Paper 2026/1195

DecryptChain: A Permissionless Proof-of-Work Encrypted Mempool

Abstract

Blockchain mempool transparency fuels Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), where attackers can front-run, back-run, and reorder transactions as soon as they appear. Encrypted mempools aim to delay the release of information until block commitment, yet nearly all existing designs rely on a trusted decryption committee. This creates two structural problems. First, committee members hold decryption material by design, so a colluding threshold can reconstruct the decryption key and learn transactions before block commitment. Second, once such a committee becomes malicious, honest parties have no easy in-protocol way to recover: restoring privacy for future epochs requires an external intervention such as a hard fork that replaces the committee and rotates the long-lived cryptographic material. In this work, we ask whether encrypted mempools can instead use proof-of-work to realize an open and recoverable decryption committee. We then introduce DecryptChain, a permissionless proof-of-work encrypted mempool in which decryption authority is not assigned to persistent identities or long-lived key shares. Instead, decryption is continuously re-contested through public computational work. Even if an adversary successfully breaches one epoch, it gains no reusable secret for future epochs; honest parties can always re-enter and recover the decryption process by contributing sufficient work. DecryptChain decouples block production from decryption, enabling it to operate as a Layer-2 timely decryption service on any underlying blockchain while preserving eventual decryption for committed on-chain encrypted transactions.