Paper 2024/1008

Impossible Boomerang Distinguishers Revisited

Xichao Hu, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China
Lin Jiao, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China
Dengguo Feng, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China
Yonglin Hao, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China
Xinxin Gong, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China
Yongqiang Li, Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
Siwei Sun, State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China, School of Cryptology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
Abstract

The Impossible Boomerang Attack (IBA) has shown significant power in evaluating the security of block ciphers, such as AES. However, current studies still lack foundational theory, user guild and universal method for constructing IBDs. This paper addresses these gaps through comprehensive research. Theoretically, we establish a new framework for constructing a series of IBDs by differential propagation, state propagation, and generalized boomerang tables. We rigorously prove their inclusion relations, resulting in a complete theory and hierarchical apply strategy for both single-key and related-key settings. We further analyze IBD constructions in two types of related-key settings: two-related-keys with arbitrary schedules and four-related-keys with linear schedules, structurally in a unified way. Technically, we develop a scheduling algorithm and a general SAT-based method to search for IBDs across various block cipher designs, including SPN, Feistel, and ARX. Additionally, we propose several strategies to enhance the search process. As applications, we derive (RK-)IBDs for 10 block ciphers, almost for the first time. Compared to impossible differentials, our IBDs are at least as effective, such as DES and PRESENT. Notably, we achieve 1 more round on PRINTcipher48 in single-key setting; 2 more rounds on AES-128, and 1 or 2 more rounds on SPECK variants in two-related-keys settings; 1, 4, 2 more rounds on GIFT-64, CHAM-64/128 and CHAM-128/256 in four-related-keys settings. We also obtain full-round RK-IBDs on GOST. Compared to current IBDs, we achieve 1, 1 more rounds on SKINNY-64/192 and SKINNYee. Furthermore, as an applied case of derived IBDs, we present a 31-round IBA on SKINNYee, which is the first 31-round attack on SKINNYee and the best result to date.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Impossible BoomerangSingle-keyRelated-keyBlock cipherSPNFeistelARX
Contact author(s)
xchao_h @ 163 com
History
2025-02-21: last of 5 revisions
2024-06-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1008
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1008,
      author = {Xichao Hu and Lin Jiao and Dengguo Feng and Yonglin Hao and Xinxin Gong and Yongqiang Li and Siwei Sun},
      title = {Impossible Boomerang Distinguishers Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1008},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1008}
}
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