Paper 2025/243

K-Linkable Ring Signatures and Applications in Generalized Voting

Abstract

$\mathit{\text{Linkable ring signatures}}$ (LRS) allow a user to sign anonymously on behalf of a ring, while maintaining linkability—two signatures from the same signer are publicly identified, i.e., linked. This linkability makes LRS suitable to prevent double-voting in classical, $$ voting protocols—each voter casts one vote and the candidate with the most votes wins the election. Several voting scenarios rely on (generalized) rules rather than plurality. For example, in $$, voters submit a ranking of the candidates, and the outcome is a function of these rankings. Such generalized voting rules are common in social choice theory, and have recently found their way into blockchain governance, e.g., for prioritizing (voting on) proposed (candidate) projects. However, unlike plurality voting, using LRS for voters to sign their votes (rankings) does not guarantee vote privacy as one can observe the rankings of each individual voter, which, depending on the scoring rule, is more information than what the outcome of the election offers. We introduce $$-$$ ($$-LRS) as a primitive for simultaneously achieving anonymity and privacy in generalized voting. A $$-LRS scheme has the following properties: ($$-)$$: a user can sign anonymously (on behalf of the ring) up to $$ times, so that even an unbounded adversary cannot link his signatures. ($$-)$$: If any signer signs more than $$ times, all his signatures are publicly linked $$; and, any set of $$ signers cannot generate more than $$ unlinked signatures $$. We provide two constructions of $$-LRS: one is from the DDH, and the other is from SIS (hence post-quantum). Finally, we show how $$-LRS can be applied to a broad range of voting rules, including $$, $$, and $$. Our protocols are non-interactive voting—each voter just posts a message on a bulletin board—which highlights the potential of $$-LRS in blockchain-governance scenarios.