Paper 2026/1190
CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework
, University of Connecticut, The College of Management Academic Studies, Trinity College, University of ConnecticutAbstract
CMoSS facilitates modular specifications, design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. Modular design and analysis is achieved by supporting provably-secure compositions of protocols; typically, a protocol uses a blackbox subprotocol, and is proven secure when composed with any subprotocol meeting the blackbox specifications. For modularity of specifications, CMoSS extends the approach of the MoSS framework: protocol specifications are defined modularly, by a set of independent predicates (games) for each model (assumption) and requirement (goal). CMoSS makes it feasible to rigorously specify, develop and analyze realistic applied cryptographic protocols, supporting real-time concurrency and involving different attacker capabilities, delays, faults and synchronization challenges. CMoSS specifications provide a precise formalization of the informal specifications used by practitioners, facilitating provable security for practical protocols.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- provable securityprotocolsspecificationscompositionmodular
- Contact author(s)
-
sara wrotniak @ uconn edu
menahemle @ colman ac il
ewa syta @ trincoll edu
amir herzberg @ uconn edu - History
- 2026-06-10: approved
- 2026-06-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1190
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1190,
author = {Sara Wrótniak and Hemi Leibowitz and Ewa Syta and Amir Herzberg},
title = {{CMoSS}: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1190},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1190}
}
