Paper 2025/1265
A note on a recent attack against SPEEDY-7-192
Abstract
Recently, two independent differential attacks on SPEEDY-7-192 were proposed by Boura et al. and by Beyne and Neyt. Both works present, for the first time, a valid differential attack on SPEEDY-7-192 with time complexities of $2^{186.36}$ and $2^{185}$ respectively. In this note, by extending the search space for 1-round trails, we propose a new differential attack on SPEEDY-7-192 with both data and time complexity of $2^{174.80}$. This improves upon both previous attacks by more than a factor of $2^{10}$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- differential cryptanalysisSPEEDYquasidifferentials
- Contact author(s)
-
christina boura @ irif fr
patrick derbez @ inria fr
baptiste germon @ inria fr
rachelle heim @ uclouvain be
maria naya-plasencia @ inria fr - History
- 2025-07-11: approved
- 2025-07-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/1265
- License
-
CC BY-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/1265,
author = {Christina Boura and Patrick Derbez and Baptiste Germon and Rachelle Heim Boissier and María Naya-Plasencia},
title = {A note on a recent attack against {SPEEDY}-7-192},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/1265},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1265}
}