Paper 2024/1696
Revisiting the Robustness of (R/M)LWR under Polynomial Moduli with Applications to Lattice-Based Compact SO-CCA Security
Abstract
This work conducts a comprehensive investigation on determining the entropic hardness of (R/M)LWR under polynomial modulus. Particularly, we establish the hardness of (M)LWR for general entropic secret distributions from (Module) LWE assumptions based on a new conceptually simple framework called rounding lossiness. By combining this hardness result and a trapdoor inversion algorithm with asymptotically the most compact parameters, we obtain a compact lossy trapdoor function (LTF) with improved efficiency. Extending our LTF with other techniques, we can derive a compact all-but-many LTF and PKE scheme against selective opening and chosen ciphertext attacks, solely based on (Module) LWE assumptions within a polynomial modulus. Additionally, we show a search-to-decision reduction for RLWR with Gaussian secrets from a new R\'enyi Divergence-based analysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Learning with RoundingsSelective Openning SecurityLossy Trapdoor Function
- Contact author(s)
- jinhaoxiang2000 @ outlook com
- History
- 2024-10-18: approved
- 2024-10-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1696
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1696,
author = {Haoxiang Jin and Feng-Hao Liu and Zhedong Wang and Yang Yu and Dawu Gu},
title = {Revisiting the Robustness of (R/M){LWR} under Polynomial Moduli with Applications to Lattice-Based Compact {SO}-{CCA} Security},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1696},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1696}
}
