Paper 2026/1238

On the Additive Sensitivity of LZ77 Under Consecutive Edits

Jeremiah Blocki, Purdue University West Lafayette
Seunghoon Lee, University of Waterloo
Abstract

We revisit the problem of mitigating information leakage in the widely used but insecure compress-then-encrypt paradigm. While encryption hides message contents, the ciphertext length is directly related to the length of the compressed message, which may, in turn, leak information about the {\em content} of the message itself. Recent work of Blocki et al. (TCC 2025) proposed an $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differentially private approach that adds randomized padding calibrated to the global sensitivity of the compression algorithm, and showed that the global sensitivity of LZ77 is $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$, where $n$ is the input length and $W$ is the sliding window size. However, prior analysis focused only on sensitivity with respect to single-character edits, which leads to limited privacy guarantees when protecting longer substrings such as passwords, passphrases, cookies, or confidential user records. A natural attempt to handle longer secrets is to appeal to group privacy, but for approximate differential privacy, this leads to very poor parameter degradation: in particular, the effective value of $\delta$ can grow exponentially with the group size $g$. In this work, we introduce and study the sensitivity of compression schemes under block edits. Specifically, we define two strings to be $g$-neighbors if they differ only within a contiguous interval of length $g$. Our main technical contribution is a nearly tight characterization of the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77. We show that the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of both LZ77 variants (with and without self-referencing) is at most $O((W^{2/3}+g+\sqrt{Wg})\log n)$. In particular, when $g \leq W^{1/3}$, the bound simplifies to $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$, matching the known bound for single-character edits. Thus, calibrating noise to the single-character sensitivity of LZ77 already suffices to protect much longer contiguous substrings. We provide matching lower bounds to demonstrate that our upper bound is tight, e.g., when $n=W=O(g^2)$, the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77 is at least $\tilde{\Omega}(g^{1.5})$, matching the $\sqrt{Wg}=O(g^{1.5})$ term from our upper bound up to a logarithmic factor.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
jblocki @ purdue edu
seunghoon lee @ uwaterloo ca
History
2026-06-11: approved
2026-06-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1238
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1238,
      author = {Jeremiah Blocki and Seunghoon Lee},
      title = {On the Additive Sensitivity of {LZ77} Under Consecutive Edits},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1238},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1238}
}
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