adversarial party is in the claimed location. This leaves open the possibility that a distributed team of adversaries can jointly simulate a prover in a way that defeats the intended meaning of ``being at a location'' in position-based cryptography. We introduce stronger notions of position verification that we call quantum localization, which requires that there is a specified, unclonable state at the verified spacetime point -- and that this state can be found nowhere else. We show that quantum localization leads naturally to a meaningful notion of trajectory verification, in which quantum information is verifiably tracked through space and time. We construct quantum localization and trajectory verification protocols using quantum anchor states, which generalize coset states from unclonable cryptography. The security of our schemes is proven in the classical oracle (i.e. ideal obfuscation) model, which can be heuristically instantiated in the plain model using post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation. We also introduce and instantiate the concept of functionality localization, which guarantees that the adversary has the ability to compute a secret function at the verified spacetime point, and this function cannot be computed anywhere else. This raises the intriguing possibility of localizing computational capabilities in space and time. More broadly, we believe our notions of quantum localization and subsequent feasibility results provide stronger foundations for position-based cryptography. At a conceptual level, our results also explore the tight link between two fundamental notions in physics -- location and information -- thus serving as a natural foundation for cryptographic capabilities tied to physical spacetime.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
The Effectiveness of Differential Privacy in Real-world Settings: A Metrics-based Framework to help Practitioners Visualise and Evaluate $\varepsilon$
Akasha Shafiq, Abhishek Kesarwani, Dimitrios Vasilopoulos, and Paolo Palmieri
Differential privacy (DP) has emerged as a preferred solution for private data analysis, having been adopted by several leading Internet companies. DP is a privacy-preserving mechanism that protects against re-identification of individuals. \emph{Privacy budget} $\varepsilon$ determines the trade-off between privacy and utility. Currently, there are no widely accepted methodologies for selecting $\varepsilon$ and choosing the best DP mechanism that offers an optimal trade-off between privacy and utility. We propose using a novel set of metrics and an easy-to-implement, step-by-step framework to facilitate DP deployment and guide the selection of $\varepsilon$ based on the desired accuracy vs utility trade-off. To address this gap, we perform experiments using three real-world datasets, aiming to identify the optimal parameters . The analysis focuses on the commonly used queries for each dataset. Based on our experiment results, we observe that using our metric and framework, one can analyse noise distribution of multiple queries, and choose the suitable $\varepsilon$ and the DP mechanism for achieving a balance between privacy and utility. Additionally, we show that the optimal $\varepsilon$ depends on the particular query, desired accuracy and context in which DP is implemented, which suggests that an arbitrary a prior selection of $\varepsilon$ cannot provide adequate results. Our framework prioritises the visualisation of key metrics in the DP analysis as a function of $\varepsilon$ and mechanism. Enabling the adoption easy for a wider audience without deep knowledge, providing a road map for DP implementation.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
SEC: One-Share Everywhere-Short Secret Sharing from Lossless Expanders
Muhammad Arzaki, Muhammed F. Esgin, Amin Sakzad, and Ron Steinfeld
We introduce \(\mathsf{SEC}\), an expander-code-based ramp secret sharing scheme over \(\mathbb{Z}\)-modules, particularly suitable for lattice-based distributed cryptography. It is everywhere-short: bounded secret coefficients yield bounded share coefficients, and the integer reconstruction vectors have bounded entries. Moreover, each participant receives exactly one share, regardless of the number of parties and the privacy and reconstruction thresholds. This improves on prior schemes with bounded share coefficients and bounded entries in the integer reconstruction vectors, in which the number of sub-shares or shares per participant grows either with the number of parties and the threshold or with the security parameter. The construction rests on a coding-theoretic observation: in the bi-adjacency matrix of a lossless bipartite expander, unique-neighbor peeling completes every sufficiently small set of columns to a square unimodular submatrix. We prove correctness, everywhere-shortness, and linearity, and give a publicly computable entrywise bound on the reconstruction vector our algorithm returns for each authorized set. For privacy, we introduce hard-core local leakage resilience, which strengthens the leakage-resilience notion of Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT 2020) to protect a hard-core function of the secret, and we prove that \(\mathsf{SEC}\) satisfies it against correlated multi-query local leakage under the \(\mathsf{MatrixHint\text{-}MLWE}\) problem, which admits a reduction from the standard \(\mathsf{MLWE}\) problem. For \(n=60\) participants and security parameter \(\kappa = 128\), \(\mathsf{SEC}\) achieves privacy threshold \(6\) against \(2^{64}\) leakage queries and empirical reconstruction threshold \(46\). The ideal entropy-coded secret and share sizes are about \(3.5\) KiB and \(6.4\) KiB, respectively.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Beyond-Birthday-Bound Security with HCTR2: Cascaded Construction and Tweak-based Key Derivation
Yu Long Chen, Yukihito Hiraga, Nicky Mouha, Yusuke Naito, Yu Sasaki, and Takeshi Sugawara
The block cipher (BC) mode for realizing a variable-input-length strong tweakable pseudorandom permutation (VIL-STPRP), also known as the accordion mode, is a rapidly growing research field driven by NIST's standardization project, which considers AES as a primitive. Widely used VIL-STPRP modes, such as HCTR2, have birthday-bound security and provide only 64-bit security with AES. To provide higher security, NIST is considering two directions: to develop new modes with beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security and to use Rijndael-256-256 with HCTR2. This paper pursues the first direction while maintaining compatibility with HCTR2. In particular, we provide two solutions to achieve BBB security for two different approaches: (i) general cases without any conditions on the tweak and (ii) under the condition that the same tweak is not repeated too often as adopted in bbb-ddd-AES recently presented at Eurocrypt 2025. For the first approach, we propose a new mode, CHCTR, that iterates HCTR2 with two independent keys, which achieves $2n/3$-bit security in the multi-user (mu) setting and satisfies NIST's requirements. For the second approach, we prove mu security of HCTR2, which allows us to apply the tweak-based key derivation (TwKD) to HCTR2 in a provable manner. When the number of BC calls processed by a single tweak is upper-bounded by $2^{n/3}$, HCTR2-TwKD achieves $2n/3$-bit mu security. By benchmarking optimized software implementations, we show that CHCTR with AES-256 outperforms HCTR2 with Rijndael-256-256, in all the twelve processor models examined. Similarly, HCTR2-TwKD outperforms bbb-ddd-AES in general cases, and it is even comparable to bbb-ddd-AES rigorously optimized for tweak-repeating use cases using precomputation.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
MPCTM: MPC-Based Trajectory Matching on Unmanned Autonomous Systems
Dominik Roy George, Martin Zbudila, and Barry Van Leeuwen
Emerging technologies such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UASs) are increasingly being deployed across several application domains. Their deployment, however, introduces safety risks, especially when unmanned vehicles operate in shared operational spaces (e.g., air, land, or maritime) and may follow collision-prone paths. This creates the need for solutions that can detect possible collisions among pre-planned trajectories, thereby improving operational safety and reducing risk. At the same time, revealing trajectories in plaintext leaks sensitive information, such as traversal patterns, deployment and infrastructure locations, and potentially private user data. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving trajectory matching protocol based on Multi-Party Computation (MPC). We introduce an end-to-end secure scheme for collision detection that reveals no information beyond the prescribed output. Our solution models the behaviour of UASs along their paths, accurately capturing collisions that may occur between discretely sampled points. We further propose a lightweight, MPC-friendly model and discuss the trade-off between accuracy and efficiency for the two approaches. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our scheme and compare it to the closest state-of-the-art solution. Our evaluation shows that our work MPCTM, in the dealer mode, improves the online latency upon previous work by over 2x in our modelled protocol and by 8x in our lightweight protocol. In autonomous mode, our protocol results in a slow-down of 2.5-3x, while providing a more expressive model with no false negatives and fully preserving privacy of the trajectory data.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
RoKoko: Lattice-based Succinct Arguments, a Committed Refinement
Michael Klooss, Russell W. F. Lai, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, Michał Osadnik, and Lorenzo Tucci
We present RoKoko, a new lattice-based succinct argument system that achieves a linear-time prover alongside polylogarithmic communication and verifier complexity. Asymptotically, our construction improves upon RoK and Roll (ASIACRYPT 2025), the first post-quantum SNARK with $\tilde{O}(\lambda)$ proof size, by a multiplicative factor of $\Theta(\log \lambda)$. Practically, our system yields proofs of roughly $200$KB, while outperforming the state-of-the-art polynomial commitment scheme Greyhound (CRYPTO 2024) with a $100\times$ faster verification time, similar prover time, and competitive proof size. Our framework natively supports (tensor-)structured relations, such as polynomial evaluation and sumcheck relations. At a high level, our construction follows the recursive split-and-fold paradigm: the prover first splits the witness into $\rho$ sub-witnesses, sends the corresponding cross-terms, and then folds them into a single witness that is shorter by a factor of $\rho$ using verifier challenges. Prior works typically restrict $\rho = O(1)$ to preserve succinct verification and maintain the optimal $\tilde{O}(\lambda)$ proof size. We overcome this “constant barrier”, which enables larger $\rho$ and thereby reduces the proof size. To achieve this, we introduce the following technical contributions. (i) Committed folding. Instead of sending $O(\rho)$ cross-terms in the clear, the prover commits to the messages and later proves that the committed vector satisfies the verification relations. This enables the use of a larger shrinking factor, thereby reducing the number of recursion rounds. While this strategy has been successfully used in LaBRADOR (CRYPTO 2023), additional care is required here to preserve succinct verification. (ii) Recursive commitments. We generalise the double-commitment technique from LaBRADOR into a framework for recursive commitments, yielding further compression in commitment size. This results in concrete improvements in communication within each recursion round. (iii) Sumcheck-driven structured recursion. We extend the sumcheck framework from SALSAA (ePrint 2025/2124) to prove substantially more complex constraints arising in our construction (and open for future extensions), including correctness of random projections, inner-product claims and well-formedness of recursive commitments. While expressing these constraints as sumcheck relations requires considerable technical effort, the resulting protocols compose seamlessly with the structured recursion, yielding both linear-time proving and succinct verification.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
AirBB: Lightweight Threshold Anonymous Credentials without Random Oracles from BB Signatures
Sebastian Faust, Jonas Hofmann, Philipp-Florens Lehwalder, and Hussien Othman
Anonymous credentials are a well-studied cryptographic primitive enabling users to prove statements about their identity and selectively present personal information in an unlinkable manner. The issuer, however, is often a single point of failure. Threshold issuance addresses this by distributing the issuer across several parties such that a quorum of them must cooperate to issue credentials. Numerous constructions of single-issuer and threshold issuance anonymous credentials have been proposed. However, existing schemes each have at least one of the following weaknesses: (1) their presentations depend on the number of attributes, (2) they are not concretely efficient, or (3) they rely on the random oracle model (ROM) for non-interactive presentations. In this work, we present a new construction of threshold anonymous credentials that has a constant presentation size of 240 bytes, rivals the efficiency of BBS, and does not rely on the random oracle model. We achieve this by combining techniques from set commitments with Boneh-Boyen (BB) signatures (Eurocrypt'04) and prove our scheme's security in the algebraic group model. This is on par with the tight security proofs of existing schemes, which typically rely on the AGM or GGM, or on assumptions justified in those models. Since signing uses linear operations, the scheme is easily thresholdizable, without requiring interaction between the issuers or preprocessing.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Practical Confidential Clustering for Federated Learning using Efficient Secret-Sharing
Cédric Prigent and Sonia Ben Mokhtar
Federated Learning (FL) often suffers from statistical heterogeneity, where diverging data distributions prevent a single global model from achieving high utility for all participants. Clustered Federated Learning (CFL) addresses this problem by grouping similar clients to train personalized sub-models, yet performing such clustering while ensuring strict confidentially with minimal communication overhead remains a significant challenge. This paper introduces CCFL, a framework for Confidential Clustering that executes clustering logic, including distance computations and centroid updates, entirely within the encrypted domain using Replicated Secret Sharing (RSS). CCFL orchestrates a unified pipeline that integrates client-side feature extraction, an anonymization server for oblivious shuffling, and Multi-Party Computation (MPC)-based clustering to ensure both input privacy and participant unlinkability. By employing a ring-based Euclidean distance optimization, CCFL significantly reduces interactive rounds, achieving up to $46.7\times$ computational speedup under realistic LAN and WAN constraints. Our one-shot clustering approach decouples heavy cryptographic computation from the training loop, allowing the system to scale seamlessly to thousands of clients with negligible edge overhead. Finally, downstream evaluations confirm that CCFL achieves a superior privacy-utility trade-off, matching or outperforming state-of-the-art personalized FL paradigms without exposing sensitive feature geometries.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Sonata: Certifying Canonical Openings in High-Arity Lattice Folding
Xiang Wang
Folding lets a prover certify a computation incrementally by combining committed instances into an accumulator. In lattice-based folding, a linear combination of field values can change their canonical digit representations. Re-encoding the result gives the prover a short opening. The verifier must establish that this opening represents the prescribed fold of the original committed values. We present Sonata, a high-arity lattice folding scheme for committed quadratic relations. A quadratic sumcheck certifies canonical encoding and the folded equations together. A recursive short-opening argument binds its final evaluation to the original commitments. We prove knowledge soundness for classical rewindable provers by comparing two labelled extraction contexts and bounding the probability that both yield the same invalid candidate. We evaluate complete five-layer transitions for batches of 16 to 1,024 fresh inputs. Across this range, communication increases from 143,165 to 170,361 bytes when the input commitments and setup are shared. At 1,024 inputs, the median prover and verifier times are 258.3 and 226.2 seconds.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
DKG: A Dual-Layer Knowledge Graph and LLM Co-Driven Framework for Fully Automated Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptosystems
Wenquan Zhou, An Wang, Yaoling Ding, Jiakun Li, Jingqi Zhang, and Liehuang Zhu
Cryptographic algorithms underpin billions of devices, from payment smartcards to smartphone secure enclaves and industrial controllers. Yet their physical implementations risk leaking secret keys. Non-profiled side-channel analysis (SCA) evaluates whether such leakage enables key recovery, but executing it end-to-end remains expert-intensive. Large language model (LLM) agents now automate complex workflows across many domains, yet reliable key recovery requires specialized SCA knowledge that must be extracted and organized from scattered technical literature. In this paper, we propose DKG, a dual-layer knowledge graph and LLM co-driven key-recovery agent framework. We introduce the first graph schema designed specifically for SCA: an upper layer of configuration components and a lower layer of diagnostic strategies, joined by cross-layer relationships. An LLM-driven three-step extraction pipeline (Locate & Rewrite, Triple Extraction, and Knowledge Fusion) builds the graph from raw technical documents without manual annotation, and at runtime the retrieved knowledge drives a closed-loop autonomous attack workflow. Built from a corpus of 166 technical documents, the graph contains 1,334 entities and 1,813 relationships. On eight datasets covering AES, DES, and SM4 across smartcards, FPGAs, and MCUs, DKG with DeepSeek-V3.2 achieves a 97.5% end-to-end key-recovery success rate. By comparison, ReAct-RAG, a text-retrieval-augmented agent, achieves only 68.8%. Across the open-weights backbones DeepSeek-V3.2, GLM-5, and Qwen3.5, DKG achieves an average success rate of 93.3%. To the best of our knowledge, DKG is the first framework to achieve consistent end-to-end automated key recovery across diverse implementations. Its automated pipeline lets the graph grow with new literature, and its dual-layer organization provides a basis for extending DKG to additional SCA techniques.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Adaptive Leaky LWE and Its Security
Chuanqi Zhang, Muhammed F. Esgin, and Ron Steinfeld
The Leaky LWE problem, proposed by Lai, Swarnakar, and Woo (CiC '25), studies whether LWE samples remain pseudorandom in the presence of noisy linear information about their secrets and errors. In Leaky LWE, the leakage matrix may depend on the public matrix, but must be chosen before the LWE challenge is revealed. We study $t$-round adaptive Leaky LWE, where each leakage matrix may depend on the challenge and all preceding leakage answers. Under explicit norm, smoothing, and sampling conditions, we reduce Gaussian-secret LWE to this problem at the corresponding source parameters for polynomially many rounds. The reduction preserves the public-matrix distribution and access to its correlated oracle, and supports rectangular leakage matrices and non-spherical discrete Gaussians over arbitrary orders in number fields.
Last updated:  2026-11-09
Doubly-Efficient Private Information Retrieval from Modular Forms
Alexandra Henzinger and Seyoon Ragavan
We present new information-theoretic protocols for $s$-server, doubly-efficient private information retrieval (PIR) in sublinear server time and one extra bit of space on the servers, for every constant $s \geq 2$. On an $n$-bit database, each of the $s$ PIR servers first builds and stores a preprocessing data structure consisting of $n+1$ bits (which is unique to each server, and after which the server may discard the original database). Then, each server answers a PIR query in time $T_s(n)$, by reading at most $T_s$ bits of its data structure and sending them to the user. In the two server setting ($s=2$), our PIR protocols achieve $T_2 = n^{0.82}$, matching the server time of the state-of-the-art schemes of Henzinger and Ragavan (EUROCRYPT 2026) while shrinking their storage from $O(n\sqrt{\log n})$ to $n+1$ bits. With $s \geq 3$ servers, our PIR protocols retain the $n+1$ bits of storage and additionally improve on the server time of all prior information-theoretic $s$-server schemes with $n^{1+o(1)}$ storage: for example, achieving $T_3 = n^{0.74}$ and $T_{10} = n^{0.61}$ (previously $n^{0.79}$ and $n^{0.75}$). Asymptotically, as the server count $s$ grows, we shrink the number of servers required to achieve a given server-work exponent from $s^{3.9}$ to $s$. Our results draw inspiration from matching-vector techniques (Efremenko, STOC 2009), which we generalize to handle degree-two computations in the exponent. Using this generalization, we build doubly-efficient PIR from the new intermediate abstraction of Fourier-sparse cone-delta functions. Then, we construct such Fourier-sparse cone-delta functions via a connection to modular forms and complex analysis: if a Fourier-sparse cone-delta function does not exist, then there exists a modular form which has too many roots, contradicting the valence formula.
Last updated:  2026-11-08
Undine: Distributed Extendable Merkle Tree Storage with Private Retrieval and Efficient Reconfiguration
Nicolas Alhaddad, Harry Eldridge, Julia Guskind, Eran Tromer, and Mayank Varia
Clients of transparency logs, public-key directories, and shielded blockchain pools require authenticated access to an ever-changing Merkle tree, without storing it in full or revealing which entry they open. We seek to distribute storage and query work across independent servers as the data grows and participants join, leave, change their shares, or misbehave. We present Undine, which combines a distributed Merkle tree encoding with private retrieval from independently-maintained fragments. Maintainers can choose and efficiently adjust the size of their stored fragments, to offer a flexible tradeoff against the number of maintainer replies needed for authenticated data reconstruction by clients. Maintainers can also perform authenticated updates and appends, at a write cost of just twice the number of modified Merkle nodes. Undine uses a linear encoding of the Merkle tree nodes to divide evenly the storage and retrieval load across maintainers. This is combined with a private information retrieval (PIR) protocol that operates directly over the linearly-encoded fragments. Undine avoids repeated storage and computation for nodes shared by Merkle paths across records, producing the same PIR replies with work over tree values linear in the filled prefix. Record sizes adapt as the prefix grows to balance query and reply sizes. Clients verify against the Merkle root, without commitments to individual PIR databases. Computational query privacy holds against any coalition. Undine is also secure against selective-failure leakage (i.e., deductions from acceptance), up to the PIR backend's correctness error, given enough timely honest replies, fixed public timing, and no reply-dependent follow-up. We evaluate UndineLog, our append-only implementation of Undine combined with YPIR. On a height-50 sparse Merkle tree with a 4GiB prefix of nonempty 32-byte leaves and a reconstruction threshold of 64, a maintainer replies in 100ms (single-core); a client can process 192 replies from maintainers and reconstruct a verified opening in 380ms, even with 64 corrupted replies. Scaled up to 1TiB and 256 threshold , a maintainer answers in 1.13s. Existing shielded pools can use this service without consensus changes.
Last updated:  2026-11-08
Optimality and Efficiency of Higher-Order Rank-Based Side-Channel Attacks against Inner Product Masking Schemes
Haitao Zhan, Wei Cheng, Yuejun Liu, Jingdian Ming, Sylvain Guilley, and Yongbin Zhou
Higher-Order Spearman Coefficient Analysis (HO-SPA) is of particular interest in non-profiling Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) due to its effectiveness against monotonic nonlinear leakage. However, the optimal form, effective order combinations, and performance of HO-SPA (or its variants) remain underexplored. This work systematically revisits HO-SPA in the presence of Boolean Masking (BM) and Inner Product Masking (IPM). Specifically, we propose a new variant of HO-SPA, called HO-ASPA (Higher-Order Adjusted Spearman Coefficient Analysis), and derive the optimal form of HO-ASPA for two-share BM and IPM across a wide range of order combinations under the Hamming weight (HW) leakage model. We first derive the optimal form of HO-ASPA by extending the Spearman Coefficient Analysis to higher-order moments, while preserving the centered-product combination of the share leakages. We then establish an upper bound on the maximal correlation induced by the rank transformation and characterize the relationship between the signal-to-noise ratio and the optimal correlation coefficient in the rank-domain, and extend these analyses to IPM. To enable a fair comparison, we also derive the optimal forms of Higher-Order Correlation Power Analysis (HO-CPA) and HO-ASPA for both BM and IPM under the Least-Significant-Bit (LSB) leakage model. Our analysis highlights a key distinction: unlike HO-CPA, where higher orders often outperform the lowest feasible order, HO-ASPA shows no significant performance gap between higher-order and lower-order attacks. Moreover, under the HW leakage model, our HO-ASPA not only aligns with existing results and succeeds in counteracting the security order amplification, but also significantly outperforms Kruskal-Wallis Analysis (KWA)-based attacks at various order combinations. We further validate the effectiveness of the proposed HO-ASPA through simulated and real-world experimental evaluations.
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