Paper 2026/1252
HedgeSwap: Universal Hedged Atomic Swaps Against Griefing Attacks
Abstract
Universal atomic swaps [Oakland'22] replace hashed timelock contracts with adaptor signatures and verifiable timed dlogs, enabling secure cross-chain cryptocurrency exchanges that only require basic signature verification from the underlying blockchains. However, existing universal swap protocols remain vulnerable to griefing attacks, where a deviating party aborts the swap to lock a compliant party's assets for a long period. A natural approach is to lift existing contract-based solutions to the universal setting, but we identify that this straightforward solution faces two key challenges: (i) timeout race attacks, first identified in PipeSwap [Oakland'25], which arises from the absence of an upper bound on the transaction validity; (ii) a timeout overlap dilemma, which results from multiple overlapping refund periods. In this paper, we propose HedgeSwap, a universal hedged atomic swap protocol against griefing attacks, which compensates a compliant party with a premium if its asset is locked but not redeemed. To mitigate the timeout race attacks and timeout overlap dilemma, HedgeSwap eliminates the premium timeout and instead relies on a hard relation to refund the premium. For high-value asset swaps where the parties acceptable premium ranges do not overlap, we further propose a round-based HedgeSwap that utilizes a premium migration mechanism to solve these two timeout challenges, where parties iteratively increase the premium until the lock-up risk premium acceptable to both. Our experimental results show that our HedgeSwap can complete in under 0.5 seconds, and round-based HedgeSwap completes in under 1.3 seconds for a five-round setting, while HedgeSwap reduces gas cost by 2.69X compared to existing contract-based solutions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ESORICS 2026
- Keywords
- BlockchainAtomic SwapsUniversalityGriefing Attacks
- Contact author(s)
-
dongkun hou @ monash edu
ying-teng chen @ monash edu
shujie cui @ monash edu
john tszhonyuen @ monash edu
joseph liu @ monash edu
jiangshan yu @ sydney edu au - History
- 2026-07-07: last of 5 revisions
- 2026-06-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1252
- License
-
CC BY-NC-ND
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1252,
author = {Dongkun Hou and Ying-Teng Chen and Shujie Cui and Tsz Hon Yuen and Joseph K. Liu and Jiangshan Yu},
title = {{HedgeSwap}: Universal Hedged Atomic Swaps Against Griefing Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1252},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1252}
}