Paper 2025/647

Anamorphic Voting: Ballot Freedom Against Dishonest Authorities

Rosario Giustolisi, IT University of Copenhagen
Mohammadamin Rakeei, University of Luxembourg
Gabriele Lenzini, University of Luxembourg
Abstract

Electronic voting schemes typically ensure ballot privacy by assuming that the decryption key is distributed among tallying authorities, preventing any single authority from decrypting a voter’s ballot. However, this assumption may fail in a fully dishonest environment where all tallying authorities collude to break ballot privacy. In this work, we introduce the notion of anamorphic voting, which enables voters to convey their true voting intention to an auditor while casting an (apparently) regular ballot. We present new cryptographic techniques demonstrating that several existing voting schemes can support anamorphic voting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Voting' 25
Keywords
ballot privacyanamorphic encryptiondishonest authority
Contact author(s)
rosg @ itu dk
amin rakeei @ uni lu
gabriele lenzini @ uni lu
History
2025-04-13: approved
2025-04-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/647
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/647,
      author = {Rosario Giustolisi and Mohammadamin Rakeei and Gabriele Lenzini},
      title = {Anamorphic Voting: Ballot Freedom Against Dishonest Authorities},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/647},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/647}
}
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