Paper 2026/1238
On the Additive Sensitivity of LZ77 Under Consecutive Edits
Abstract
We revisit the problem of mitigating information leakage in the widely used but insecure compress-then-encrypt paradigm. While encryption hides message contents, the ciphertext length is directly related to the length of the compressed message, which may, in turn, leak information about the {\em content} of the message itself. Recent work of Blocki et al. (TCC~2025) proposed an $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differentially private approach that adds randomized padding calibrated to the global sensitivity of the compression algorithm, and showed that LZ77 has global sensitivity $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$ for input length $n$ and sliding window size $W$. However, prior analysis focused only on sensitivity with respect to single-character edits, which leads to limited privacy guarantees when protecting longer substrings such as passwords, passphrases, cookies, or confidential user records. A natural attempt to handle longer secrets is to appeal to group privacy, but for approximate differential privacy, this leads to very poor parameter degradation: in particular, the effective value of $\delta$ can grow exponentially with the group size $g$. In this work, we introduce and study the sensitivity of compression schemes under block edits. Specifically, we define two strings to be $g$-neighbors if they differ only within a contiguous interval of length $g$. Our main technical contribution is a nearly tight characterization of the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77. We show that the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77, both with and without self-referencing, is at most $O\!\left((W^{2/3}+g+\sqrt{Wg})\log n\right)$. In particular, when $g \leq W^{1/3}$, the bound simplifies to $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$, matching the known bound for single-character edits. Combined with the framework of Blocki et al., our bound yields $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differential privacy for $g$-neighbors with the same asymptotic padding scale as for single-character edits. We provide matching lower bounds to demonstrate that our upper bound is tight, e.g., when $n=W=\Theta(g^2)$, the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77 is at least $\tilde{\Omega}(g^{3/2})$, matching the $\sqrt{Wg}=\Theta(g^{3/2})$ term from our upper bound up to a logarithmic factor.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Contact author(s)
-
jblocki @ purdue edu
seunghoon lee @ uwaterloo ca - History
- 2026-09-16: revised
- 2026-06-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1238
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1238,
author = {Jeremiah Blocki and Seunghoon Lee},
title = {On the Additive Sensitivity of {LZ77} Under Consecutive Edits},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1238},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1238}
}