Paper 2024/1598

On the security of the initial tropical Stickel protocol and its modification based on Linde-de la Puente matrices

Sulaiman Alhussaini, University of Birmingham
Serge˘ı Sergeev, University of Birmingham
Abstract

Recently, a more efficient attack on the initial tropical Stickel protocol has been proposed, different from the previously known Kotov-Ushakov attack, yet equally guaranteed to succeed. Given that the Stickel protocol can be implemented in various ways, such as utilizing platforms beyond the tropical semiring or employing alternative commutative matrix ``classes'' instead of polynomials, we firstly explore the generalizability of this new attack across different implementations of the Stickel protocol. We then conduct a comprehensive security analysis of a tropical variant that successfully resists this new attack, namely the Stickel protocol based on Linde-de la Puente (LdlP) matrices. Additionally, we extend the concept of LdlP matrices beyond the tropical semiring, generalizing it to a broader class of semirings.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
public key cryptographycryptographic attackStickel protocol
Contact author(s)
saa399 @ student bham ac uk
s sergeev @ bham ac uk
History
2024-10-09: approved
2024-10-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1598
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1598,
      author = {Sulaiman Alhussaini and Serge˘ı Sergeev},
      title = {On the security of the initial tropical Stickel protocol and its modification based on Linde-de la Puente matrices},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1598},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1598}
}
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