Paper 2026/1248

Atlantis: Lattice-based Anonymous Tokens with Private Metadata Bit

Foteini Baldimtsi, George Mason University
Aayush Yadav, George Mason University
Abstract

Anonymous tokens with private metadata bit (ATPM) allow an issuer to embed a hidden trust flag, as a single bit, within issued tokens. The bit remains hidden from the clients, but verifiers can read the bit and rate-limit or discard tokens marked suspect. A series of ATPM constructions exist in the literature, however all current constructions rely on classical hardness assumptions such as RSA groups, pairings, or elliptic-curve VRFs and do not provide any post-quantum security guarantees. In this work we present, the first ATPM scheme based on lattice assumptions. Tokens generated with our scheme are publicly verifiable, and privately bit-extractable given partial knowledge of the issuing authority's secret. Our design follows the Fischlin blind-signature paradigm and enriches it with lattice-based linearly-homomorphic encryption to carry the hidden bit. We also instantiate our scheme from Falcon-512 and the efficient LNP22 lattice NIZK proof system (Lyubashevsky et. al, Crypto '22). The resulting protocol, which we call $\textsf{Atlantis}$, requires 70 KB of client-issuer communication and yields 129 KB tokens.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. SCN 2026
Keywords
anonymous tokenslattice cryptography
Contact author(s)
foteini @ gmu edu
ayadav5 @ gmu edu
History
2026-06-13: approved
2026-06-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1248
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1248,
      author = {Foteini Baldimtsi and Aayush Yadav},
      title = {Atlantis: Lattice-based Anonymous Tokens with Private Metadata Bit},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1248},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1248}
}
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