Paper 2025/1265

A note on a recent attack against SPEEDY-7-192

Christina Boura, IRIF, Université Paris Cité, France
Patrick Derbez, Univ Rennes, Inria, CNRS, IRISA, France
Baptiste Germon, Univ Rennes, Inria, CNRS, IRISA, France
Rachelle Heim Boissier, UCLouvain, ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, Belgium
María Naya-Plasencia, Inria, Paris, France
Abstract

Recently, two independent differential attacks on SPEEDY-7-192 were proposed by Boura et al. and by Beyne and Neyt. Both works present, for the first time, a valid differential attack on SPEEDY-7-192 with time complexities of $2^{186.36}$ and $2^{185}$ respectively. In this note, by extending the search space for 1-round trails, we propose a new differential attack on SPEEDY-7-192 with both data and time complexity of $2^{174.80}$. This improves upon both previous attacks by more than a factor of $2^{10}$.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
differential cryptanalysisSPEEDYquasidifferentials
Contact author(s)
christina boura @ irif fr
patrick derbez @ inria fr
baptiste germon @ inria fr
rachelle heim @ uclouvain be
maria naya-plasencia @ inria fr
History
2025-07-11: approved
2025-07-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/1265
License
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
CC BY-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1265,
      author = {Christina Boura and Patrick Derbez and Baptiste Germon and Rachelle Heim Boissier and María Naya-Plasencia},
      title = {A note on a recent attack against {SPEEDY}-7-192},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1265},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1265}
}
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