Papers updated in last 7 days (49 results)

Last updated:  2022-07-02
Simple Three-Round Multiparty Schnorr Signing with Full Simulatability
Yehuda Lindell
In a multiparty signing protocol, also known as a threshold signature scheme, the private signing key is shared amongst a set of parties and only a quorum of those parties can generate a signature. Research on multiparty signing has been growing in popularity recently due to its application to cryptocurrencies. Most work has focused on reducing the number of rounds to two, and as a result: (a) are not fully simulatable in the sense of MPC real/ideal security definitions, and/or (b) are not secure under concurrent composition, and/or (c) utilize non-standard assumptions of different types in their proofs of security. In this paper, we describe a simple three-round multiparty protocol for Schnorr signatures and prove its security. The protocol is fully simulatable, secure under concurrent composition, and proven secure in the standard model or random-oracle model (depending on the instantiations of the commitment and zero-knowledge primitives). The protocol realizes an ideal Schnorr signing functionality with perfect security in the ideal commitment and zero-knowledge hybrid model (and thus the only assumptions needed are for realizing these functionalities). We also show how to achieve proactive security and identifiable abort. In our presentation, we do not assume that all parties begin with the message to be signed, the identities of the participating parties and a unique common session identifier, since this is often not the case in practice. Rather, the parties achieve consensus on these parameters as the protocol progresses.
Last updated:  2022-07-02
The most efficient indifferentiable hashing to elliptic curves of $j$-invariant $1728$
Dmitrii Koshelev
This article makes an important contribution to solving the long-standing problem of whether all elliptic curves can be equipped with a hash function (indifferentiable from a random oracle) whose running time amounts to one exponentiation in the basic finite field $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$. More precisely, we construct a new indifferentiable hash function to any ordinary elliptic $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$-curve $E_a$ of $j$-invariant $1728$ with the cost of extracting one quartic root in $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$. As is known, the latter operation is equivalent to one exponentiation in finite fields with which we deal in practice. In comparison, the previous fastest random oracles to $E_a$ require to perform two exponentiations in $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$. Since it is highly unlikely that there is a hash function to an elliptic curve without exponentiations at all (even if it is supersingular), the new result seems to be unimprovable.
Last updated:  2022-07-02
Practical Side-Channel Attack on Masked Message Encoding in Latticed-Based KEM
Jian Wang, Weiqiong Cao, Hua Chen, and Haoyuan Li
To defend against the rising threat of quantum computers, NIST initiated their Post-Quantum Cryptography(PQC) standardization process in 2016. During the PQC process, the security against side-channel attacks has received much attention. Lattice-based schemes are considered to be the most promising group to be standardized. Message encoding in lattice-based schemes has been proven to be vulnerable to side-channel attacks, and a first-order masked message encoder has been presented. However, there is still a lack of security evaluation for the first-order masked message encoder under different implementations. In this paper, we analyzed the security of the first-order masked message encoder of Kyber. We found although masked Kyber certainly is able to defend against the previous side-channel attacks, there still exist some exploitable leakages. With the help of the leakages, we proposed a deep learning-based key recovery attack on message encoding of masked Kyber. Our method can recover the original message from masked message encoding and then enable a chosen-ciphertext attack to recover the secret key. In our experiments, the whole secret key of masked Kyber768 was recovered with only 9 traces and the success rate of attack was close to 100%.
Last updated:  2022-07-02
Survey of Approaches and Techniques for Security Verification of Computer Systems
Ferhat Erata, Shuwen Deng, Faisal Zaghloul, Wenjie Xiong, Onur Demir, and Jakub Szefer
This paper surveys the landscape of security verification approaches and techniques for computer systems at various levels: from a software-application level all the way to the physical hardware level. Different existing projects are compared, based on the tools used and security aspects being examined. Since many systems require both hardware and software components to work together to provide the system's promised security protections, it is not sufficient to verify just the software levels or just the hardware levels in a mutually exclusive fashion. This survey especially highlights system levels that are verified by the different existing projects and presents to the readers the state of the art in hardware and software system security verification. Few approaches come close to providing full-system verification, and there is still much room for improvement.
Last updated:  2022-07-02
Efficient Homomorphic Evaluation on Large Intervals
Jung Hee Cheon, Wootae Kim, and Jai Hyun Park
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is being widely used for privacy-preserving computation. Since HE schemes only support polynomial operations, it is prevalent to use polynomial approximations of non-polynomial functions. We cannot monitor the intermediate values during the homomorphic evaluation; as a consequence, we should utilize polynomial approximations with sufficiently large approximation intervals to prevent the failure of the evaluation. However, the large approximation interval potentially accompanies computational overheads, and it is a serious bottleneck of HE application on real-world data. In this work, we introduce domain extension polynomials (DEPs) that extend the domain interval of functions by a factor of $k$ while preserving the feature of the original function on its original domain interval. By repeatedly iterating the domain-extension process with DEPs, we can extend with $O(\log{K})$ operations the domain of a given function by a factor of $K$ while the feature of the original function is preserved in its original domain interval. By using DEPs, we can efficiently evaluate in an encrypted state a function that converges at infinities, i.e., $\lim_{x\to\infty}f(x)$ and $\lim_{x\to-\infty}f(x)$ exist in $\mathbb{R}$. To uniformly approximate the function on $[-R,R]$, our method exploits $O(\log{R})$ operations and $O(1)$ memory. This is more efficient than the previous approach, the minimax approximation and Paterson-Stockmeyer algorithm, which uses $\Omega(\sqrt{R})$ multiplications and $\Omega(\sqrt{R})$ memory for the evaluation. As another application of DEPs, we also suggest a method to manage the risky outliers from a large interval $[-R,R]$ by using $O(\log{R})$ additional multiplications. As a real-world application, we trained the logistic regression classifier on large public datasets in an encrypted state by using our method. We exploit our method to the evaluation of the logistic function on large intervals, e.g., $[-7683,7683]$.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
Dew: Transparent Constant-sized zkSNARKs
Arasu Arun, Chaya Ganesh, Satya Lokam, Tushar Mopuri, and Sriram Sridhar
We construct polynomial commitment schemes with constant sized evaluation proofs and logarithmic verification time in the transparent setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result achieving this combination of properties. Our starting point is a transparent inner product commitment scheme with constant-sized proofs and linear verification. We build on this to construct a polynomial commitment scheme with constant size evaluation proofs and logarithmic (in the degree of the polynomial) verification time. Our constructions make use of groups of unknown order instantiated by class groups. We prove security of our construction in the Generic Group Model (GGM). Using our polynomial commitment scheme to compile an information-theoretic proof system yields Dew -- a transparent and constant-sized zkSNARK (Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge) with logarithmic verification. Finally, we show how to recover the result of DARK (Bünz et al., Eurocrypt 2020). DARK presented a succinct transparent polynomial commitment scheme with logarithmic proof size and verification. However, it was recently discovered to have a gap in its security proof (Block et al, CRYPTO 2021). We recover its extractability based on our polynomial commitment construction, thus obtaining a transparent polynomial commitment scheme with logarithmic proof size and verification under the same assumptions as DARK, but with a prover time that is quadratic.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
BalanceProofs: Maintainable Vector Commitments with Fast Aggregation
Weijie Wang, Annie Ulichney, and Charalampos Papamanthou
We present BalanceProofs, the first vector commitment scheme that is maintainable (i.e., supporting sublinear updates) while also supporting fast proof aggregation and verification. The basic version of BalanceProofs has $O(\sqrt{n}\log n)$ update time and $O(\sqrt{n})$ query time and its constant-size aggregated proofs can be produced and verified in milliseconds. In particular, BalanceProofs improves the aggregation time and aggregation verification time of the only known maintainable and aggregatable vector commitment scheme, HyperProofs (USENIX SECURITY 2022), by up to 1000$\times$. Fast verification of aggregated proofs is particularly useful for applications such as stateless cryptocurrencies (and was a major bottleneck for Hyperproofs), where an aggregated proof of balances is produced once but must be verified multiple times and by a large number of nodes. As a limitation, BalanceProofs' update time compared to Hyperproofs roughly doubles, but always stays in the range from 2 to 3 seconds. BalanceProofs can be viewed as a compiler that transforms any non-maintainable vector commitment with fast aggregation to a maintainable one with the aforementioned complexities. We finally study useful tradeoffs in BalanceProofs between (aggregate) proof size, update time and (aggregate) proof computation and verification, by introducing a bucketing technique, and present an extensive evaluation, including a comparison to Hyperproofs as well as applications of BalanceProofs to Verkle trees.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
Effective and Efficient Masking with Low Noise using Small-Mersenne-Prime Ciphers
Loïc Masure, Pierrick Méaux, Thorben Moos, and François-Xavier Standaert
Embedded devices with built-in security features are natural targets for physical attacks. Thus, enhancing their side-channel resistance is an important practical challenge. A standard solution for this purpose is the use of Boolean masking schemes, as they are well adapted to current block ciphers with efficient bit-slice representations. Boolean masking guarantees that the security of an implementation grows exponentially in the number of shares under the assumption that leakages are sufficiently noisy (and independent). Unfortunately, it has been shown that this noise assumption is hardly met on low-end devices. In this paper, we therefore investigate techniques to mask cryptographic algorithms in such a way that their resistance can survive an almost complete lack of noise. Building on seed theoretical results of Dziembowski et al., we put forward that arithmetic encodings in prime fields can reach this goal. We first exhibit the gains that such encodings lead to thanks to a simulated information theoretic analysis of their leakage (with up to six shares). We then provide figures showing that on platforms where optimized arithmetic adders and multipliers are readily available (i.e., most MCUs and FPGAs), performing masked operations in Mersenne-prime fields as opposed to binary extension fields will not lead to notable implementation overheads. We compile these observations into a new AES-like block cipher, called AES-prime, which is well-suited to leverage the remarkable advantages of masking in prime fields. We also confirm the practical relevance of our findings by evaluating concrete software (ARM Cortex-M3) and hardware (Xilinx Spartan-6) implementations. Our experimental results show that security gains over Boolean masking (and, more generally, binary encodings) can reach orders of magnitude.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
Scooby: Improved Multi-Party Homomorphic Secret Sharing Based on FHE
Ilaria Chillotti, Emmanuela Orsini, Peter Scholl, Nigel Paul Smart, and Barry Van Leeuwen
We present new constructions of multi-party homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) based on a new primitive that we call homomorphic encryption with decryption to shares (HEDS). Our first construction, which we call Scooby, is based on many popular fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes with a linear decryption property. Scooby achieves an $n$-party HSS for general circuits with complexity $O(|F| + \log n)$, as opposed to $O(n^2 \cdot |F|)$ for the prior best construction based on multi-key FHE. Scooby can be based on (ring)-LWE with a super-polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. In our second construction, Scrappy, assuming any generic FHE plus HSS for NC1-circuits, we obtain a HEDS scheme which does not require a super-polynomial modulus. While these schemes all require FHE, in another instantiation, Shaggy, we show how in some cases it is possible to obtain multi-party HSS without FHE, for a small number of parties and constant-degree polynomials. Finally, we show that our Scooby scheme can be adapted to use multi-key fully homomorphic encryption, giving more efficient spooky encryption and setup-free HSS. This latter scheme, Casper, if concretely instantiated with a B/FV-style multi-key FHE scheme, for functions $F$ which do not require bootstrapping, gives an HSS complexity of $O(n \cdot |F| + n^2 \cdot \log n)$.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
A Central Limit Framework for Ring-LWE Decryption
Uncategorized
Sean Murphy and Rachel Player
Show abstract
Uncategorized
This paper develops Central Limit arguments for analysing the noise in ciphertexts in two homomorphic encryption schemes that are based on Ring-LWE. The first main contribution of this paper is to present an average-case noise analysis for the BGV scheme. Our approach builds upon the recent work of Costache et al. that gives the approximation of a polynomial product as a multivariate Normal distribution. We show how this result can be applied in the BGV context and experimentally verify its improvement over prior, worst-case, approaches. Our second main contribution is to develop a Central Limit framework to analyse the noise growth in the homomorphic Ring-LWE cryptosystem of Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev (Eurocrypt 2013, full version). Our approach is very general: apart from finite variance, no assumption on the distribution of the noise is required (in particular, the noise need not be subgaussian). We show that our approach leads to tighter bounds for the probability of decryption failure than have been obtained in prior work.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
A note on key control in CSIDH
Antonio Sanso
In this short note we explore a particular behaviour of the CSIDH key exchange that leads to a very special form of (shared) key control via the use of the quadratic twists. This peculiarity contained in CSIDH with regard to quadratic twists was already noted in the original CSDIH work and used in several subsequent papers but we believe spelling out this in the form of an attack might be useful to the wider community.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
Genus Distribution of Random q-ary Lattices
Peter J. Bruin, Léo Ducas, and Shane Gibbons
The genus is an efficiently computable arithmetic invariant for lattices up to isomorphism. Given the recent proposals of basing cryptography on the lattice isomorphism problem, it is of cryptographic interest to classify relevant families of lattices according to their genus. We propose such a classification for q-ary lattices, and also study their distribution. In particular, for an odd prime q, we show that random q-ary lattices are mostly concentrated on two genera. Because the genus is local, this also provides information on the distribution for general odd q. The case of q a power of 2 is also studied, although we only achieve a partial classification.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
SoK: Design Tools for Side-Channel-Aware Implementations
IR Buhan, Lejla Batina, Yuval Yarom, and Patrick Schaumont
Side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through a computing device’s interaction with its physical environment have proven to be a severe threat to devices’ security, particularly when adversaries have unfettered physical access to the device. Traditional approaches for leakage detection measure the physical properties of the device. Hence, they cannot be used during the design process and fail to provide root cause analysis. An alternative approach that is gaining traction is to automate leakage detection by modeling the device. The demand to understand the scope, benefits, and limitations of the proposed tools intensifies with the increase in the number of proposals. In this SoK, we classify approaches to automated leakage detection based on the model’s source of truth. We classify the existing tools on two main parameters: whether the model includes measurements from a concrete device and the abstraction level of the device specification used for constructing the model. We survey the proposed tools to determine the current knowledge level across the domain and identify open problems. In particular, we highlight the absence of evaluation methodologies and metrics that would compare proposals’ effectiveness from across the domain. We believe that our results help practitioners who want to use automated leakage detection and researchers interested in advancing the knowledge and improving automated leakage detection.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
A Tale of Two Boards: On the Influence of Microarchitecture on Side-Channel Leakage
Vipul Arora, Ileana Buhan, Guilherme Perin, and Stjepan Picek
Advances in cryptography have enabled the features of confidentiality, security, and integrity on small embedded devices such as IoT devices. While mathematically strong, the platform on which an algorithm is implemented plays a significant role in the security of the final product. Side-channel attacks exploit the variations in the system’s physical characteristics to obtain information about the sensitive data. In our scenario, a software implementation of a cryptographic algorithm is flashed on devices from different manufactures with the same instruction set configured for identical execution. To analyze the influence of the microarchitecture on side-channel leakage, we acquire thirty-two sets of power traces from four physical devices. While we notice minor differences in the leakage behaviour for different physical boards from the same manufacturer, our results confirm that the difference in microarchitecture implementations will leak different side-channel information. We also show that TVLA leakage prediction should be treated with caution as it is sensitive to both false positives and negatives.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
Dynamic Searchable Encryption with Optimal Search in the Presence of Deletions
Javad Ghareh Chamani, Dimitrios Papadopoulos, Mohammadamin Karbasforushan, and Ioannis Demertzis
We focus on the problem of Dynamic Searchable Encryption (DSE) with efficient (optimal/quasi-optimal) search in the presence of deletions. Towards that end, we first propose $\mathsf{OSSE}$, the first DSE scheme that can achieve asymptotically optimal search time, linear to the result size and independent of any prior deletions, improving the previous state of the art by a multiplicative logarithmic factor. We then propose our second scheme $\mathsf{LLSE}$, that achieves a sublogarithmic search overhead ($\log\log i_w$, where $i_w$ is the number or prior insertions for a keyword) compared to the optimal achieved by $\mathsf{OSSE}$. While this is slightly worse than our first scheme, it still outperforms prior works, while also achieving faster deletions and asymptotically smaller server storage. Both schemes have standard leakage profiles and are forward-and-backward private. Our experimental evaluation is very encouraging as it shows our schemes consistently outperform the prior state-of-the-art DSE by 1.2-6.6$\times$ in search computation time, while also requiring just a single roundtrip to receive the search result. Even compared with prior simpler and very efficient constructions in which all deleted records are returned as part of the result, our $\mathsf{OSSE}$ achieves better performance for deletion rates ranging from 45-55%, while the previous state-of-the-art quasi-optimal scheme achieves this for 65-75% deletion rates.
Last updated:  2022-07-01
AB-SIFA: SIFA with Adjacent-Byte Model
Chunya Hu, Yongbo Hu, Wenfeng Zhu, Zixin Tan, Qi Zhang, Zichao Gong, Yanhao Gong, Luyao Jin, and Pengwei Feng
Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack (SIFA) has been a threat for implementa-tions of symmetric cryptographic primitives. Unlike Differential Fault At-tacks (DFA) which takes both correct and faulty ciphertexts, SIFA can re-cover the secret key with only correct ciphertexts. The classic SIFA is only effective on fault models with non-uniform distribution of intermediate val-ue. In this paper, we present a new fault model named adjacent-byte model, which describes a non-uniform distribution of relationship between two bytes (i.e. exclusive-or). To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that this fault model has been proposed. We also show that the adjacent-byte faults can be induced by different fault sources and easy to reproduce. Then a new SIFA attack method called AB-SIFA on symmetric cryptography is proposed. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this new attack by simulating the attack. Finally, our attacks are applied to a software implementations of AES-128 with redundant countermeasure and a hardware AES co-processor, utilizing voltage glitches and clock glitches.
Last updated:  2022-06-30
Nova: Recursive Zero-Knowledge Arguments from Folding Schemes
Abhiram Kothapalli, Srinath Setty, and Ioanna Tzialla
We introduce a new approach to realize incrementally verifiable computation (IVC), in which the prover recursively proves the correct execution of incremental computations of the form $y=F^{(\ell)}(x)$, where $F$ is a (potentially non-deterministic) computation, $x$ is the input, $y$ is the output, and $\ell > 0$. Unlike prior approaches to realize IVC, our approach avoids succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) entirely and arguments of knowledge in general. Instead, we introduce and employ folding schemes, a weaker, simpler, and more efficiently-realizable primitive, which reduces the task of checking two instances in some relation to the task of checking a single instance. We construct a folding scheme for a characterization of $\mathsf{NP}$ and show that it implies an IVC scheme with improved efficiency characteristics: (1) the "recursion overhead" (i.e., the number of steps that the prover proves in addition to proving the execution of $F$) is a constant and it is dominated by two group scalar multiplications expressed as a circuit (this is the smallest recursion overhead in the literature), and (2) the prover's work at each step is dominated by two multiexponentiations of size $O(|F|)$, providing the fastest prover in the literature. The size of a proof is $O(|F|)$ group elements, but we show that using a variant of an existing zkSNARK, the prover can prove the knowledge of a valid proof succinctly and in zero-knowledge with $O(\log{|F|})$ group elements. Finally, our approach neither requires a trusted setup nor FFTs, so it can be instantiated efficiently with any cycles of elliptic curves where DLOG is hard.
Last updated:  2022-06-30
Higher-order masked Saber
Suparna Kundu, Jan-Pieter D’Anvers, Michiel Van Beirendonck, Angshuman Karmakar, and Ingrid Verbauwhede
Side-channel attacks are formidable threats to the cryptosystems deployed in the real world. An effective and provably secure countermeasure against side-channel attacks is masking. In this work, we present a detailed study of higher-order masking techniques for the key-encapsulation mechanism Saber. Saber is one of the lattice-based finalist candidates in the National Institute of Standards of Technology's post-quantum standardization procedure. We provide a detailed analysis of different masking algorithms proposed for Saber in the recent past and propose an optimized implementation of higher-order masked Saber. Our proposed techniques for first-, second-, and third-order masked Saber have performance overheads of 2.7x, 5x, and 7.7x respectively compared to the unmasked Saber. We show that compared to Kyber which is another lattice-based finalist scheme, Saber's performance degrades less with an increase in the order of masking. We also show that higher-order masked Saber needs fewer random bytes than higher-order masked Kyber. Additionally, we adapt our masked implementation to uSaber, a variant of Saber that was specifically designed to allow an efficient masked implementation. We present the first masked implementation of uSaber, showing that it indeed outperforms masked Saber by at least 12% for any order. We provide optimized implementations of all our proposed masking schemes on ARM Cortex-M4 microcontrollers.
Last updated:  2022-06-30
Decoding McEliece with a Hint - Secret Goppa Key Parts Reveal Everything
Elena Kirshanova and Alexander May
We consider the McEliece cryptosystem with a binary Goppa code $C \subset \mathbb{F}_2^n$ specified by an irreducible Goppa polynomial $g(x) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}[X]$ and Goppa points $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}^n$. Since $g(x)$ together with the Goppa points allow for efficient decoding, these parameters form McEliece secret keys. Such a Goppa code $C$ is an $(n-tm)$-dimensional subspace of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$, and therefore $C$ has co-dimension $tm$. For typical McEliece instantiations we have $tm \approx \frac n 4$. We show that given more than $tm$ entries of the Goppa point vector $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$ allows to recover the Goppa polynomial $g(x)$ and the remaining entries in polynomial time. Hence, in case $tm \approx \frac n 4$ roughly a fourth of a McEliece secret key is sufficient to recover the full key efficiently. Let us give some illustrative numerical examples. For \textsc{ClassicMcEliece} with $(n,t,m)=(3488,64,12)$ on input $64\cdot 12+1=769$ Goppa points, we recover the remaining $3488-769=2719$ Goppa points in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}$ and the degree-$64$ Goppa polynomial $g(x) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{12}}[x]$ in $60$ secs. For \textsc{ClassicMcEliece} with $(n,t,m)=(8192,128,13)$ on input $128\cdot 13+1=1665$ Goppa points, we recover the remaining $8192-1665=6529$ Goppa points in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{13}}$ and the degree-$128$ Goppa polynomial $g(x) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^{13}}[x]$ in $288$ secs. Our results also extend to the case of erroneous Goppa points, but in this case our algorithms are no longer polynomial time.
Last updated:  2022-06-30
Reliable Password Hardening Service with Opt-Out
Chunfu Jia, Shaoqiang Wu, and Ding Wang
As the most dominant authentication mechanism, password-based authentication suffers catastrophic offline password guessing attacks once the authentication server is compromised and the password database is leaked. Password hardening (PH) service, an external/third-party crypto service, has been recently proposed to strengthen password storage and reduce the damage of authentication server compromise. However, all existing schemes are unreliable because they overlook the important restorable property: PH service opt-out. In existing PH schemes, once the authentication server has subscribed to a PH service, it must adopt this service forever, even if it wants to stop the external/third-party PH service and restore its original password storage (or subscribe to another PH service). To fill the gap, we propose a new PH service called PW-Hero that equips its PH service with an option to terminate its use (i.e., opt-out). In PW-Hero, password authentication is strengthened against offline attacks by adding external secret spices to password records. With the opt-out property, authentication servers can proactively request to end the PH service after successful authentications. Then password records can be securely migrated to their traditional salted hash state, ready for subscription to other PH services. Besides, PW-Hero achieves all existing desirable properties, such as comprehensive verifiability, rate limits against online attacks, and user privacy. We define PW-Hero as a suite of protocols that meet desirable properties and build a simple, secure, and efficient instance. Moreover, we develop a prototype implementation and evaluate its performance, which shows the practicality of our PW-Hero service.
Last updated:  2022-06-29
Transparent SNARKs from DARK Compilers
Benedikt Bünz, Ben Fisch, and Alan Szepieniec
We construct a new polynomial commitment scheme for univariate and multivariate polynomials over finite fields, with logarithmic size evaluation proofs and verification time, measured in the number of coefficients of the polynomial. The underlying technique is a Diophantine Argument of Knowledge (DARK), leveraging integer representations of polynomials and groups of unknown order. Security is shown from the strong RSA and the adaptive root assumptions. Moreover, the scheme does not require a trusted setup if instantiated with class groups. We apply this new cryptographic compiler to a restricted class of algebraic linear IOPs, which we call Polynomial IOPs, to obtain doubly-efficient public-coin interactive arguments of knowledge for any NP relation with succinct communication. With linear preprocessing, the online verifier's work is logarithmic in the circuit complexity of the relation. There are many existing examples of Polynomial IOPs (PIOPs) dating back to the first PCP (BFLS, STOC'91). We present a generic compilation of any PIOP using our DARK polynomial commitment scheme. In particular, compiling the PIOP from PLONK (GWC, ePrint'19), an improvement on Sonic (MBKM, CCS'19), yields a public-coin interactive argument with quasi-linear preprocessing, quasi-linear (online) prover time, logarithmic communication, and logarithmic (online) verification time in the circuit size. Applying Fiat-Shamir results in a SNARK, which we call *Supersonic*. Supersonic is also concretely efficient with 10KB proofs and under 100ms verification time for circuits with 1 million gates (estimated for 120-bit security). Most importantly, this SNARK is transparent: it does not require a trusted setup. We obtain zk-SNARKs by applying a hiding variant of our polynomial commitment scheme with zero-knowledge evaluations. Supersonic is the first complete zk-SNARK system that has both a practical prover time as well as asymptotically logarithmic proof size and verification time. The original proof had a significant gap that was discovered by Block et al. (CRYPTO 2021). The new security proof closes the gap and shows that the original protocol with a slightly adjusted parameter is still secure. Towards this goal, we introduce the notion of almost-special-sound protocols which likely has broader applications.
Last updated:  2022-06-29
Snapshot-Oblivious RAMs: Sub-Logarithmic Efficiency for Short Transcripts
Yang Du, Daniel Genkin, and Paul Grubbs
ObliviousRAM(ORAM)isapowerfultechniquetopreventharmful data breaches. Despite tremendous progress in improving the concrete perfor- mance of ORAM, it remains too slow for use in many practical settings; recent breakthroughs in lower bounds indicate this inefficiency is inherent for ORAM and even some natural relaxations. This work introduces snapshot-oblivious RAMs, a new secure memory access primitive. Snapshot-oblivious RAMs bypass lower bounds by providing security only for transcripts whose length (call it c) is fixed and known ahead of time. Intuitively, snapshot-oblivious RAMs provide strong security for attacks of short duration, such as the snapshot attacks targeted by many encrypted databases. We give an ORAM-style definition of this new primitive, and present several constructions. The underlying design principle of our constructions is to store the history of recent operations in a data structure that can be accessed obliviously. We instantiate this paradigm with data structures that remain on the client, giving a snapshot-oblivious RAM with constant bandwidth overhead. We also show how these data structures can be stored on the server and accessed using oblivious memory primitives. Our most efficient instantiation achieves O(log c) bandwidth overhead. By extending recent ORAM lower bounds, we show this performance is asymptotically optimal. Along the way, we define a new hash queue data structure—essentially, a dictionary whose elements can be modified in a first-in- first-out fashion—which may be of independent interest.
Last updated:  2022-06-29
PLONK: Permutations over Lagrange-bases for Oecumenical Noninteractive arguments of Knowledge
Uncategorized
Ariel Gabizon, Zachary J. Williamson, and Oana Ciobotaru
Show abstract
Uncategorized
zk-SNARK constructions that utilize an updatable universal structured reference string remove one of the main obstacles in deploying zk-SNARKs [GKMMM, Crypto 2018]. The important work of Maller et al. [MBKM, CCS 2019] presented $\mathsf{Sonic}$ - the first potentially practical zk-SNARK with fully succinct verification for general arithmetic circuits with such an SRS. However, the version of $\mathsf{Sonic}$ enabling fully succinct verification still requires relatively high proof construction overheads. We present a universal SNARK construction with fully succinct verification, and significantly lower prover running time (roughly 7.5-20 less group exponentiations than [MBKM] in the fully succinct verifier mode depending on circuit structure). Similarly to [MBKM], we rely on a permutation argument based on Bayer and Groth [Eurocrypt 2012]. However, we focus on ``Evaluations on a subgroup rather than coefficients of monomials''; which enables simplifying both the permutation argument and the artihmetization step.
Last updated:  2022-06-29
SIDH Proof of Knowledge
Luca De Feo, Samuel Dobson, Steven D. Galbraith, and Lukas Zobernig
We show that the soundness proof for the De Feo-Jao-Plut identification scheme (the basis for supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) signatures) contains an invalid assumption, and we provide a counterexample for this assumption---thus showing the proof of soundness is invalid. As this proof was repeated in a number of works by various authors, multiple pieces of literature are affected by this result. Due to the importance of being able to prove knowledge of an SIDH key (for example, to prevent adaptive attacks), soundness is a vital property. Surprisingly, the problem of proving correctness of an isogeny turns out to be considerably more difficult than was perhaps anticipated. The main result of this paper is a sigma protocol to prove that an SIDH public key (including the torsion points in the public key) is correctly formed. Our scheme also avoids the SIDH identification scheme soundness issue raised by Ghantous, Pintore and Veroni. In particular, our protocol provides a non-interactive way of verifying that SIDH public keys are well-formed as protection against adaptive attacks, leading to an SIDH-based non-interactive key exchange (NIKE).
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Succinct Classical Verification of Quantum Computation
James Bartusek, Yael Tauman Kalai, Alex Lombardi, Fermi Ma, Giulio Malavolta, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Thomas Vidick, and Lisa Yang
We construct a classically verifiable succinct interactive argument for quantum computation (BQP) with communication complexity and verifier runtime that are poly-logarithmic in the runtime of the BQP computation (and polynomial in the security parameter). Our protocol is secure assuming the post-quantum security of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and Learning with Errors (LWE). This is the first succinct argument for quantum computation in the plain model; prior work (Chia-Chung-Yamakawa, TCC '20) requires both a long common reference string and non-black-box use of a hash function modeled as a random oracle. At a technical level, we revisit the framework for constructing classically verifiable quantum computation (Mahadev, FOCS '18). We give a self-contained, modular proof of security for Mahadev's protocol, which we believe is of independent interest. Our proof readily generalizes to a setting in which the verifier's first message (which consists of many public keys) is compressed. Next, we formalize this notion of compressed public keys; we view the object as a generalization of constrained/programmable PRFs and instantiate it based on indistinguishability obfuscation. Finally, we compile the above protocol into a fully succinct argument using a (sufficiently composable) succinct argument of knowledge for NP. Using our framework, we achieve several additional results, including - Succinct arguments for QMA (given multiple copies of the witness), - Succinct non-interactive arguments for BQP (or QMA) in the quantum random oracle model, and - Succinct batch arguments for BQP (or QMA) assuming post-quantum LWE (without iO).
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Mix-Nets from Re-Randomizable and Replayable CCA-secure Public-Key Encryption
Antonio Faonio and Luigi Russo
Mix-nets are protocols that allow a set of senders to send messages anonymously. Faonio et al. (ASIACRYPT’19) showed how to instantiate mix-net protocols based on Public-Verifiable Re-randomizable Replayable CCA-secure (Rand-RCCA) PKE schemes. The bottleneck of their approach is that public-verifiable Rand-RCCA PKEs are less efficient than typical CPA-secure re-randomizable PKEs. In this paper, we revisit their mix-net protocol, showing how to get rid of the cumbersome public-verifiability property, and we give a more efficient instantiation for the mix-net protocol based on a (non publicly-verifiable) Rand-RCCA scheme. Additionally, we give a more careful security analysis of their mix-net protocol.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Tightness Subtleties for Multi-user PKE Notions
Hans Heum and Martijn Stam
Public key encryption schemes are increasingly being studied concretely, with an emphasis on tight bounds even in a multi-user setting. Here, two types of formalization have emerged, one with a single challenge bit and one with multiple challenge bits. Another modelling choice is whether to allow key corruptions or not. How tightly the various notions relate to each other has hitherto not been studied in detail. We show that in the absence of corruptions, single-bit left-or-right indistinguishability is the preferred notion, as it tightly implies the other (corruption-less) notions. However, in the presence of corruptions, this implication no longer holds; we suggest the use of a more general notion that tightly implies both existing options. Furthermore, for completeness we study how the relationship between left-or-right versus real-or-random evolves in the multi-user PKE setting.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
On Access Control Encryption without Sanitization
Cecilia Boschini, Ivan Damgård, and Claudio Orlandi
Access Control Encryption (ACE) allows to control information flow between parties by enforcing a policy that specifies which user can send messages to whom. The core of the scheme is a sanitizer, i.e., an entity that ''sanitizes'' all messages by essentially re-encrypting the ciphertexts under its key. In this work we investigate the natural question of whether it is still possible to achieve some meaningful security properties in scenarios when such a sanitization step is not possible. We answer positively by showing that it is possible to limit corrupted users to communicate only through insecure subliminal channels, under the necessary assumption that parties do not have pre-shared randomness. Moreover, we show that the bandwidth of such channels can be limited to be O(log(n)) by adding public ciphertext verifiability to the scheme under computational assumptions. In particular, we rely on a new security definition for obfuscation, Game Specific Obfuscation (GSO), which is a weaker definition than VBB, as it only requires the obfuscator to obfuscate programs in a specific family of programs, and limited to a fixed security game.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Hashing to Prime in Zero-Knowledge
Thomas Groß
We establish a set of zero-knowledge arguments that allow for the hashing of a committed secret $a$-bit input $x$ to a committed secret $(k+1)$-bit prime number $p_x$. The zero-knowledge arguments can convince a verifier that a commitment indeed is the correctly generated prime number derived from $x$ with a soundness error probability of at most $2^{-k}+ 2^{-t}$ dependent on the number of zero-knowledge argument rounds $k$ and the number of primality bases $t$ to establish primality. Our constructions offer a range of contributions including enabling dynamic encodings for prime-based accumulator, signature and attribute-based credential schemes allowing to reduce these schemes' public key size and setup requirements considerably and rendering them extensible. While our new primality zero-knowledge arguments are of independent interest, we also show improvements on proving that a secret number is the product of two secret safe primes significantly more efficient than previously known results, with applications to setting up secure special RSA moduli.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Making Biased DL Models Work: Message and Key Recovery Attacks on Saber Using Amplitude-Modulated EM Emanations
Ruize Wang, Kalle Ngo, and Elena Dubrova
Creating a good deep learning (DL) model is an art which requires expertise in DL and a large set of labeled data for training neural networks. Neither is readily available. In this paper, we introduce a method which enables us to achieve good results with bad DL models. We use simple multilayer perceptron (MLP) networks, trained on a small dataset, which make strongly biased predictions if used without the proposed method. The core idea is to extend the attack dataset so that at least one of its traces has the ground truth label to which the models are biased towards. The effectiveness of the presented method is demonstrated by attacking an ARM Cortex-M4 CPU implementation of Saber KEM, a finalist of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project, on a nRF52832 system-on-chip supporting Bluetooth 5, using amplitude-modulated EM emanations. Previous amplitude-modulated EM emanation-based attacks on Saber KEM could not recover its messages with a sufficiently high probability. We recover messages with the probability 1 from the profiling device and with the probability 0.74 from a different device. Using messages recovered from chosen ciphertexts, we extract the secret key of Saber KEM.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Chaghri --- an FHE-friendly Block Cipher
Tomer Ashur, Mohammad Mahzoun, and Dilara Toprakhisar
The Recent progress in practical applications of secure computation protocols has also attracted attention to the symmetric-key primitives underlying them. Whereas traditional ciphers have evolved to be efficient with respect to certain performance metrics, advanced cryptographic protocols call for a different focus. The so called arithmetic complexity is viewed through the number and layout of non-linear operations in the circuit implemented by the protocol. Symmetric-key algorithms that are optimized with respect to this metric are said to be algebraic ciphers. Previous work targeting ZK and MPC protocols delivered great improvement in the performance of these applications both in lab and in practical use. Interestingly, despite its apparent benefits to privacy-aware cloud computing, algebraic ciphers targeting FHE did not attract similar attention. In this paper we present Chaghri, an FHE-friendly block cipher enabling efficient transciphering in BGV-like schemes. A complete Chaghri circuit can be implemented using only 16 multiplications, 32 Frobenius automorphisms and 32 rotations, all arranged in a depth-32 circuit. Our HElib implemention achieves a throughput of 0.26 seconds-per-bit which is 65% faster than AES in the same setting.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
NIWI and New Notions of Extraction for Algebraic Languages
Chaya Ganesh, Hamidreza Khoshakhlagh, and Roberto Parisella
We give an efficient construction of a computational non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof in the plain model, and investigate notions of extraction for NIZKs for algebraic languages. Our starting point is the recent work of Couteau and Hartmann (CRYPTO 2020) who developed a new framework (CH framework) for constructing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and arguments under falsifiable assumptions for a large class of languages called algebraic languages. In this paper, we construct an efficient NIWI proof in the plain model for algebraic languages based on the CH framework. In the plain model, our NIWI construction is more efficient for algebraic languages than state-of-the-art Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai (GOS) NIWI (JACM 2012). Next, we explore knowledge soundness of NIZK systems in the CH framework. We define a notion of strong f-extractability, and show that the CH proof system satisfies this notion. We then put forth a new definition of knowledge soundness called semantic extraction. We explore the relationship of semantic extraction with existing knowledge soundness definitions and show that it is a general definition that recovers black-box and non-black-box definitions as special cases. Finally, we show that NIZKs for algebraic languages in the CH framework cannot satisfy semantic extraction. We extend this impossibility to a class of NIZK arguments over algebraic languages, namely quasi-adaptive NIZK arguments that are constructed from smooth projective hash functions.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
A More Accurate Automatic Search Model for Characterizing Division Property
Huawei Liu, Zilong Wang, and Liu Zhang
Division property is a generalized integral property proposed by Todo at EUROCRYPT 2015. Subsequently, Todo and Morii extended division property to the bit level and proposed conventional bit-based division property (CBDP) and bit-based division property using three subsets (BDPT). At ASIACRYPT 2016, Xiang et al. applied MILP technique to model the CBDP propagation for the first time. To construct an automatic search model for BDPT propagation, Hu et al. characterized a variant BDPT based on SMT/SAT. Later at ASIACRYPT 2019, Wang et al. characterized the BDPT based MILP. However, the above two automatic search models have some limitations. In this paper, we focus on constructing an automatic search model that can more accurately characterize the BDPT propagation. Firstly, we define a new notion named BDPT Trail, which divides the BDPT propagation into three parts: the division trail K, division trail L, and Key-Xor operation. Secondly, we improve the insufficiency of the previous methods of calculating division trails and propose an effective algorithm that can obtain more valid division trails L of the S-box operation. Thirdly, we propose a new algorithm that models each Key-Xor operation based on MILP technique for the first time. Based on this, we can accurately characterize the Key-Xor operation by solving these MILP models. After that, by selecting appropriate initial BDPT and stopping rules, we construct an automatic search model that more accurately characterizes the BDPT propagation. As a result, our automatic search model is applied to search integral distinguishers for some block ciphers. For GIFT-64, we find a 11-round integral distinguisher which is one more round than the previous best results. For Rectangle, we find a better 10-round integral distinguisher with 9 balanced bits, which has eight more bits than the previous best results. For Simon64, we can find more balanced bits than the previous longest distinguishers. For Present, we find a better 9-round integral distinguisher with less active bits.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Privacy-aware Secure Region-based Handover for Small Cell Networks in 5G-enabled Mobile Communication
Rabiah Alnashwan, Prosanta Gope, and Benjamin Dowling
The 5G mobile communication network provides seamless communications between users and service providers and promises to achieve several stringent requirements, such as seamless mobility and massive connectivity. Although 5G can offer numerous benefits, security and privacy issues still need to be addressed. For example, the inclusion of small cell networks (SCN) into 5G brings the network closer to the connected users, providing a better quality of services (QoS), resulting in a significant increase in the number of Handover procedures (HO), which will affect the security, latency and efficiency of the network. It is then crucial to design a scheme that supports seamless handovers through secure authentication to avoid the consequences of SCN. To address this issue, this article proposes a secure region-based handover scheme with user anonymity and an efficient revocation mechanism that supports seamless connectivity for SCNs in 5G. In this context, we introduce three privacy-preserving authentication protocols, i.e., initial authentication protocol, intra-region handover protocol and inter-region handover protocol, for dealing with three communication scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the privacy and security in both the intra-region and inter-region handover scenarios in 5G communication. Detailed security and performance analysis of our proposed scheme is presented to show that it is resilient against many security threats, is cost-effective in computation and provides an efficient solution for the 5G enabled mobile communication.
Last updated:  2022-06-28
Formalizing Delayed Adaptive Corruptions and the Security of Flooding Networks
Christian Matt, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Søren Eller Thomsen
Many decentralized systems rely on flooding protocols for message dissemination. In such a protocol, the sender of a message sends it to a randomly selected set of peers. These peers again send the message to their randomly selected peers, until every network participant has received the message. This type of protocols clearly fail in face of an adaptive adversary who can simply corrupt all peers of the sender and thereby prevent the message from being delivered. Nevertheless, flooding protocols are commonly used within protocols that aim to be cryptographically secure, most notably in blockchain protocols. While it is possible to revert to static corruptions, this gives unsatisfactory security guarantees, especially in the setting of a blockchain that is supposed to run for an extended period of time. To be able to provide meaningful security guarantees in such settings, we give precise semantics to what we call $\delta$-delayed adversaries in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Such adversaries can adaptively corrupt parties, but there is a delay of time $\delta$ from when an adversary decides to corrupt a party until they succeed in overtaking control of the party. Within this model, we formally prove the intuitive result that flooding protocols are secure against $\delta$-delayed adversaries when $\delta$ is at least the time it takes to send a message from one peer to another plus the time it takes the recipient to resend the message. To this end, we show how to reduce the adaptive setting with a $\delta$-delayed adversary to a static experiment with an Erdős–Rényi graph. Using the established theory of Erdős–Rényi graphs, we provide upper bounds on the propagation time of the flooding functionality for different neighborhood sizes of the gossip network. More concretely, we show the following for security parameter $\kappa$, point-to-point channels with delay at most $\Delta$, and $n$ parties in total, with a sufficiently delayed adversary that can corrupt any constant fraction of the parties: If all parties send to $\Omega(\kappa)$ parties on average, then we can realize a flooding functionality with maximal delay $\mathcal{O}\bigl(\Delta \cdot \log (n) \bigr)$; and if all parties send to $\Omega\bigl( \sqrt{\kappa n \log (n)} \bigr)$ parties on average, we can realize a flooding functionality with maximal delay $\mathcal{O}(\Delta)$.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
More Efficient Algorithms for the NTRU Key Generation using the Field Norm
Thomas Pornin and Thomas Prest
NTRU lattices are a class of polynomial rings which allow for compact and efficient representations of the lattice basis, thereby offering very good performance characteristics for the asymmetric algorithms that use them. Signature algorithms based on NTRU lattices have fast signature generation and verification, and relatively small signatures, public keys and private keys. A few lattice-based cryptographic schemes entail, generally during the key generation, solving the NTRU equation: $$ f G - g F = q \mod x^n + 1 $$ Here $f$ and $g$ are fixed, the goal is to compute solutions $F$ and $G$ to the equation, and all the polynomials are in $\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$. The existing methods for solving this equation are quite cumbersome: their time and space complexities are at least cubic and quadratic in the dimension $n$, and for typical parameters they therefore require several megabytes of RAM and take more than a second on a typical laptop, precluding onboard key generation in embedded systems such as smart cards. In this work, we present two new algorithms for solving the NTRU equation. Both algorithms make a repeated use of the field norm in tower of fields; it allows them to be faster and more compact than existing algorithms by factors $\tilde O(n)$. For lattice-based schemes considered in practice, this reduces both the computation time and RAM usage by factors at least 100, making key pair generation within range of smart card abilities.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Formal Verification of Arithmetic Masking in Hardware and Software
Barbara Gigerl, Robert Primas, and Stefan Mangard
Masking is a popular secret-sharing technique that is used to protect cryptographic implementations against physical attacks like differential power analysis. So far, most research in this direction has focused on finding efficient Boolean masking schemes for well-known symmetric cryptographic algorithms like AES and Keccak. However, especially with the advent of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), arithmetic masking has received increasing attention from the research community. In practice, many PQC algorithms require a combination of arithmetic and Boolean masking, which makes the search for secure and efficient conversion algorithms between these domains (A2B/B2A) an interesting but very challenging research topic. While there already exist lots of tools that can help with the formal verification of Boolean masked implementations, the same cannot be said about arithmetic masking and accompanying mask conversion algorithms. In this work, we demonstrate the first formal verification approach for (any-order) Boolean and arithmetic masking which can be applied to both hardware and software, while considering side-effects such as glitches and transitions. First, we show how a formal verification approach for Boolean masking can be used in the context of arithmetic masking such that we can verify A2B/B2A conversions for arbitrary masking orders. We investigate various conversion algorithms in hardware and software, and point out several new findings such as glitch-based issues for straightforward implementations of [CGV14]-A2B in hardware, transition-based leakage in Goubin-A2B in software, and more general implementation pitfalls when utilizing common optimization techniques in PQC. We provide the first formal analysis of table-based A2Bs from a probing security perspective and point out that they might not be easy to implement securely on processors that use of memory buffers or caches.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Security Analysis of a Recent Pairing-based Certificateless Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol for Blockchain-based WBANs
Yong-Jin Kim, Dok-Jun An, Kum-Sok Sin, and Son-Gyong Kim
In this paper, we proposed some vulnerabilities of a recent pairing-based certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol for blockchain-based wireless body area networks (WBAN). According to our analysis, this protocol is insecure against key offset attack (KOA), basic impersonation attack (BIA), and man-in-the-middle attack (MMA) of the malicious key generation center (KGC) administrators. We also found and pointed out some errors in the description of the protocol.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Symmetrical Disguise: Realizing Homomorphic Encryption Services from Symmetric Primitives (extended version)
Alexandros Bakas, Eugene Frimpong, and Antonis Michalas
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a modern cryptographic technique that allows direct computations on encrypted data. While relatively new to the mainstream debate, HE has been a solid topic in research for decades. However, despite the technological advances of the past years, HE’s inefficiencies render it impractical for deployment in realistic scenarios. Hence research in the field is still in its initial phase. To overcome certain challenges and bring HE closer to a realization phase, researchers recently introduced the promising concept of Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption (HHE) – a primitive that combines symmetric cryptography with HE. Using HHE, users perform local data encryptions using a symmetric encryption scheme and then outsource them to the cloud. Upon reception, the cloud can transform the symmetrically encrypted data into homomorphic ciphertexts without decrypting them. Such an approach can be seen as an opportunity to build new, privacy-respecting cloud services, as the most expensive operations of HE can be moved to the cloud. In this work, we undertake the task of designing a secure cryptographic protocol based on HHE. In particular, we show how HHE can be used as the main building block of a protocol that allows an analyst to collect data from multiple sources and compute specific functions over them, in a privacy-preserving way. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that aims at demonstrating how HHE can be utilized in realistic scenarios, through the design of a secure protocol.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Round Efficient Byzantine Agreement from VDFs
Poulami Das, Lisa Eckey, Sebastian Faust, Julian Loss, and Monosij Maitra
Byzantine agreement (BA) is a fundamental primitive in distributed systems and has received huge interest as an important building block for blockchain systems. Classical byzantine agreement considers a setting where $n$ parties with fixed, known identities want to agree on an output in the presence of an adversary. Motivated by blockchain systems, the assumption of fixed identities is weakened by using a \emph{resource-based model}. In such models, parties do not have fixed known identities but instead have to invest some expensive resources to participate in the protocol. Prominent examples for such resources are computation (measured by, e.g., proofs-of-work) or money (measured by proofs-of-stake). Unlike in the classical setting where BA without trusted setup (e.g., a PKI or an unpredictable beacon) is impossible for $t \geq n/3$ corruptions, in such resource-based models, BA can be constructed for the optimal threshold of $t <n/2$. In this work, we investigate BA without a PKI in the model where parties have restricted computational resources. Concretely, we consider sequential computation modeled via computing a verifiable delay function (VDF) and establish the following results: Positive Result: We present the first protocol for BA with expected constant round complexity and termination under adaptive corruption, honest majority and without a PKI. Earlier work achieved round complexity $O(n\kappa^2)$ (CRYPTO'15) or $O(\kappa)$ (PKC'18), where $\kappa$ is the security parameter. Negative Result: We give the first lower bound on the communication complexity of BA in a model where parties have restricted computational resources. Concretely, we show that a multicast complexity of $O(\sqrt{n})$ is necessary even if the parties have access to a VDF oracle.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Efficient Algorithms for Broadcast and Consensus Based on Proofs of Work
Lisa Eckey, Sebastian Faust, and Julian Loss
Inspired by the astonishing success of cryptocurrencies, most notably the Bitcoin system, several recent works have focused on the design of robust blockchain-style protocols that work in a peer-to-peer setting such as the Internet. In contrast to the setting traditionally considered in multiparty computation (MPC), in these systems, honesty is measured by computing power instead of requiring that only a certain fraction of parties is controlled by the adversary. This provides a potential countermeasure against the so-called Sybil attack, where an adversary creates fake identities, thereby easily taking over the majority of parties in the system. In this work we design protocols for Broadcast and Byzantine agreement that are secure under the assumption that the majority of computing power is controlled by the honest parties and for the first time have expected constant round complexity. This is in contrast to earlier works (Crypto'15, ePrint'14) which have round complexities that scale linearly with the number n of parties; an undesirable feature in a P2P environment with potentially thousands of users. In addition, our main protocol which runs in quasi-constant rounds, introduces novel ideas that significantly decrease communication complexity. Concretely, this is achieved by using an appropriate time-locked encryption scheme and by structuring the parties into a network of so-called cliques. Note: This article contains incorrect claims. Some of its contributions were subsumed by eprint article 2022/823
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Automatically Verified Mechanized Proof of One-Encryption Key Exchange
Bruno Blanchet
We present a mechanized proof of the password-based protocol One-Encryption Key Exchange (OEKE) using the computationally-sound protocol prover CryptoVerif. OEKE is a non-trivial protocol, and thus mechanizing its proof provides additional confidence that it is correct. This case study was also an opportunity to implement several important extensions of CryptoVerif, useful for proving many other protocols. We have indeed extended CryptoVerif to support the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. We have also added support for proofs that rely on Shoup's lemma and additional game transformations. In particular, it is now possible to insert case distinctions manually and to merge cases that no longer need to be distinguished. Eventually, some improvements have been added on the computation of the probability bounds for attacks, providing better reductions. In particular, we improve over the standard computation of probabilities when Shoup's lemma is used, which allows us to improve the bound given in a previous manual proof of OEKE, and to show that the adversary can test at most one password per session of the protocol. In this paper, we present these extensions, with their application to the proof of OEKE. All steps of the proof are verified by CryptoVerif. This document is an updated version of a report from 2012. In the 10 years between 2012 and 2022, CryptoVerif has made a lot of progress. In particular, the probability bound obtained by CryptoVerif for OEKE has been improved, reaching an almost optimal probability: only statistical terms corresponding to collisions between group elements or between hashes are overestimated by a small constant factor.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
A Note on Key Ranking for Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks
Cezary Glowacz
In our paper "Optimal collision side-channel attacks" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/828) we studied collision side-channel attacks, derived an optimal distinguisher for the key, and provided an optimal algorithm for maximizing the success rate of the attacks. In this note we show that the problem of key ranking using an optimal distinguisher for collision side-channel attacks is NP-hard and we provide lower bounds for key ranks in collision side-channel attacks.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
A Long Tweak Goes a Long Way: High Multi-user Security Authenticated Encryption from Tweakable Block Ciphers
Benoît Cogliati, Jérémy Jean, Thomas Peyrin, and Yannick Seurin
We analyze the multi-user (mu) security of a family of nonce-based authentication encryption (nAE) schemes based on a tweakable block cipher (TBC). The starting point of our work is an analysis of the mu security of the SCT-II mode which underlies the nAE scheme Deoxys-II, winner of the CAESAR competition for the defense-in-depth category. We extend this analysis in two directions, as we detail now. First, we investigate the mu security of several TBC-based variants of the counter encryption mode (including CTRT, the encryption mode used within SCT-II) that differ by the way a nonce, a random value, and a counter are combined as tweak and plaintext inputs to the TBC to produce the keystream blocks that will mask the plaintext blocks. Then, we consider the authentication part of SCT-II and study the mu security of the nonce-based MAC Nonce-as-Tweak (NaT) built from a TBC and an almost universal (AU) hash function. We also observe that the standard construction of an AU hash function from a (T)BC can be proven secure under the assumption that the underlying TBC is unpredictable rather than pseudorandom, allowing much better conjectures on the concrete AU advantage. This allows us to derive the mu security of the family of nAE modes obtained by combining these encryption/MAC building blocks through the NSIV composition method. Some of these modes require an underlying TBC with a larger tweak length than what is usually available for existing ones. We then show the practicality of our modes by instantiating them with two new TBC constructions, Deoxys-TBC-512 and Deoxys-TBC-640, which can be seen as natural extensions of the Deoxys-TBC family to larger tweak input sizes. Designing such TBCs with unusually large tweaks is prone to pitfalls: Indeed, we show that a large-tweak proposal for SKINNY published at EUROCRYPT 2020 presents an inherent construction flaw. We therefore provide a sound design strategy to construct large-tweak TBCs within the Superposition Tweakey (STK) framework, leading to new Deoxys-TBC and SKINNY variants. We provide software benchmarks indicating that while ensuring a very high security level, the performances of our proposals remain very competitive.
Last updated:  2022-06-27
Key Structures: Improved Related-Key Boomerang Attack against the Full AES-256
Jian Guo, Ling Song, and Haoyang Wang
This paper introduces structure to key, in the related-key attack settings. While the idea of structure has been long used in keyrecovery attacks against block ciphers to enjoy the birthday effect, the same had not been applied to key materials due to the fact that key structure results in uncontrolled differences in key and hence affects the validity or probabilities of the differential trails. We apply this simple idea to improve the related-key boomerang attack against AES-256 by Biryukov and Khovratovich in 2009. Surprisingly, it turns out to be effective, i.e., both data and time complexities are reduced by a factor of about 2^8, to 2^92 and 2^91 respectively, at the cost of the amount of required keys increased from 4 to 2^19. There exist some tradeoffs between the data/time complexity and the number of keys. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first essential improvement of the attack against the full AES-256 since 2009. It will be interesting to see if the structure technique can be applied to other AES-like block ciphers, and to tweaks rather than keys of tweakable block ciphers so the amount of required keys of the attack will not be affected.
Last updated:  2022-06-26
Predicting BKZ Z-Shapes on q-ary Lattices
Martin R. Albrecht and Jianwei Li
Primal attacks against the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem rely on reducing \(q\)-ary lattices. These reduced bases have been observed to exhibit a so-called ``Z-shape'' on their Gram--Schmidt vectors. We propose an efficient simulator to accurately predict this Z-shape behaviour, which we back up with extensive simulations and experiments. We also formalise (under standard heuristics) the intuition that the presence of a Z-shape makes enumeration-based primal lattice attacks faster. Furthermore, we upgrade the LWE or lattice estimator with our simulator to assess and then rule out the impact of the \(q\)-ary Z-shape on solving LWE instances derived from parameter sets for NIST PQC candidates. We consider this improved estimator to be of independent interest.
Last updated:  2022-06-26
Batch point compression in the context of advanced pairing-based protocols
Dmitrii Koshelev
This paper continues author's previous ones about compression of points on elliptic curves $E_b\!: y^2 = x^3 + b$ (with $j$-invariant $0$) over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$. More precisely, we show in detail how any two (resp. three) points from $E_b(\mathbb{F}_{\!q})$ can be quickly compressed to two (resp. three) elements of $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$ (apart from a few auxiliary bits) in such a way that the corresponding decompression stage requires to extract only one cubic (resp. sextic) root in $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$ (with several multiplications and without inversions). As a result, for many $q$ occurring in practice the new compression-decompression methods are more efficient than the classical one with the two (resp. three) $x$ or $y$ coordinates of the points, which extracts two (resp. three) roots in $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$. We explain why the new methods are useful in the context of modern real-world pairing-based protocols such as Groth16. As a by-product, when $q \equiv 2 \ (\mathrm{mod} \ 3)$ (in particular, $E_b$ is supersingular), we obtain a two-dimensional analogue of Boneh--Franklin's encoding, that is a way to sample two "independent'' $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$-points on $E_b$ at the cost of one cubic root in $\mathbb{F}_{\!q}$. Finally, we comment on the case of four and more points from $E_b(\mathbb{F}_{\!q})$.
Last updated:  2022-06-26
How to Base Security on the Perfect/Statistical Binding Property of Quantum Bit Commitment?
Junbin Fang, Dominique Unruh, Jun Yan, and Dehua Zhou
The concept of quantum bit commitment was introduced in the early 1980s for the purpose of basing bit commitments solely on principles of quantum theory. Unfortunately, such unconditional quantum bit commitments still turn out to be impossible. As a compromise like in classical cryptography, Dumais et al. [DMS00] introduce the conditional quantum bit commitments that additionally rely on complexity assumptions. However, in contrast to classical bit commitments which are widely used in classical cryptography, up until now there is relatively little work towards studying the application of quantum bit commitments in quantum cryptography. This may be partly due to the well-known weakness of the general quantum binding that comes from the possible superposition attack of the sender of quantum commitments, making it unclear whether quantum commitments could be useful in quantum cryptography. In this work, following Yan et al. [YWLQ15] we continue studying using (canonical non-interactive) perfectly/statistically-binding quantum bit commitments as the drop-in replacement of classical bit commitments in some well-known constructions. Specifically, we show that the (quantum) security can still be established for zero-knowledge proof, oblivious transfer, and proof-of-knowledge. In spite of this, we stress that the corresponding security analyses are by no means trivial extensions of their classical analyses; new techniques are needed to handle possible superposition attacks by the cheating sender of quantum bit commitments. Since (canonical non-interactive) statistically-binding quantum bit commitments can be constructed from quantum-secure one-way functions, we hope using them (as opposed to classical commitments) in cryptographic constructions can reduce the round complexity and weaken the complexity assumption simultaneously.
Last updated:  2022-06-26
Autoguess: A Tool for Finding Guess-and-Determine Attacks and Key Bridges
Hosein Hadipour and Maria Eichlseder
The guess-and-determine technique is one of the most widely used techniques in cryptanalysis to recover unknown variables in a given system of relations. In such attacks, a subset of the unknown variables is guessed such that the remaining unknowns can be deduced using the information from the guessed variables and the given relations. This idea can be applied in various areas of cryptanalysis such as finding the internal state of stream ciphers when a sufficient amount of output data is available, or recovering the internal state and the secret key of a block cipher from very few known plaintexts. Another important application is the key-bridging technique in key-recovery attacks on block ciphers, where the attacker aims to find the minimum number of required sub-key guesses to deduce all involved sub-keys via the key schedule. Since the complexity of the guess-and-determine technique directly depends on the number of guessed variables, it is essential to find the smallest possible guess basis, i.e., the subset of guessed variables from which the remaining variables can be deduced. In this paper, we present Autoguess, an easy-to-use general tool to search for a minimal guess basis. We propose several new modeling techniques to harness SAT/SMT, MILP, and Gröbner basis solvers. We demonstrate their usefulness in guess-and-determine attacks on stream ciphers and block ciphers, as well as finding key-bridges in key recovery attacks on block ciphers. Moreover, integrating our CP models for the key-bridging technique into the previous CP-based frameworks to search for distinguishers, we propose a unified and general CP model to search for key recovery friendly distinguishers which supports both linear and nonlinear key schedules.
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