Paper 2026/1188

Rank Ceiling for Twiddle-Perturbation Faults on the Forward NTT

Abstract

NIST standardised ML-KEM and ML-DSA in 2024 for post-quantum key establishment and digital signatures. Both compute forward number-theoretic transforms (NTTs) on secret polynomials. Published attacks zero every fixed multiplier, or twiddle, during Kyber key generation with a single fault, or individual twiddles in one Dilithium signing variant; countermeasures detect or mask these faults. Nonzero replacements preserve invertibility, but the uncompressed correct-minus-faulted transform difference can still expose input information. This paper characterises the linear map from a secret polynomial to this difference under arbitrary static twiddle replacements, including bit-flips. For one fault, rank equals the number of butterflies sharing its twiddle, halving by layer from 128 to 2 for ML-KEM and to 1 for ML-DSA. Known positions, replacement values and the difference determine that many independent linear combinations of input coefficients. With one fault per layer, all but the constant and linear coefficients for ML-KEM, or the constant for ML-DSA, are determined; Lean 4 certifies this rank-and-kernel result. Those coefficients cancel for every fault set and choice of replacement values. NIST permits seed storage, motivating comparison of a known correct key with a released faulty key from the same seed. If only one ML-KEM secret-polynomial NTT is faulted, the key difference is a known matrix column times the transform difference; an invertible column entry reconstructs the latter. For ML-DSA, neither reconstruction nor the number of secret-polynomial candidates from compressed key differences is established. The per-layer ranks give a closed-form measure of raw exposure for countermeasure design.