Cryptographic compression functions are a core component of vector commitment schemes, including Merkle tree commitments, which are widely used in modern ZK-SNARK and STARK frameworks. Arithmetization-Oriented (AO) compression functions minimize multiplicative complexity over the framework's native field F_p, making them significantly more efficient than bit-oriented designs in algebraic circuits. To date, AO compression functions have been almost exclusively constructed by applying the Sponge mode to an AO permutation. In this work, we introduce two novel approaches for building permutation-based AO compression modes: the PA family, based on a Permutation with feedforward Addition, and PAX, as an eXtension of the PA family. We formally establish that, in contrast to the Sponge construction, our modes achieve optimal collision and preimage resistance. We also prove that PAX is indifferentiable from a random oracle, further strengthening its security and composability guarantees. We further show that variable-input-length hash functions can be safely instantiated from the PA(X) modes by applying appropriate domain extenders. Beyond their strong security guarantees, our modes provide a framework that unifies and extends the description of several recently proposed modes that have been studied via cryptanalysis but do not come with provable security guarantees, including Jive and Trunc, as used in the AO designs Anemoi and Poseidon2. Finally, through extensive experimental evaluation, we compare the concrete efficiency improvement that our modes offer compared to the Sponge approach over two popular AO permutation designs, Poseidon permutation and Rescue. For 128 bits of collision resistance, our modes can achieve up to a 2x speed-up over Sponge for equivalent compression rates in a software implementation. When considering R1CS arithmetization in the Groth16 framework, the PA(X) preimage-verification circuit can be 10% faster than Sponge. In the Plonky2 framework, PA(X) can achieve up to a 60% speed-up

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows $n$ parties to compute a function of their private inputs, so that nothing beyond the output of the function is revealed. In the sub-optimal honest majority setting in which the number of corrupted parties $t<(1/2-\varepsilon)n$, the works of Goyal et al. (CRYPTO'21 and CRYPTO'22), achieved $O(|C|)$ communication even against active adversaries, but with $\Omega(n\cdot|C|)$ computation, where $C$ is the arithmetic circuit computed by the MPC. Recent work by Garg et al. (CRYPTO'24) showed that both $O(|C|)$ communication and computation can be achieved in this regime, however, only against passive adversaries. In this work, we achieve the best-of-both-worlds by obtaining MPC with $O(|C|)$ communication and computation against active corruption of $t<(1/2-\varepsilon)n$ parties. To do this, we introduce novel techniques for actively-secure MPC constructed from Chinese Remainder Theorem based secret sharing.

Consensus protocols form the core of blockchains and other replicated state machines, ensuring that all correct nodes process the same totally ordered log of input transactions. In fault-free executions, performance is driven by the good-case transaction latency -- the time between a transaction becoming known to all nodes and its confirmation by the consensus protocol -- which depends on both how frequently proposals are made and, once made, how quickly they are confirmed. While prior work has established tight lower bounds on confirmation latency that modern protocols already achieve, it remains open whether the inter-proposal time can be further reduced below the state-of-the-art of one network delay. We introduce Gatling, an atomic broadcast protocol that achieves arbitrarily small inter-proposal times under rotating leader schedules; in particular, smaller than the network delay. Gatling runs multiple parallel instances of a black-box atomic broadcast protocol and staggers their proposal schedules to generate proposals in faster succession than state-of-the-art protocols. A deterministic interleaving rule merges the outputs of these instances into a single global log. We analyze the effects of head-of-line blocking caused by crashed leaders, and derive Gatling's optimal number of parallel instances. We further study the impact of Gatling on predictable validity and present two variants that retain this property. Finally, our experiments confirm that Gatling can be used with off-the-shelf component protocols to achieve low latency without fine-tuning the component protocol for minimum latency.

We initiate the study of multi-authority traitor tracing (MA-TT), a decentralized variant of traitor tracing in which tracing capabilities are distributed across multiple independent authorities rather than concentrated in a single trusted entity. Ciphertexts are associated with tracing policies over a collection of authorities, specifying which subsets of authorities are authorized to jointly accuse a user of contributing to a pirate decoder. This enables fine-grained control over tracing capabilities, prevents unilateral accusations, and reduces the surveillance risks inherent in centralized tracing systems. Our scheme naturally supports conjunction, disjunction, threshold, and more general monotone tracing policies. We further introduce multi-authority attribute-based traitor tracing (MA-AB-TT), which combines distributed tracing in MA-TT with decentralized access control from multi-authority attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE). Ciphertexts are therefore equipped with two orthogonal policies: an attribute policy governing decryption and a tracing policy governing which tracing authorities may jointly identify traitors. Our main contribution is a construction of MA-AB-TT for arbitrary monotone access structures from the standard matrix decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption in prime-order pairing groups. Our construction achieves adaptive security under static corruption of authorities in the random oracle model. All system parameters are independent of the number of authorities and users in the system, while ciphertexts grow linearly with the size of the associated policies. Our framework also yields a publicly traceable variant, in which tracing can be performed using only the authorities' public keys, albeit with weaker asymptotic efficiency guarantees. Technically, we extend the blueprint for pairing-based traitor tracing based on private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE) [Boneh et al., Eurocrypt 2006] to the multi-authority setting. The key technical ingredient is a new multi-authority PLBE construction, which we instantiate from slotted inner-product function encryption (sIPFE) [Lin and Luo, Eurocrypt 2020]. As an intermediate step, we provide a new attribute-based sIPFE scheme supporting arithmetic branching programs, which may be of independent interest. Our techniques also yield a new modular construction of adaptively secure MA-ABE under static corruptions from sIPFE, improving on a prior construction by Ambrona and Gay [PKC 2023]. Finally, when specialized to a single authority, our framework gives the first ciphertext-policy attribute-based traitor tracing scheme with asymptotically optimal parameters and exponentially large user spaces.

Existing encrypted search and private set intersection (PSI) protocols struggle to reconcile post-quantum security with practical efficiency, often leaking search and access patterns or requiring prohibitively deep fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) circuits. We address these limitations by introducing a new Homomorphic Bloom Filters (HBF) framework, a quantum-resilient framework that embeds length-$m$ Bloom filters directly into the plaintext space of an RLWE-based FHE scheme, enabling shallow homomorphic evaluation and matching without structural leakage. Building on HBF, we construct a searchable encryption (SE) scheme and a private set intersection (PSI) protocol, both based on a depth-1 homomorphic missing-bit circuit. The SE scheme requires no rotations or bootstrapping at server side and incurs no additional computational cost as the number of query keywords increases. The PSI protocol reduces each packed Bloom-filter comparison to a single ciphertext--plaintext multiplication, with cost depending on the Bloom-filter length rather than direct element-wise comparisons with the responder's set. This framework confines leakage to benign dataset dimensions, tunable false-positive rates, and other public metadata, thereby eliminating explicit pattern leakage.

This paper presents the first practical end-to-end fault injection attacks on the post-quantum signature scheme PERK, based on the MPC-in-the-Head paradigm and relies on GGM tree expansions for efficient randomness generation. While GGM trees reduce memory requirements, they introduce implementation-level deviations from the theoretical model. We show that these implementation choices fundamentally alter the fault surface and enable new attack vectors that are not captured by the original security assumptions. We propose two attacks targeting distinct stages of the GGM tree construction. The first attack fixes the root seed, resulting in deterministic tree generation and enabling full reconstruction of all leaf labels. The second attack induces reuse of GGM roots via an instruction skip, allowing recovery of hidden leaf values across consecutive rounds. Both attacks require only a single fault to recover the secret key. We demonstrate both attacks end-to-end on the pqm4 reference implementation compiled with optimization levels -O3 as well as -Os for ARM Cortex-M4 microcontrollers. Our evaluation is performed on two hardware platforms (ChipWhisperer-Lite with STM32F303 and Nucleo-L4R5ZI-P) using clock glitching and electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI). We achieve success probabilities of 100% and 85% for the two attacks, respectively. Finally, we propose countermeasures for both attacks.

Lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic schemes such as ML-KEM or ML-DSA combine bitwise operations, which are most efficiently masked using Boolean secret sharing, with arithmetic operations modulo q, which are cheaper to mask using an additive sharing in the respective field or ring. Previous work has automated the generation of Boolean-masked hardware circuits as well as the design space exploration process, but to the best of our knowledge, no similar generic framework exists for hardware designs requiring mixed masking domains. Such designs pose three additional challenges. First, share-wise arithmetic requires no registers to be secure, leading to long critical paths without deliberate pipelining. Second, the conversions required at domain boundaries increase both complexity and susceptibility to human error. Finally, generation of masking randomness from a traditional PRNG requires post-processing, e.g., via rejection sampling, to achieve uniformity modulo q, which results in a variable output rate. We solve these issues and integrate our scheme-agnostic solutions into the masking and design space exploration framework HADES. An efficient pre-synthesis critical path estimation, which is around 60 times faster than synthesis with traditional timing analysis, enables effective exploration of mixed-domain masked circuits without compromising the maximum clock frequency. Our adapted gadget-based masking procedure tracks masking domains and inserts pipelined conversions at domain boundaries automatically, or lets the template developer place resource-shared conversions manually. Lastly, a Markov-chain model of probabilistic masking randomness generation and buffering yields cost-minimal design configurations that guarantee stall-free masked operation except for a user-defined failure probability. We evaluate our methodology for multiple relevant moduli and implement an arbitrary-order masked ML-KEM decapsulation core as a case study for our open-source framework. Its area-optimized configurations represent, to the best of our knowledge, the most compact reported ML-KEM designs, with 54.1 kGE unmasked and 125.4 kGE at first order using the NanGate45 library. Jointly optimizing for area and critical path yields competitive clock frequencies of 325–429 MHz for at most 31% more area, which is still smaller than all previous designs. Practical side-channel security at both first and second masking order is validated through FPGA-based TVLA measurements of the full decapsulation routine using 10 million traces each.

The CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme has traditionally been viewed as suitable only for approximate arithmetic. However, recent work (Alexandru et al., Crypto 2025) has introduced functional bootstrapping techniques that enable accurate lookup tables (LUTs) evaluation in CKKS. Nevertheless, to deal with the high precision problem, the state-of-the-art scheme (Dumezy et al., TCHES 2026) requires reshaping the LUTs into a matrix, which incurs $O(P)$ multiplications for a size-$P$ table and dominates runtime. We first observe that LUT matrices for many practical functions are often highly structured, with exact or numerical rank much smaller than matrix dimension. We then develop a spectral framework for the LUT evaluation problem, which characterizes the relationship between function classes and the singular value decomposition. This framework yields exact rank bounds for structured function classes such as separable functions, and establishes exponential decay of singular values (implying low numerical rank) for smooth analytic functions. Building on this framework, we propose Low Rank Multiplexer Tree Functional Bootstrapping (LRMT-FBT), which evaluates the LUT via the singular values and singular vectors instead of direct matrix multiplication. This reduces the homomorphic multiplication cost from $O(P)$ to $O(r\sqrt{P})$, where $r$ denotes the rank of matrix, while also supporting extensions to multi-value and multi-input settings. We implement LRMT-FBT in OpenFHE and evaluate it across different spectral classes. We also introduce implementation optimizations to improve the bootstrapping efficiency. At high precision, LRMT-FBT provides substantial performance improvements for common low rank functions compared with Dumezy et al. Typically, for $P = 2^{20}$, our method accelerates the LUT evaluation step by \(196.9\times\) for Step (\(r=1\)) and \(99.6\times\) for ReLU (\(r=3\)), yielding functional bootstrapping speedups of \(5.3\times\) and \(5.1\times\), respectively.

As machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) becomes ubiquitous, protecting model queries via private inference is increasingly critical. Existing homomorphic encryption (HE)-based protocols for Private Decision Tree Evaluation (PDTE) have server complexity that scales at least as $O(2^D)$ in the tree depth $D$, so the cost of evaluating each tree grows exponentially with depth; in gradient boosted decision tree (GBDT) ensembles, where predictions aggregate the outputs of many trees, this per-tree cost is directly amplified. In this paper, we present a non-interactive HE-based PDTE protocol built on the CKKS scheme with an end-to-end complexity of $O(p\sqrt{2^D})$, where $p$ is the input bit-length. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first HE-based PDTE scheme that asymptotically improves over the $O(2^D)$ dependence on $D$ while remaining non-interactive. We address two depth-driven sources of $O(2^D)$ dependence in existing protocols: we use the One-Branch-Only (OBO) paradigm from PROBONITE for comparisons, and we design the Baby-Step Giant-Step based Branch Selection algorithm for traversal. To further exploit the structure of GBDT ensembles, we deploy the batched bootstrapping technique by applying level-major tree evaluation. Our experimental results show that, at depth $D=12$, our protocol reduces communication by $8.38\times$ and runtime by $7.74\times$ compared to FASTER, which is the fastest prior HE-based non-interactive PDTE baseline in our amortized setting, and the advantage increases as $D$ grows. These results suggest that our design provides a practical path toward depth-scalable HE-based PDTE for large boosted ensembles.

Satellite communication systems, as critical long-lifecycle infrastructure, face a dual security challenge in the coming decades: the threat of quantum computers and the operational rigidity of traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). While migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) addresses the former, it fails to solve the inefficiency of certificate management, where in-orbit policy updates require a prohibitively slow and complex multi-party re-issuance process. To address these challenges, we introduce the concept of a Post-Quantum Sanitizable Multi-Signature ($\texttt{PQ-SMS}$), a novel primitive that enables controlled certificate adaptation across hierarchical trust while preserving the integrity of the root of trust. Building on this, we present $\texttt{Sat-APCS} $($\textbf{Sat}$ellite $\textbf{A}$daptable $\textbf{P}$ost-quantum $\textbf{C}$ertificate $\textbf{S}$cheme), which cryptographically decouple a certificate's immutable, multi-signed identity from its dynamic operational policies. This allows a delegated entity to perform lightweight, in-orbit policy updates while the foundational signature from the original consortium of authorities remains unchanged and valid. We instantiate $\texttt{PQ-SMS}$ based on the NIST-standard CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature and a ISIS-based chameleon hash, and prove its security under standard lattice assumptions. Furthermore, Performance evaluation demonstrates that $\texttt{PQ-SMS}$ bypasses the interactive re-signing loop of traditional PKI, achieving an order-of-magnitude reduction in update bandwidth.

Asynchronous multi-party computation (AMPC) en- ables a set of mutually distrustful parties to securely compute any joint function on their private inputs under arbitrary network delays. The guaranteed output delivery (i.e., G.O.D.) property is essential for availability, but can be very challenging to achieve in practice. HoneyBadgerMPC (CCS 2019), the first practical AMPC protocol, follows Beaver’s paradigm that generates Beaver triples offline to simplify online computation. One of the underlying building blocks, the random double sharing protocol that generates random double shares, how- ever, implicitly assumes a synchronous network. DumboMPC (Usenix Sec 2025) overcomes the issue by adopting a two-phase workflow where the underlying consensus protocol has to be executed twice, and thus incurs high latency. Velox (CCS 2025) achieves lower latency and weaker cryptographic assumptions at the cost of sacrificing G.O.D. It remains an open question whether there exists a more practical AMPC protocol with the G.O.D. property. In this paper, we present RondoMPC, a practical AMPC protocol with G.O.D. with only one phase of consensus. To achieve this goal, we build a practical asynchronous and complete random double sharing (ACRDS) protocol. Our ACRDS protocol supports batching, so a batch of random double shares can be generated simultaneously. Furthermore, ACRDS supports efficient verification of aggregated secret shares, allowing the random double shares to be used for Beaver triple generation using only one phase of consensus. Our experimentation results show that RondoMPC is highly practical, achieving both higher throughput and lower latency for Beaver triple generation compared to existing protocols.

We present TruthTable, a verifiable database engine that allows a prover to produce a succinct proof that convinces a verifier of the correct execution of the verifier's SQL query over the prover's committed database. TruthTable supports a large subset of SQL, enabling it to prove 17 out of 22 queries in the standard TPC-H benchmark. To our knowledge, this is the widest support out of all prior work. Moreover, TruthTable's proofs are small, and fast to generate and verify: on the TPC-H benchmark with a database of a million rows, TruthTable's average proving time is $55$ seconds, average verification time is $32$ ms, and average proof size is $24$ kB. Compared to prior work, TruthTable's proving times are between $6.3\times$-$63\times$ better, while the verification times and proof sizes are competitive. TruthTable achieves these properties via a codesign of cryptography and database techniques. On the cryptographic front, we propose a new polynomial representation of database tables, and design new subprotocols for proving the correct execution of various relational operators on these representations. On the database front, we propose a query planner that optimizes queries for minimal proving time, as opposed to minimal execution time. We also design new optimizations for this planner that reduce proving time by up to $2 \times$.

Rate Limiting Nullifier (RLN) is a privacy-preserving and decentralized spam-prevention mechanism for anonymous broadcast networks: each member can emit at most $r$ signals per epoch, and any violation reveals a secret that enables the member's stake to be slashed. The standard construction binds each membership to a single secret key $\mathsf{sk}_G$, so the unit of identity, the unit of authorization, and the unit of slashing all coincide with one party. This rules out settings in which a group should speak with one voice, share one rate budget, and stand behind one collective bond without any single member being able to act unilaterally. We introduce Collaborative RLN Signaling (coRLN), a protocol that lets $n$ parties register as a single RLN member and signal only by acting jointly. The group secret $\mathsf{sk}_G$ is held as additive shares under SPDZ and never reconstructed; the identity (or rate) commitment, the per-epoch RLN evaluation, and the broadcast proof are produced inside an MPC network using collaborative zk-SNARKs. The group occupies one leaf in the membership Merkle tree, locks one aggregated stake $\mathsf{stake}_G$, and is bound by one rate limit. We present the construction in both the rate-limit-1 and the general $r \geq 1$ settings, and we extend the protocol with a collaborative withdrawal procedure that lets the group exit without ever reconstructing $\mathsf{sk}_G$. We prove three security properties of coRLN by reduction to the collaborative-SNARK composition and the standard primitives underneath: (i) no PPT adversary corrupting up to $n-1$ parties recovers $\mathsf{sk}_G$ as long as one party is honest; (ii) two signals in the same epoch with the same $\mathsf{messageId}$ yield an efficient extractor that recovers $\mathsf{sk}_G$ and triggers forfeiture of $\mathsf{stake}_G$; and (iii) no strict subset of $G$ can produce a verifying signal. The verifier interface and signal shape match classical RLN at the byte level, so coRLN deploys on existing RLN-aware infrastructure with only the verification key updated.

Distributed shuffling is a core primitive underlying mix-nets, electronic voting, and, more recently, single secret leader election (SSLE) protocols for proof-of-stake blockchains. In these settings, a collection of resource-constrained parties jointly permutes a list of ciphertexts or commitments in order to conceal the correspondence between inputs and outputs. Existing security analyses of such protocols typically rely on heuristic anonymity measures or implicitly assume honest behavior; therefore, they fail to capture statistical dependencies that arise when shuffling is partial and some participants are corrupted. In this work, we introduce a new security model for distributed shuffling that accurately reflects the setting of real-world attacks by explicitly accounting for adversarial corruption and information leakage. Our model allows an adversary to corrupt a subset of shufflers and track selected elements throughout the execution, as well as query the resulting permutation afterwards. We then turn to studying Whisk in this model, the shuffle-based SSLE mechanism proposed for Ethereum. Leveraging Markov-chain techniques, we show that security can only be guaranteed for more stringent parameters than currently proposed. We evaluate the performance impact of changing these parameters on the Ethereum network.

We give a witness-finding cryptanalysis of Stickel-type key exchange schemes, which involve two-sided multiplication of $n \times n$ matrices over $\mathbb{F}_p$, where these matrices are drawn from public subspaces with a particular commuting structure. This analysis covers Stickel's original proposal, Shpilrain's polynomial extension of that scheme, Nager's algebraic extension of that scheme, and more generally all Stickel-type approaches using public subspaces over matrix algebra in finite fields: all such schemes can be broken in polynomial time. We also describe a new key establishment scheme using two-sided matrix multiplication in which the commuting subspaces used to form the key are hidden via conjugation by private terms, blocking this specific public-subspace analysis; the witness-finding problem in this new scheme has a direct reduction from a standard NP-hard problem (Edmonds' problem).

In 2011, Grigoriev and Shpilrain proposed using tropical algebraic structures in cryptography. In recent years, numerous protocols based on tropical and related structures have been introduced, as well as many attacks on some of these protocols. This direction of research is now known as tropical cryptography. As a result of the efforts both to design secure schemes and to analyze their vulnerabilities, many purely algebraic and computational problems have emerged. In this paper, we give an overview of several results and open questions in this area. We discuss the complexity of solving certain classes of systems of equations over tropical and similar structures, as well as algorithms and approaches for solving such systems. We also present results on the asymptotic density of satisfiable systems of equations of special forms over tropical algebras. Furthermore, we discuss the discrete logarithm problem, the two-sided discrete logarithm problem, the knapsack problem, and the subset sum problem over tropical matrix structures. We consider a generalization of marginal sets for tropical semirings and semigroups. We also explore different classes of pairwise commuting matrices.

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables non-interactive secure transformer inference (NISTI). Due to the high cost of bootstrapping, conventional approaches typically choose parameters that support a large multiplicative depth to reduce bootstrapping frequency. However, larger depth directly increases ciphertext size, resulting in higher communication and computation overheads. In this paper, we introduce a novel functional bootstrapping (FBS) scheme that fundamentally reshapes the computation paradigm for NISTI: by fusing as many operations as possible into each bootstrapping operation, our approach significantly reduces the prescribed multiplicative depth. Our FBS achieves a trigonometric minimax approximation for the target function, making it well suited for precision-sensitive components such as transformer nonlinear layers. Furthermore, we incorporate linear layers into the slot-to-coefficient (S2C) transformation within FBS, thereby eliminating the need to evaluate them separately. Building on these innovations, we present a complete NISTI framework that achieves a 1.9$\times$ speedup in runtime (from 662.3s to 349.5s) and a 3$\times$ reduction in communication (from 48.3MB to 16.1MB) compared with the state-of-the-art.

Poseidon is one of the most widely deployed arithmetization-oriented cryptographic permutations and plays a central role in modern zero-knowledge proof systems. Although several algebraic attacks on reduced-round variants have been proposed, the security of the recommended parameter sets remains intact. A central difficulty in such attacks is controlling the degree growth of the polynomial representations induced by the permutation. In this work, we develop degree annihilation, extending coefficient cancellation in round-skipping attacks to cubic Poseidon. Degree annihilation reduces the contribution of existing rounds by imposing algebraic constraints that force dominant degree terms to vanish. This yields polynomial systems of substantially lower effective degree. We first present a simple bivariate form of degree annihilation and show how it combines naturally with classical round-skipping techniques. For cubic S-boxes with six full rounds, making the first partial-round input affine reduces the final degree bound by a factor of three. We then generalize the technique to multivariate settings, where systems of control equations are used to annihilate successive partial-round degree contributions. We find control solutions using elimination, resultants, and Gröbner basis techniques. As a proof of concept, we apply the framework to reduced-round Poseidon instances and obtain new CICO-2 attacks. More broadly, our results suggest that constructing algebraic varieties that actively control degree growth may provide a direction for the cryptanalysis of arithmetization-oriented primitives.

Universal multi-party swaps were proposed for secure cross-chain cryptocurrency exchanges across multiple blockchains that require only signature verification from the underlying blockchains. However, existing universal swap protocols remain vulnerable to griefing attacks, where a deviating party aborts the swap to lock a compliant party’s assets for a long period, potentially causing indirect economic losses. A natural approach is to lift existing griefing-free solutions to the universal setting; however, we observe that this direct approach still faces three key challenges: (i) a timeout race attack, which arises from the absence of an upper bound on the transaction validity; (ii) a premium escape attack, which results from multiple refund transactions for the same assets being simultaneously valid; and (iii) a topological limitation, which implies that universal multi-party swaps can support only a special class of strongly connected digraphs, called reuniclus graphs. In this paper, we propose GumSwap, a Griefing-free universal multi-party atomic Swap, which guarantees that a compliant party receives a premium if its asset is locked but not redeemed. To mitigate the timeout race attack and the premium escape attack, we impose minimum timeout intervals for the principal and premium timeouts, respectively, and introduce an asset migration mechanism that ensures that, during any time interval, at most one refund transaction is valid. Given the topological limitations of universal swap protocols, we further design a novel premium distribution mechanism that accommodates two classes of leaders in reuniclus graphs. Our experimental results demonstrate that GumSwap can be performed in less than 0.5 seconds per party, while reducing gas costs by 10.3X compared with existing contract-based solutions.

Universal atomic swaps [Oakland'22] replace hashed timelock contracts with adaptor signatures and verifiable timed dlogs, enabling secure cross-chain cryptocurrency exchanges that only require basic signature verification from the underlying blockchains. However, existing universal swap protocols remain vulnerable to griefing attacks, where a deviating party aborts the swap to lock a compliant party's assets for a long period. A natural approach is to lift existing contract-based solutions to the universal setting, but we identify that this straightforward solution faces two key challenges: (i) timeout race attacks, first identified in PipeSwap [Oakland'25], which arises from the absence of an upper bound on the transaction validity; (ii) a timeout overlap dilemma, which results from multiple overlapping refund periods. In this paper, we propose HedgeSwap, a universal hedged atomic swap protocol against griefing attacks, which compensates a compliant party with a premium if its asset is locked but not redeemed. To mitigate the timeout race attacks and timeout overlap dilemma, HedgeSwap eliminates the premium timeout and instead relies on a hard relation to refund the premium. For high-value asset swaps where the parties acceptable premium ranges do not overlap, we further propose a round-based HedgeSwap that utilizes a premium migration mechanism to solve these two timeout challenges, where parties iteratively increase the premium until the lock-up risk premium acceptable to both. Our experimental results show that our HedgeSwap can complete in under 0.5 seconds, and round-based HedgeSwap completes in under 1.3 seconds for a five-round setting, while HedgeSwap reduces gas cost by 2.69X compared to existing contract-based solutions.

A pair of differences $(x,y)$ is a \emph{related differential} for a linear layer $M$ if, for every coordinate at both the input and the output, at least one of the two values vanishes or the two values coincide. Related differentials underlie the zero-difference attack on AES of Bardeh and Rijmen, and the question of which maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices admit them was raised by Daemen and Rijmen, who showed that every $4\times4$ circulant MDS matrix does while some Hadamard ones do not. In earlier work the $3\times3$ MDS matrices over $\mathbb{F}_{2^r}$ admitting related differentials were characterized by fifteen explicit equations. In this paper we settle the $4\times4$ case completely: an MDS matrix $M=DNE$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^r}$ admits a related differential if and only if at least one of $280$ explicit polynomial equations in the nine free entries of its reduced form $N$ holds. The equations, $70$ quadratic and $210$ cubic, are pairwise distinct, irreducible and pairwise coprime, and fall into $27$ orbits under the natural symmetries. We further determine the structure of the equation set: the fifteen equations of the $3\times3$ case are exactly the points of $\mathrm{PG}(3,2)$, while the $280$ equations span a $14$-dimensional $\mathbb{F}_2$-space, satisfy exactly $560$ additive relations, and contain exactly $840$ pairs that can never hold simultaneously on an MDS matrix. The discarded zero patterns split into $525$ whose determinant condition is equivalent to the failure of MDS-ness and $289$ vacuous cases. Over $\mathbb{F}_8$, the smallest field carrying $4\times4$ MDS matrices, exhaustive enumeration shows that there are exactly $720$ reduced MDS matrices; each satisfying exactly $28$ of the equations and each equation being satisfied by exactly $72$ matrices; in particular every $4\times4$ MDS matrix over $\mathbb{F}_8$ admits a related differential. Over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{10}}$ we exhibit an explicit MDS matrix admitting none. All results are verified by exact computation against an independent exhaustive search.

GPU Tensor Cores, specialized hardware units designed to accelerate matrix multiplication, have served as the primary engine behind the AI revolution. Given the exponential performance gains they have delivered, aligning cryptographic implementations with this hardware evolution is critical. This is particularly acute for zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), a cryptographic primitive that currently grapples with high proof generation costs. Existing GPU implementations for ZKPs rely exclusively on general-purpose SIMT cores, leaving the massive computational power of Tensor Cores untapped. In this paper, we introduce TensorZKP, the first GPU framework to harness Tensor Cores for ZKP acceleration. Since Tensor Cores are designed for low-precision matrix multiplication, mapping ZKP's arithmetic to this hardware is non-trivial. To bridge this gap, we develop Tensor-Core-compatible finite field arithmetic and reformulate ZKP modules, specifically sum-check protocols and Spielman code, into matrix multiplication tasks. Furthermore, we design an asynchronous warp-specialized framework that pipelines memory access, Tensor Core matrix operations, and SIMT-based modular reductions. We instantiate these optimizations with HyperPlonk as the Polynomial Interactive Oracle Proof (PIOP) and Brakedown as the Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS) to enable end-to-end proof generation. The evaluation results show that TensorZKP exhibits remarkable efficiency. At a $2^{25}$ scale, the underlying building blocks complete in $0.85$ ms for inner product, $0.91$ ms for scalar-vector multiplication, $4.04$ ms for degree-2 sum-check, and $11.58$ ms for the encoder. For a circuit with $2^{25}$ multiplication gates, TensorZKP achieves a proof generation time of only $215.28$ milliseconds, representing a $955\times$ speedup over the CPU baseline and a $36.2\times$ improvement over state-of-the-art SIMT-based GPU implementations.

Shift-invariant maps have been employed to design nonlinear layers in many symmetric cryptographic schemes, such as the $\chi$-map used in Keccak. In this paper, we study a family of shift-invariant maps on $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ which exhibit strong arithmetic properties with respect to the composition. The set of their defining functions, which we denote by $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$, is induced by a so-called ``bifix-free'' sequence $\underline{a}=(a_1,a_2,\ldots,a_m)\in \mathbb{F}_2^m$ with $2\leq m<n$. It is shown that $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$ forms a commutative monoid with respect to the composition. If $m\nmid n$, then $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$ is isomorphic to the unit group of $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/ (x^{\lceil \frac{n}{m} \rceil})$; if $m\mid n$, then the unit group of $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$ is isomorphic to that of $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/ (x^{ \frac{2n}{m}}+x^{ \frac{n}{m}})$. The isomorphic relation transforms the composition of functions in $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$ into the multiplication of polynomials in the quotient ring of $\mathbb{F}_2[x]$, where the algebraic properties of the latter are well-understood. As a straightforward application, we focus on the algebraic properties of a particular class of functions in $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$, denoted by $\rho_k$ for $k\geq 1$, which include the $\chi$-map as well as several other known maps studied in earlier literature. It is shown that $\rho_k$ is invertible if and only if $m\nmid n$. Also the inverse and the cycle structure of $\rho_k$ (if invertible) can be fully characterized. As different bifix-free sequences $\underline{a}$ typically induce different families of functions $\Omega_{\underline{a}}$ with pairwise trivial intersections, this work offers abundant parameter flexibility for designing invertible shift-invariant maps as well as deep insights into their algebraic properties.

Anonymous tokens with private metadata bit (ATPM) allow an issuer to embed a hidden trust flag, as a single bit, within issued tokens. The bit remains hidden from the clients, but verifiers can read the bit and rate-limit or discard tokens marked suspect. A series of ATPM constructions exist in the literature, however all current constructions rely on classical hardness assumptions such as RSA groups, pairings, or elliptic-curve VRFs and do not provide any post-quantum security guarantees. In this work we present, the first ATPM scheme based on lattice assumptions. Tokens generated with our scheme are publicly verifiable, and privately bit-extractable given partial knowledge of the issuing authority's secret. Our design follows the Fischlin blind-signature paradigm and enriches it with lattice-based linearly-homomorphic encryption to carry the hidden bit. We also instantiate our scheme from Falcon-512 and the efficient LNP22 lattice NIZK proof system (Lyubashevsky et. al, Crypto '22). The resulting protocol, which we call $\textsf{Atlantis}$, requires 70 KB of client-issuer communication and yields 129 KB tokens.

Session is a widely deployed decentralized messenger application that emphasizes user anonymity and privacy through end-to-end encryption. Session currently employs its own uniquely designed messaging protocol, Session Protocol V1, having migrated from the extensively studied Signal Protocol. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive, implementation-driven security analysis of the Session Protocol V1, focusing on its 1-to-1 and closed-group communication mechanisms. Our analysis reveals two fundamental design vulnerabilities: the absence of mutual public key authentication and the lack of cryptographic bindings to monotonic sequence counters. Exploiting these weaknesses within the context of actual application environments, we demonstrate three practical attacks: an impersonation attack, a message timestamp forgery attack, and message dropping and replay attacks. These attacks allow malicious server nodes or unprivileged malicious insiders to substitute public keys, silently suppress or duplicate messages, and manipulate the perceived chronological order of conversations. The findings highlight that these exploits severely undermine the fundamental security guarantees of the messenger. Finally, we propose immediate, actionable mitigation strategies to address the identified flaws and secure the protocol against these threats.

Leakage-resilient rekeying schemes aim to maintain cryptographic security in the presence of side-channel leakage by periodically refreshing ephemeral keys before sufficient information can be accumulated by an adversary. Fallen Sanctuary (LR4) is a recent higher-order leakage-resilient rekeying construction that achieves exponential security amplification with respect to the number of primitive encryption invocations and the number of traces required to compromise the physical security of the implementation. Its security, however, relies on the correct maintenance of internal counters and cached intermediate keys that enforce the prescribed trace bounds. In this work, we investigate the security of LR4 under a combined fault and side- channel attack model. We show that transient faults targeting the counter-update and counter-validation mechanism can prevent the advancement of the rekeying state, causing repeated reuse of temporal keys that are intended to be short-lived. As a consequence, the bounded-trace assumptions underlying the LR4 security proof no longer hold. We demonstrate that an adversary can accumulate an arbitrary number of leakage traces corresponding to the same secret state, effectively reducing the security of the protected primitive to that of a conventional implementation without rekeying. We evaluate the attack on a fault simulated implementation and analyze its impact on the leakage-resilience guarantees claimed by LR4. Our findings emphasize that leakage-resilient rekeying schemes must consider fault- induced violations of state evolution assumptions in addition to conventional side- channel leakage.

In non-synchronous networks, classic partition arguments imply that any $t\text{-resilient}$ protocol among $n$ parties cannot ensure safety for many meaningful functionalities once the number of corruptions reaches $f \geq n - 2t$. This motivates building in accountability to detect (and deter) safety violations. We present the first accountable asynchronous MPC (AAMPC) protocol that securely evaluates any arithmetic circuit $\mathcal{C}$ (asynchronously computable by a trusted third party). Our protocol: (1) Ensures all target hyperproperties (correctness, privacy, input-independence, and guaranteed output delivery) whenever $f \leq t < n/3$. (2) Provides strong accountability for $f \in (t,\,t_{\mathrm{acc}}]$ with $t_{\mathrm{acc}} < n - t$: either (i) all hypersafety properties continue to hold (without guaranteed output delivery), or (ii) every honest party obtains publicly verifiable evidence implicating at least $n - 2t$ faulty processes. The construction follows the standard offline/online paradigm and assumes only a transparent setup: a bulletin-board public key infrastructure (PKI) and a common random string (CRS). Our main technical contribution is an accountable additively homomorphic high-threshold asynchronous complete (verifiable) secret sharing functionality with amortized linear communication for both sharing and reconstruction. This yields an efficient online phase with $O\big(\mathsf{Depth}(\mathcal{C})\big)$ latency and amortized $O(|\mathcal{C}|n)$ communication. We additionally provide a constant-round offline phase with cubic communication per generated Beaver triple. Our results are formalized and proven in the Accountable Universal Composability (AUC) framework (S&P 2023), an extension of UC designed to support modular analysis of accountability guarantees.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) underpins modern public-key infrastructure, relying on the computational hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). While monolithic quantum architectures running Shor's algorithm threaten ECC, their physical realization is bottlenecked by massive logical qubit demands for modular inversion. Distributed Quantum Computing (DQC) offers a scalable pathway by interconnecting smaller, cooperative Quantum Processing Units (QPUs). In this paper, we adapt two state-of-the-art distributed quantum frameworks, namely a zero-quantum-communication paradigm and a sequential teleportation-based protocol, to the elliptic curve setting. We provide the first rigorous resource estimation of distributed ECDLP solvers. By incorporating the compact, register-sharing Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) formulation, we quantify the physical design trade-offs for a cryptographically secure 256-bit elliptic curve on fault-tolerant architectures. Specifically, the zero-quantum-communication variant operates with 1094 to 1154 logical qubits per node, whereas the teleportation-based variant requires as few as 856 to 1098 logical qubits per node. Furthermore, optimizing the arithmetic window size ($\omega = 16$) over $k = 22$ nodes reduces the single-node Toffoli gate count to $2^{26.84}$, which represents an approximate $14\times$ reduction compared to the $2^{30.63}$ baseline of monolithic schemes. Our results delineate the architectural boundaries between inter-QPU communication, classical coordination, and single-chip hardware floors, mapping out an efficient design space for distributed quantum cryptanalysis.

Digital library lending is a critical resource for access to information. Currently prevalent models of digital lending, however, involve opaque licensing schemes that entail serious drawbacks to reader privacy and freedom of expression. In popular modern library apps, publishers and hidden intermediaries control a wealth of informa- tion about readers and reading habits, at a scale and level of detail that would be essentially impossible in physical library lending. To understand digital lending needs in practice, our work begins with a series of interviews with library professionals (𝑁= 11). We present thematic findings on their concerns with existing systems, including privacy, surveillance, preservation, and lack of library control over resources. Many of the concerns raised are inherently unproblematic in the context of physical library lending—leading us to our central technical question: Can digital lending achieve privacy and transparency at least as strong as physical library lending? Based on our qualitative findings, we provide the first rigorous modeling of security, privacy, and transparency requirements in digital library lending. As existing systems fall short of the strong guarantees we model, we propose a new system design, LendLocked, based on cryptography and trusted hardware, and prove it achieves these guarantees in the random oracle model. We micro-benchmark our design’s key cryptographic functionalities, s

Constant time programming patterns is the primary defense against timing attacks on cryptographic implementations, yet what "constant time" means varies across academia and industry. This work systematizes constant time models and their evolution, identifies a recurring gap between what models protect and what specifications assume, and distills an offensive methodology for discovering timing vulnerabilities that originate outside the cryptographic primitive boundary. Applying this methodology, we locate a specification-level vulnerability related to private key loading, and confirm the leak in both OpenSSL and BoringSSL. Counterintuitively, BoringSSL's per-observation signal is several orders of magnitude stronger than OpenSSL's, despite an explicitly stricter threat model.

Following the cryptographic security analyses of proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain protocols, a line of research has focused on their economic robustness. The two core questions asked are: How resilient is the system to rational attacks, and how profitable it is for miners to execute it. However, to our knowledge, no work to date has attempted to address them considering the full complexity of the blockchain protocol, including difficulty readjustment, which is needed to handle dynamic participation, price fluctuations, and the impact of risk. In this work, we provide a fine-grained game-theoretic analysis for Nakamoto-style PoW blockchains, which takes into account both incentives of parties to deviate and complications introduced by difficulty readjustment. Our results employ the Rational Protocol Design framework of Garay et al. [FOCS’13] and extend recent works on the economic robustness of the Bitcoin backbone protocol to the variable difficulty setting. Notably, our fine-grained specification of miners’ utility incorporates variable difficulty adjustment alongside factors like the average cost of mining and the depreciation factor, which, despite being common in economics, are typically either abstracted as exogenous parameters or ignored in the blockchain literature. We showcase the expressivity and usefulness of our formulation of utilities by using it to provide estimates and trends for such factors across several real-world cryptocurrencies.

FESTA is an isogeny-based trapdoor function proposed as a high-performance trapdoor function in isogeny-based cryptography. Its core design principles have inspired a number of related constructions, collectively referred to as FESTA variants. The MOXZ attack is an adaptive attack that exploits malicious ciphertexts together with access to a checking oracle, aiming to compromise FESTA and its variants. This attack applies to FESTA variants whose secret keys are derived from isogenies of known degree; however, it does not extend to variants employing masked-degree isogenies. In this work, we present a novel adaptive attack that generalizes the MOXZ attack. Our attack successfully targets several FESTA variants even when their secret keys are isogenies of masked degree. We also identify POKE-4D as an exception for which our attack does not appear to be applicable.

Shuffle differential privacy (shuffle DP) offers an attractive distributed alternative to standard differential privacy. It uses a secure shuffler to permute users' randomized encodings, providing individual data privacy without a central trusted entity. A key challenge, however, is to achieve both generality and client efficiency. Under information-theoretic shuffle-DP guarantees, protocols that nearly match central-model utility are restricted to statistical tasks such as summation and histograms. In contrast, in the computational setting, additive randomized encodings (ARE), introduced by Halevi et al. (CRYPTO 2023), yield a generic compiler that achieves central-model utility for arbitrary mechanisms. However, their construction incurs prohibitive worst-case computation and communication costs for clients, making it impractical for resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones, IoT sensors, and web browsers. In this work, we present a client-efficient one-round compiler from central DP to non-robust computational shuffle DP. To achieve this, we first construct a new balanced ARE scheme, where all the clients almost equally share the computational burden in the protocol. For a mechanism $M$ over $n$ clients, this reduces the worst-case per-client computation from $O(|M|)$ in prior work to $O(|M|/n)$, where $|M|$ denotes the circuit complexity of the mechanism. The key technical ingredient is a new permute-XOR ARE primitive that enables wire splicing across independently generated garbled subcircuits. Secondly we design a more efficient ARE-to-shuffle compiler, whose client bandwidth scales with the sparsity and cross-partition structure parameter of the ARE encoding - a quantity that is always sublinear in $n$. This is an improvement over Halevi et al. (CRYPTO 2023) where each client bandwidth is $\Omega(n)$. At a high level, the first contribution improves client computation while the second improves client bandwidth. We provide an implementation of our generic compiler for differentially private tasks including selection, distinct elements, and linear contextual bandits. We obtain shuffle protocols that match the utility of their central-model counterparts with reasonable client overhead. We evaluate our method across a range of practical settings, and observe substantial gains over the compiler of Halevi et al., with per-client computational and bandwidth speedups increasing linearly in the number of clients.

We revisit the problem of mitigating information leakage in the widely used but insecure compress-then-encrypt paradigm. While encryption hides message contents, the ciphertext length is directly related to the length of the compressed message, which may, in turn, leak information about the {\em content} of the message itself. Recent work of Blocki et al. (TCC~2025) proposed an $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differentially private approach that adds randomized padding calibrated to the global sensitivity of the compression algorithm, and showed that LZ77 has global sensitivity $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$ for input length $n$ and sliding window size $W$. However, prior analysis focused only on sensitivity with respect to single-character edits, which leads to limited privacy guarantees when protecting longer substrings such as passwords, passphrases, cookies, or confidential user records. A natural attempt to handle longer secrets is to appeal to group privacy, but for approximate differential privacy, this leads to very poor parameter degradation: in particular, the effective value of $\delta$ can grow exponentially with the group size $g$. In this work, we introduce and study the sensitivity of compression schemes under block edits. Specifically, we define two strings to be $g$-neighbors if they differ only within a contiguous interval of length $g$. Our main technical contribution is a nearly tight characterization of the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77. We show that the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77, both with and without self-referencing, is at most $O\!\left((W^{2/3}+g+\sqrt{Wg})\log n\right)$. In particular, when $g \leq W^{1/3}$, the bound simplifies to $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$, matching the known bound for single-character edits. Combined with the framework of Blocki et al., our bound yields $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differential privacy for $g$-neighbors with the same asymptotic padding scale as for single-character edits. We provide matching lower bounds to demonstrate that our upper bound is tight, e.g., when $n=W=\Theta(g^2)$, the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77 is at least $\tilde{\Omega}(g^{3/2})$, matching the $\sqrt{Wg}=\Theta(g^{3/2})$ term from our upper bound up to a logarithmic factor.

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables private computation, but has significantly higher overhead than plaintext execution. Hybrid MPC compilers improve concrete efficiency by mapping distinct computation parts to contextually optimal MPC protocols. However, state-of-the-art systems like Silph (Chen et al., S&P’23) depend on deployment-specific cost models that are cumbersome to retune, and compute mappings via brittle heuristics or costly Integer Linear Programming (ILP), limiting scalability and portability across protocols and deployment settings. We present SING, the first machine-learning-based framework for hybrid MPC share assignment. SING leverages Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) for: (1) imitation of Silph’s assignments, accelerating share assignment by up to $76,697\times$ with comparable quality; and (2) cost-driven learning, where we train a GNN cost predictor on synthetic or empirical costs (e.g., runtime or communication), freeze it, and train the share-assigning GNN to minimize predicted costs. The latter supports expressive non-linear cost models, avoiding ILP's linearity constraints, and enables retargeting to new protocol suites and deployment settings by re-fitting the predictor. Finally, we release our synthetic benchmark resources, including a dataset of 704 MPC circuits with wide-ranging hybrid assignments.

In the private simultaneous message (PSM) setting, $k$ players obtain inputs $x_i\in\{0,1\}^n$ and then independently send messages to a referee, who should learn $f(x_1,...,x_k)$ but no other information about $(x_1,...,x_k)$. The PSM setting was introduced as a minimal model for secure multiparty computation. In the quantum setting, PSM has been related to non-local quantum computation (NLQC), and has several connections to the complexity of Boolean functions. The communication and correlation cost of implementing private simultaneous message passing may be much larger than the cost without privacy, and the cost of privacy in this setting remains poorly understood. Here, we give new upper and lower bounds on the PSM model, in both the quantum and classical settings. Concretely, we prove two lower bounds: 1) Nečiporuk's measure lower bounds the entanglement required for $k$-player quantum PSM with perfect correctness. This can be evaluated to give quadratic lower bounds for some explicit functions. 2) The rank of the communication matrix of $f(x_1,x_2)$ lower bounds 2-player quantum PSM with perfect privacy but imperfect correctness. This implies a previously unknown lower bound on classical PSM with imperfect correctness. When allowing both quantum communication and shared entanglement, these two bounds are the first lower bounds on quantum PSM that make use of the privacy condition. Regarding upper bounds, we show: 1) Letting $s$ be the size of a quantum circuit computing $f$, $d_f$ be the circuit depth, $k$ the number of players, $n$ the number of bits received by each player, and $\epsilon$ the correctness parameter of the PSM protocol, we obtain the upper bound $\mathsf{PSM}_k^*(f) \leq (kn +s) \cdot \log^{O( d_f)}(s/\epsilon)$. 2) The square of the Fourier 1 norm of $f$, $\Vert \hat{f}\Vert_1^2$, upper bounds the classical PSM complexity, $\mathsf{PSM}(f)\leq O(\Vert \hat{f} \Vert^2_1)$. In proving the first upper bound, we also generalize existing $T$-depth based techniques for NLQC from $2$ to $k\geq 2$ parties, and consider cases where the Clifford layers are restricted to having small light cones. These generalizations may be of independent interest.

We introduce the Huffman-Merkle Tree (HMT), an authenticated data structure (ADS) optimized for dynamic workloads where some items may be more frequently accessed than others, and access frequencies change over time. An ADS allows proving item membership against a short commitment to a large mutable state, with applications including verifiable storage, Internet transparency services, and blockchains. Optimizing ADS performance under continuously changing access frequencies has not been fully addressed before, neither in theory nor in practice. HMT tackles access skew via tiering: "hot" items are stored according to a Huffman coding layout where frequently accessed items are closer to the root and thus contribute less to overall costs, while a binary Merkle Tree (MT) is used for cold and new elements to lower their update overhead. To efficiently handle dynamic workloads, we incrementally apply and batch layout changes, track access frequencies via count-min sketch, use a tier promotion cache, and consider various tier migration policies. We implement HMT and compare it on real-world data against Ethereum's Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT) ADS and its proposed replacement, the Unified Binary Tree (UBT). Our evaluation considers two metrics: the amount of hashing per ADS update and access-weighted membership-proof size. The latter metric captures both the cost of accessing each item and its access frequency. We find that the best HMT policy uses about 2.4x and 0.34x less average hash operations than MPT and UBT respectively, while featuring proofs shorter by 0.18x than MPT and 0.55x than UBT.

Modern consensus protocols often aspire to be responsive---that is, to confirm transactions in time proportional to the actual network delays as opposed to a (typically much larger) worst-case bound on network delays. Responsiveness can yield substantial practical improvements in both protocol latency and throughput. In blockchain settings, however, block proposers commonly have economic incentives (most notably MEV) to delay their blocks, a phenomenon repeatedly observed in practice, e.g., in the block production supply chains for Ethereum and Solana. Such incentives clash with responsiveness in existing protocol designs. This paper develops a rigorous framework for designing incentive-compatible responsive consensus protocols. We first consider the canonical case of single-leader protocols and establish feasibility results characterizing the conditions on the distribution of network latency under which responsiveness can be incentivized through a suitable reward function. We further quantify the amount of stake required from the leader to deter dishonest delays. We then show strong positive results for protocols with multiple leaders, demonstrating that the multi-leader approach is fundamentally superior to single-leader designs for resolving the tension between responsiveness and incentive-compatibility: by forcing leaders to compete for rewards, much of the burden otherwise placed on the incentive mechanism is alleviated. Notably, this results in simpler reward mechanisms with no stake requirements that also remain feasible in parameter regimes which are provably impossible under a single leader.

In this paper, we demonstrate a way to generalize learning with errors (LWE) to the family of so-called modular-maximal cyclic groups which are non-commuting. Since the group $\mathbb{M}_{2^t}$ has two cycles of maximal multiplicative order, we use this fact to construct an accurate criterion for restoring the message bit with overwhelming probability. Furthermore, we implement the original idea by O. Regev in the considered group to gain benefits from the non-commutativity of $\mathbb{M}_{2^t}$. Also we prove that using this approach we can achieve a level of security comparable to the original idea.

We provide a new way of performing an algebraic attack on the McEliece cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes. It also applies in general to the case where the field over which the Goppa code is defined is of even characteristic. It is based on a new algebraic modeling for finding matrices of rank $2$ in the code of quadratic relations related to the Goppa code that is attacked. Such matrices are then used to recover the secret algebraic structure of the code, from which an equivalent secret key can be efficiently derived, leading to a full key-recovery attack. A byproduct of our approach is a new distinguisher for Goppa codes in even characteristic which is as the syzygy distinguisher of \cite{R25}subexponential in the security level of the scheme. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on McEliece TII challenges, some of which having been studied in \cite{BLT26}, and aimed at having 83,89,119,166, 210 and even 248 bit security respectively and CFS keys with parameters $r=9$ and $m=16$, corresponding to a security of $74.9$ bits according to \cite{LS12}. This CFS key was not attacked in practice in \cite{BLT26} and took us 14 hours of computation and 24GB of RAM. We make the conjecture that this attack has a complexity which is of the same nature as the distinguisher, namely subexponential in the security level. It should be noted that this attack is at best of complexity of order $2^{454}$ for NIST level 1 Classic McEliece parameters.

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) are both contenders for securing communication against quantum adversaries, but are at different stages of maturity. For hedging security risks, hybridization is the default approach. Unlike previous research on classical–post-quantum hybrids, we propose a QKD-PQC hybrid for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). To minimize the attack surface, we completely remove the requirement for digital signature schemes and propose a Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange (HAKE) that combines Post-Quantum (PQ) AKE and QKD key agreement, leveraging Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) for both key exchange and authentication. Our fully modular security analysis, based on the recent multi-input Key Derivation Function (KDF) framework by Backendal et al. (Eurocrypt 2025), establishes AKE security in the CK01 model and yields a conditional information-theoretic security guarantee when the QKD component is uncompromised; a property not achieved by prior hybrid protocols. We demonstrate the protocol’s practical feasibility with benchmarks using ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece.

Hybrid post-quantum migration is entering deployed handshake designs, but hybrid KEM security protects only one shared-secret input. It does not by itself say whether handshake, application, exporter, or resumption material remains pseudorandom after branch reveals, stage-key reveals, selective corruptions, or late corruptions. We characterize these staged claims through branch-formula freshness: each stage receives a monotone formula over branch exposure, authentication freshness, transcript binding, KDF ancestry, and explicit non-reveal atoms. Secrecy follows by replacing a surviving branch contribution and then using a labelled HKDF/PRF-style target-hiding argument along a fresh KDF cut; agreement follows separately from authentication binding and injective transcript representation. We also give selector-local accounting, where a fixed admissible witness selector determines which surviving branches and KDF cuts are charged. For scoped TLS 1.3 ECDHE--ML-KEM 1-RTT, we identify the branch-replacement, HKDF-path, and binding assumptions that imply concrete preservation bounds for handshake, application, exporter, and resumption targets.

All EU member states are required to roll out a digital identity system - the European Digital Identity (EUDI) wallet - by the end of 2026. Strong privacy is at the core of the underlying regulation, which mandates the EUDI wallet to support selective disclosure and unlinkability. The wallet currently being developed relies on the batch issuance of one-time ECDSA credentials that sign attributes through individually salted hashes for selective disclosure. This solution is known to achieve only a weak form of unlinkability, where the credential issuer must be honest: a malicious issuer could trace users through the salted hashes it signs and the signature value itself. But such a tracing attack requires the issuer to store all signed data and communicate with the verifying parties for tracing, which can be argued to be too cumbersome or obvious to happen in reality. In this work, we therefore initiate the study of a more subtle type of subversion attacks. Therein, the issuer can deviate from the issuance protocol, with two goals: (i) enabling verifiers in possession of a short tracing key to de-anonymize users and (ii) keeping this deviation undetectable from users. We formalize unlinkability against such subversion attacks, and show that batch-issued credentials with salted hashes do not achieve that form of privacy. We present several undetectable subversion attacks against batch-issued ECDSA credentials and suggest lightweight mechanisms to provably mediate them.

Pseudorandom codes (PRCs) are error-correcting codes whose codewords are computationally indistinguishable from uniform random strings, a primitive motivated by the need to robustly watermark generative AI models. While recent breakthroughs have established the feasibility of PRCs, critical challenges remain regarding the diversity of their underlying cryptographic assumptions and their security against active adversaries. This work advances the study of PRCs on two complementary fronts: structural diversity and advanced security. On the structural side, we propose a novel PRC template that departs from the prior one based on sparse parity-check trapdoors. We introduce a new LPN-type assumption, formalized as Dense-Planted LPN, which postulates $(\mathbf{M}\mathbf{T}, \ \mathbf{M}\mathbf{T}\mathbf{s}+\mathbf{e})\ \approx_c\ (\mathbf{M}\mathbf{T}, \ \mathbf{u})$, where $\mathbf{T}$ is a random dense matrix and $\mathbf{M}$ is sampled from a distribution containing a planted structure. This hidden structure enables a completely new decoding mechanism based on a local-window search rather than global parity checks. Notably, this template provides a viable path toward constructing PRCs from assumptions beyond code-based ones, including Learning with Errors (LWE) assumptions. On the security side, we construct the first public-key PRC secure against pre-challenge chosen-codeword attacks (CCA1) in the standard model. In realistic watermarking deployments where detectors are exposed as public services, CCA security is essential. However, prior CCA-secure PRCs were only achievable in the random oracle model. By formally introducing and instantiating a robust tag-based equivocal bit commitment scheme combined with robust hinting PRGs, we demonstrate that CCA1 security can be achieved in the standard model without sacrificing decoding robustness.

Pseudorandom codes (PRCs), recently proposed by Christ and Gunn (CRYPTO'24), are encryption schemes that have pseudorandom ciphertexts and a decryption algorithm which is resilient against a bounded number of Hamming errors. This notion provides a significant strengthening over standard PKE and has exciting applications in, e.g., watermarking LLMs. The recent work of Alrabiah et al. (STOC'25) initiated the study of CCA-secure public-key PRCs, where the adversary is additionally given access to a decoding oracle. In terms of realizations, they provide one that can be proven secure in the random oracle model. Constructing CCA-secure public-key PRCs in the standard model remained an open problem. In this work, we resolve this problem and provide the first construction of CCA-secure public-key PRCs in the standard model. Our construction achieves a constant rate and can decode from a constant fraction of adversarial errors. In fact, our construction is a general blueprint that can be instantiated from a broad range of standard cryptographic assumptions. As an additional contribution, we construct a strong adaptively robust public-key pseudorandom code with conjectured sub-exponential security based on a new family of assumptions we call Noisy McEliece. In a nutshell, these assumptions mask a scrambled generator matrix from an efficiently decodable inner-code family with sparse Bernoulli noise; this additional error is meant to obscure the algebraic structure targeted by known attacks and thereby permits candidate instantiations from broader classes of codes.

Masking stands as one of the most effective countermeasures against side-channel attacks. While a number of recent works have investigated first-order masking schemes that eliminate the need for fresh randomness, most existing solutions trade off this randomness reduction against increased latency or area overhead. This paper targets the simultaneous achievement of low latency and zero fresh randomness. To this end, we make the following contributions. First, we identify a security flaw in the round-based design proposed by Askeland et al.\ at CARDIS 2022, which builds upon the Changing of the Guards (COTG) technique. Second, we propose a revised construction that rectifies this vulnerability without incurring any additional randomness or latency penalty. Finally, by integrating the Time Sharing Masking (TSM) S-box introduced at CHES 2025, we present a first-order masked AES implementation with a latency of 20 clock cycles that requires no fresh randomness.

The eSIM specification enables remote SIM provisioning without the need to hand out a physical SIM card. Instead of a physical SIM card, the subscriber downloads a SIM profile, which contains a subscriber's identity and authentication key material, to their embedded UICC, a discrete, embedded chip in the user's phone. This provisioning process is specified in the remote SIM provisioning (RSP) protocol and is secured through contemporary public-key cryptography. However, the potential advent of general-purpose quantum computers threatens the security of RSP. This paper provides a quantum threat analysis of the RSP protocol, considering both Harvest Now, Decrypt Later attacks and active quantum attacks. To alleviate this threat, this paper introduces PQC-RSP, a post quantum secure version of the RSP protocol. The main challenge we address is the introduction of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) into the RSP protocol, both in a PQC-only and hybrid version, and the security implications of this modification. We prove the security of PQC-RSP and review the performance overhead introduced through the usage of post quantum cryptography.

We initiate the study of arithmetic private information retrieval (APIR) schemes, in which the database is a vector of field elements and the scheme makes a black-box use of the field. We obtain the following results. 1. Our main result is a negative one: We show that no single-server APIR scheme can achieve non-trivial download cost smaller than $n$ field elements. We observe that recent proposals for code-based PIR (Holzbaur et al., ISIT'20; Verma and Hollanti, ISIT'24) are arithmetic, and show how to break them within a few minutes on a standard workstation for all suggested parameters. 2. We complement the above by positive results in alternative models. Concretely, we show that with either two servers or a single server with secret-key preprocessing, it is possible to construct computationally secure APIR schemes based on well-studied coding assumptions. This is achieved by arithmetizing the distributed-point-function-based PIR of Boyle et al.(CCS'16), and by observing that the recent construction of secret-key single-server PIR by Chen et al.(STOC'26) also arithmetizes. 3. Finally, we characterize the existence of information-theoretic two-server APIR schemes in linear-algebraic terms, and show that communication of $O(n^{1/3})$ can be achieved in this setting based on the original approach of Chor et al.(FOCS'95). The optimality of this result remains an interesting open question.

This document provides a machine-checked Isabelle/HOL formalisation of the modular-arithmetic core of the Neon NTT paper of Becker, Hwang, Kannwischer, Yang, and Yang. We develop parametric theories of Barrett and Montgomery reduction and multiplication; the equivalence of Barrett and Montgomery arithmetic; the doubling- and rounding-Montgomery variants; and correctness and bounds theorems for Neon assembly kernels, against a hand-written model of the word arithmetic underlying the relevant Neon instructions. The development is a directed auto-formalisation: definitions, theorem statements, and proofs were produced by Claude Opus 4.7 and 4.8 using AutoCorrode's LLM-Isabelle integration layers. The human author set the architecture, chose abstractions and proof strategies, often nudged the model toward shorter or cleaner proofs, and controlled which output entered the development. This document is auto-generated from the Isabelle sources through Isabelle’s document preparation system, eliminating drift between prose and formal artifact.

Emerging attacks and applications have motivated the development of transforms that turn a given AE scheme into a committing AE (cAE) one. We give a new transform called UCX with the following attributes: It does not require the starting scheme to be tag based, works for schemes in the broad AE5 framework rather than the limited AE1 one, and preserves both UNAE (Unique Nonce AE) and MRAE (Misuse Resistant AE) security. No prior transform is ``universal'' in the sense of having the combination of all these properties. The use of UCX in place of prior, limited transforms reduces the risk of error and failure in the real world, where choices may be made by application developers and hidden in software libraries. The committing security of UCX is shown in the ideal-cipher model, and its AE5-security in the standard model. To design UCX, we introduce and build a new primitive, that we call a Tweakable Committing Concealer, and that may be of independent interest.

We study error correction in a computationally bounded world, where errors are introduced by an arbitrary polynomial-time adversarial channel. Recent works construct seeded codes in this model, where the encoding and decoding procedure share a public random seed. They achieve significantly better tradeoffs between rate and error tolerance than what is possible information theoretically for unique decoding, essentially matching the parameters of the best known efficiently list-decodable codes. Over the binary alphabet, however, this is still well short of the optimal Shannon capacity with rate $R \approx 1 - H_2(p)$ for a $p < 1/4$ fraction of errors. Even heuristic constructions meeting this target were not previously known. We make progress towards this goal. - $\textbf{Secret-Key Codes.}$ We first study secret-key codes, where the encoder and decoder share a secret key hidden from the adversarial channel. Lipton (STACS '94) constructed one-time secure secret-key codes achieving Shannon capacity in this setting, but it was unknown whether one can get CPA (resp. CCA) security where the adversary may query an encoding oracle (resp. also a decoding oracle). We construct CCA-secure secret-key codes achieving Shannon capacity via pseudorandom codes (PRCs). - $\textbf{Seeded Codes (Heuristic).}$ We can heuristically upgrade the resulting secret-key codes to seeded codes by publishing an obfuscation of the encoding/decoding procedures with a hard-coded secret key as a seed. Security holds in the ideal obfuscation model. - $\textbf{Public-key Codes.}$ We also consider public-key codes, where the decoder has a secret key and the encoder has the corresponding public key. We construct such CPA-secure public-key codes achieving Shannon capacity with unique decoding for $p < 1/4$ errors, and list decoding all the way to $p < 1/2$ errors, assuming PRCs and the subexponential security of standard crypto assumptions (e.g., LWE or DDH or QR or DCR). We also show how to get CCA security in the random oracle model. Our secret-key and public-key codes meeting Shannon capacity are also simultaneously pseudorandom codes.

Depth-robust directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are an important combinatorial primitive in cryptography, with applications to memory-hard functions, proofs of space, and proofs of sequential work. These applications require node depth-robustness, yet constructing sparse graphs with strong concrete guarantees remains a longstanding challenge. By contrast, edge depth-robust graphs are easier to construct explicitly and achieve better parameters, motivating the problem of efficiently transforming edge-depth-robust graphs into node-depth-robust graphs. We give a new and substantially more efficient transformation from edge-depth-robust graphs to node-depth-robust graphs. We give a new and substantially more efficient transformation from edge-depth-robust graphs to node-depth-robust graphs. Prior work of Blocki and Cinkoske (ITCS 2021) gave a general transformation by replacing each node with an ST-robust graph, resulting in extraordinarily large overhead and relying on non-explicit components. In contrast, our transformation replaces each node with a single superconcentrator rather than an ST-robust graph, yielding an explicit construction whenever the input graph is explicit, with dramatically improved concrete efficiency. Formally, given an $(e,d)$-edge-depth-robust graph $G$ with $N$ nodes and $m$ edges, our transformation generates a graph $G'=Transform(G_N)$ with $N' = O(m)$ nodes, constant indegree, and $(e/3,\, 2d-1)$-node depth-robustness. We also show that the transformation preserves fractional depth-robustness. Moreover, when $m=\omega(N)$, we show that our transformation can amplify depth --- overcoming a key limitation of prior work. In particular, for any parameter $d'$, we can obtain a constant-indegree graph $G'$ with $N' = O(m+d'N)$ nodes and $(e/3,\, (d-e)d')$-node depth-robustness, yielding asymptotically tighter results in the important setting where $m = \omega(N)$ and $e \geq d$ by setting $d' \sim m/N$. As an application, We provide a novel analysis of Schnitger's edge-depth-robust graph construction (FOCS 1983). We show that the graph $G_n$, which has $N=2^{n+1}-1$ nodes and $m \leq n2^{n}$ edges, is $(e,2d-1)$-edge-depth robust for all $e + d \leq 2^n$. Applying our transformation yields an explicit DAG on $N'$ nodes with maximum indegree $2$ and depth-robustness parameters $e = \Omega(N'/\log N')$ and $d = \Omega(N')$, matching the best known asymptotic trade-offs—even compared with non-explicit constructions—while improving the best previously known concrete ed-product lower bound by a multiplicative factor of 6.6.

We introduce WayFinder, a framework for generalizing the Delfs-Galbraith and SuperSolver algorithms for the supersingular isogeny problem. Our framework extends the search for elliptic curves with an orientation by an order containing $\mathbb{Z}[\ell \sqrt{-p}]$ to more general orders, and we derive a cost model for such generalisations. Our cost model not only works in a more general context, but also provides more accurate predictions when applied to SuperSolver. We instantiate WayFinder for orders containing $\mathbb{Z}[\ell_1\sqrt{-\ell_2p}]$ where $\ell_i$ are $1$ or primes such that the modular curve $X_0(\ell_2)$ has genus $0$. We then introduce a low-storage algorithm for computing an isogeny between two oriented supersingular elliptic curves, even when the curves are oriented by distinct orders. Together, these provide an algorithm that improves on the state of the art for solving the isogeny problem, and a cost model with potential applications to parameter selection in isogeny-based cryptography.

We study frequency estimation in the shuffle model of differential privacy under poisoning attacks, where corrupted users may deviate from the local randomizer to inject crafted in-domain messages. Existing shuffle-model protocols face a core tension: achieving low estimation error relies on flexible multi-message noise generation, which can amplify poisoning influence once messages are anonymized by shuffling. To address this tension, we propose a symmetric binomial-sum noise distribution (i.e., $\mathrm{Bin}(n/2,p) + \mathrm{Bin}(n/2,1-p)$), which preserves high accuracy while limiting the impact of crafted in-domain messages. We realize this distribution via preprocessing-guided noise generation, which routes a balanced collection of mode flags through the shuffler so that each user receives a randomly assigned mode flag that fixes their noise-sampling behavior prior to shuffling. For binary estimation, our protocol requires a single Bernoulli trial per user and at most $2$ messages per user ($1.5$ on average), while bounding the worst-case poisoning influence of a single corrupted user by $O(1/n)$. We extend the protocol to histograms, including large domains via hashing, and provide formal privacy, accuracy, and robustness guarantees. Experiments on real datasets show that our protocols remain resilient under poisoning and reduce MAE by up to nearly $2\times$ over the strongest baseline at comparable per-user communication on small-domain workloads, and stay on par with it on large domains.

In this work, we construct (stateful) leakage-resilient circuits (LRCs) secure against bounded-output-length leakage functions computable by \(\mathsf{NC}^1\) circuits under the mild worst-case assumption \(\mathsf{NC}^1 \subsetneq \oplus\mathsf{L}/\mathsf{poly}\), without relying on any leak-free hardware components, thereby resolving the open problem left by Bogdanov, Ishai, and Srinivasan (CRYPTO 2019; Journal of Cryptology, 2021) and Wang (CRYPTO 2025). Concretely, we first construct a leakage-tolerant circuit with succinct setup (sAI-LTC) secure against 2-adaptive \(\mathsf{NC}^1\) leakage, and then generically combine it with a 2-adaptive leakage-resilient composable encoding scheme to obtain the desired LRC. We further give a direct non-black-box instantiation that optimizes the compiled circuit size at the cost of a slightly larger setup, matching the circuit size of Wang's construction that relies on leak-free hardware while using a more compact setup. Finally, we show that our sAI-LTC generically implies a fine-grained multi-theorem non-interactive proof system for all \(\mathsf{NP}\), with compact common reference strings, perfect soundness, and multi-theorem zero-knowledge with offline simulation against \(\mathsf{NC}^1\) adversaries.

Shor demonstrated that the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative roup $\mathbb{Z}_{p}^{*}$, where $p$ is an odd prime, can be solved fficiently using a period-finding algorithm based on the quantum Fourier transform. In this paper, we propose a quantum-classical algorithm based on algebraic properties that do not rely on periodicity. Specifically, we show that the hardcore predicate for the discrete logarithm problem, which was introduced by Blum and Micali, can be reduced, using the swap test, to the problem of distinguishing between two Bernoulli distributions. In our algorithm, although the swap test is used as a quantum subroutine, most of the computation is performed classically. Moreover, the algorithm does not require the quantum Fourier transform.

Classically testing for the presence of anti-commuting operators on a quantum device is a critical tool underpinning recent progress in classical verification of quantum computation. While such tests can be based on cryptographic assumptions, known constructions rely on highly structured assumptions, e.g. trapdoor claw-free functions. In this work, we seek to explain this state of affairs by constructing strong cryptography from (certain forms of) classical tests of anti-commutation. In particular, we formulate the notion of a test of non-commutation (ToNC), an interactive protocol between a quantum prover and classical verifier in which the prover's final-round response is obtained by measuring one of two binary observables 𝑃₀, 𝑃₁ depending on the verifier's challenge bit 𝑐. We prove that, for a broad range of parameters, ToNC implies classical-communication key agreement (KA), and ToNC combined with one-way functions implies oblivious transfer (OT). Along the way, we develop tools for and provide the first known results on hardness amplification for post-quantum KA and OT, where communication is classical but adversaries may be quantum. In particular, we prove the following results of independent interest. - Post-quantum hard-core measure theorem: For any efficiently sampleable high-min-entropy distribution 𝐷 over pairs (𝑥,𝑏) such that quantum circuits have advantage at most 𝛿 in predicting 𝑏 from 𝑥, there exists a sub-distribution 𝑀≼𝐷 of density 1-𝛿 on which 𝑏 is nearly optimally quantum-hard to predict. - Post-quantum interactive XOR lemma: Given any classically-interactive protocol, if quantum adversaries have advantage at most 𝛿 in guessing a private challenger bit 𝑏, then two sequential repetitions reduce the advantage for predicting the XOR of the challenger bits 𝑏₁⊕𝑏₂ to at most 𝛿² + negl(𝜆).

Blockchain consensus protocols, also known as BFT state-machine replication, enable a system of $n$ players to decide an ever-growing chain of blocks. We consider partial synchrony: after an unknown time GST, messages sent by honest players are delivered within an unknown actual delay $\delta$, and a known bound $\Delta$ satisfies $\delta \leq \Delta$. This setting imposes $t<n/3$ corruptions. We study leader-based consensus, a class with the smallest known latency metrics when sufficiently many designated leaders behave honestly. We consider the mainstream metric of {expected latency in the view-based sense:} for a transaction known to all honest players having entered a post-GST iteration, this is the expected time until that transaction appears in a decided block, under independent random leaders. We introduce Hamster, a rotating-leader consensus protocol, which reduces this expected latency to $\Delta+4\delta$, down from the previous $1.5\Delta+3.5\delta$ bound achieved by Simplex (Chan-Pass, TCC'23) for the same view-based metric. Hamster also brings this latency further down to $\Delta+3.5\delta$ for adversaries that do not get publicly caught equivocating. The main technical novelty is a certificate of exclusivity for a block $B$. It is shown by the next leader as evidence that players can safely vote for a child of $B$. A certificate of exclusivity is an interpolation between a quorum certificate and a timeout certificate, in that it is formed from a mix of votes for a unique block $B$ and complaint votes, proving that $B$ is the only non-dummy block that can still obtain a decision certificate for that iteration. The other novelty of Hamster is the use of {overlapping iterations: after a process has supported a newer proposal, the protocol may still allow it to support a safe proposal of an earlier iteration}. This overlap is what allows old honest proposals to be decided in time despite players advancing iterations faster. We also analyze another metric, called the {pessimistic block proposal time}, which is the time during which a bad leader can delay the proposal of a transaction in a block which will be decided. Hamster achieves a pessimistic block proposal time of $2\Delta+2\delta$, refined to $2\Delta+\delta$ for leaders not caught equivocating, down from $3\Delta+\delta$ for Simplex.

In addition to anonymity and traceability, which are the primary security properties of group signatures, non‑frameability is also defined (Bellare-Shi-Zhang, CT-RSA 2005). This property guarantees that even an adversary colluding with all authorities (the opener and the issuer) cannot produce a signature that frames an honest user, and it is regarded as a security notion that protects users. In this short note, we introduce a new perspective on non-frameability, namely that it can also protect the authorities, and we examine its significance in the context of anonymous auctions, a well‑known application of group signatures. We show that non-frameability serves as an effective countermeasure against situations in which a winning bidder falsely claims not to have placed a bid and accuses the organizer of forgery.

Federated fine-tuning of Large Language Models via Low Rank Adaptation (LoRA) faces a critical privacy-efficiency trade-off: low-rank factors can leak sensitive data, yet standard secure aggregation is restricted to linear operations. Existing solutions for aggregating matrix products (e.g., $\mathbf{B}_i \mathbf{A}_i$) either sacrifice exactness, depend on a trusted third party, or incur prohibitive costs at scale. We present SecLoRA, the first decentralized framework achieving exact aggregation of LoRA updates with linear communication complexity. The core of SecLoRA is a novel cryptographic primitive: Pairwise Composable Multi-Client Functional Encryption (PC-DMCFE). Unlike traditional functional encryption, which treats ciphertext recombination as an attack, the dual-encryption architecture of PC-DMCFE ($\mathsf{Enc}_A, \mathsf{Enc}_B$) is intentionally designed to harness this property. It allows any ciphertexts $\mathsf{ct}_A$ and $\mathsf{ct}_B$ to be arbitrarily paired and evaluated via a functional key to reveal their inner product. This unique property enables secure and decentralized aggregation of matrix products without losing LoRA's linear communication advantages. Furthermore, SecLoRA ensures round-isolated decryption to prevent temporal leakage without extra interaction. Evaluation shows that SecLoRA is practical for cross-silo deployments.

A private information retrieval (PIR) protocol enables a client to retrieve a bit from an $N$ bit database replicated among $k$ servers in such a way that each server learns no information about the retrieved bit. Modern PIR protocols with information-theoretic privacy (Efremenko, SICOMP, 2012; Dvir and Gopi, STOC, 2015; Ghasemi et al., STOC, 25) are based on matching vectors over a composite number $m$. To construct a PIR protocol from the matching vectors, these protocols use a decoding polynomial, a sparse polynomial that returns a non-zero value on 1 and returns zero on a certain set implied by the matching vectors. Beimel et al. (CCC, 2012) abstracted the properties required by the transformation computed by the decoding polynomial, defining the notion of share conversion. In such a conversion, a set of parties is given shares of a secret in one secret-sharing scheme, and each party locally computes a new share (without any communication) such that the new shares are shares in a second secret-sharing scheme of a related secret. Beimel et al. showed that share conversion can replace the decoding polynomial in the PIR protocol of Efremenko and constructed a share conversion from the ring $\mathbb{Z}_6$ to the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^2}$. This share conversion cannot be computed by a decoding polynomial, as decoding polynomials convert shares from a ring $\mathbb{Z}_m$ to a finite field of characteristic $p$ such that $p$ does not divide $m$. Alon et al. (TCC, 2025) simplified and generalized the PIR protocols of Dvir and Gopi and Ghasemi et al., using share conversion; however, in this protocol, the share conversion is from a ring $\mathbb{Z}_m$ to a finite field of characteristic $p$ such that $p$ does not divide $m$. In this paper, we study the power of share conversions. Our main result proves that if there is a $k$-party share conversion from a ring $\mathbb{Z}_m$ to a finite field of characteristic $p$ such that $p$ does not divide $m$, then there is a $k$ sparse decoding polynomial from a ring $\mathbb{Z}_m$ to a finite field of characteristic $p$. This result implies that using share conversion in the protocol of Alon et al. can only improve the communication complexity by a constant factor. In addition, we show that if there is a $k$-party share conversion from a ring $\mathbb{Z}_m$ to a finite field, where $m$ is a product of $r$ distinct primes, then $k\geq r+1$, i.e., the number of servers in the resulting PIR protocols using the appropriate matching vectors is at least $r+1$. A similar result was recently proved by Ghasemi and Kopparty (ITCS 26); our lower bound also applies to the case in which the characteristic of the field divides $m$.

Quantum cryptography is a rapidly developing area which leverages quantum information to accomplish classically impossible tasks. In many of these protocols, quantum states are used as long-term cryptographic keys, relying on the quantum no-cloning theorem to ensure that the keys cannot be copied by an adversary. Unfortunately, quantum state tend to decohere, and hence, persistent quantum memory is and will remain one of the most valuable and challenging resources for quantum computers. As such, it will be important to minimize the extent to which our protocols use persistent quantum memory. In this work, we consider the case of one-shot signatures (OSS), and more general quantum signing tokens, important uncloneable primitives where quantum signing keys allow for signing a single message but not two. Very recently, the first OSS scheme was constructed unconditionally in a classical oracle model as well as in the standard model under cryptographic assumptions (Shmueli and Zhandry, CRYPTO 2025). We observe that the quantum memory required for these protocols is a large polynomial (in the security parameter). The main contribution of this work is to significantly decrease the quantum secret key size, in some cases achieving the asymptotically optimal size. One of our schemes guarantees perfect correctness and the other one admits a parallel signing algorithm for long messages. We also achieve strong signature incompressibility, which implies a public-key quantum fire scheme (Çakan, Goyal and Shmueli, QCrypt 2025) with perfect correctness. During the course of this work, we develop novel techniques for proving the security of cryptosystems using coset states, one of the main tools used in uncloneable cryptography.

Homomorphic Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) evaluation refers to evaluating the AES circuit with a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)-encrypted secret key. Applications include in particular Transciphering, which converts AES-encrypted data into FHE ciphertexts without exposing the secret key. Existing homomorphic AES evaluations show a clear separation between latency-oriented solutions and throughput-oriented solutions. CKKS-based methods exploit massive SIMD parallelism and focus on throughput by processing many AES blocks in parallel. They are hardly suitable for latency-critical settings. In contrast, TFHE-based methods process a small number of blocks efficiently. They are preferable for low-latency settings, but provide very limited throughput. In this work, we show that AES-CKKS evaluation can achieve both interactive latency and high throughput. Our first variant is optimized for latency and decrypts a single AES block in only 26ms on an NVIDIA RTX-5090. This is more than 6× faster than recent TFHE-based state-of-the-art approaches; further, an extension of it processes 4 AES blocks at once in 29ms. Our second variant is based on a new embedding of $\textrm{GF}(16)$, the finite field with 16 elements, into CKKS message space. It is optimized for throughput and processes up to 2048 AES blocks at once, achieving 238KB/s throughput (a more than 3.41× improvement over the state-of-the-art CKKS-based approaches), while maintaining latency comparable to TFHE-based methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first AES-FHE evaluation algorithm combining good latency and throughput properties, bringing homomorphic outsourcing with AES within reach of real-time applications on constrained devices. Our main ingredients are redundant structures that maximize SIMD utilization, improved algorithms for the SubBytes step (one of them being based on inversion in $\textrm{GF}(256)$ using CKKS), fusion of linear layers into bootstrapping, and carefully crafted FHE parameters.

We construct preimage sampleable function families on $q$-ary lattices [Gentry–Peikert–Vaikuntanathan, STOC'08] for which preimage sampling reduces to sampling uniform points of unitriangular lattices from simple polytopes: affine linear transforms on the $\ell_1$ and $\ell_\infty$ balls, and a scaled intersection thereof. We build the necessary samplers by adapting an algorithm of [Kannan–Vempala, STOC'97] and improving its analysis. This sampling requires only uniform bits and affine linear transforms on the uniform distribution on $[0,1]$. The collision resistance of these families relies on the short integer solutions problem [Ajtai, STOC'96] in various $\ell_p$ norms. Considering the Lee metric as the $\ell_1$ norm in $q$-ary lattices, we answer an open question to construct such families for the Lee metric [Hörmann–van Woerden, CRYPTO'24]. We also answer an open question of [Plançon--Prest, PKC'21] by sampling from polytopes with inradius smaller by a factor almost square root in the lattice rank. We provide a generic framework for constructing preimage sampleable function families from polytopes with sufficient conditions for realising it. While our parameters are worse than prior discrete Gaussian based constructions, such distributions are challenging from a physical security perspective.

Overbroad computer crime, intellectual property, and other laws are well known to create legal risks that can discourage essential research. Notable examples include the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the UK Computer Misuse Act. Because such laws fail to distinguish malicious hacking from good-faith testing and research, researchers face serious legal risks for public-interest research activity like identifying software or hardware vulnerabilities or scraping data. Despite the research community's broad awareness of these risks, our understanding of their practical impacts is limited, as most of the community's knowledge comes from anecdotal evidence rather than systematic study. We conduct the first qualitative study focused on researchers' lived experiences, to empirically document the *impacts of legal risks and threats* on research and researchers*, and *how researchers navigate legal risk situations*. Our study engages two participant groups: researchers with legal-risk experiences in the UK or the US ($N_R=36$), who discuss 130 projects and incidents spanning over three decades, and professionals that offer support to researchers navigating legal risks ($N_S=8$), who have collectively supported thousands of researchers. We thus provide an unprecedented big-picture view of researchers' experiences with legal risks. We synthesise actionable strategies for researchers, and our findings provide evidence to support policy reform.

We show new constructions for pseudorandom quantum states (PRS) and pseudorandom function-like quantum state (PRFS) generators satisfying scalability, which means the security parameter can be much larger than the number of qubits, quantum accessibility, which means the adversary can provide quantum input, and adaptivity, which means the adversary can query it adaptively. We present an isometric procedure to prepare quantum states that can be arbitrarily random (i.e., the trace distance from the Haar-random state can be arbitrarily small for the true random case, or the distinguishing advantage can be arbitrarily small for the pseudorandom case). This naturally gives the first construction for scalable, quantum-accessible, and adaptive PRFS assuming quantum-secure one-way functions. Compared to prior PRFS works, we use a stronger definition of quantum accessibility in which the adversary can be ancilla-assisted, i.e., the input state may not be pure and could be entangled with other quantum registers. Thus, our result also gives the first (fully) quantum-accessible PRFS. Our PRFS construction implies various primitives, including long-input PRFS, short-input PRFS, short-output PRFS, non-adaptive PRFS, and classically-accessible adaptive PRFS. This new construction may be helpful in simplifying the microcrypt zoo.

This work proposes StakeNote, a distributed ledger protocol that combines Proof-of-Stake (PoS) with privacy and anonymity preserving payments. The protocol combines Ouroboros Praos, a provably secure PoS protocol, with CryptoNote, a privacy-preserving payment system based on ring signatures which has been widely used in practice. We prove that StakeNote inherits the security guarantees of Ouroboros Praos and the privacy guarantees of CryptoNote and we demonstrate its practicality via a proof of concept implementation, where block creation requires less than 25 ms and eligibility proofs are approx. 3 KB for anonymity sets of size 16. Finally, we discuss heuristic enhancements that potentially increase privacy and enable dynamic participation.

End-to-end deep-learning side-channel attacks on public-key implementations have recently become possible even for million-sample traces. However, existing methods require large computational resources and extract only partial key shares, which means that dedicated post-processing is required to turn detected leakage into demonstrations of successful key recovery attacks. We present an end-to-end sequence-to-sequence prediction approach to recover complete 256-bit key shares from single raw traces on the SCAAML ECC datasets recently studied by Bursztein et al (TCHES 2024). Our solution combines aggressive trace compression for dimensionality reduction with a 1-D U-Net trained using Connectionist Temporal Classification loss. The key idea is to decouple detecting leakage from mapping each leakage site to the correct part of the secret: the network outputs an annotated map of the trace marking likely leakage sites, and a greedy decoder reconstructs the ordered key bits from that map. Using synthetic tasks, we show that this division of labor circumvents a fundamental problem that causes neural network architectures and training methods commonly used in side-channel analysis to struggle with massive multi-target or misaligned extraction tasks. As a result, we are able to train a single extractor that achieves high accuracy on all four SCAAML ECC datasets in a single training run that takes minutes on a single GPU. The resulting extractors are robust, essentially maintaining their performance under large misalignment (we empirically tested rotations up to \(61\%\) of trace length), while degrading gracefully under a variety of trace corruptions, and even time reversal. They transfer across key shares and datasets with little degradation and no retraining. The U-Net outputs also yield prediction maps that localize leakage along the trace prior to decoding.

Cryptographic signatures play an integral part in ensuring authenticity and integrity in digital systems. Their security crucially relies on the secrecy of the signing key, since knowledge of this key enables an adversary to generate valid signatures on any message. Once a signing key is compromised, the standard countermeasure is to revoke the corresponding public key and to invalidate all signatures produced for this key. However, with this approach even legitimate signatures created by the honest signer would retroactively lose their validity. In this work, we initiate the formal study of a new approach - Signatures with Post-Compromise Accountability (SPCA) - which provides security guarantees even after the secret key was compromised. This notion effectively introduces a grace period for the legitimate key owner, during which the validity of honestly generated signatures is preserved despite the adversary’s knowledge of the secret key. We formally define SPCA and its security guarantees, and present two constructions achieving this notion. Our first construction generalizes the signature-in-signature approach of Błaśkiewicz et al. (ESORICS '21), where an inner signature is embedded into the randomness of an outer signature. This construction, however, requires revealing the signing secret key during revalidation. Our second construction overcomes this limitation by enabling revalidation without disclosing the secret key, yielding stronger security guarantees.

Cryptographic accumulators based on groups of unknown order (GUO) provide constant-size set membership proofs. For security purposes, existing works require first encoding set elements via division-intractable (DI) hash functions, typically instantiated as random oracles that destroy any algebraic structure. This confines GUO-based accumulators to a purely set-membership role, making them "incompatible" with various existing cryptographic proof techniques over committed integers in the same groups as the GUO, such as constant-size proofs of exponentiation and modular exponent relations. We introduce the notion of morphic accumulators, which replaces the DI hash with a discrete logarithm encoding $H_g(x) = g^x$, mapping set elements to a group before accumulation. We prove, under a variant of the subset product assumption in the generic group model, that this encoding is inherently division intractable, achieving the same security guarantee as random-oracle DI hashes, while simultaneously being a group homomorphism: accumulated elements retain their group-algebraic relationships. This resolves a fundamental tension between compact representation and algebraic structure: the accumulator serves simultaneously as a binding commitment to a set and as a substrate for homomorphic computation over its elements. Morphic accumulators yield asymptotically optimal constructions across multiple domains: range proofs with $O(n)$ prover time, $O(1)$ proof size, $O(1)$ verification with transparent setups (the first scheme to simultaneously achieve these optimal bounds); polynomial commitments with $O(n)$ prover and $O(1)$ proof size, resolving the cubic bottleneck in prior constant-proof-size GUO-based schemes; and the first linkable ring signatures with $O(1)$ signature size, transparent setup, $O(n)$ offline signing and $O(1)$ online signing.

In the line of the SPDZ protocol for secure multi-party computation, the generation of Beaver triples is the most expensive task. Silentium (Rieder, PrivCryp 25) is the implementation of a Pseudorandom Correlation Generator (PCG) for Beaver triples (Boyle et al., Crypto 20). PCGs focus on low-communication costs., e.g. their PCG reduces the communication by one order of magnitude compared to protocols in MP-SPDZ. Silentium is an implementation of their PCG, achieving similar running times than MP-SPDZ. We make three theoretical contributions to Silentium, including an implementation. First, we make a practical proposal how to generate Beaver triples over binary fields F2λ, which extends the previous setting over prime fields. For this, we propose a suitable instantiation of the Number Theoretic Transform. Second, we show how to use the binary triples to construct what we call a Beaver triple expansion scheme, that is we construct a scheme that expands a small batch of Beaver triples into a large batch of Beaver triples, in the sense of recently established oblivious transfer extension schemes. This feature enables an efficient preprocessing stage for the PCG, closing a practical issue of Silentium. Finally, we provide details about the Silentium implementation, by clearing a technical bug in the initial theoretical protocol description.

Functional bootstrapping has made discrete computation practical in the Cheon--Kim--Kim--Song (CKKS) scheme, but it fuses four distinct tasks -- lookup table (LUT) evaluation, modular reduction, noise cleaning, and ciphertext refreshing -- into a single rigid pipeline. As a consequence, a generic LUT over an alphabet of size $t$ costs multiplicative depth proportional to $\log_2 t$ and consumes a large share of the modulus budget during a fixed bootstrapping procedure, invoked each time a LUT evaluation or modular reduction is needed. We show that this pipeline can be unbundled by changing the representation, rather than optimizing the bootstrapping, through block encodings. A finite-alphabet value is carried across several CKKS slots whose coordinates form a basis of functions on the alphabet, typically the characters of a finite abelian group. In such a basis, every LUT is an affine plaintext map evaluated in a single multiplicative level, with depth independent of $t$. Modular reduction comes for free: a block encoding cannot represent anything but a residue, so arithmetic modulo $t$ is native. Because every encoded coordinate has magnitude at most one, noise growth is independent of the alphabet size $t$. In the worst case, it matches the noise growth of standard discrete CKKS on the smallest alphabet $\mathbb Z_2$, and in more typical workloads it is linear in the number of operations, exponentially better than discrete CKKS at every $t > 2$. Noise cleaning becomes a constant-depth procedure of at most four levels, because the alphabet-dependent part is an LUT and only a fixed-degree-3 smoothstep is nonlinear. Finally, since LUTs are no longer part of the bootstrapping, refreshing reverts to its classical role as a maintenance operation invoked only to regain multiplicative depth. Any CKKS bootstrapping can be used, rather than a constrained and expensive pipeline. We instantiate the framework with several block encodings that make modular addition, modular multiplication, xor or min/max possible with a single CKKS multiplication. We use them to build CRT arithmetic over large composite moduli, and finite-state prefix scans for radix addition and subtraction in depth $4 + \lceil\log_2 d\rceil$ and for equality and comparison in depth $3 + \lceil\log_2 d\rceil$ for $d$ radix digits. For example, a 256-bit CRT modular addition or multiplication consumes a single multiplicative level and has a latency of 4.7 ms on a single thread.

We present a post-quantum commitment scheme based on kernel-tagged punctured Richelot isogeny walks on superspecial genus-2 Jacobians. The puncturing rule skips every step landing in the product locus, detected by I10 = 0, so honest executions remain in the Jacobian locus and avoid the entry point of known product-locus attacks. Each opening is encoded as a deterministic non-backtracking walk together with a kernel tag recording its action on a small public auxiliary torsion basis. The tag is verified as part of the opening and is kept explicit throughout the security analysis. In particular, scalar-related collisions force equality of the ordered kernel sequence and hence equality of the tag, so any nontrivial binding attack yields a short non-scalar endomorphism. Using spectral bounds for the Richelot graph, we show that puncturing preserves rapid mixing for logarithmic walk lengths, which yields statistical hiding for the tagged punctured scheme. We therefore reduce binding to the Short Richelot Endomorphism Problem (SREP), relate SREP to the One-Endomorphism Problem and, under a standard KLPT2 -style heuristic, to the endomorphism-ring problem. A SageMath prototype based on (2, 2)-Kummer isogenies indicates practical performance at standard security levels.

Finding a nontrivial endomorphism of a given supersingular elliptic curve is a hardness assumption of isogeny-based cryptography. We prove the reduction from it to the problem of finding a splitting of a given principally polarized abelian surface. By using this new reduction, we also prove the heuristic equivalence of the splitting problem with a degree restriction and the endomorphism ring problem in dimension two.

Batched encryption (BE) has emerged as a novel public-key cryptographic paradigm that enables the efficient decryption of a designated batch of $B$ ciphertexts simultaneously. By incorporating threshold decryption capabilities into this framework, batched threshold encryption (BTE) further decentralizes the decryption process. While both BE and BTE serve as highly effective solutions for mitigating Miner Extractable Value (MEV) attacks in blockchain networks by providing robust mempool privacy, ciphertext integrity, and communication efficiency, they still suffer from heavy computational overhead during the ciphertext decryption phase. In this paper, we address this computational bottleneck by introducing a novel framework that delegates the heavy decryption workloads to an untrusted cloud server while enabling verifiability of the outsourced computations. To achieve this, we first propose an outsourced batched identity-based encryption (O-BIBE) scheme by integrating outsourcing functionalities into the conventional BIBE paradigm, accompanied by a rigorous security proof. We then construct a verifiable outsourced batched encryption (VOBE) scheme by strategically combining O-BIBE with other core cryptographic building blocks and formally prove its security. To eliminate the single point of failure and enhance threshold resiliency, we extend our framework to the threshold setting by developing an outsourced threshold batched identity-based encryption (O-TBIBE) scheme. Building upon this, we propose a verifiable outsourced batched threshold encryption (VOBTE) scheme, which successfully achieves decentralized threshold resilience. Our proposed VOBE and VOBTE schemes are the first to concurrently guarantee ciphertext integrity and mempool privacy against sophisticated blockchain attacks, while significantly reducing decryption costs via efficient and verifiable outsourcing.

We present Grand Danois, a new post-quantum multilinear polynomial commitment scheme from lattices for polynomials over $\mathbb{F}_q$ that achieves polylogarithmic $O(\lambda \ell)$ verification complexity and proof sizes. We build on the general approach introduced in Hachi (ePrint 2026/156) with three key changes. First, we switch to the vanishing Short Integer Solution (vSIS) assumption to obtain structured public parameters for our commitment scheme and utilize this structure to design a sumcheck protocol amenable to succinct verification. Second, rather than casting ring relations into $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}[X]$, via the residual technique of Hachi, we express multiplication by fixed $\mathcal{R}_q$ elements through its rotation matrix, which lets the verifier fold each row of the constraint matrix in time linear rather than quadratic in the ring degree $d$. Third, we modify the quadratic relation used in Hachi and Greyhound (CRYPTO 2024) so that it becomes compatible with proving norm bounds using Johnson-Lindenstrauss projections. This is achieved through an adaptation of the structured projection strategy introduced in RoK and Roll (ASIACRYPT 2025). This has the benefit for communication complexity in that proving norm bounds and correct polynomial evaluation are integrated into a single protocol, reducing the number of commitments sent by the prover. Furthermore, we impose additional structure on our random projections to reduce the witness size even more aggressively during each round of recursion without sacrificing verification complexity. Under the vSIS assumption, our construction yields an estimated proof size of roughly $80$ KB for $2^{32}$-size polynomial evaluations.

Blockchain mempool transparency fuels Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), where attackers can front-run, back-run, and reorder transactions as soon as they appear. Encrypted mempools aim to delay the release of information until block commitment, yet nearly all existing designs rely on a trusted decryption committee. This creates two structural problems. First, committee members hold decryption material by design, so a colluding threshold can reconstruct the decryption key and learn transactions before block commitment. Second, once such a committee becomes malicious, honest parties have no easy in-protocol way to recover: restoring privacy for future epochs requires an external intervention such as a hard fork that replaces the committee and rotates the long-lived cryptographic material. In this work, we ask whether encrypted mempools can instead use proof-of-work to realize an open and recoverable decryption committee. We then introduce DecryptChain, a permissionless proof-of-work encrypted mempool in which decryption authority is not assigned to persistent identities or long-lived key shares. Instead, decryption is continuously re-contested through public computational work. Even if an adversary successfully breaches one epoch, it gains no reusable secret for future epochs; honest parties can always re-enter and recover the decryption process by contributing sufficient work. DecryptChain decouples block production from decryption, enabling it to operate as a Layer-2 timely decryption service on any underlying blockchain while preserving eventual decryption for committed on-chain encrypted transactions.

The communication complexity of unconditionally Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols has been studied by a series of works in the honest-majority setting. For evaluating an arbitrary Boolean circuit, the state-of-the-art MPC protocol by Goyal et al. (Crypto 2021 and Crypto 2022) achieves the total communication cost of $O(\log n)$ bits per gate, where $n$ is the number of parties. In this work, we present the first unconditional MPC protocol for any Boolean circuit with communication of $O(1)$ bits per gate. We first construct an unconditionally secure protocol in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and then strengthen it to guarantee security against malicious adversaries with the same communication efficiency.

This paper proposes a systematic approach to compute cryptanalytic properties of arbitrary Mealy machines or S-functions. Based on the geometric approach to cryptanalysis, we provide a uniform formula for any cryptanalytic property of such a function, as long as the property is compatible with the way its input and output are split into chunks. Examples include linear, (quasi) differential, (ultrametric) integral, differential-linear, and boomerang properties. To illustrate our results, we compute these properties for several important examples, including modular additions, the Chi- and ChiChi-functions, and the SHA-1 step function. As proof-of-concept applications, we construct a boomerang distinguisher for the Subterranean permutation, and show how to compute the correlations of conditional linear approximations in partitioning-based differential-linear attacks more accurately. Our results also lead to a new approach to compute the algebraic normal form of the inverse of the Chi-function.

In their seminal work, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [CRYPTO 1984] constructed a pseudorandom function (PRF) using a black-box access to a pseudorandom generator (PRG). When combined with Levin's domain extension technique, the GGM construction invokes the PRG $\omega(\log n)$ times, where $n$ denotes the input length to the PRG. To this day, no black-box construction achieving fewer calls is known. Recently, Beimel, Malkin, and Mazor [CRYPTO 2024] showed that for a certain family of constructions, which they termed \emph{tree constructions}, the GGM construction is optimal. However, the basic challenge of whether a PRF can be built with just \emph{one invocation} of the PRG still remains open. In this work, we consider fully black-box constructions of PRFs from PRGs, where both the construction and the reduction are required to be black-box, and the number of interactions the reduction makes with the adversary is independent of the number of oracle calls the adversary makes to its underlying function within each interaction. Our main result shows that no such construction can have $o(n/\log n)$ and $o(\mathsf{in}/\log\mathsf{in})$ \emph{non-adaptive} calls to the PRG, where $\mathsf{in}$ is the input length of the PRF. This impossibility holds even for weak PRFs with one-bit output, where the adversary is restricted to making i.i.d. uniformly random queries. In addition, we prove a lower bound for weak PRFs with sufficiently long outputs that holds even when the construction is allowed to make adaptive queries to the PRG.

In KEM-based TLS 1.3 key establishment, the client generates a fresh KEM key pair for each connection, placing key generation on the handshake critical path. For NTRU+, a KEM based on the NTRU problem selected in the Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition, the dominant cost in this path is the polynomial inversion needed to compute the public key. Although NTRU+ uses an NTT-friendly ring and performs this inversion in the NTT domain, the routine still decomposes into many base inversions, each requiring a modular inversion computed by exponentiation. To accelerate polynomial inversion in the NTT domain, we collect the modular inversions arising from base inversions into a single stage. This makes it possible to apply Montgomery's trick, reducing the number of modular inversions to one at the cost of sequential product and recovery chains. These chains limit instruction-level parallelism (ILP). To address this dependency bottleneck, we apply hierarchical batching to these exposed denominator inversions, splitting the inputs into $k$ groups to expose independent product chains and recursively batching the resulting $k$ group-product inversions. This preserves the arithmetic cost of Montgomery's trick while improving ILP, thereby reducing cycle counts. We evaluate hierarchical batch inversion across all NTRU+ parameter sets in both C and AVX2. For NTRU+$864$, the parameter set with the largest gains, compared with non-batched polynomial inversion, it reduces polynomial inversion latency by 48.91% in C and 59.57% in AVX2. For key generation, the corresponding speedups are 18.91% in C and 9.34% in AVX2.

CMoSS facilitates modular specifications, design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. Modular design and analysis is achieved by supporting provably-secure compositions of protocols; typically, a protocol uses a blackbox subprotocol, and is proven secure when composed with any subprotocol meeting the blackbox specifications. For modularity of specifications, CMoSS extends the approach of the MoSS framework: protocol specifications are defined modularly, by a set of independent predicates (games) for each model (assumption) and requirement (goal). CMoSS makes it feasible to rigorously specify, develop and analyze realistic applied cryptographic protocols, supporting real-time concurrency and involving different attacker capabilities, delays, faults and synchronization challenges. CMoSS specifications provide a precise formalization of the informal specifications used by practitioners, facilitating provable security for practical protocols.

A key challenge in digital credential systems is revocation, that is, the ability to revoke credentials post-issuance and verify their status upon presentation. While anonymous credentials enhance privacy over classical credentials (e.g., by providing unlinkability), they complicate revocation. Existing revocation schemes for anonymous credentials often suffer from high client or verifier computation, long delays before revocation takes effect (e.g., epoch-based settings), or require updates to all users with each revocation. We present an efficient, real-time revocation system for anonymous credentials with decentralized revocation authorities based on a novel primitive called Private Record Certification (PRC). PRC enables users to obtain a certificate for a record stored in a server-managed database without the servers learning which record was requested. This primitive is of independent interest, and we construct it by combining techniques from private information retrieval and secure multi-party computation. Our revocation scheme outsources its costs to the revocation authorities and has minimal overhead for clients and verifiers, while ensuring the communication costs are sublinear in the number of credentials for the revocation authorities. We build a prototype and demonstrate that our system achieves sub-second real-time latency at a scale of over 1 billion credentials, with an online operational cost of 2.5$ per server for processing 1 million PRC queries.

NIST standardised ML-KEM and ML-DSA in 2024 for post-quantum key establishment and digital signatures. Both compute forward number-theoretic transforms (NTTs) on secret polynomials. Published attacks zero every fixed multiplier, or twiddle, during Kyber key generation with a single fault, or individual twiddles in one Dilithium signing variant; countermeasures detect or mask these faults. Nonzero replacements preserve invertibility, but the uncompressed correct-minus-faulted transform difference can still expose input information. This paper characterises the linear map from a secret polynomial to this difference under arbitrary static twiddle replacements, including bit-flips. For one fault, rank equals the number of butterflies sharing its twiddle, halving by layer from 128 to 2 for ML-KEM and to 1 for ML-DSA. Known positions, replacement values and the difference determine that many independent linear combinations of input coefficients. With one fault per layer, all but the constant and linear coefficients for ML-KEM, or the constant for ML-DSA, are determined; Lean 4 certifies this rank-and-kernel result. Those coefficients cancel for every fault set and choice of replacement values. NIST permits seed storage, motivating comparison of a known correct key with a released faulty key from the same seed. If only one ML-KEM secret-polynomial NTT is faulted, the key difference is a known matrix column times the transform difference; an invertible column entry reconstructs the latter. For ML-DSA, neither reconstruction nor the number of secret-polynomial candidates from compressed key differences is established. The per-layer ranks give a closed-form measure of raw exposure for countermeasure design.

While FHE enables computation on encrypted data, protecting the program itself remains a theoretical and practical challenge, often forcing practitioners to choose between exposing proprietary logic or suffering impractical performance penalties. This paper introduces HEGIDE, an oblivious processor based on the (discrete) Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme that bridges the gap between theoretical Private Function Evaluation (PFE) and its practical realization. Central to our contribution is OSReM (Oblivious Shift Register Memory), a novel memory architecture that circumvents the linear complexity of standard FHE-RAM writes. By treating memory as a shift register, OSReM enables low-latency, constant-time writes without the need for expensive full-memory bootstrapping. HEGIDE leverages a MIMD (Multiple Instruction, Multiple Data) design, utilizing CKKS packing to evaluate distinct program threads in parallel, thus maximizing throughput. While the processor architecture natively supports arbitrary word sizes and instructions, we provide a compiler that manages memory scheduling to abstract the complexity of the shift-register design. We provide a proof-of-concept full implementation of HEGIDE using the OpenFHE library. Experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of our approach, achieving an amortized cycle time of just 6.4 ms for a 16-bit processor - two orders of magnitude faster in throughput than comparable approaches - offering a viable path for the secure execution of proprietary algorithms on encrypted data.

The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is a fundamental hardness assumption underlying most fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. Given the close relationship between the Learning with Rounding (LWR) and LWE problems, several cryptographic constructions have also been developed based on LWR. In particular, LWR-based schemes often benefit from simpler and more efficient implementations, as they eliminate the need for explicit Gaussian error sampling. Despite these advantages, relatively few FHE constructions in the literature are based on the LWR assumption. At AsiaCCS 2025, Goyal and Gangopadhyay proposed a multi-key FHE (MKFHE) scheme based on LWR that adopts a public-key extension mechanism rather than the conventional ciphertext-extension paradigm. The authors also identified the development of a ring-based analogue as an open future direction. In this work, we present two Ring-LWR-based MKFHE constructions that can be viewed as ring analogues of the LWR-based MKFHE scheme of Goyal and Gangopadhyay. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first MKFHE schemes based on the Ring-LWR assumption. Compared with existing Ring-LWE-based multi-key constructions, our schemes achieve improved compactness in terms of storage and communication costs. We provide concrete parameterizations supporting circuits of varying multiplicative depths and present a proof-of-concept implementation to validate our claims.

We show that the data deduplication scheme [IEEE Trans. Cloud Comput., 11(1), 156-167, 2023] is flawed due to some inconsistent computations. The scheme tries to propose a hybrid encryption and authentication mechanism based on RSA cryptosystem and pairing cryptosystem, but it has confused the different group operations. In the data sharing phase, the cloud service provider cannot determine which stored tag matches the temporary tag, and fails to return the stored data to the requester. To fix, it should explicitly specify which is randomized by modular exponentiation with an RSA modulus, and which is randomized by point multiplication over the underlying elliptic curve.

Pseudorandom codes (PRCs), introduced at Crypto 2024 by Christ and Gunn, are encryption schemes with pseudorandom ciphertexts and error-correction guarantees. PRCs are useful as a tool to obtain watermarking for generative models, in particular ensuring that a watermark is hard to remove against an attacker that can modify up to a given fraction of the watermarked output (a.k.a. the robustness property). A PRC is public-key if the encoding procedure is public (whereas detection requires the corresponding secret key). In this paper, we provide the first construction of public-key PRCs for the binary alphabet satisfying robustness in the presence of a constant fraction of substitutions ($1/6 - \varepsilon$, for arbitrary $\varepsilon > 0$) and at the same time achieving pseudorandomness against sub-exponential-time distinguishers. The pseudorandomness property relies on a new family of distorted McEliece assumptions that we introduce, instantiated with a class of expanded subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes, called Raw Reed-Solomon codes, for which we provide heuristic evidence of (plausible) sub-exponential hardness. Our construction is obtained by revisiting the original blueprint by Christ and Gunn to obtain public-key PRCs based on McEliece assumptions. Along the way, we also uncover that their blueprint does not work directly with Raw Reed-Solomon codes. In particular, we show that a generating matrix of a permuted Raw Reed-Solomon code is distinguishable in polynomial time from a uniformly random generating matrix. To circumvent that difficulty, we propose to distort the public key by multiplication with a sparse invertible matrix of constant row Hamming weight.

Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocols must ensure not only agreement and termination, but also validity: the value agreed upon should meaningfully reflect the honest parties' inputs. The choice of validity condition can change the exact resilience threshold at which BA is solvable. Tight characterizations for BA with general validity conditions are known in the partially synchronous model (PODC'23), in the synchronous model (PODC'24), and in the network-agnostic model (DISC'25). We focus on general validity for synchronous BA with responsive termination. Such protocols remain secure against up to $t_s$ byzantine corruptions, but incur a running time that depends on the actual network delay $\delta$, rather than the conservative delay bound $\Delta \gg \delta$, whenever at most $t_r \leq t_s$ parties are corrupted. We present a tight characterization of the validity properties solvable in this setting. We prove that every non-trivial validity property requires $n>2 t_r+t_s$ in authenticated settings, where a public-key infrastructure and digital signatures are available, and $n>3 t_s$ in unauthenticated settings. These threshold conditions are accompanied by a validity-dependent requirement, the responsive similarity condition: roughly, for any concrete configuration of honest inputs, there is a value that is valid for any view that a protocol could obtain from this initial configuration. We then present matching protocols in both settings, showing that these conditions are sufficient. The main technical contribution is an authenticated responsive Core-Set Agreement protocol requiring $n>2 t_r+t_s$. This threshold may place the protocol in an honest-minority regime, where prior constructions for general validity do not apply and where standard Synchronous Broadcast is not responsive. Finally, we instantiate the characterization for several standard validity notions -- weak validity, strong unanimity, convex validity, and honest-input validity.

We continue the study of fast functions, computable by linear-size circuits, that share useful properties of random functions. Motivated by cryptographic applications, we generalize and improve on previous results in this area, obtaining the following results: - For any constant $t$, we construct a fast $t$-wise independent hash function with algebraic degree $\log_2 t$ (over $\mathbb F_2$), simultaneously optimizing both asymptotic circuit size and degree. - We simplify and improve a recent construction (ITCS 2026) of a family of fast codes with fast duals, both meeting the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Unlike the previous construction, our construction has negligible failure probability, can accommodate general fields and rates, supports a systematic encoding, and admits fast universal encoders. - We strengthen the above to support stronger random-like properties, such as optimal combinatorial list-decoding. This is achieved by constructing, for any constant $t$, a family of fast linear functions that map any $t$ linearly independent inputs to uniform and statistically independent outputs. Prior to our work, this was only known for $t=1$. We demonstrate the usefulness of the above results to cryptography. This includes the first nontrivial protocols for perfectly secure multiparty computation whose circuit complexity scales linearly with the number of parties, as well as protocols for computing encrypted matrix-vector products with optimal asymptotic circuit complexity.

Heterogeneous computing platforms increasingly rely on high-throughput data paths spanning CPUs and accelerators, yet most high-speed software ciphers are optimized primarily for CPU-centric execution models. We present AICE, an arithmetic-oriented stream cipher over \(\mathbb{Z}/2^{16}\mathbb{Z}\) with a 37-word (592-bit) internal state, a nonlinear feedback combining modular addition, multiplication, bitwise OR, and rotation, a 370-round initialization with post-initialization key feed-forward, and periodic blank updates. We analyze AICE under several cryptanalytic models, including differential trail screening, linear approximation over the abelian group \(\mathbb{Z}/2^{16}\mathbb{Z}\), guess-and-determine state recovery, and exact SMT-based cube evaluation, and find that all observable structural phenomena remain confined to reduced-round settings far below the full initialization. On the AI Cores of Huawei Ascend accelerators, AICE reaches a single-core peak throughput of $114.13$ Gbps on the Ascend 950 and $55.36$ Gbps on the Ascend 910B4, and scales to $1.59$ Tbps on $32$ Ascend 910B4 cores, roughly $54\times$ the throughput of AES-CTR and $107\times$ that of SM4-CTR on the same $32$-core configuration; on the ARM Kunpeng 920 it remains in the same throughput class as hardware instruction accelerated AES-CTR.

Modern cryptography relies on the intractability of computational problems. We present an approach to building cryptography from a new source of hardness: \emph{proving mathematical theorems}. Our main result is a construction of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) for NP under a new, but natural, assumption on the hardness of proving lower bounds in proof complexity. Specifically, our assumption states that it is impossible to prove, within a weak bounded arithmetic theory, the correctness of certifying hard tautologies against Extended Frege. This assumption is inspired by an informal mathematical challenge proposed by Razborov [Ann. Math. '15], and can be viewed as a generalization of an unconditional unprovability result due to Krajíček and Pudlák [J. Symb. Log. '89]. Our construction is a simple variant of the SNARG construction of Jin, Kalai, Lombardi, and Vaikuntanathan [STOC '24]. While the soundness of their construction was proven only for a subclass of NP, we prove its soundness for all of NP under our assumption. At the heart of our result is the observation that cryptographic reasoning is simple in a formal sense: the security proof of most cryptographic primitives can be formalized in a weak theory. In particular, we show how to formalize the scheme of Jin et al. in Jeřábek's theory $\mathsf{APC}_1$ [J. Symb. Log. '07], a weak theory of bounded arithmetic.

Permissionless consensus enables parties to perform Byzantine agreement without any a priori knowledge about who is participating, except for an upper bound on the number of participants running the protocol (no PKI, etc.). Since Nakamoto’s Bitcoin paper, it has been widely believed that permissionless consensus is feasible provided the (Byzantine) adversary only controls a fraction of the collective computational power. However, all known protocols, including Nakamoto’s, rely on idealized assumptions (or ad hoc instantiations). Is permissionless consensus possible without such assumptions? Surprising little progress had been made towards solving this open question until the recent result by Ball et al. (Crypto 2024), which showed how to achieve permissionless consensus from proofs of work (PoWs) based on fine-grained complexity assumptions in a setting where a randomness beacon is available to all parties running the protocol. Their work left open whether it is possible to remove the beacon assumption; this question is the focus of our work, which we resolve via a new consensus protocol construction that relies on a novel class of distributed samplers and a common random string (that does not need to be structured or sampled precisely at the onset of the protocol execution). To prove our protocol secure, we revisit the concept of distributed samplers and adapt it to a setting where multiple sampler executions need to be simultaneously secure. To address this challenge we introduce the primitive we call d-wise independent distributed samplers and put forward constructions for such samplers based on DDH and LWE. We then present our consensus protocol via a modular design that utilizes a new moderately hard cryptographic primitive we call multi-verifier signatures of work, a sort of “time-based signature” we construct by composing distributed samplers and (fine-grained complexity-based) PoWs, and which may be of independent interest.

Censorship has always existed, serving both to prevent harms and to inflict them by chilling speech, suppressing organizing, and withholding inconvenient facts and ideas; most technical work aims to prevent all forms of censorship --- the "good", the "bad", and everything in between. We study the complementary, rarely explored goal of making any censorship attempt transparent. We formalize censorship-evident publishing systems (CEPS), protocols that force both overt and covert takedowns to yield transferable evidence. We also provide a CEPS instantiation with Streisand, a proof-of-concept deployment that combines a blockchain-backed timestamp oracle, private information retrieval (PIR)-based anonymous queries to prevent extraction attempts from being conspicuous, and probabilistic Merkle-witness retrieval to produce compact censorship proofs. We present performance evaluations on a 1.3 GiB Enron-derived dataset with regex-based PII redaction to model realistic censorship, and demonstrate that a background daemon can detect heavy censorship after a small number of post-censorship queries, making Streisand an effective auditing mechanism rather than interactive file retrieval. We also discuss design trade-offs (proof size vs. computation, PIR sufficiency vs. necessity), scalability limits, and how CEPS complements existing transparency practices, with Streisand as a starting point for CEPS deployments.

This paper presents high-performance Advanced Vector Extensions 512 (AVX-512) implementations of two Korean standard cryptographic algorithms: the Lightweight Secure Hash (LSH) hash function and Lightweight Encryption Algorithm-Galois/Counter Mode (LEA-GCM) authenticated encryption. For LSH, we apply three optimization strategies: single-message processing using AVX-512 512-bit vector registers, dual-message parallel processing through register interleaving, and multi-core parallelization using a dynamic queue-based pthread thread pool. For LEA-GCM, we propose an end-to-end optimization that replaces scalar Counter mode (CTR) encryption with 16-block AVX-512 parallel processing and Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE)-based Galois Hash (GHASH) authentication with VPCLMULQDQ-based 4-block parallel processing. Performance evaluation on an Intel Core i7-1165G7 (Tiger Lake) processor shows that LSH-256 achieves an average 1.16× throughput improvement and LSH-512 achieves an average 1.61× improvement over the Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA) AVX2 reference implementation. Dual-message interleaving achieves an average superlinear speedup of 2.28× driven by instruction-level parallelism (ILP), and the 8-core thread pool delivers speedups of 3.50× to 5.12×. The optimized LEA-GCM implementation achieves a 3.26× throughput improvement over the KISA SSE-based reference and a 12.1× improvement over the pure software implementation for 4096-byte inputs, with correctness verified against KISA official test vectors.

Electronic voting systems inherently encompass a structural tension among ballot secrecy, verifiability, and coercion resistance. Voters must be able to verify whether their votes have been included; however, if such verification information can serve as evidence presentable to a third party, it becomes a basis for post-election intimidation. Existing studies have focused primarily on performance evaluation or data separation, and have not comprehensively addressed the structural tension between verifiability and coercion resistance. This study defines this tension as the verification paradox and designs and implements an electronic voting prototype on a three-organization consortium based on Hyperledger Fabric 2.5, combining a 2-of-3 endorsement policy, nullifier-based anonymity, Exponential ElGamal homomorphic tallying, zero-knowledge proof (ZKP)-based ballot validity verification, panic password-based deniable verification, and Private Data Collection (PDC)-based coerced vote separation. Quantitative evaluation results confirm a server latency overhead of +0.9% for ElGamal relative to the AES performance baseline, statistical indistinguishability between normal and panic responses (p > 0.05), and a peak throughput of approximately 40.7 TPS (with an error rate of 0%) under 1,000 concurrent voters. This study demonstrates that permissioned blockchains can provide practical mitigation of the verification paradox through implementation and quantitative evaluation.

The Korean Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP) is a national certification system that verifies the security and conformity of cryptographic modules deployed in government and public institutions. The current process typically takes about one and a half years, during which frequent supplement requests and the resulting retesting cycles substantially raise costs and delay schedules. To address this, we propose an AI-based pre-certification framework that combines rule-based deterministic detection (L1), RAG-based guideline-evidence retrieval (L2), and LLM-based final decision (L3) into a funnel-shaped pipeline that progressively reduces false positives. L1 applies more than 170 YAML inspection rules across four pattern types (missing, regex, semantic, ast) to perform deterministic detection. L2 retrieves and attaches KCMVP guideline evidence to each violation through multi-stage RAG search, and L3 employs Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite to make context-aware decisions on false-positive candidates. In an initial evaluation on 128 Ground Truth cases derived from the KISA LEA code, the system detected all 128 cases, achieving 100% recall, while L3 correctly removed 9 of 46 FP candidates (19.6%) without inducing any false negatives (FN), confirming the stepwise refinement effect of the funnel structure. A blind verification on a certified commercial cryptographic module (~14.5 KLOC) yielded a low detection frequency of 0.58 cases per 1,000 lines of code, supporting the system’s practicality in real environments.

The advancement of quantum computing threatens public-key cryptographic algorithms used in TLS connections, such as RSA and ECDHE. The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) attack exposes long-term confidential data to risk even before quantum computers are practically realized, yet a systematic methodology for immediately quantifying the quantum vulnerability of individual TLS connections remains absent. This paper proposes a layered risk scoring model that quantifies the quantum threat exposure of TLS connections on a 0–100 scale. The model decomposes risk into five independent layers—TLS protocol exposure (L1), legacy public-key vulnerability (L2a), AES-128 Grover weakening (L2b), PQC Level-1 vulnerability (L2c), and certificate expiration urgency (L3)—and incorporates an HNDL global multiplier M that reflects the confidentiality retention period of transmitted data. Applied to 502 real-world TLS sessions across four industry sectors with M = 1.50, the domestic average risk score (16.0) is approximately 34% higher than the global average (11.9), with domestic legacy key exchange usage at 77.4% versus 53.5% globally and PQC adoption at 22.6% versus 46.5%. These results quantitatively confirm the elevated quantum risk of domestic network infrastructure, underscoring the urgency of PQC transition.

The “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL)” attack—which intercepts and stores encrypted communications before quantum computers become practical and decrypts them afterward—poses a long-term threat to TLS communication channels. Following the completion of NIST PQC standardization, organizations must pursue a phased migration of their TLS layers; however, existing approaches are limited by late detection of configuration errors, absence of cryptographic asset tracking, and insufficient automated response. This paper proposes an 11-Step DevSecOps pipeline grounded in Policy as Code. The pipeline automatically validates and deploys a 3-Stage TLS migration—Classical ECC (Stage 1), Hybrid PQC (Stage 2), and Advanced Hybrid PQC (Stage 3)—through 11 steps per execution, integrating OQS-Nginx custom builds, security scanning, CBOM Diff, and matrix CI regression detection. In our evaluation against six PQC toolchain pitfalls, standard SCA/SAST/SBOM pre-detected 0/6, whereas custom builds pre-prevented 5/6 and matrix CI detected 6/6 at runtime. In an evaluation of LLM-based code migration across 80 trials (55 responses received), even with static AST validation applied, 24 failures due to signature/argument hallucination (43.6% of response trials) were only caught at runtime, quantitatively confirming that semantic execution validation is an essential component of multi-layered defense.

Organizations relying on RSA-OAEP encryption in protocols such as JWE, SAML, and OIDC face a critical challenge: transitioning to post-quantum cryptography without disrupting operational continuity. This paper presents a phased migration strategy that uses RSA-KEM-ML-KEM composite Key Encapsulation Mechanisms as an intermediary step between current RSA-OAEP encryption and the target state of pure ML-KEM adoption. We formalize the RSA-KEM-ML-KEM construction, prove IND-CCA2 security via a Split-Key PRF combiner, and integrate it into the Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) framework. Our implementation demonstrates that composite schemes enable quantum-resistant encryption while preserving existing RSA key infrastructure, though with measurable throughput trade-offs that inform migration timelines. We analyze protocol-specific integration for JWE, SAML, and OIDC encryption use cases, providing decision frameworks for transitioning from RSA-OAEP through composite approaches to pure post-quantum encryption. This work contributes a formally analyzed transition mechanism and practical migration guidance for organizations seeking to adopt quantum-resistant encryption in RSA-dependent systems, validated through application to identity and access management protocols.