Papers updated in last 183 days (Page 13 of 2708 results)

Last updated:  2026-09-18
Top Gun: Degree Annihilation Attacks on Poseidon
Antonio Sanso and Giuseppe Vitto
Poseidon is one of the most widely deployed arithmetization-oriented cryptographic permutations and plays a central role in modern zero-knowledge proof systems. Although several algebraic attacks on reduced-round variants have been proposed, the security of the recommended parameter sets remains intact. A central difficulty in such attacks is controlling the degree growth of the polynomial representations induced by the permutation. In this work, we develop degree annihilation, extending coefficient cancellation in round-skipping attacks to cubic Poseidon. Degree annihilation reduces the contribution of existing rounds by imposing algebraic constraints that force dominant degree terms to vanish. This yields polynomial systems of substantially lower effective degree. We first present a simple bivariate form of degree annihilation and show how it combines naturally with classical round-skipping techniques. For cubic S-boxes with six full rounds, making the first partial-round input affine reduces the final degree bound by a factor of three. We then generalize the technique to multivariate settings, where systems of control equations are used to annihilate successive partial-round degree contributions. We find control solutions using elimination, resultants, and Gröbner basis techniques. As a proof of concept, we apply the framework to reduced-round Poseidon instances and obtain new CICO-2 attacks. More broadly, our results suggest that constructing algebraic varieties that actively control degree growth may provide a direction for the cryptanalysis of arithmetization-oriented primitives.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Batched and Weighted Threshold Encryption with Silent Setup
Amit Agarwal, Rutchathon Chairattana-Apirom, Sourav Das, and Babak Poorebrahim Gilkalaye
Batched Threshold Encryption (BTE) enables a committee of parties to jointly decrypt any subset of ciphertexts from a large set, while all other ciphertexts remain private. BTE has applications in blockchains, particularly in designing encrypted mempools, where transactions are encrypted until included into a block to prevent maximal extractable value (MEV) attacks. Existing BTE constructions, however, encounter one of the following usability downsides: (a) reliance on expensive distributed key generation (DKG) protocols, (b) dependency on a batch label during ciphertext generation, (c) ciphertexts that are only decryptable if they are encoded with respect to a non-conflicting index in the batch, or (d) no support for weighted threshold policies. In this work, we present a BTE scheme that simultaneously addresses all of the above issues. It has a silent setup (key generation does not require interaction between parties), is batch and index independent, and supports weighted threshold policies. Our construction is based on prime-order groups with bilinear pairings with security proof in the Generic Group Model. Our ciphertext size is also the shortest among existing silent batched threshold encryption schemes with only $2$ group elements in addition to the message length.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Slipway: Accessing Finite Subspace Trails in Poseidon
Giuseppe Vitto
Poseidon is an algebraic permutation designed for efficient use in proof systems. Its nonlinear layer consists of power-map S-boxes. In a full round, the S-box is applied to every state coordinate; in a partial round, it is applied to only one coordinate, reducing the arithmetization cost. Each round also applies an MDS linear layer to diffuse information across the state. To study algebraic degree, we let the input depend on variables and follow the resulting family of states through the permutation. If the coordinate entering a partial-round S-box is constant across that family, the S-box adds no degree in the family variables. Directions with this property over several consecutive partial rounds form finite subspace trails. Such trails exist for every linear layer, but their existence does not by itself explain how a constrained family can pass through the preceding full rounds and enter them without first acquiring high degree. We address this reachability problem by constructing a constrained input family and a round-constant-dependent MDS matrix together. The prescribed matrix images carry the family through the four initial full rounds and into a chosen finite trail. After an explicit change of variable, the state at the end of the full-round prefix is linear in the new root variable, so the prefix acts as a controlled reparametrization rather than as a source of degree growth. We call this effect full-round absorption. For the KoalaBear instance $(t,\alpha,R_F,R_P)=(16,3,8,20)$, we construct a two-parameter family whose first two input coordinates are zero. On this family, the four initial full rounds act as a reparametrization and deliver the variable directions into a two-dimensional trail, so those four rounds and the next fourteen partial S-boxes add no degree. For the exhibited control, the polynomials representing the first two output coordinates have exact degree $3^{R_F+R_P-4-14}=3^{10}$, rather than the expected degree $3^{R_F+R_P}=3^{28}$. We exhibit a common base-field root, yielding a complete CICO-2 solution for the full-round Poseidon instance. The resulting matrices are MDS and satisfy the relevant matrix checks prescribed by the Poseidon designers, yet they make a finite trail reachable through the full-round prefix. We generalize the construction to CICO-$k$, derive bounds on trail dimension and matrix images, and provide a concrete MDS matrix that meets the CICO-3 matrix-image bound with equality.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Dynamic Participant Updates to Access and Adversary Structures for Ideal Secret Sharing Schemes Based on Linear Codes
Xu Qiuxia, Tang Chunming, and Yi Zongxiang
The paper investigates secret sharing schemes based on linear codes, focusing primarily on the access structures and adversary structures arising from dynamic participant updates, as well as on whether such access structures can be realized by ideal linear secret sharing schemes. First, we characterize the maximal adversary structure corresponding to the access structure obtained by adding new participants to every authorized subsets of a given access structure.Second, we prove that the original access structure can be realized by a linear code $C(n+1)[n+1,k;q]$ if and only if the access structure obtained after adding $\ell$ new participants can be realized by a linear code $C(n+\ell+1)[n+\ell+1,k+\ell;q]$. In addition, we establish the correspondence between the codewords of these two linear codes. Furthermore, We prove that the original access structure can be realized by an ideal secret sharing scheme if and only if the expanded access structure can be realized by one as well. Finally, we demonstrate that every linear secret sharing scheme realizing a disjoint access structure is ideal. We also prove that access structures whose any two minimal authorized subsets share all but one participant can be realized by an ideal linear secret sharing scheme. In addition, we determine the adversary structure corresponding to this class of access structures. More generally, we obtain the maximal adversary structure when new participants are added to merely part of the minimal authorized subsets.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
FHE for ALU over Large Prime Moduli and Application to One-Round Threshold ECDSA
Yuchen Wei, Kaisheng Ma, Mingyu Gao, and Hongren Zheng
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) has served as a theoretical building block for cryptographic primitives, but concrete instantiations remain limited by the cost of generic homomorphic computation. One example is the universal thresholdizer that compiles any (deterministic) signature scheme into a multi-party threshold signature scheme with a one-round signing protocol (Boneh et al., Crypto'18), where the signing algorithm is homomorphically evaluated without communication with other parties. Practically, however, the signing algorithm itself often involves different types of computation. For example, ECDSA requires a hash function, point arithmetic over the high-precision defining field $\mathbb{F}_p$, and base-point group arithmetic over $\mathbb{F}_u$. Generic schemes like DM/CGGI take days to complete the homomorphic evaluation. Recent schemes like Boneh--Kim (Crypto'25), Cha--Park--Lee (Eurocrypt'26) and Gao--Zheng (Crypto'26) either support only one computation type, or lack efficient conversion methods. We propose a new FHE scheme whose arithmetic logic unit supports both large prime modulus arithmetic and bit-level operations. We then specialize it to the $\mathbb{F}_p$ mode, the $\mathbb{F}_u$ mode and the Boolean mode for ECDSA. Our key component is a homomorphic canonicalization operation that restores the unique bit representation of the encrypted messages. It requires a constant number of CKKS bootstrapping operations regardless of the bit-width of the prime moduli, and it therefore enables efficient high-precision conversions like $\mathbb{F}_p$-to-$\mathbb{F}_u$ modular reduction and $\mathbb{F}_u$-to-Boolean conversion. The conversion to Boolean mode is essential to allow noise flooding in the threshold decryption process. For the workload of $\mathbb{F}_u$ modular multiplication followed by conversion to bit representation in GPU, we estimate a 14.5$\times$ and $\sim$19000$\times$ better amortized latency compared with Montgomery-based approach in Cha--Park--Lee and TFHE-rs based approach, respectively. Our end-to-end homomorphic ECDSA signing experiment takes 56s on an NVIDIA RTX Pro 6000 GPU. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first concrete FHE-based construction towards threshold ECDSA with one-round signing.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Second Round Key Recovery and a Floating-Point Attack on DNN-based AES Implementations
Sisung Kim, Minjae Lee, and Dongjae Lee
At EUROCRYPT 2026, Gérault et al. introduced natural DNN implementations of block ciphers: ReLU networks that agree exactly with the underlying cipher on binary inputs but extend it continuously to real-valued inputs. They showed that this extension exposes the first round key to recovery, and proposed a generic Secure Blackbox Transformation that turns an arbitrary DNN-based implementation into a provably secure implementation. We revisit both sides of their result. On the attack side, the known attacks on the unprotected implementation reach only the first round key. Under the same threat model, we refine the absorption property of the natural S-box and combine it with a chosen-plaintext collision test, validated empirically, to recover the second round key of AES-256 in about $2^{39}$ queries. On the defense side, their transformation is provably secure over the reals, but that guarantee does not carry over to finite precision, where any neural-network implementation must ultimately run. We give a floating-point attack that recovers the first round key of the protected AES-128 implementation in 128 chosen queries, driven by an input value that the defense fails to round to a bit. Such a value exists in bfloat16, float16, float32, and float64, so moving to higher precision does not remove the weakness. We confirm the recovery in all four formats. Finally, we block the attack with a clamp placed before the defense's rounding step, which keeps every finite input in $[0,1]$ in the working precision and changes neither the cipher nor the exact-real security guarantee.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Quantum implementation of Keccak-f(25) for emulator and quantum hardware, and application to quantum password cracking
Mathilde Chenu and Mario Chizzini
In this work, we present a quantum implementation of Keccak-$f(25)$, a toy version of SHA-3 introduced in the specification of Keccak, with the objective of using as few qubits as possible so that the resulting implementation can be run both on quantum emulators and on quantum hardware. The code, written in Qiskit, uses $25$ qubits representing the internal state. All computations are performed in-place, meaning that no ancillary qubit is required. We use this implementation to compare the number of logical and instruction-set-architecture quantum gates required to run Keccak-$f(25)$, both on emulators and on quantum hardware, as well as for Grover's algorithm on the hash function. Finally, we use our implementation to highlight the specificity of quantum password cracking using Grover's algorithm with Keccak-$f(25)$.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
SPRINT: New Isogeny Proofs of Knowledge and Isogeny-Based Signatures
Thomas den Hollander, Shai Levin, Marzio Mula, Robi Pedersen, Daniel Slamanig, and Sebastian A. Spindler
Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge are a fundamental building block in many isogeny-based cryptographic protocols, such as signature schemes based on identification-to-signature transformations, or multi-party ceremonies that avoid a trusted setup, in particular for generating supersingular elliptic curves with unknown endomorphism rings. In this paper, we construct SPRINT, an efficient polynomial IOP-based proof system that encodes the radical $2$-isogeny formulas into a system of multivariate polynomials. When combined with the recent polynomial commitment scheme (PCS) DeepFold, our construction yields substantial improvements over state-of-the-art isogeny proofs of knowledge. For the SQIsign NIST-I prime $p=5 \cdot 2^{248}-1$, our implementation takes only a few milliseconds for proving and verification, with proof sizes around 80 kB. Compared to the previous state-of-the-art proof system by den Hollander, Mula, Slamanig & Spindler (PQCrypto'26), we achieve speedups ranging from $1.1\times$ to $22.7\times$ for the prover and from $4.4\times$ to $109\times$ for the verifier, while achieving proof sizes that are $1.4\times$ to $17.5\times$ smaller, across different instantiations and parameter sets. Moreover, we study the weak simulation extractability of our proof system, which we can use as a starting point for a modular construction of signatures. We show that any Fiat–Shamir compiled interactive proof with a so-called canonical simulator is weakly simulation-extractable. We expect this general result to be applicable to other proof systems and thus of independent interest. Building on SPRINT and our wSE result, we introduce a new family of signature schemes whose security solely relies on the $\ell$-isogeny path problem, a foundational problem in isogeny-based cryptography. As a concrete instantiation, we construct a signature scheme using DeepFold as the PCS. Across the different parameter sets, a prototype implementation of our scheme sees significantly faster signing times than the highly optimized NIST specification for SQIsign, at the cost of much larger signature sizes and excluding a one-time precomputation phase. When this phase is instead included with the signing time, we still get almost on-par timings. Meanwhile our signature scheme relies on weaker assumptions and is constant-time when instantiated with a suitable PCS. Even though our signatures are large, the framework offers flexibility for tradeoffs and optimizations – both within a given PCS and by switching to alternative PCS constructions. In particular, it will naturally inherit efficiency gains from future advances in plausibly post-quantum secure PCS constructions.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Faster SVP in Polynomial Space
Yansong Feng, Yiming Gao, and Jiaqi Liu
Kannan's algorithm, as analyzed by Hanrot and Stehl\'e in 2007, solves the exact Euclidean shortest vector problem in polynomial space and \(n^{\frac{n}{2e}+o(n)}\) time. In the classical setting with polynomial space, we obtain the first improvement on this bound via a randomized algorithm that runs in \(n^{\frac{n}{4e}+o(n)}\) time. The main idea is to represent a fixed shortest vector in many ways as a difference of samples, thereby enabling the low-space collision search of Lyu and Zhu (SODA 2023) to replace exhaustive enumeration in the original analysis.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
CVP Is NP-Complete for Principal Cyclotomic Ideals
Jiaqi Liu, Yansong Feng, and Yanbin Pan
We prove that exact Euclidean decision-CVP is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete on the coefficient lattices of nonzero principal ideals in the power-of-two cyclotomic rings $R_d:=\mathbb{Z}[y]/(y^d+1)$. Our deterministic reduction from Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C) produces a target and a squared threshold $\Delta$ such that the closest squared distance is exactly $\Delta$ in YES instances and at least $\Delta+4$ in NO instances. This also implies $\mathsf{NP}$-hardness of exact search-CVP under polynomial-time Turing reductions. We also transfer the resulting principal-ideal CVP instances to full-rank principal ideals of the cyclic quotient ring $\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^D-1)$, where $D:=2d$. Their coefficient lattices are invariant under cyclic coordinate shifts. The lift preserves principality and multiplies corresponding squared distances by eight. Thus, on principal cyclic ideal lattices, exact decision-CVP is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete and exact search-CVP is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard. We also obtain uniformly computable fixed cyclotomic and cyclic families in which only the target and threshold depend on the X3C collection. Consequently, a polynomial-time solution to exact decision-CVPP on either family would imply $\mathsf{NP}\subseteq\mathsf{P}/\mathrm{poly}$ and collapse the polynomial hierarchy to $\Sigma_2^{\mathsf{P}}$. To our knowledge, the cyclic results answer Micciancio's questions of whether exact decision-CVP is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard on cyclic lattices and on a fixed family of cyclic lattices, even when restricted to full-rank principal cyclic ideals. Finally, under the coefficient embedding, we prove that exact decision-module-SIVP is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete on free rank-two modules over the same cyclotomic rings.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Two-Bit Lifting for Ternary SIS: Polynomial-Time Collision Attacks on LtHash
Rui Ding, Xiaorui Gong, Hao Jiang, and Lili Tang
LtHash is a lattice-based incremental hash function introduced by Bellare and Micciancio at EUROCRYPT 1997. It can be used in distributed systems to efficiently maintain digests of changing data. Its set-collision resistance rests on the average-case hardness of the ternary short integer solution (SIS) problem in the random oracle model. LtHash implementations typically use power-of-two groups $(\mathbb{Z}/2^d\mathbb{Z})^N$ for efficient machine-word arithmetic and SIMD parallelism. Previous security estimates were based on Wagner-type generalized birthday attacks with sub-exponential running time. Chen, Liu, and Zhandry (CLZ, EUROCRYPT'22) describe a folklore algorithm attributed to Regev that solves ternary SIS modulo $2^d$. Applying this algorithm to LtHash yields polynomial-time collision attacks requiring $O(N^d)$ hash queries, a result that has not been previously documented. We improve the Regev--CLZ algorithm by canceling two modulus bits per layer instead of one, while preserving ternary coefficients. This reduces the number of input columns---and hence the number of LtHash queries---from $O(N^d)$ to $O(N^{\lceil d/2\rceil})$. This refutes the uniform average-case formulation of Liyan Chen et al.'s conjecture (ITC'26) that the Regev--CLZ bound is optimal. Our technique also extends to inhomogeneous SIS with the same bound. For LtHash16 with $(N,d)=(1024,16)$, used at Facebook and in Solana, our attack requires approximately $2^{81}$ hash queries. Its expected computational cost is at most $2^{101}$ scalar operations over $\mathbb{F}_2$, compared with our estimates of approximately $2^{180}$ operations for the Regev--CLZ algorithm and $2^{188}$ for the state-of-the-art generalized birthday attack of Tang et al. (CRYPTO'26), under their respective operation models. Our query and scalar-operation costs are both far below the level suggested by the original claim of at least 200-bit security.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Incremental Keyword Private Information Retrieval from d-ary Segmented Cuckoo Filters
Bao Ninh
We introduce RisePIR, the first preprocessing keyword private information retrieval (PIR) scheme that absorbs insert, update, and delete on its key-value store at a cost proportional to the number of mutations alone. Where the static state-of-the-art schemes ChalametPIR and $\mathsf{KPIR}^{\mathsf{index}}$ re-run their preprocessing from scratch on every change, RisePIR patches its preprocessing in place and stays as practical as both in the online phase. We give a generic construction of incremental preprocessing keyword PIR from any updatable preprocessing index PIR, an index PIR that efficiently supports in-place update. The construction rests on our $d$-ary Segmented Cuckoo Filter, a cuckoo filter that confines the $j$-th candidate bucket of every key to the $j$-th of $d$ segments and stays dynamic under partial-key cuckoo hashing. Instantiating the construction over FrodoPIR and SimplePIR, each equipped with the entry-level hint patch of iSimplePIR, gives RisePIR-F and RisePIR-S, both secure under decisional LWE. On a store of about one million keys, both variants patch their hint in place in 0.06–4.7 ms per mutation, five to six orders of magnitude faster than the 56–686 s full re-run of the preprocessing phase. Their online phase stays competitive with ChalametPIR and $\mathsf{KPIR}^{\mathsf{index}}$ in both asymptotic and concrete cost. We deploy RisePIR-S as a privacy-preserving eth_getBalance service over the $2.05 \times 10^{8}$ accounts of Ethereum mainnet, so that a wallet reads a balance without revealing to its RPC provider which account it holds. The running service answers a private query in 0.69 s and absorbs each block's changes in 5.6 ms, well inside the 12 s block interval. The filter and RisePIR ship as an open-source Rust implementation, together with the benchmark harness behind every number in this paper.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
FRI-Style Rank Metric PCS via FFT for Gabidulin Encoding
Songsong Li, Zhe Li, Shu Liu, Chaoping Xing, and Chen Yuan
Polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) are fundamental cryptographic primitives, with applications to SNARKs, data availability, and privacy preserving protocols. Many efficient transparent PCSs are built from interactive oracle proofs of proximity (IOPPs) for codes in the Hamming metric. In constructions based on the fast Reed-Solomon IOPP (FRI), low degree polynomials are encoded as Reed-Solomon (RS) codewords over suitable evaluation domains, and FRI is used to test proximity to the RS code. The efficiency of this approach relies on fast Fourier transform (FFT) based encoding and recursive proximity testing through folding operations. Motivated by applications of rank metric codes in post quantum cryptography, random linear network coding, and distributed storage, we develop an analogous framework based on Gabidulin codes, the rank metric counterparts of RS codes. These codes encode $q$-linearized polynomials of bounded $q$-degree over $\mathbb F_{q^m}$ by evaluating them at $\mathbb F_q$-linearly independent points in this field. We construct a recursive FFT for these polynomials and show that its algebraic structure supports both proximity testing for Gabidulin codes and succinct verification of polynomial evaluations, yielding a FRI-style PCS for $q$-linearized polynomials. Our contributions are as follows. \begin{enumerate} \item[(1)] \textbf{FFT algorithms for $q$-linearized polynomials.} For every $O(1)$-smooth positive integer $n\mid m$, we construct an $\mathbb F_q$-linearly independent evaluation set $\mathcal A\subseteq\mathbb F_{q^m}$ of size $n$. On this set, we present FFT and inverse FFT algorithms for evaluating and interpolating $q$-linearized polynomials of $q$-degree less than $n$ over $\mathbb F_{q^m}$. Both algorithms require $O(n\log n)$ operations in $\mathbb F_{q^m}$. Consequently, Gabidulin codes defined over $\mathcal A$ admit encoding with the same complexity. \item[(2)] \textbf{A FRI-style IOPP for Gabidulin codes.} The recursive structure of our FFT induces a folding operation that reduces a Gabidulin code instance of length $n$ to one of length $n/2$. Combining this operation with recent proximity gap results for Gabidulin codes, we construct a FRI-style IOPP, which we call the Fast Gabidulin IOPP (FGI). The soundness analysis accounts for the Frobenius twists introduced by folding and their effect on rank metric proximity. \item[(3)] \textbf{A FGI based PCS for $q$-linearized polynomials.} The usual quotient based opening reduction in PCSs for ordinary polynomials does not directly preserve for $q$-linearized polynomials. We instead use the FGI folding structure to recursively reduce the proximity claim and the evaluation claim together. Combined with Merkle tree commitments, this yields a transparent PCS for $q$-linearized polynomials with polylogarithmic proof size and verification time. \end{enumerate}
Last updated:  2026-09-18
HE-based On-the-Fly MPC, Revisited: Universal Composability, Approximate and Imperfect Computation, Circuit Privacy
Ganyuan Cao, Sylvain Chatel, and Christian Knabenhans
On-the-fly multi-party computation (OtF-MPC, López-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan, STOC 2012) allows clients to join a computation dynamically without remaining online, while outsourcing the computation to an untrusted but powerful server. Existing OtF-MPC constructions rely on composing multi-party homomorphic encryption with zero-knowledge or succinct arguments. While both components have seen substantial efficiency and expressivity improvements in recent years, the security of their composition has not been revisited under these modern refinements. In this work, we revisit OtF-MPC through the lens of composable security. We extend the original analysis to systematically capture recent advances in these two building blocks, and to reason about their secure composition. We focus on multi-group homomorphic encryption (MGHE), a unifying abstraction that generalizes threshold and multi-key HE, and emerges as the natural backbone for OtF-MPC. Our contributions are fourfold. (1) We introduce the first Universal Composability (UC) ideal functionality for MGHE, jointly modeling client and server privacy, approximate or imperfect computation, and threshold security. (2) We define fine-grained security notions for MGHE and show that they are sufficient to realize this functionality against semi-malicious adversaries. (3) We revisit generic compilers that combine MGHE with any-simulation-extractable zkSNARKs, and prove that they realize OtF-MPC against fully malicious adversaries. (4) We introduce a split-witness ideal functionality for NIZKs, which separates the witness component that must be supplied by the ideal adversary from an existential component that only needs to be certified. We show that a Naor--Yung-style composition of MGHE and split-witness NIZKs realizes OtF-MPC while avoiding full extraction from the NIZK
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Lightweight Cryptography for Secure UAV Data Integrity Using Ascon-XOF128 and SHAKE128
Mehul Kumar Das, Varun Shukla, Prabhavi Tripathi, Vivek Shukla, Divya Mishra, and Atul
The increasing deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in communication, surveillance, and other mission-critical applications has created a growing requirement for efficient mechanisms to preserve the integrity of exchanged data. UAV platforms may operate under computational, memory, energy, and communication constraints, making lightweight cryptographic techniques an important consideration for secure data processing. This paper investigates the applicability of lightweight cryptography for UAV data integrity using two extendable-output functions (XOFs), Ascon-XOF128 and SHAKE128. A mathematical framework is developed to represent UAV messages, cryptographic processing, integrity verification, and relevant security and performance metrics. The two XOF constructions are analyzed with respect to their internal structures, sponge-based processing, security properties, computational characteristics, and suitability for resource-constrained UAV communication. A comparative evaluation framework is established using message-size and output-length variations, with performance and integrity-related measures including execution time, throughput, computational cost, memory usage, communication overhead, and Hamming-distance-based analysis. The study aims to provide an evidence-based comparison of Ascon-XOF128 and SHAKE128 for UAV data-integrity workloads and to identify the practical trade-offs between lightweight resource requirements and cryptographic integrity performance.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Period-Aligned Secure Cosine Evaluation Based on Two-Party Computation
Qingyu Mo
The cosine function is widely used in machine-learning applications, but evaluating it on secret-shared data is difficult. Conventional approaches use polynomial approximations or lookup tables, whose costs grow substantially over large input domains. More recent protocols first reduce the private input modulo the cosine period, but securely performing this modular reduction also incurs significant cost. We present a period-aligned two-party cosine protocol. Based on the cosine addition rule, it rescales each share so that a wrap of the input modulus corresponds to a full $2\pi$ period and therefore does not change the recombined cosine. Each party evaluates sine and cosine locally on its share, while the secure computation uses only two cross-party products and one fixed-point output conversion. We evaluate the protocol directly on synthetic inputs and within private RFF-based RBF-SVM prediction. Comparisons with the protocol of Xing et al. (NDSS 2025) and Guo et al. (USENIX Security 2026) demonstrate better efficiency of our proposed protocol.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Resolving the Worst-Case Complexity of Linear Secret Sharing
Oded Nir
A secret-sharing scheme allows a dealer to distribute a secret among $n$ parties such that only predefined “authorized” sets of parties can reconstruct the secret, and all other “unauthorized” sets learn nothing about it. Families of authorized sets are called access structures, and a scheme is called linear if its sharing map is linear in the secret and the dealer’s randomness. We show that every $n$-party access structure can be realized by a linear secret-sharing scheme over every finite field with at most $2^{\lceil n/2\rceil-1}+1$ field elements per share. Taking the field to be $\mathbb{F}_2$ yields the same bound in bits for one-bit secrets. A known counting lower bound for monotone span programs shows that for every fixed finite field, almost all access structures require share size $2^{n/2-o(n)}$ in every linear scheme, which makes our upper bound tight. Our scheme is considerably simpler than previous schemes that obtained share size $2^{cn+o(n)}$ with $1/2\leq c<1$. We also present a variant of this linear construction that is tailored for monotone k-DNF access structures (also known as $k$-upslices). Then, by combining it with existing non-linear schemes, we derive a scheme for all access structures with share size $2^{0.494n+o(n)}$. This improves the previous upper bound of $2^{0.585n+o(n)}$ by Applebaum and Nir (CRYPTO 2021), and establishes a separation between the worst-case non-linear and linear exponents. Additionally, we prove that almost all monotone functions require monotone span programs of size $2^{n/2-o(n)}$ simultaneously over all fields, finite or infinite, improving the previous bound of $2^{n/3-o(n)}$ for this setting. In particular, almost all access structures require information ratio $2^{n/2-o(n)}$ in linear schemes over every finite field, including fields whose size depend on $n$. Some of the constructions and proofs were discovered in conversations prompted by the author with GPT-5.6 Sol and Claude Fable 5.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Radical Ring-LWR: Efficient Key Encapsulation and Signatures from Structured Rounding
Joost Renes, Joppe W. Bos, Haochen Huang, Selim Kirbiyik, Alberto Ovena, Sujoy Sinha Roy, Frederik Vercauteren, Peng Wang, Fangyu Zheng, and Chenxin Zhong
State-of-the-art lattice-based cryptography requires a power-of-two cyclotomic field that limits the attainable security levels, or a module structure for which the cost grows quadratically in the module rank. Radical rings were recently proposed as a solution in the context of Learning With Errors (LWE) based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) with heuristic hardness arguments for the Ring-LWE security and failure probability. We develop the Learning With Rounding counterpart, Radical Ring-LWR (RR-LWR). We give a proved closed-form bound on the distortion incurred from the error sampling independent of the radical ring parameters: this places RR-LWR inside the regime identified by Peikert as safe for instantiating Ring-LWE/LWR. We instantiate two schemes: Mithril, an IND-CCA KEM, and Octarine, an EF-CMA signature scheme. They are built on a single radical-ring arithmetic foundation based on powers of two (favorable for sampling, rounding and masking) and we provide security reductions in the QROM to RR-LWR and SelfTarget-RR-SIS, a radical-ring variant of SIS. We show that the KEM failure probability estimators used for power-of-two cyclotomics are insufficient and provide an exact solution tailored to the RR-LWR setting. Finally, we instantiate Mithril and Octarine with concrete parameters and benchmark optimized AVX2 and Arm Cortex-M4 implementations, showing that both are competitive with (and in some cases significantly faster than) the MLKEM and MLDSA standards.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Practical Group Signatures from Tag-Based NTRU Sampler
Corentin Jeudy
The post-quantum migration for key agreements and signatures being well underway, the focus naturally shifts to other properties and primitives that still lack efficient solutions. One such area is that of privacy-enhanced primitives, with a growing number of post-quantum constructions. Among the most fundamental are group signatures, which represent an important milestone of anonymity and accountability towards more involved designs. However, despite recent progress, most compact lattice constructions are either computationally intensive or suffer large key materials, or both. In this paper, we introduce a new lattice group signature scheme that reaches compact signatures and keys, while being runtime-efficient in all its procedures. Our key element is a new tag-based gadget sampler that properly interfaces with NTRU, then benefiting from the desirable properties of such trapdoor frameworks for advanced constructions while leveraging the compactness of NTRU. Although applied to group signatures, our sampler may be of independent interest and used for more expressive privacy-driven primitives like anonymous credentials. We also introduce two assumptions, which can be seen as hybrid versions of NTRU and ISIS, that independently underly the security of our group signature. Despite their similarities with the recently introduced NTRU-ISIS$_f$ assumption, they appear strictly harder and even admit reductions from R-ISIS in some parameter settings.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
On the Mismatch between Neural-Discovered Differential-Linear Features and Long-Round Distinguisher Construction
Thomas Peyrin, Zilong Wang, Liu Zhang, and Chenlu Zheng
To the best of our knowledge, existing differential-neural cryptanalysis have not yet shown a clear round advantage over the strongest comparable classical analyses. Recent Fourier-based interpretability results show that, under a difference-only representation, features extracted from differential-neural distinguishers can be interpreted as classical differential-linear masks. This suggests a possible route toward longer-round classical cryptanalysis and motivates our question: can such neural-discovered masks serve as useful candidates in the search for long-round differential-linear distinguishers of ARX ciphers? As a prerequisite to the long-round study, we first characterize the short-round differential-linear candidates exposed by difference-only differential-neural distinguishers. We introduce Conv1DFully to facilitate mask-level analysis by removing the residual tower and reorganizing the first convolution along the ciphertext-difference bit dimension. On Speck32/64, the dominant differential-linear feature remains preserved after these modifications. On SipHash, we compare Fourier masks extracted from trained distinguishers with an exhaustive evaluation of a low-Hamming-weight output-mask space. The neural-extracted masks are concentrated among high-correlation differential-linear approximations, including several of the strongest candidates examined. These experiments provide a controlled basis for treating neural-extracted masks as candidates in the subsequent long-round analysis. We then examine their utility in the known 18-round Speck128/128 distinguisher with a 5+8+5 decomposition. Under the same middle input difference, an 8-round difference-only differential-neural distinguisher recurrently exposes several masks with substantially stronger local middle correlations than the classically selected mask. However, after 5-round single XOR-linear extensions, these masks yield considerably weaker overall 18-round correlations. We further impose sparsity guidance on the first convolutional layer to promote low-Hamming-weight candidates. Under this guidance, the intermediate mask used in the classical 18-round distinguisher is recovered in the first-layer candidate set in 9 of 30 independent runs, showing that the neural model can reproduce a long-round-useful classical candidate. Nevertheless, this recovery is not stable, and the final neural decision rule still favors locally stronger features rather than the classically selected mask. These results indicate that differential-neural distinguishers can assist long-round candidate generation, while reliable recovery and long-round-aware prioritization remain unresolved.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
On Post-Quantum Multi-Key Security of GCM
Akinori Hosoyamada
This paper studies the post-quantum multi-key security of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in the Quantum Ideal Cipher Model (QICM). GCM is one of the most widely used AEAD schemes. In practice, widely deployed cryptosystems are often instantiated under many independent keys, making the multi-key setting practically relevant. A trivial reduction from the multi-key setting to the single-key setting incurs a security loss proportional to the number of keys. In particular, in the post-quantum setting, the term corresponding to exhaustive key search becomes \(up^2/2^k\), where \(u\) is the number of keys, \(k\) is the key length, and \(p\) is the number of quantum queries to the underlying block cipher \(E\) and its inverse, with \(p\) serving as a coarse measure of the amount of offline (quantum) computation performed by the adversary. For example, when \(u=2^{32}\), the term \(up^2/2^k\) reaches constant order at \(p=2^{48}\) for \(k=128\) and at \(p=2^{80}\) for \(k=192\). We show that, at the cost of additional loss terms, the \(u\)-dependent quantum key-search term \(up^2/2^k\) can be replaced by a term of order \(\sqrt{dp^2/2^k}\), where \(d\) denotes the maximum number of keys under which the same nonce appears in encryption queries. Thus, when \(d\) is much smaller than \(u\) and the additional loss terms remain small, our bound improves upon the trivial multi-key bound in that the security bound reaches constant order only at a substantially larger value of \(p\). This can be viewed as a post-quantum counterpart of the classical result of Hoang et al. (CCS 2018). As in their work, for randomized nonce-generation mechanisms that abstract patterns used in protocols such as TLS, the parameter \(d\) remains small even when \(u\) is large. Although our bounds are not tight and leave room for improvement, they give non-trivial post-quantum multi-key guarantees for several concrete parameter settings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first non-trivial post-quantum multi-key security bound for an AEAD mode in the QICM. Our proof combines the reprogramming-and-resampling approach of Alagic et al. (EUROCRYPT 2022) with counting arguments used in the classical multi-user analysis of GCM by Hoang et al.
Last updated:  2026-09-18
Generalized Integral Properties: Separable Structure and Structured Searc
Dongchen Chai, Shenghu Hu, Thomas Peyrin, Zilong Wang, Trevor Yap, Hongyi Zhang, Liu Zhang, and Chunning Zhou
Generalized integral properties extend classical integral distinguishers by allowing general Boolean mappings over plaintext and ciphertext variables. This additional flexibility raises two natural cryptanalytic questions: whether generalized mappings can yield higher-round distinguishers, and whether the resulting relations can be exploited to improve key-recovery attacks. Addressing these questions requires understanding which generalized integral structures are relevant and how they can be searched systematically. In this work, we introduce a structural classification of key-independent generalized integral properties into separably generated and residual-cancellation properties. Although some previously reported generalized integral properties appear to involve cancellations among key-dependent residuals, we show through explicit decompositions that they are in fact separably generated. Motivated by this view, we search for balanced separable terms within explicit plaintext-side and ciphertext-side candidate spaces. We develop two complementary automated search strategies: a unified Matrix--Bipartite Graph--Matrix framework for joint plaintext--ciphertext search and a specialized Gaussian-elimination-based solver for ciphertext-side mappings under a fixed plaintext structure. Across five representative block ciphers, the proposed methods extend previous integral distinguishers by one round for SIMON and for SPECK variants other than SPECK32, while the other evaluated ciphers mainly yield additional balanced mappings at the same round depth. We further show that the underlying round-extension mechanisms for the SPECK family and SIMON arise from exploitable algebraic structures in their round functions, whereas no comparable simplification is observed for the remaining ciphers under the current search setting. Using SKINNY-64-64 as a case study, we show that the additional nonlinear relations provide stronger filtering but destroy the computational separability exploited by existing partial-sum techniques, and therefore do not yield a better key-recovery attack under the current approach.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Bounding the Excess Risk for Linear Models Trained on Marginal-Preserving, Differentially-Private, Synthetic Data
Yvonne Zhou, Mingyu Liang, Ivan Brugere, Danial Dervovic, Antigoni Polychroniadou, Min Wu, and Dana Dachman-Soled
The growing use of machine learning (ML) has raised concerns that an ML model may reveal private information about an individual who has contributed to the training dataset. To prevent leakage of sensitive data, we consider using differentially-private (DP), synthetic training data instead of real training data to train an ML model. A key desirable property of synthetic data is its ability to preserve the low-order marginals of the original distribution. Our main contribution comprises novel upper and lower bounds on the excess empirical risk of linear models trained on such synthetic data, for continuous and Lipschitz loss functions. We perform extensive experimentation alongside our theoretical results
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Revisiting Malicious Private Aggregation: Formalization, Weaknesses, and Enhancements
Ananya Appan, Pranav Shriram Arunachalaramanan, David Heath, and Ling Ren
Private aggregation schemes enable aggregation of sensitive data across clients without leaking any individual client's input. Their applications include privacy-preserving federated learning, private heavy hitters, and anonymous systems. Many private aggregation schemes assume two non-colluding servers and aim to guarantee privacy even when one server is malicious, i.e., the malicious server learns an aggregation result that includes all honest client inputs. However, many private aggregation schemes in the literature fail to achieve privacy, which we believe is in large part due to a lack of formalism for the nuanced variations of privacy guarantees. In this work, we present ideal functionalities for several variants of private aggregation. We also formalize a common paradigm underlying most prior private aggregation schemes. The formal treatment helps us identify security flaws or underspecifications in existing private aggregation schemes. We then present modular modifications or fill in critical details to help prior schemes in the share-aggregate paradigm securely realize the private aggregation functionalities we formally define, including in settings where clients may have unreliable networks.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Revisiting ML Training under Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Convergence Guarantees, Differential Privacy, and Efficient Algorithms
Yvonne Zhou, Mingyu Liang, Ivan Brugere, Danial Dervovic, Yue Guo, Antigoni Polychroniadou, Min Wu, and Dana Dachman-Soled
We present the first theoretical convergence analysis of machine learning training under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), combined with a differentially private (DP) training algorithm tailored to encrypted computation. Our approach improves computational efficiency over standard differentially private gradient descent (DP-GD) while achieving comparable utility. In particular, we prove convergence of approximate gradient descent using polynomial approximations of activation and loss functions, which are required for FHE compatibility. To preserve privacy in downstream tasks, we integrate differential privacy without relying on costly per-sample gradient clipping, enabling scalable encrypted learning. We also provide data-independent hyperparameter selection and theoretically grounded strategies for polynomial approximation which can be of independent interest. Together, these contributions advance the feasibility of efficient, private, and secure machine learning on sensitive data.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Higher-order differential attacks on the full DuX
Guoqiang Liu and Bing Sun
DuX is a family of substitution-permutation block ciphers over $\mathbb{F}_q^{16}$ with $q\in\{2^{8},2^{16},65537\}$ and twelve rounds. For the two large-word instances its designers estimate that integral and higher-order differential distinguishers in the encryption direction reach at most six rounds, and fix the number of rounds accordingly. We bound the word-wise algebraic degree of DuX by exponent sets in the decryption direction, where the decryption S-box has coordinate degrees $(2,3,4,2)$ against the $(5,3,2,8)$ of the encryption S-box. Each row of the inverse diffusion matrix is supported on two residue classes of word indices modulo four. An active set equal to one class therefore keeps the vector of degree bounds constant within each class at every layer, and we prove that the four class-wise bounds then obey an exact recursion with base $2+\sqrt{3}$ instead of four. This yields higher-order differential distinguishers for eleven rounds of DuX($2^{16}$) and DuX($65537$) with $q^{4}$ chosen ciphertexts, and for seven rounds of DuX($2^{8}$) with $2^{88}$. Extending one round towards the plaintext gives three successive systems of equations. Every unknown there has a coefficient computed from the returned plaintext words, and the key words recovered at one stage are substituted into the next; for DuX($65537$) the last two systems are replaced by bivariate interpolation. Once each system attains the maximal rank that its structure permits, a condition that can be checked during the attack, solving the systems recovers all sixteen master-key words of the full twelve-round DuX($2^{16}$) and DuX($65537$). The data and time complexity is $2^{67.32}$ and $2^{67.58}$ with constant memory, and eight rounds of DuX($2^{8}$) are covered with $2^{91.32}$. The two diffusion layers differ by a rotation of four words, so the analysis is the same for each of the $2^{11}$ key-dependent choices of diffusion layers.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Sunshine Systems: Enabling Privacy-Preserving Compliance with Freedom of Information Laws
Aarushi Goel, Gabriel Kaptchuk, and Yuange Li
Freedom of information laws (informally known as Sunshine Laws), such as the US Federal Freedom of Information Act, provide legal pathways for members of the public to compel governments to produce internal documentation. These laws have become a powerful tool for government accountability, allowing journalists and activists to uncover malfeasance and advocate for change. However, because compliance with these laws requires government actors---the same entities who may be accused of malfeasance---to produce documentation, there is a risk that evidence of malfeasance may be suppressed rather than produced in response to a query. In this work, we introduce a cryptographic framework called Sunshine Systems, designed to constrain government actors' ability to circumvent freedom of information laws. At a high level, Sunshine Systems enable agencies to prove, in zero knowledge, that they have produced the complete and correct set of documents responsive to a given request. We instantiate a Sunshine System that supports keyword queries, building on recent advances in lookup arguments. We implement and evaluate our approach on low-cost hardware, demonstrating its practicality even for small government agencies.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Mind Small Integers in MDS Matrix: Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Reinforced Concrete
Jiamin Cui, Fukang Liu, Jianqiang Ni, and Willi Meier
The rapid advancement of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) has motivated the design of ZK-friendly hash functions. A relatively new design strategy for ZK-friendly hash functions is using the composition of small look-up tables (LUTs) to build a nonlinear transform (called \bars layer) over a large prime field $\Fp$. This not only improves the plain performance but also enhances its security against algebraic attacks since the \bars layer is equivalent to a complex and high-degree polynomial over $\Fp.$ This design strategy was first proposed at CCS 2022 for the ZK-friendly hash function \rc. However, there has been no third-party collion attacks of \rc since then, and all existing attacks on such LUT-based ZK-friendly ciphers like \tip, \mono and \sky mainly exploit the differential or linear properties of \bars. In this paper, we demonstrate that the \bars layer surrounded by MDS matrices (called \conc layers) with small integers, i.e., $\conc\circ\bars\circ \conc$, might lead to weaker differential properties of the round function. This key observation leads to a novel collision attack on 4.5 out of 7 rounds of \rc, successfully bypassing the \bars layer as well as the subsequent \conc layer and power-map-based nonlinear layer (called \brick layer). The attack is verified by providing a practical collision for 3.5-round \rc where the last 4 layers are $\bricks \circ \conc \circ \bars\circ \conc$. Furthermore, we provide constructive countermeasures by designing an algorithm to generate an improved \conc layer that thwarts this specific attack without increasing the number of arithmetic constraints compared to the original design. Finally, we also applied our framework to \tip but found that its MDS matrix can effectively prevent this attack. This is the first time to exploit the weak combination of \bars layer and \conc layer to mount efficient attacks on LUT-based ZK-friendly hash functions. We believe that it sheds new insight into the security of these hash functions.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Combined blinding Side-Channel and Fault countermeasures for Lattice-Based schemes
Mounir Taha, Julien Cam, Max Duparc, Herve Pelletier, and Karine Villegas
In this paper, we revisit and enhance two blinding countermeasures aimed at protecting implementations of lattice‑based cryptographic schemes against side‑channel and fault‑injection attacks. First, we build upon the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) blinding technique introduced by Ravi et al., and optimize the use of blinding twiddle factors so as to maximize their number without increasing the total number of modular multiplications. Second, we improve the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)–based blinding scheme proposed by Heinz and Pöppelmann by substantially reducing the randomness‑sampling overhead and streamlining the associated fault‑detection mechanism. Importantly, the two countermeasures are fully compatible and can be seamlessly combined to provide enhanced resistance to both classical and soft‑analytical side‑channel attacks, as well as fault‑injection attacks, while maintaining a performance overhead comparable to existing approaches. We demonstrate the practicality of our proposals through a proof‑of‑concept implementation integrated into Kyber/ML‑KEM.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
From Specs to Apps: Verifying and Monitoring Models of Signal and WhatsApp
Moustafa Said, Aurora Naska, Kevin Morio, and Robert Künnemann
The Signal protocol is a prominent messaging protocol that secures communication for billions of users. It powers WhatsApp, the most widely used messaging application worldwide, and the Signal app, popular among privacy-conscious users. Extensive research in the computational and Dolev-Yao settings provides strong formal security guarantees for the protocol itself. However, a gap remains between the guarantees of the protocol specification and the implementation’s actual behavior at runtime. In this work, we bridge this gap by applying SpecMon, a recently proposed runtime monitor, to check whether observed executions conform to formal protocol models. To this end, we instrument two applications (WhatsApp Web and Signal Desktop) to capture their interactions with the network and the cryptographic components. Using this instrumentation, we develop two multiset-rewrite models that are compatible with Tamarin, thus enabling verification. We derive the first model of WhatsApp Web’s implementation of the Signal protocol and the most detailed model to date of Signal’s original protocol. Monitoring establishes that observed executions conform to these models, relative to the trusted event extraction and the symbolic abstraction. For the core components of the Signal protocol, we verify authentication and secrecy properties. Finally, monitoring reveals previously undocumented differences between the original libsignal library and WhatsApp’s fork. We evaluate our methodology and demonstrate its reproducibility. Developing the WhatsApp Web model, instrumenting the app, adding fuzzing, and running the experiments took three person-weeks. We also demonstrate efficient monitoring of real-world applications and detection of deliberately injected security faults, with low overhead in our measured setting.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks on SHA-2 and HMAC
Maxime Lecomte, Julien Maillard, Antoine Moran, Guénaël Renault, and Benjamin Smith
We investigate the use of bit-level Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA) to recover secret inputs of the SHA-256 hash function, and secret keys of HMAC-SHA-256, using Sentential Decision Diagrams to overcome the computational challenge posed to classical Belief Propagation by multiple-word modular addition. Our attack on HMAC requires no control nor knowledge of the input, and exploits its double manipulation of the key to improve key-recovery performance. We make comprehensive simulations to evaluate the attacker’s recovery capacity for both SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-256. Finally, we study the profiling capabilities of load instructions in a multiposition EM probe setup on a STM32F303RET6 microcontroller, and use these results to evaluate the capability of our attack against software implementations of HMAC-SHA-256 in a realistic scenario.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
A Heuristic Subexponential Attack on the McEliece Cryptosystem
Pierre Briaud, Axel Lemoine, Hugues Randriambololona, and Jean-Pierre Tillich
We provide a new way of performing an algebraic attack on the McEliece cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes. It also applies in general to the case where the field over which the Goppa code is defined is of even characteristic. It is based on a new algebraic modeling for finding matrices of rank $2$ in the code of quadratic relations related to the Goppa code that is attacked. Such matrices are then used to recover the secret algebraic structure of the code, from which an equivalent secret key can be efficiently derived, leading to a full key-recovery attack. A byproduct of our approach is a new distinguisher for Goppa codes in even characteristic which is as the syzygy distinguisher of \cite{R25}subexponential in the security level of the scheme. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on McEliece TII challenges, some of which having been studied in \cite{BLT26}, and aimed at having 83,89,119,166, 210 and even 248 bit security respectively and CFS keys with parameters $r=9$ and $m=16$, corresponding to a security of $74.9$ bits according to \cite{LS12}. This CFS key was not attacked in practice in \cite{BLT26} and took us 14 hours of computation and 24GB of RAM. We make the conjecture that this attack has a complexity which is of the same nature as the distinguisher, namely subexponential in the security level. It should be noted that this attack is at best of complexity of order $2^{454}$ for NIST level 1 Classic McEliece parameters.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Byzantine Broadcast with Unknown Participants
Wonseok Choi, Ran Cohen, Juan Garay, Nikos Skoumios, and Vassilis Zikas
A sender wishes to broadcast a message across an open, permissionless network (e.g., on the dark web) such that whoever is around and active reaches agreement, even if the sender is malicious. Crucially, no a priori knowledge of the number of parties or their identities is given, and no assumptions are made regarding the number of honest parties or existence of resource-allocation mechanisms, like proof-of-work or stake. The above is an instance of Byzantine broadcast (BB) with unknown-participants (UP Broadcast). Despite extensive research on dishonest-majority BB, existing approaches (such as Dolev-Strong broadcast) fail in this setting, as they rely on knowing the number of parties or corruption bounds. A key challenge, which might appear as an inherent limitation, is that malicious parties can join dynamically, making it difficult for honest parties to terminate without violating consistency. In this work, we provide the first definitions of UP Broadcast, accommodating both static and dynamic participation under arbitrarily many corruptions. We show that the problem is solvable by introducing a novel primitive called active-parties set agreement (APSA), which we use to construct a polynomial-time deterministic UP Broadcast protocol (as well as UP Interactive Consistency). Our protocols guarantee consistency and validity for all honest parties active throughout the execution. Furthermore, we settle the round complexity of UP Broadcast by proving that our deterministic protocols are round-optimal, matching a lower bound that holds even for randomized protocols. Finally, while we establish negative results for unrestricted dynamic participation where parties may join late, we formulate best-possible guarantees for late-joining parties alongside matching round-optimal constructions.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Cryptanalytic Extraction of Neural Networks for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Wen Zhang, Bingsheng Zhang, Tianpei Lu, and Kui Ren
Since Carlini et al. (CRYPTO'20) introduced a black-box neural network extraction method inspired by differential cryptanalysis, cryptanalytic model extraction has been extensively studied. Existing methods, however, still face three bottlenecks. \begin{itemize} \item First, these methods are largely confined to contractive architectures and generally do not extend to expansive networks because of rank deficiency. We classify the regimes for single-point and multi-point recovery and mitigate this limitation through projection-based aggregation in the multi-point case. \item Second, prior attacks fundamentally exploit the non-differentiability of activations such as ReLU. Asselineau et al. (CRYPTO'26) recently extended cryptanalytic extraction to a broad class of nonlinear activations, but their approach requires high numerical precision and may recover only a subset of the parameters. We show that privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) unintentionally introduces a new attack surface: fixed-point arithmetic over finite rings induces silent modular wraparound, creating observable discontinuities even when the underlying activation is smooth. Exploiting these discontinuities, we recover all parameters of networks with smooth activations at much lower precision than prior work. \item Third, Neuron Wiggle, a widely used sign-recovery technique, is suboptimal. We recast it as a unified paradigm and analyze it from a signal-detection perspective. We prove that when the downstream coefficients are Gaussian, or the network is sufficiently wide, there exists an optimal probing direction, and the resulting method outperforms the original algorithm. \end{itemize} We evaluate our attack on eight CIFAR-10 DNNs and eight expansive networks with different activation functions. The attack extracts all parameters of expansive networks with smooth, unbounded activations. Our sign-recovery method further attains \(100\%\) accuracy on our benchmark while reducing the number of queries by \(30\%\)--\(74\%\) relative to Neuron Wiggle.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Asynchronous Shamir-Based Threshold FHE: Smaller Moduli and Strong Simulation Security
Won Kim, Changmin Lee, JeongHwan Lee, Alain Passelègue, and Damien Stehlé
We study $t$-out-of-$n$ threshold fully homomorphic encryption (ThFHE) based on Shamir secret sharing (SSS) in the asynchronous setting. With SSS, a partial decryption share is a single ring element; this allows to avoid the large number of ring elements stored per party required by prior strongly secure constructions based on $\{0,1\}$ reconstruction coefficients. However, this reduction introduces a fundamental trade-off: Lagrange reconstruction during distributed decryption severely amplifies noise, forcing a substantially larger ciphertext modulus. In this work, we give SSS-based asynchronous ThFHE constructions over standard RLWE-based FHE schemes (BFV, BGV, and CKKS) for both standard and strong simulation security. Through tight analysis of the modulus constraints, our constructions simultaneously reduce the required modulus, compared with prior asynchronous Shamir-based constructions, and the per-party storage, compared with the prior strongly secure construction. For example, for $n=512$ under standard simulation security, our analysis reduces the modulus overhead of distributed decryption by $33 \%$ at $t=n/2$ and by up to $90\%$ for $t$ close to $n$, relative to the prior works. Under strong simulation security, the per-party storage for $n=16$ and $t=8$ at $128$-bit security drops from $79$ GB in prior work to $897$ KB.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
SCA-GPT: A Generation-Planning-Tool Assisted LLM Agent for Fully Automated Side-Channel Analysis on Cryptosystems
Wenquan Zhou, An Wang, Yaoling Ding, Annyu Liu, Jingqi Zhang, Jiakun Li, and Liehuang Zhu
Non-invasive security testing under standards such as ISO/IEC 17825 still relies on human experts: how to measure a given target, and what the standard requires once the results are available, differ with every device and algorithm class, so the procedure is composed anew for each assessment. We present SCA-GPT, a large language model (LLM) agent for side-channel evaluation: given only a single natural-language instruction, it completes a full standard-conformant assessment covering timing analysis, simple power analysis, and differential power analysis, reporting for every test item a verdict, the governing clause, and checkable numeric evidence. The agent integrates a domain-specific expert knowledge base curated from 155 documents with a suite of specialized side-channel analysis tools. In retrieval experiments, the expert knowledge base achieves a Hit Rate@5 of 89.7% and an MRR@5 of 74.1%. We further evaluate the full framework with three LLMs on 13 real datasets covering six cryptographic algorithms on smart-card, microcontroller, and FPGA targets. DeepSeek-V3.2, Kimi-K2.6, and Qwen3.5 achieve success rates of 90.0%, 87.7%, and 94.6%, respectively, versus 0.0% for a plain ReAct agent, at an average of 253 seconds per assessment. To our knowledge, SCA-GPT is the first automated LLM agent for standard-conformant side-channel evaluation.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Codeword Masking Can Be Harmful Under Replay Attacks on HQC
Jaeho Jeon, Yongseong Park, Jaeyeon Lee, Suseong Lee, Donghyen Kim, and Young-Sik Kim
HQC, selected by NIST for standardization in 2025, was recently shown vulnerable to a replay attack recovering $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{u}\cdot \mathbf{y}$, from which the long-term secret $\mathbf{y}$ was shown to be recoverable, and against which \emph{codeword masking} was proposed as the countermeasure. We revisit both and demonstrate that the countermeasure yields an opposite effect: on the target build, the unmasked replay attack is ineffective, whereas introducing codeword masking paradoxically enables its success. We present a new leakage venue in HQC, in the Reed--Muller encoder, and apply to it the post-decoding idea of recent work, turning HQC's own error correction into a side-channel budget that recovers the message: a single trace suffices, with only ${\sim}80$ profiling traces, and we confirm the same across the official implementations (the NIST reference and optimized code, and PQClean) at both \texttt{-O3} and \texttt{-Os}. We then improve the replay attack on $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{u}\cdot \mathbf{y}$, raising its per-bit recovery probability; at the optimization level we study, that is still not enough for a practical attack. Codeword masking, adopted as the defense, supplies what replay could not: the random share erases the ambiguity that identical replays leave behind, and the extrapolated probability of recovering the whole $\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{u}\cdot \mathbf{y}$ rises from $10^{-555}$ to $1.0$. Increasing the masking order fails to mitigate the attack: we demonstrate identical recovery against a three-share implementation, without incurring additional profiling overhead for the adversary. Masking must therefore be designed against the optimization level and the device it is deployed on.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Default Correct: A New Fault Surface in the Comparison Booleanisation of Kyber-KEM
Anirudh Jaiswal, Abhilash Kumar Das, and Dhiman Saha
The Fujisaki–Okamoto (FO) transform protects Kyber-KEM against chosen- ciphertext attacks and is based on a ciphertext comparison step. This comparison is usually treated as a single atomic check. However, in every mainstream implementation it is a short pipeline of independently faultable stages. It comprises a byte-wise mismatch accumulation, a two’s-complement Booleanisation, and a conditional move (cmov). In this work, we expose a previously unexamined stage of this pipeline, the Booleanisation, as a new attack surface. Our research reveals that a single sub-instruction clock glitch forces the mismatch flag fail to 0, so decapsulation accepts any ciphertext. Every prior fault attack on this comparison targets the equality test or the conditional move. So does the only countermeasure proposed for it: the default-fail cmov ordering of Xagawa et al. Our surface sits upstream of that move, so it escapes both. We instantiate this Default Correct fault on an ARM Cortex-M4 (ChipWhisperer-Lite) and demonstrate it across the pqm4, PQClean, and reference implementations of Kyber-512/768/1024 at all optimisation levels (-O0–O3). Crucially, every one of these implementations already carries Xagawa’s default-fail ordering, yet the fault succeeds on all of them: the surface is therefore not merely new but structurally beyond the reach of the state-of-the-art defence for this comparison. The Booleanisation is thus a single point of failure common to all three code bases. Leveraging the accept-everything behaviour, we use the standard plaintext-checking oracle and recover the full secret key of Kyber-512, Kyber-768, and Kyber-1024 in a single on-device run each. Finally, we analyse why defences that protect only the cmov or a single fail flag cannot address a fault that targets an upstream stage of the comparison, and we propose a producer-side countermeasure: an integrity-checked Booleanisation that computes the same flag while folding in an execution counter, so that any partial instruction skip is detected, at negligible overhead.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Distributed SNARGs Resilient to Corrupt Verifiers
Elette Boyle and Lalita Devadas
Distributed certification is a method for monitoring the correctness of a distributed system. The model consists of a centralized prover in addition to multiple verifiers lying on the nodes of a communication network, where the goal is to assert that the network satisfies a desired property. In doing so, the prover generates certificates for each verifier; the verifiers can then communicate in a small number of rounds, and accordingly accept or reject. The prover’s assertion is accepted if all verifiers accept. A significant body of work has gone toward developing and understanding limitations of distributed certification schemes, predominantly in the setting of information-theoretic soundness, and recently with computational soundness, achieving a form of distributed (locally verifiable) Succinct Non-interactive Arguments (SNARGs) (Aldema Tshuva et al, TCC 2023). As is standard in the model, soundness holds in existing constructions assuming that all verifiers in the network are honest. In this work, we introduce and explore the notion of robust distributed SNARGs (rdSNARGs) which retain (computational) soundness guarantees even when the cheating prover can collude with some nodes in the network. Addressing cheating verifiers presents several challenges. We construct rdSNARGs for any distributed language in P with succinct certificate size and communication from extended versions of RAM SNARGs (Kalai et al, STOC 2023), where the level of succinctness scales with the threshold of corrupt nodes. Complementarily, we demonstrate a lower bound showing that an rdSNARG with significantly smaller certificates and communication implies a SNARG for NP.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Adaptively-Secure Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight Security
Chen Qian, Shuo Chen, and Shuai Han
(Bi-Directional) Proxy Re-Encryption ($\mathsf{PRE}$) is a public-key encryption scheme that allows a proxy, holding a re-encryption key from $i$ to $j$, to transform a ciphertext intended for $i$ into one intended for $j$. $\mathsf{PRE}$ has numerous applications, including secure data sharing and cloud computing. However, most existing $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes experience significant security degradation when adversaries are allowed to adaptively corrupt re-encryption or secret keys. Prior to this work, only a few $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes achieved quasi-polynomial security loss in the adaptive setting, and even those were limited to restricted re-encryption strategies. In this paper, we propose four distinct $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes with tight security guarantees in the adaptive setting, based on the $\mathsf{MDDH}$ assumption: - $\mathsf{PRE}_0$, $\mathsf{PRE}_1$: Single- and multi-challenge $\mathsf{aHRA}$-secure $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes with tight security focusing on efficient constructions. - $\mathsf{PRE}_2$, $\mathsf{PRE}_3$: Single- and multi-challenge $\mathsf{aCCA}$-secure $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes with (almost) tight security focusing on $\mathsf{CCA}$-type security. To achieve tightly $\mathsf{CCA}$-secure $\mathsf{PRE}$ schemes, we introduce a novel concept called tag-based language-malleable $\mathsf{NIZK}$ with special simulation soundness. This primitive provides simulation-sound $\mathsf{NIZK}$ while preserving a restricted form of malleability. We construct both one-time and unbounded versions of this primitive under the $\mathsf{MDDH}$(Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
New Exchanged Boomerang Distinguishers for 5-Round AES
Hanbeom Shin, Seonkyu Kim, Byoungjin Seok, Dongjae Lee, Deukjo Hong, Jaechul Sung, and Seokhie Hong
In block ciphers, the attacker should not be able to distinguish a block cipher from a random permutation; therefore the existence of a distinguisher is important. Cryptanalysis of the reduced-round variants of block ciphers is also important in cryptographic design. AES is the most widely used block cipher, and currently, the best-known distinguisher for 5-round AES has a data and time complexity of $2^{29.95}$ with a success probability of 55\%. In this paper, we propose the massive exchanged boomerang and multiple exchanged boomerang distinguishers for 5-round AES. The massive exchanged boomerang distinguisher utilizes the probability that the truncated difference for the returned plaintext pairs is such that, in each of its diagonals, the 4 bytes are either all active, or all inactive. Although this probability is very high for a random permutation, we significantly reduce it using the friend pairs technique, while keeping the boomerang probability unchanged. This enables us to distinguish a block cipher from a random permutation. The massive exchanged boomerang distinguisher for 5-round AES has a data and time complexity of $2^{31}$ with a success probability of 70\%. The multiple exchanged boomerang distinguisher is constructed by clustering four trails that have the same input and output truncated differences, enabling it to distinguish a block cipher from a random permutation with lower complexity and higher success probability. The multiple exchanged boomerang distinguisher for 5-round AES has a data and time complexity of $2^{27.1}$ and a success probability of 79.6\%, which represents a new best-known result for the secret-key distinguisher on 5-round AES.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Maltese: Succinct Polynomial Commitment from Lattices
Katarina Cheng, Wilson Nguyen, and Nirvan Tyagi
Succinct polynomial commitment schemes are a key building block in succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs). Existing succinct lattice-based polynomial commitment schemes take a "split-and-fold" strategy making use of homomorphism to compress proof size to $O(\text{polylog} N)$ for polynomials of size $N$. Prior works either (1) incur superlogarithmic verifier work (e.g., $O(\sqrt{N})$), (2) incur concretely large proof sizes and verifier work (e.g., hundreds of MB), or (3) rely on non-standard lattice assumptions. We proprose a new succinct polynomial commitment scheme Maltese that operates over a Merkle tree commitment of the lattice-based Ajtai hash function. We employ a folding strategy and propose new sum-check-based reductions for managing norm growth of the tree commitment over folding rounds. Maltese is secure under the standard Module-SIS assumption and produces opening proofs of $335$KB for multilinear polynomials of size $N=2^{30}$; proofs are around $300\times$ smaller than prior work with polylogarithmic verifier complexity but between $2$-$6\times$ larger than prior work with larger verifier complexity or stronger structured assumptions.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Optimizing HAETAE and SMAUG-T on Cortex-M4 for Resource-Constrained IoT Devices
JunHyeok Choi, DongHyun Shin, and Seog Chung Seo
The practicality of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) on IoT devices depends on both operation cycle counts and communication costs from public values (public keys, ciphertexts, and signatures). The DSA HAETAE and the KEM SMAUG-T, both selected in the KpqC competition, provide smaller public values than ML-DSA and ML-KEM; however, the lack of platform-specific optimization leaves their operation cycle counts high, which can offset this advantage. In this paper, we optimize HAETAE and SMAUG-T on the Cortex-M4, a representative 32-bit embedded MCU, and conduct a multi-faceted evaluation. We fix two bugs in the existing implementation of the HAETAE $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{s})$ evaluation and propose Autocorrelation-based Spectral-Norm Evaluation (ASNE), which replaces the per-polynomial FFTs with a single autocorrelation FFT. Together with further optimizations, we achieve improvements of up to 309.1%, 4.8%, and 6.0% in KeyGen, Sign, and Verify, respectively, over the state-of-the-art implementation. For SMAUG-T, we analyze the coefficient ranges of the polynomial multiplication operands to select an auxiliary NTT-friendly modulus $q'$, and count the number of operations per layer to apply the optimal NTT. As a result, we achieve improvements of up to 266.7%, 348.9%, and 341.0% in KeyGen, Encaps, and Decaps, respectively, over the reference C implementation. Furthermore, we apply static analysis and dudect measurements to the optimized kernels and observe no evidence of timing leakage. Using models anchored to prior IoT protocol measurements, we estimate the transmission-unit count, end-to-end latency, and energy, showing that HAETAE and SMAUG-T can be competitive PQC alternatives in constrained wireless environments.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
HARE: Compact HQC via Distance-Informed Erasure Decoding
Tianrui Wang, Qicheng Teng, Anyu Wang, Jun Zhang, Bo Pang, Chunhuan Zhao, Sihuang Hu, and Xiaoyun Wang
We present HARE, a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) scheme based on the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) framework that achieves substantially reduced public key and ciphertext sizes. HARE focuses on two complementary techniques: a novel distance-informed erasure decoding method for the concatenated code and ciphertext compression based on covering codes. The distance-informed erasure decoding method uses distance information from the inner Reed-Muller decoder to identify unreliable local blocks and treats them as erasures for the outer Reed-Solomon decoder.This improves decoding performance and enables more compact code parameters. For ciphertext compression, HARE adopts a covering-code perspective and maps the ciphertext vector to a nearby codeword with a shorter representation. The use of the Kaikkonen-Rosendahl code provides a more favorable bandwidth trade-off than previously considered Hamming and Golay code constructions. Combining these techniques, HARE reduces the combined size of the public key and ciphertext by 15.4%, 14.8%, and 15.3% at NIST security categories 1, 3, and 5, respectively, compared with HQC.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
How Many Traces Suffice? PAC Guarantees for Profiled and Non-profiled Side-Channel Analysis
Seyedmohammad Nouraniboosjin and Fatemeh Ganji
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is commonly evaluated by reporting the number of traces required to reduce the rank of the correct key. Still, such evaluations remain empirical and do not explain how many traces suffice for reliable recovery, how profiling and attack data contribute separately, or when additional traces cannot overcome weak key distinguishability. We address these questions through a Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) formulation of profiled and non-profiled SCA. Our framework treats candidate-key scores as the common cryptanalytic object and separates finite-sample estimation from the intrinsic separation between the correct key and competing hypotheses. This distinction enables confidence guarantees for key rank and helps determine whether an attack failure is due to insufficient data or an inherently weak attack score. We instantiate the framework with representative profiled and non-profiled attacks chosen for their analytical tractability. Experiments on ASCAD-f and ASCAD-r show that this analytical tractability does not come at the cost of impractical attack performance. The profiled attack achieves exact recovery with tens of attack traces, whereas the non-profiled single-attack rank certificate guarantees exact recovery with about 1,000 traces. These results are competitive with recent ASCAD attacks and, in the non-profiled setting, substantially below the smallest trace counts identified in prior studies, while additionally providing finite-sample guarantees on key rank. More generally, the same finite-sample rank analysis can be adapted to other learners and distinguishers by deriving the corresponding score-gap guarantees. Overall, the framework turns trace complexity from an empirical attack observation into a reusable finite-sample criterion for key recovery.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Key-Independent Secret-Key Distinguisher for 7-Round AES based on the Joint Generalized Zero-Difference Property
Hanbeom Shin, Sunyeop Kim, Byoungjin Seok, Deukjo Hong, Jaechul Sung, Seokhie Hong, Sangjin Lee, and Dongjae Lee
A key-independent secret-key distinguisher identifies structural deviations from an ideal random permutation without discovering any information about the secret key. It is therefore of primary importance for understanding the inherent properties of a block cipher's round function. While numerous key-independent secret-key distinguishers have been proposed for 5- and 6-round AES, none has been proposed for 7-round AES to date. In this paper, we propose the first key-independent secret-key distinguisher for 7-round AES, which exploits solely the structural properties of the round function. We propose the Joint Generalized Zero-Difference Property, where a quartet constructed from related differences satisfies three distinct generalized zero-difference properties simultaneously. By leveraging this joint property, we construct a new 7-round differential characteristic that a right quartet follows with a probability of $2^{-250.4}$, whereas a random permutation satisfies the same conditions with a probability of $2^{-253.4}$. Based on this characteristic, we design a distinguishing attack requiring data, time, and memory complexities of $2^{126.2}$. Our analysis confirms that the proposed distinguisher achieves a success probability of approximately 77.8%. We experimentally verify the joint property using small-scale AES, confirming that the theoretical predictions match the observed results. This work achieves the longest-round key-independent secret-key distinguisher for AES reported to date.
Last updated:  2026-09-17
Differentially Oblivious Resizing for Group-By Aggregations
James Bell-Clark, Albert Cheu, Adria Gascon, Jonathan Katz, and Lukas Gerlach
Systems for private group-by aggregation (e.g., computing histograms, min/max values, or averages) let a confidential virtual machine (CVM) generate statistics from streaming user data. A particular challenge in such systems is ensuring that the CVM's memory-access patterns do not reveal (too much) private information to the untrusted host. While it is possible to rely on oblivious RAM (ORAM), doing so imposes a significant performance penalty and requires allocating sufficient memory to handle a worst-case data stream. We introduce ROGA, a scheme for Resizable Oblivious Group-by Aggregation. ROGA uses an extension of oblivious single-access machines and thus improves performance, both asymptotically and concretely, relative to using ORAM. It also incorporates a novel, differentially oblivious resizing mechanism that ensures the allocated memory is within a constant factor of the memory used by a non-oblivious solution. ROGA also parallelizes cleanly across multiple cores for improved performance. We implement ROGA in Rust and use Binsec/Rel to verify trace noninterference of its compiled fixed-capacity operations, resize estimator, and fixed-work noise sampler, showing that executions with equal public parameters have identical branch-target and memory-address traces for all secret inputs. The only data-dependent branch is the differentially private resize decision. Compared to state-of-the-art oblivious schemes for confidential analytics (which do not support private resizing), ROGA is up to 50.4$\times$ faster when sharded across 64 logical cores, and private resizing cuts memory by up to 14$\times$ compared to domain-provisioned instances. In a case study, ROGA using 16 cores processes the standard network statistics of a 277-million-packet backbone trace with $5.3\times$ end-to-end overhead over a non-oblivious pipeline while exactly matching the reference output.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Witness Encryption for NP from SNARGs and Groups
Zhengzhong Jin
We construct the first witness encryption for NP in the generic group model from succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) for NP. Our construction applies to any SNARG with subexponential soundness and polylogarithmic online verification time after input preprocessing. Central to our result is the first Karp-Levin reduction from satisfiability for circuits of size $\mathrm{polylog}(\lambda)$ to the minimum-distance problem for linear codes (GapMDP) over a prime field of size $\lambda^{\omega(1)}$, with an approximation factor of $\omega(\log \lambda)$, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter. We obtain this reduction by adapting Hair and Sahai's recent hardness result for GapSVP. Combining our reduction with the witness encryption framework due to Barta, Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Wu [CRYPTO 2020], we obtain the first unconditional extractable witness encryption for circuits of size $\mathrm{polylog}(\lambda)$ in the generic group model. These techniques may be of independent interest.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Exploiting SNOVA’s Structure in the Wedge Product Attack
Maxime Bros, Thai Hung Le, Jacob Lichtinger, Brice Minaud, Ray Perlner, Daniel Smith-Tone, and Cristian Valenzuela
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) aims to develop cryptographic schemes secure against quantum adversaries. One promising class of digital signature schemes is based on multivariate quadratic equations, where Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) is a leading example. UOV has been extensively studied since its introduction by Kipnis, Patarin, and Goubin at Eurocrypt 1999, and it has remained secure. The signature sizes the scheme allows are quite small; however the key sizes are very large, making the scheme less attractive for some common protocols. To remediate this deficiency, some schemes---such as MAYO, QRUOV, and SNOVA---add a structure to reduce the size of the public key. These multivariate schemes are candidates that made it to the third round of the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Call for Additional Digital Signature Schemes for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process. In this work, we revisit a recently proposed algebraic attack by Ran at Eurocrypt 2026 on UOV and extend this approach to a new attack on SNOVA by exploiting its block-ring structure. In addition to improving the attack complexity, the exploitation of the block-ring structure rules out spurious solutions, which prevents the generic version of Ran's attack from applying to SNOVA. This attack breaks 6 of the 11 second-round SNOVA parameter sets and improves on the previous best result for an additional 2 sets; it is significantly more effective against larger $\ell$ in comparison to several earlier attacks. For example, for SNOVA-V with parameters $(v,o,\ell) = (29,6,5)$, the estimated security drops to $181$ bits, compared to $310$ bits for the previous best known attack.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
A Practical and Fully Distributed E-Voting Protocol for the Swiss Context
Véronique Cortier, Alexandre Debant, Henri Devillez, Olivier Esseiva, Pierrick Gaudry, Audhild Høgåsen, and Chiara Spadafora
Internet voting aims at guaranteeing both vote secrecy and verifiability. Advanced deployed systems, such as in Estonia or Switzerland, put a strong emphasis on cast-as-intended: even when a voter uses a corrupt device, they should be able to check that their intended vote is included in the tally. One approach relies on return codes, written on a voting card. This enables cast-as-intended even when the voter uses a single device that may be corrupted. While convenient for voters, this requires to generate the codes in a secure manner. This approach is deployed in Switzerland but the current system requires a single trusted setup authority: an offline component that is assumed to correctly generate the voting data. We propose a novel protocol that allows to distribute the trust during the setup. At the heart of our system lies an asymmetric protocol where several parties create the voting material, while allowing one of these parties to remain offline during the voting phase. Usability constraints are taken into account in our design, both in terms of computational complexity (linear setup and tally) and in terms of user experience (we ask the voter to type a high-entropy string only once). Our protocol is therefore a candidate for the next generation e-voting protocol in Switzerland. We provide an implementation of our protocol, demonstrating its practicability. Moreover, we formally prove vote privacy and verifiability. Our analysis takes into account the presence of short codes that an attacker can guess with non-negligible probability and reveals that making a significant change to the result remains exponentially hard.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Security Amplification via Robust Indistinguishability Combiners
Benny Applebaum, Nir Bitansky, and Nathan Geier
A robust combiner for a cryptographic primitive $P$ takes multiple candidate constructions of $P$ and produces a secure construction of $P$ provided that sufficiently many of the candidates are secure. A closely related notion is that of a security amplifier, where given a weakly secure construction of $P$, we aim to obtain a (strongly) secure one. Intuitively, one may expect that any robust combiner should act as an amplifier by thinking of "good randomness" as inducing secure instances, and of "bad randomness" as inducing insecure instances. Formalizing this intuition, however, has turned out to be challenging. Despite significant progress, general results remain limited and confined either to specific primitives or only to the statistical setting. We establish a new framework of robust indistinguishability combiners, which greatly extends the class of combiners covered by prior work, and prove that they inherently act as security amplifiers. Our results extend to the computational setting, provided that the combiner makes a single query to each candidate. The new framework allows us to rederive previously known amplification results in a simplified manner, as well as prove new amplification results that have so far been out of reach. As our main application, we present the first security amplifier for functional encryption, resolving an open question that first arose in constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation, and for which a gap was discovered in previous proofs. Our amplifier transforms a weak scheme with any constant indistinguishability error into one with full negligible security.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Normal Alignment: Improved Cryptanalytic Sign Recovery on Hard-Label Networks
Shi Tang, Zirui Chen, Yongjia Su, Zhengchao Gao, Lingyue Qin, and Xiaoyang Dong
At EUROCRYPT 2025, Carlini {\em et al.} proposed a breakthrough in the cryptanalytic extraction on hard‑label (S1) deep neural networks (DNNs), demonstrating polynomial-time signature and sign recovery. However, Carlini {\em et al.}'s sign‑recovery method ({which we call \em Future Toggle}) suffers only a marginal advantage over random guessing, producing high‑confidence wrong sign predictions in deeper layers. Such errors trigger expensive exponential‑time enumeration. This work presents {\em Normal Alignment}, a novel statistical sign‑recovery approach for S1 DNNs. Drawing on the expected length difference between projected normals of adjacent decision facets at dual points, our method infers neuron signs via normal‑signature alignment. It delivers higher voting accuracy and pushes erroneous predictions to low‑confidence ranks, which further enables a more efficient combined method, {\em eSOE + Alignment}, by combining {\em Normal Alignment} with the hard‑label {SOE} extension. This combined strategy removes heavy enumeration overhead and realizes exact polynomial‑time full sign recovery. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, especially for deep layers. For example, with our method, the signs for CIFAR-10 (architecture 192-64$\times$8-10) and MNIST (architecture 64-96$\times$3-32-10) models can be fully recovered in polynomial time; in contrast, Carlini {\em et al.}'s sign‑recovery method would require exponential‑time enumerations involving $2^{52}$ or $2^{82}$ guesses of the signs, respectively.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
DelegProof: A Machine-Checked Security Analysis of EIP-7702 Delegation
Rong Qian, Yu Cheng, Lingyu Gao, Yuchang Zhang, and Zengli Guo
EIP-7702, live on Ethereum since the Pectra upgrade, lets externally owned accounts delegate their execution to arbitrary contract code with a single signature. The consequences are measurable: 63% of observed delegations point to malicious contracts, with $2.36M in confirmed losses, and ecosystem guidance already warns about cross-chain replay and front-run initialization. What is missing is a formal account of the problem: the 7702 delegation lifecycle has no formal treatment, and none of the recommended mitigations has been machine-verified. We present DelegProof, to our knowledge the first symbolic formal analysis of EIP-7702 authorization semantics composed with the ERC-4337 EntryPoint pipeline. Our Tamarin models are calibrated by reproducing four documented attack classes, and yield ten machine-checked attack patterns—among them the silent failure of the advertised temporary-delegation bundle, storage confusion across re-delegation, and an ERC-1271 substitution attack that reaches into the signature checks of relying contracts—together with the security invariants that do hold. Formalizing the recommended mitigations shows that banning chainId-0 authorizations eliminates cross-chain replay, that an account-bound initialization gate restores init authorization while an unbound gate is provably still bypassable, and that namespaced storage slots make the storage-confusion class structurally inexpressible. All models and proofs are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/delegproof-artifact-F7FE/.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Haechi: Simple Commitment-based Keyless In-person Verifiable Elections
Jiwon Kim, Michael Naehrig, Bharath Namboothiry, Olivier Pereira, and Josh Benaloh
Verifiable election systems allow voters to verify that their secret ballots were accurately recorded and counted, while enabling anyone to verify the announced tallies. However, two practical obstacles stand between this guarantee and actual verification. First, public election records can be prohibitively large: for an election with one million ballots, deployed systems may publish more than 100GB of cryp- tographic data. Second, most existing systems protect ballot privacy through encryption, introducing key management—usually one of the most cumbersome and error-prone components of election administration. We present Haechi, a keyless verifiable election scheme for in-person voting, based on cryptographic vector commitments rather than encryption. At the core of Haechi is a new zero-knowledge proof of ballot well-formedness based on Compressed Σ-protocol theory. Our proof scheme proves the validity of an entire ballot using only a logarithmic number of group elements in the number of the ballot options. This allows all of a voter’s selections to be encoded into a single vector commitment. With this approach, Haechi reduces the data required for public verification by more than an order of magnitude compared to prior in-person verifiable election systems. Haechi thereby makes verifications for large-scale election considerably more practical. We also give a post-quantum instantiation of Haechi based on lattice commitments, which preserves the same keyless workflow at the cost of larger election records.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
On Aborts in Differential Privacy
Fredrik Meisingseth
There is a growing literature on differential privacy (DP) in multiparty protocols, enabling use in distributed settings and reduced trust assumptions. A largely overlooked aspect of such protocols is the extent to which an adversary can undermine the DP guarantees by making the protocol abort. Another is the DP properties of the honest parties' outputs. We initiate the study of both these issues. First, we propose an idealized model of aborts, where an aborter is leaked some information about a DP mechanism execution and then chooses whether or not to let an independent malicious analyst learn the mechanism output. We bound the effects of aborts according to what information (the database, randomness, output, or any combination of these) is leaked. These bounds are not only applicable to multiparty DP via general-purpose multiparty computation (MPC) but may also be used in the analysis of other methods to certify DP properties of a protocol. Second, we apply these bounds to analyze ideal protocol executions in MPC. We show, for the first time, that the ideal execution with fairness gives strictly stronger DP guarantees than that for security-with-abort, for the outputs to the honest parties. Further, solitary-output functionalities satisfy guarantees similar to those of the execution with fairness. Finally, we analyze multiparty protocols with respect to the way in which they realize the respective ideal functionalities. We show that partially fair and fully fair protocols have very similar DP guarantees. Since partial fairness, as opposed to full fairness, can be achieved in dishonest-majority settings, and in particular the two-party setting, this opens up for enhanced DP guarantees in two-party computation.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
On the (Privacy) Harms of the European Digital Identity Framework
Christian Knabenhans, Shannon Veitch, Mathilde Raynal, Theresa Stadler, Sylvain Chatel, Wouter Lueks, and Carmela Troncoso
As digital identity frameworks (DIFs) gain traction around the world, many see privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) as the key to prevent their potential negative societal impacts such as discrimination or surveillance. We critically examine whether PETs can achieve this goal using the European Digital Identity Framework (EUDIF) as an example. We develop a harm analysis methodology based on harm trees that illustrates how information leakage, certain design decisions, or a DIF's deployment context lead to harms. We leverage techniques from cryptographic modeling to formally capture the leakage of the core functionality of the EUDIF and its proposed applications. Our harm modeling elucidates which pathways to harm are inherent to the EUDIF's core functionality, and which pathways can be mitigated through PETs. Our analysis shows that, while PETs can reduce information flows, they fall short in actually mitigating the harms that deploying digital identity can bring to individuals and society.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Polynomial Evaluation on Many Inputs with Bounded Hamming Weight over GF(2)
Fukang Liu, Vaibhav Dixit, Muzhou Li, Daisuke Yamamoto, Wakaha Ogata, Santanu Sarkar, and Willi Meier
We propose a new polynomial evaluation algorithm to evaluate a degree-$d$ Boolean polynomial $f(x_n,\ldots,x_1)$ on all elements in some structured sets $S\subseteq \mathbb F_2^n$. This problem has been well-studied for $S=\mathbb F_2^n$ and there are efficient polynomial evaluation algorithms like standard Mobius transform, memory-efficient Mobius transform (EUROCRYPT 2021, TOMS 2024) and fast exhaustive search (CHES 2010, PQCrypt 2023) for the case $S=\mathbb F_2^n$. In addition, the standard Mobius transform can also be used to evaluate a polynomial over the set $S=P_{n}^w$ of all $(x_n,\ldots,x_1)\in\mathbb F_2^n$ whose Hamming weight is upper bounded by $w$, and its memory complexity is the same as the size of $S$. In Dinur's algorithm for polynomial method proposed at EUROCRYPT 2021, there is a critical step to efficiently evaluate $f$ over a more general input set $P_{n-n_1}^{w}\times P_{n_1}^{n_1}\subseteq \mathbb F_2^n$. To our knowledge, in the literature, no memory-efficient polynomial evaluation algorithms are designed for such a special input set. Dinur proposed a tweaked fast exhaustive search algorithm for this problem, but it has not been proved nor implemented. This leaves us with a natural question: can we design an efficient polynomial evaluation algorithm tailored for a more general input set $P_{n_s,\ldots,n_1}^{w_s,\ldots,w_1}=P_{n_s}^{w_s}\times \cdots \times P_{n_1}^{w_1}\subseteq \mathbb F_2^n$ where $\sum_{i=1}^{s}n_i=n$ and $w_i\leq n_i$? We answer this question by proposing a new polynomial evaluation algorithm named \textbf{FESG}, i.e., \textbf{F}ast \textbf{E}xhaustive \textbf{S}earch over a more \textbf{G}eneral input set, to handle the input set $P_{n_s,\ldots,n_1}^{w_s,\ldots,w_1}$. This algorithm is based on the derivative-based polynomial evaluation framework proposed at CHES 2010. In addition to extending the application of derivative-based framework to a more general input set, we also successfully address a major issue in existing derivative-based algorithms over $\mathbb F_2$ proposed at CHES 2010 and PQCrypt 2023, reducing the time complexity of the initialization phase from $\mathcal O\big(\binom{n}{\leq d}^2\big)$ to $\mathcal O\big(\binom{n}{\leq d}\big)$. As a result, FESG is also efficient for large $d$. Our algorithm is almost optimal, whose theoretic time and memory complexity are $\binom{n}{\leq d}+d\cdot |P_{n_s,\ldots,w_1}^{w_s,\ldots,w_1}|$ bit operations and $2\cdot \binom{n}{\leq d}$ bits, respectively. Here, $|P_{n_s,\ldots,w_1}^{w_s,\ldots,w_1}|$ is the size of the set $P_{n_s,\ldots,w_1}^{w_s,\ldots,w_1}$. An efficient implementation of the FESG algorithm for any $(d,n_s,\ldots,n_1,w_s,\ldots,w_1)$ is also given in this work. In particular, the FESG algorithm also provides a proven method for a critical step in Dinur's algorithm for polynomial method without affecting its overall complexity.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Revisiting Single-Color Initial Structures in Meet-In-The-Middle Attacks
Shiyao Chen, Jian Guo, Wenjie Nan, Danping Shi, and Tianyu Zhang
The meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack framework is one of the most powerful cryptanalytic techniques with broad influence to preimage, key recovery, and collision attacks. In this paper, we present two generic techniques. First, we observe that the constant space in MITM attacks is an exploitable source of degrees of freedom: its value-independence enables MITM-style partition and acceleration of attack subprocesses. With this intuition in mind, we revisit the single-color initial structure technique by Chen et al. at Asiacrypt 2025, and find an improved algorithm that relaxes the canonical optimization objective in automatic search for MITM attacks. Second, we extend the partial-target-preimage-to-collision conversion by Li, Isobe, and Shibutani at FSE 2012 used in MITM-based collision attacks to the settings of chosen-prefix collision and diamond structure construction. We demonstrate the practical relevance of our techniques by presenting a number of improved results in (pseudo-)preimage, (chosen-prefix) collision, and herding attacks on AES-like constructions over the state-of-the-art.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Anonymous Attribute-Based Signcryption: Definitions, Constructions, and Applications
Yongkang Lang, Fangguo Zhang, Zhiyuan An, Xinyi Huang, and Xiaofeng Chen
We put forward a generalization of attribute-based signcryption, called anonymous attribute-based signcryption (A$^2$BSC). Beyond message confidentiality and ciphertext unforgeability, A$^2$BSC further requires \textit{ciphertext anonymity}: no information about the signcryptor's attributes or ciphertext-related attributes/policies is leaked, regardless of the decryption outcome. Specifically, we begin by establishing the syntax and security notions for A$^2$BSC within a \textit{unified} framework, which encompasses various variants (key-policy, ciphertext-policy, dual-policy, and a hierarchical dual-policy variant called Special A$^2$BSC). Then, we construct a Special A$^2$BSC scheme for \textit{general policies} (modeled as bounded-depth Boolean circuits) from the succinct learning with errors and the basis-augmented short integer solution assumptions in the standard model, hence achieving post-quantum security. This naturally yields lattice-based instantiations of both ciphertext-policy and dual-policy A$^2$BSC. Beyond its independent interest, we also show the expressiveness and generality of our A$^2$BSC by exploring its application to matchmaking encryption (ME) and arranged matchmaking encryption (AME) proposed by Ateniese et al. (Crypto '19). As a byproduct, we give generic constructions of both ME and AME for \textit{arbitrary policies} against unbounded collusions, and strengthen the CPA-privacy of (A)ME to achieve CCA security. The latter is achieved for free in our construction, as A$^2$BSC natively provides CCA security. Overall, our new solution enhances the diversity of approaches for building the advanced primitive (A)ME.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
On the Additive Sensitivity of LZ77 Under Consecutive Edits
Jeremiah Blocki and Seunghoon Lee
We revisit the problem of mitigating information leakage in the widely used but insecure compress-then-encrypt paradigm. While encryption hides message contents, the ciphertext length is directly related to the length of the compressed message, which may, in turn, leak information about the {\em content} of the message itself. Recent work of Blocki et al. (TCC~2025) proposed an $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differentially private approach that adds randomized padding calibrated to the global sensitivity of the compression algorithm, and showed that LZ77 has global sensitivity $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$ for input length $n$ and sliding window size $W$. However, prior analysis focused only on sensitivity with respect to single-character edits, which leads to limited privacy guarantees when protecting longer substrings such as passwords, passphrases, cookies, or confidential user records. A natural attempt to handle longer secrets is to appeal to group privacy, but for approximate differential privacy, this leads to very poor parameter degradation: in particular, the effective value of $\delta$ can grow exponentially with the group size $g$. In this work, we introduce and study the sensitivity of compression schemes under block edits. Specifically, we define two strings to be $g$-neighbors if they differ only within a contiguous interval of length $g$. Our main technical contribution is a nearly tight characterization of the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77. We show that the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77, both with and without self-referencing, is at most $O\!\left((W^{2/3}+g+\sqrt{Wg})\log n\right)$. In particular, when $g \leq W^{1/3}$, the bound simplifies to $O(W^{2/3}\log n)$, matching the known bound for single-character edits. Combined with the framework of Blocki et al., our bound yields $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-differential privacy for $g$-neighbors with the same asymptotic padding scale as for single-character edits. We provide matching lower bounds to demonstrate that our upper bound is tight, e.g., when $n=W=\Theta(g^2)$, the $g$-consecutive sensitivity of LZ77 is at least $\tilde{\Omega}(g^{3/2})$, matching the $\sqrt{Wg}=\Theta(g^{3/2})$ term from our upper bound up to a logarithmic factor.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Functional Bootstrapping for a Single LWE Ciphertext with \(\tilde{O}(1)\) Polynomial Multiplications
Xiaopeng Zheng, Hongbo Li, and Dingkang Wang
Bootstrapping is the key technique that turns leveled homomorphic encryptionc into fully homomorphic encryption, but it remains a major efficiency bottleneck. Recent work by Z. Liu and Y. Wang (ASIACRYPT 2023) showed how to bootstrap \(N\) LWE ciphertexts with total cost of \(\widetilde{O}(N)\) polynomial multiplications based on the BFV scheme. However, their results achieve \(\widetilde{O}(1)\) complexity only through amortization over large batches, and do not give a genuine non-amortized \(\widetilde{O}(1)\) bound for a single ciphertext. In this paper, we present a BFV-based functional bootstrapping algorithm for arbitrary functions over large plaintext spaces with total cost of \(\widetilde{O}(1)\) polynomial multiplications for one LWE ciphertext. The same construction also supports small and moderate batches, and processes a batch of \(m\) ciphertexts with total cost \(\widetilde{O}(m)\) in the supported parameter range. The main technical ingredient is a sparse-packing polynomial-evaluation method for BFV ciphertexts, which exploits the duplicated-slot structure to evaluate an arbitrary polynomial on \(m\) encrypted inputs with total cost of \(\widetilde{O}(m)\). We implement the scheme in Lattigo using the BFV scheme. At 128 bit security and on a single thread, bootstrapping an arbitrary function takes 3.15 seconds for one ciphertext encrypting a 9-bit plaintext and 3.77 seconds for 128 such ciphertexts in one batched invocation. For 16-bit plaintexts, it takes 10.63 seconds for one ciphertext and 18.07 seconds for 16 ciphertexts. These results show that non-amortized single-ciphertext functional bootstrapping, as well as small and moderate batch bootstrapping, can be practical for arbitrary functions over relatively large plaintext spaces.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Strong Pseudorandom Functions in $AC^0[2]$ in the Bounded-Query Setting
Marshall Ball, Clément Ducros, Saroja Erabelli, Lisa Kohl, Nicolas Resch, and Peter Scholl
Understanding the minimal computational power needed to realize a pseudorandom function (PRF) is a long-standing question in cryptography. By the Razborov–Smolensky polynomial approximation method, it is known that $AC^0[2]$ cannot support strong pseudorandom functions with subexponential security, since any such function can be distinguished from random with quasipolynomially many samples. In this work, we initiate the study of low-complexity strong PRFs under a refined framework that separates adversary query complexity from running time and distinguishing advantage, and observe that distinguishing algorithms for $AC^0[2]$ do not apply if the number of queries is below the threshold implied by the Razborov–Smolensky approximation bound. In this setting, we prove that strong PRFs cannot exist in the smaller class $MOD_2 \circ AC^0$, showing that every such function family can be efficiently distinguished from random using polynomially many queries. Together with the fact that functions in $AC^0 \circ MOD_2$ are conjectured to have heavy Fourier coefficients (ITCS 2014), this identifies $AC^0[2]$ as the minimal candidate class for realizing strong PRFs in the bounded-query setting. We propose the first candidate strong PRF in $AC^0[2]$, which we conjecture to offer subexponential security against adversaries limited to a fixed quasipolynomial number of queries. Furthermore, our candidate is in the class $MOD_2 \circ AC^0\circ MOD_2$, arguably the minimal class given the above barriers. We show that our candidate lacks heavy Fourier coefficients, resists many settings of linear attacks, is non-sparse over $\mathbb{F}_2$ with high probability, has high rational degree, is inapproximable by low-degree polynomials over $\mathbb{F}_2$, and has low correlation with fixed function families. As a final contribution, we show that if any strong PRF exists in $AC^0[2]$ (or a superclass), then we can construct a universal PRF, i.e., a single, fixed function which is guaranteed to be a strong PRF in the same class.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
A Locality-Sensitive Hashing Framework for Reducing Bounded Distance Decoding to EDCP
Ryann Cartor, Felice Manganiello, and William Youmans
Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) is a fundamental primitive in both code- and lattice-based post-quantum cryptography. Prior work of Regev (FOCS~2002) and Brakerski, Kirshanova, Stehl\'e and Wen (PKC~2018) connected lattice BDD and Learning With Errors (LWE) to the Extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem (EDCP), but these reductions rely heavily on geometric structure and do not naturally extend to coding-theoretic metrics. We present a general quantum reduction from BDD over finite Abelian groups equipped with translation-invariant metrics to EDCP, requiring only the existence of an appropriate locality-sensitive hash family. Instantiating this framework yields new reductions for decoding in the Hamming metric, rank metric, and the $p$-Lee metric (which coincides with the standard Lee metric when $p = 1$). For the Hamming and rank metrics, our reductions only yield a non-negligible number of EDCP states in parameter regimes where known decoding algorithms are already efficient. However, we recover the LWE-to-EDCP reduction within our framework by combining known equivalences between lattice CVP/BDD in the $\ell_p$ norm and $p$-Lee metric decoding.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
The Closest-Vector Problem over Cyclotomics and its Application to Homomorphic Encryption
Natalie Lang and Dana Dachman-Soled
Rounding error plays a key role in approximate homomorphic encryption (HE), as it determines the noise level and affects the achievable precision. While rounding is typically performed coordinate-wise in the coefficient basis, an alternative is to perform lattice-based rounding in the canonical embedding. These two approaches coincide for power-of-two (PoT) cyclotomics, but can differ for non-PoT cyclotomics. This difference opens the possibility of new parameter tradeoffs for approximate HE over general cyclotomic rings. Motivated by this distinction, we study rounding error in the Closest-Vector Problem (CVP) over cyclotomic lattices of arbitrary order. We derive new worst- and average-case bounds, showing improved rounding for non-PoT cyclotomics over their PoT counterparts. To enable efficient rounding, we analyze Babai’s nearest-plane algorithm as an approximation to exact nearest-point rounding, while retaining efficient ring arithmetic for broad families of cyclotomic orders. These improved bounds, together with the additional flexibility afforded by moving beyond the sparse PoT orders, inform the choice of encryption parameters for approximate HE. Our concrete evaluation yields parameters with simultaneously smaller lattice dimension and ciphertext modulus than the corresponding PoT choices at fixed output precision and target security level. Our results highlight the potential benefits of non-PoT cyclotomics for approximate HE.
Last updated:  2026-09-16
Lemur+: Compact Post-Quantum Synchronized Multi-Signatures and Multi-Hop Aggregation
Yini Lin, Hongxiao Wang, Muhammed F. Esgin, Amin Sakzad, and Ron Steinfeld
In this work, we introduce Lemur+, a compact post-quantum synchronized multi-signature scheme based on standard lattice assumptions (namely, Module LWE and Module SIS). Lemur+ builds on Lemur (CCS 2026) and targets large-scale, long-term distributed applications such as blockchain consensus while supporting non-interactive aggregation. Lemur+ maintains an almost constant signature size of about 56 KB even for one million signers and a 42-year key lifetime, compared to 491 KB in Lemur, yielding about $8.8\times$ reduction in communication/storage. Our end-to-end implementation demonstrates practical runtime performance: 7.75 s for signature aggregation and 0.29 s for verification with $2^{13}$ signers. These are roughly within $2\times$ of the corresponding Lemur runtimes. The key to Lemur+ is our proposed Homomorphic Vector Commitment with Succinct Opening Proof (HVC-SOP), a new primitive that augments standard HVC with succinct opening proofs. We show that HVC-SOP can be generically combined with key-homomorphic one-time signatures (KOTS) to construct non-interactive synchronized multi-signatures, and prove the security of the resulting construction against rogue-key attacks. We then instantiate HVC-SOP using the lattice-based LaBRADOR proof system (CRYPTO 2023), yielding Lemur+. Finally, we extend Lemur+ to support multi-hop aggregation, allowing signatures to be recursively aggregated across distributed network trees. Beyond Lemur+, our HVC-SOP may be broadly applicable and of independent interest.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
One Scalar to Fold Them All, and in the Commitment Bind Them: Reduced Logarithmic ElGamal Shuffle Proofs
Freeman Slaughter
Xue, Lu, and Au design a logarithmic-size verifiable shuffle for rerandomized ElGamal ciphertexts by combining a KZG permutation argument with a tagged inner-product argument, with cost $(2\log N+11) \mathbb{G}_1 + 8 \mathbb{F}$. We reduce the communication and computation of their construction by observing that the rerandomization vector $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in \mathbb{F}^N$, despite being utilized as a full witness vector, only enters the consistency equations through the scalar $\rho^* =\langle\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{\rho} \rangle$. We bind this scalar into an existing KZG commitment and replace XLA's two-vector consistency argument with a one-sided folding proof, while preserving the original relation, polynomial degrees, and powers-of-$\tau$ setup. We show that the the naive scalarization is unsound. Applied correctly, the committed scalar indeed permits extraction of the full rerandomization vector. We present two variants: Variant A has proof size $(2\log_2 N+8) \mathbb{G}_1 + 5 \mathbb{F}$, while Variant B adds one group element but removes one interactive round. Under XLA's grouped base-scalar-pair accounting, the prover's exponentiation count decreases from approximately $18N$ to $13N$ (or $14N$, for Variant B), and the verifier's drops from approximately $7N$ to $6N$. Each proof is a constant $240$ B smaller than XLA's; in a $4$-server mix-net election protocol with $N = 2^{10}$ ballots, our Variant A mixing proof costs $5.88$ KiB in total, about $14\%$ smaller than XLA.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
PyuQuMuQu: Attacks on MQ-Based Linkable Ring Signatures and a New 5-Pass Construction
Freeman Slaughter
Linkable ring signatures (LRS) let a member sign on behalf of a group anonymously while ensuring that any two signatures by the same signer are publicly linkable, a major component in e-voting and cryptocurrencies. Random systems of multivariate quadratic (MQ) equations are one of the most conservative post-quantum assumptions, yet there are only two MQ-based LRS's in the literature: the first is due to Omar, Padhye, and Dey, and the second by Namdeo, Mishra, and Srivastava. Both of these schemes are built from Sakumoto-style identification protocols whose soundness for signatures is well-established, but in the ring setting was never re-examined. We present a sumset attack that lets a signer with no knowledge of an MQ solution universally forge accepting signatures in both protocols. In the same vein, we show that the four-challenge MQ protocol of Monteiro, Goya, and Terada (as transcribed in Namdeo, Mishra, and Srivastava) has soundness error $3/4$ instead of the claimed $1/2$, and this bound is tight. Its natural repair does achieve $1/2$, but is only $3$-special sound, so the two-transcript extraction argument upon which their LRS relies upon does not hold regardless. We then build PyuQuMuQu, a plausibly post-quantum MQ-based LRS from a $5$-pass proof with a $d$-dimensional vector first challenge and an additively split second challenge, whose soundness error is $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{N}{2(q^d-1)}$ for a ring with $N \leq q^d-1$ members. We demonstrate anonymity, linkability, and non-slanderability in the random-oracle model under explicitly stated assumptions involving random MQ maps. PyuQuMuQu attains $355$ kB signature sizes for a ring with $4$ members $128$ bits of security.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
A Polynomial-Time Attack on the McEliece Cryptosystem on Elliptic Codes with Arbitrary Divisors
Artyom Kuninets, Ekaterina Malygina, and Evgeniy Melnichuk
The McEliece cryptosystem based on algebraic geometry codes has been proposed as a way to reduce the key size of code-based cryptography, but several structural attacks have demonstrated the vulnerability of particular families of algebraic geometry codes. Despite this, until recently, there remained schemes and parameter sets that were not vulnerable to any known attack. We propose a new structural attack with ``hints'' that applies to elliptic codes with arbitrary effective divisors. In particular, we prove that, given the elliptic curve, the public generator matrix, and three points from the evaluation divisor, the entire divisor can be recovered in polynomial time, independently of the number of errors used in the cryptosystem. The attack requires $\mathcal{O}(k^2n^2+|\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_q)|+n)$ operations in $\mathbb{F}_q$ and succeeds with overwhelming probability, after which the second divisor is recovered in $\mathcal{O}\!\left(k^2n^2 + (|\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_q)|-n)n^2\right)$ operations. We further propose an optimized version of the attack that requires no additional information at all. Exploiting the action of the automorphisms of the curve, the three known points are replaced by the enumeration of a single pair of field elements, which yields an equivalent key on the given public curve in $\mathcal{O}\!\left(k^2n^2 + q^2 + (|\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_q)|-n)n^2\right)$ operations on average.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Bit Operation Cost of ``Holdout'' Key-Recovery Attacks Against Classic McEliece
Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
We give an itemized conditional arithmetic estimate for ``Holdout'' key recovery on each Classic McEliece parameter set. This attack uses polynomial relations to recover locators, the hidden field values specifying the code. Shortening restricts codewords to zero on selected positions and then deletes those positions. Assuming the public tests uniquely recover enough compatible locator values, one shortened coordinate set suffices for each parameter set, instead of the four or five in the analysis of Ghoshal, Ishai, Jain, and Sun. We make the linear solves reliable using Eberly's random scaling of rows and columns and scalar Lanczos, an iterative solver over a larger field. Returned solutions are mapped back and checked in the original equations. Charging operations with binary coefficients separately from general field arithmetic gives conditional arithmetic estimates of $2^{126.77}$ bit operations for mceliece348864, $2^{145.22}$ for mceliece460896, $2^{137.48}$ for mceliece6688128, $2^{136.65}$ for mceliece6960119, and $2^{137.48}$ for mceliece8192128}. The corresponding working-memory estimates are $2^{51.33}$, $2^{59.10}$, $2^{55.18}$, $2^{54.86}$, and $2^{55.18}$ bits. All five arithmetic estimates lie below the NIST classical-gate reference level for their claimed category; the model excludes address generation and memory traffic and uses budget estimates for some stages.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Threshold Traitor Tracing Revisited: Insider Attacks and Multi-Traitor Tracing
Jan Bormet, Sebastian Faust, and Hussien Othman
Threshold traitor tracing [Boneh et al., Crypto’24] enhances threshold decryption with anti-collusion guarantees via a tracing mechanism. In this model, a set of colluders constructs a decryption box, called a decoder, and sells it to an external buyer. Collusion-resilience is guaranteed by a tracing algorithm that, given only black-box access to the decoder, can identify at least one of the colluders. Since its introduction, threshold traitor tracing has attracted significant attention, leading to a number of new constructions that have been proven secure within this model [Asiacrypt'25, CiC'25, CCS’25, Eurocrypt’26], focusing on optimizing parameter sizes and removing trusted authority. However, in this paper, we argue that the state-of-the-art definition and constructions are not resilient against natural attacks where the decoder is sold to an insider, i.e., a member of the decryption committee. Motivated by this gap, we introduce new definitions to model decoder boxes that are sold to insiders. We show that existing threshold traitor tracing techniques are inherently vulnerable to insider attacks. Then, we introduce a novel approach to achieve insider resilience through \emph{multi-traitor tracing}, i.e., identifying multiple traitors. We present compilers that amplify the number of traitors that can be found, thereby achieving insider-resilience with efficient parameters, in particular, sublinear ciphertext size. These compilers may also be of independent interest.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Tighter and Friendlier Integer Bounds for Quaternion Algorithms - Application to SQIsign
Maciej Czuprynko, Anisha Mukherjee, and Sujoy Sinha Roy
The digital signature scheme SQIsign, currently under consideration in NIST's call for additional post-quantum signatures, offers the smallest key and signature sizes among all candidates. Its signing procedure, however, relies on an involved arithmetic layer over quaternions, in which the objects are represented by small-dimensional integer lattices. In this layer, the intermediate integers can grow significantly larger than the final outputs. Controlling this growth is essential for fixed-precision and, ultimately, constant-time implementations. In this work, we revisit the integer-size analysis of this arithmetic layer. We first observe that all lattices arising in SQIsign satisfy a structural containment property that allows their canonical form to be computed with a modulus of half the bit length used in previous analyses. Exploiting the same property, we give a matrix inversion algorithm using only exact divisions whose intermediate integers remain bounded by twice the modulus. This algorithm avoids the cubic blow-up of standard inversion methods. We show that the triangular-form convention used in the SQIsign implementation reduces the size of intermediate values by a factor of $O(p)$. Second, we show that these lattices can be represented in dimension two over the Gaussian integers instead of dimension four over the integers. This allows us to replace the LLL algorithm by the simpler Lagrange reduction that has the number of iterations bounded by a multiple of the bit-size of the longest input vector. Furthermore, this reduction provably outputs the shortest basis without requiring floating-point arithmetic. Combining these results, we derive integer-size bounds for SQIsign key generation and signing, improving on previous bounds for key generation and for all signing subroutines outside of the response quaternion sampling. We provide an implementation of our algorithms in the GMP-based C reference implementation of SQIsign.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
High-throughput Verifiable Distributed OPRF from Gold PRF
Nan Cheng, Yohei Watanabe, Yugo Kasashima, Ioannis Katis, and Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
An oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) is a two-party protocol that enables a client to obtain $F_k(x)$ on an input $x$ without learning the server-held key $k$, while the server learns nothing about $x$. OPRF is a fundamental building block in a wide range of privacy-preserving applications, including password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), private set intersection (PSI), and distributed function secret sharing. In this work, we present the first concrete, high-throughput, post-quantum secure, verifiable distributed OPRF (dOPRF) tolerating $t < n/2$ malicious servers and a malicious client over replicated secret sharing, extending the recently introduced Gold OPRF of Yang et al. (IEEE S&P 2025) to a threshold setting. We adopt an offline-online paradigm and introduce new protocol designs for both phases. (i) In the offline phase, we develop efficient protocols for batched generation of replicated secret sharing of $\alpha^e$ whose cost is independent of $e$. We present two complementary approaches, each designed for different parameter regimes: the first leverages a degenerate additive encoding under which exponentiation commutes with secret sharing; the second employs $t+1$ designated dealers that prove dual-share consistency via non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, instantiated using both VOLE-in-the-Head and Ligero, yielding post-quantum security based solely on collision-resistant hashing. (ii) In the online phase, we propose a constant-round protocol that tightly integrates secure multiplication-and-opening with distributed zero-knowledge proof (DZKP) verification, reducing communication in every setting we evaluate and computation in all but the largest batched setting, compared to naively using the standard DZKP framework. (iii) We give a verifiable input protocol that enforces a possibly-malicious client providing well-formed inputs; its well-formedness check is absorbed into a hash exchange the online protocol already performs, and it lowers the client's upload from a full replicated share to one field element per server per input. Our end-to-end benchmarks show that the construction substantially outperforms the state-of-the-art Legendre-PRF dOPRF of Kaluđerović et al. (ESORICS 2025) in terms of communication across all evaluated settings, and remains practical up to $(n,t)=(9,4)$, a regime where prior approaches become bandwidth- or memory-prohibitive.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
ROSETTA: Efficient and Accurate Privacy-Preserving LLM Decoding via Hybrid CKKS/TFHE Evaluation
Jiangrui Yu, Baosheng Zhang, Liang Kong, Lin Ding, Yi Chen, Ye Yu, Mingzhe Zhang, and Meng Li
Generative large language models (LLMs) have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many real-world tasks such as code generation and question answering. These models predominantly rely on an autoregressive decoding strategy that generates output tokens sequentially. However, their pervasive deployment raises serious privacy concerns, motivating private inference frameworks based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). A major limitation of existing FHE frameworks is their inefficiency in evaluating nonlinear operations, which incur substantial overhead and dominate the decode stage. In this paper, we propose ROSETTA, a hybrid CKKS/TFHE framework that overcomes this limitation. We first observe that nonlinear operations in the decode stage exhibit heterogeneous workload patterns, which can be handled effectively via a hybrid approach. We then realize this with two key contributions: 1) an adaptive segmented lookup-table protocol based on TFHE that enables efficient and accurate evaluation of nonlinear operations; and 2) a scheme-aware operator-selection framework that automatically assigns each nonlinear operator to CKKS or TFHE to minimize end-to-end decoding latency. We demonstrate that ROSETTA achieves up to 4.8x Softmax speedup and 1.5--2.1x end-to-end speedup over the SOTA framework CacheMir.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Cryptanalysis of the Alternative Mod-2/Mod-3 Weak PRF
Augustin Bariant, Christina Boura, Baptiste Germon, Rachelle Heim Boissier, Charles Meyer-Hilfiger, and Tyge Tiessen
The alternative mod-$2$/mod-$3$ function is one of the most widely used weak PRF constructions in modern cryptographic protocols. Despite its practical importance, its security has received relatively limited attention, with the main cryptanalytic results consisting of two distinguishing attacks due respectively to Cheon et al. and Johansson et al. In this work, we revisit the cryptanalysis of this primitive by analyzing the output distribution of the weak PRF under fixed Hamming weights for both the secret key and the inputs. This refined analysis allows us to isolate and amplify statistical biases that were averaged out in previous works. Using this approach, we derive a new distinguishing attack with asymptotic data and time complexity $\mathcal O(2^{0.099n})$. We implemented the attack for the original parameter set $n=384$, thereby obtaining the first practical attack against this instance of the construction. We then introduce a generic technique, called the splitting strategy, which consists in partially fixing or guessing part of the secret key in order to amplify the biases while introducing an additional computational cost that can be efficiently handled using Fast Fourier Transform-like techniques. This leads to the currently best known attack against the construction, with asymptotic data, time, and memory complexities $\widetilde{\mathcal O}(2^{0.09n})$. This last technique also provides a useful time-memory trade-off for estimating the security of real-world constructions when the available data is bounded: we show that the weak PRF offers less than $128$-bit security for $n = 510$ when the data is limited to $2^{45}$. Finally, we revisit the attack of Johansson et al. and provide a corrected and refined analysis of the underlying bias, showing that the statistical behavior of the attack differs significantly once the Hamming weight of the secret key is taken into account. This new analysis explains phenomena previously observed experimentally but left unexplained. Thanks to this approach we are able to identify a large class of keys for which the attack performs much better asymptotically than anticipated by Johansson et al.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Square Root of All Evil: The Dangers of Falcon's Superfluous Square Roots
Hiroto Kaihara, Calvin Abou Haidar, Mehdi Tibouchi, and Masayuki Abe
Falcon is one of the 3 post-quantum signature schemes already selected by NIST for standardization (as FN-DSA). It is very compact and efficient, but also infamously difficult to implement correctly and securely. This is due in particular to its reliance of various floating point operations, the most complex and costly of which are square root computations. In this paper, we first point out that those square root computations are in fact wholly unnecessary: the algorithm can be rewritten without them, resulting in a somewhat simpler implementation that is equally fast or even slightly faster. We then observe that they also present security risks, in particular as a singularly sensitive target for physical attacks. We demonstrate this with a fault attack, supported by concrete experiments against an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller target. We show that injecting a single glitch in one square root computation, and then generating around a million signatures with the unperturbed signing algorithm, leads to full key recovery with 100% success rate and, moreover, faulty signatures are not easy to distinguish from validly generated ones. This makes this fault attack the most devastating against Falcon to date, in contrast with earlier attacks requiring hundreds of millions of signature samples, many injected faults, or resulting in signatures that are straightforward to distinguish from regular ones. In addition, we mention potential risks of the square root computations from the standpoint of dependency management and supply chain security.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Tighter Proofs for PKE-to-KEM Transformations under Average-Case Decryption Error and without $\gamma$-Spread
Jinrong Chen, Rongmao Chen, Yi Wang, Haodong Jiang, Cong Peng, Xinyi Huang, Debiao He, and Xiaofeng Chen
In the NIST post-quantum standardization process, Fujisaki-Okamoto-like (FO-like) transformation has become the de facto paradigm for constructing IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) from public-key encryption (PKE). However, most post-quantum PKE schemes exhibit decryption error, which poses significant challenges for the security proofs of FO-like PKE-to-KEM transformations, particularly in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM). Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC 2017) gave the first QROM security proofs for PKE-to-KEM transformations under \textit{worst-case} decryption error. To relax this to the more designer-friendly one of \textit{average-case} decryption error, Duman et al. (PKC 2023) presented two transformations, $\mathsf{FOAC}_0$ and $\mathsf{FOAC}$, which are under average-case decryption error but introduce substantial loss in QROM reduction tightness ($\mathcal{O}(q^8)$ for $\mathsf{FOAC}_0$ and $\mathcal{O}(q^6)$ for $\mathsf{FOAC}$) and the need for the $\gamma$-spread assumption on the underlying PKEs. Very recently, Ge et al. (ePrint 2025) removed the $\gamma$-spread assumption for $\mathsf{FOAC}_0$ and improved the QROM reduction tightness to $\mathcal{O}(q^4)$ for both $\mathsf{FOAC}_0$ and $\mathsf{FOAC}$. In this work, we make further advances by introducing two refined variants: $\mathsf{FOAC}'_0$ and $\mathsf{FOAC'}$. We provide new security analyses in both the ROM and the QROM, and present the following key contributions: (1) Compared with previous transformations under average-case decryption error, $\mathsf{FOAC}'_0$ and $\mathsf{FOAC'}$ exhibit tighter security proofs with QROM reduction loss of only $\mathcal{O}(q^2)$ for $\mathsf{FOAC}'_0$ and $\mathcal{O}(q^3)$ for $\mathsf{FOAC'}$ when the underlying PKE is OW‑CPA secure, and just $\mathcal{O}(q)$ when it is deterministic or IND‑CPA security; (2) Both $\mathsf{FOAC}'_0$ and $\mathsf{FOAC'}$ eliminate the $\gamma$-spread assumption entirely, further relaxing the requirements on the underlying PKE. To support our QROM proofs, we provide three new QROM proof techniques that build on Zhandry's compressed oracle technique (CRYPTO 2019). These techniques may be of independent interest and could have broader applicability in post-quantum cryptography.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Splitting the MAYO: A Component-Wise Fault Injection Attack on Randomized MAYO
Mohamed Abdelmonem, Lejla Batina, Durba Chatterjee, Vincent Dankbaar, and Håvard Raddum
We present a practical component-wise fault injection attack against randomized MAYO implementations. The attack targets the final addition of oil and vinegar components during signing. Depending on compiler optimization, a fault may expose either oil coefficients directly or vinegar coefficients that can be used to recover the oil coefficient via the public verification algorithm. By accumulating partial coefficient-wise information across multiple faulty signatures and exploiting the linear structure of the oil space, we recover the full secret oil space. Unlike prior attacks, our method does not rely on deterministic signing, memory reuse, or faulting a hash function. We validate the attack on ARM Cortex-M4 platforms using clock glitching and electromagnetic fault injection, and recover the MAYO-1 secret oil space for both the -O3 and -Os compiler optimization settings. Additionally, we analyze several countermeasures against our attack, showing that some are ineffective or increase the attack cost, while others provide effective protection at additional implementation cost.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Universally Composable Reverse Firewalls for Oblivious Linear Evaluation and Applications
Suvradip Chakraborty, Kiran Deep Ghosh, Satrajit Ghosh, Subha Kar, Divyam Katiyar, Sougata Mandal, Soumit Pal, and Amlan Sinha
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) traditionally assumes that parties execute protocols on trustworthy machines. This assumption fails under machine subversion, where compromised devices may leak sensitive information through manipulated protocol transcripts. Reverse Firewalls (RFs), introduced by Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz, counter this threat by externally sanitizing messages in a functionality-preserving manner, without trusting the internal execution environment. Prior RF constructions are limited to Boolean-circuit-based MPC using oblivious transfer (OT) and garbled circuits (GC). In contrast, many high-performance MPC protocols are predominantly arithmetic, relying on Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE) as a core primitive. Achieving subversion resilience in this setting requires sanitizing OLE, a problem that has remained open. We initiate a systematic study of subversion-resilient arithmetic MPC in the universally composable (UC) framework against semi-honest adversaries. We formalize a sanitizable OLE functionality \FsOLE, prove a two-round impossibility for a natural class of additive homomorphic encryption (AHE)-based protocols, and present a UC-secure three-round construction from key-malleable AHE. To recover the full expressiveness of plain OLE, we further introduce wrapped sanitizing OLE under a covert adversary model, yielding an efficient UC-secure two-round protocol. Both constructions are instantiated using a key-malleable AHE scheme from class groups that we construct. Using OLE as a black box, we obtain the first subversion-resilient UC-secure protocols for Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE), Oblivious Polynomial Addition (OPA), and Private Set Intersection (PSI), achieving optimal communication for PSI. A full end-to-end implementation demonstrates that RF protection incurs only a 1.5--3X overhead, showing that practical subversion-resilient MPC is attainable.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
sPAR: (Somewhat) Practical Anonymous Router
Debajyoti Das, Jeongeun Park, and Hyewon Sung
Anonymous communication is one of the fundamental tools to achieve privacy for communication over the internet. Almost all existing design strategies (e.g., onion routing/Tor, mixnets) for anonymous communication rely on the existence of some honest server/router in the network infrastructure to provide anonymity. A seminal work by Shi and Wu (Eurocrypt 2021) proposes the first cryptographic design for a non-interactive anonymous router (NIAR) that can use a single untrusted server or router to permute a set of messages without revealing the permutation to the untrusted router. This work is a really important step towards showing the possibility of designing such protocol from standard cryptographic assumptions. However, the existing constructions are only of theoretical nature and still leaves many open questions towards realizing such systems in practice: (1) the cryptographic building blocks used in those designs are really difficult to implement in practice. (2) Their setup phase takes the permutation as an input to generate the encryption/decryption keys; which means that the messages from the same sender in different rounds will be at the same position in the output vector, unless the setup phase is run before every round with a new permutation. (3) It is not known how to realize such a setup procedure, that initializes a random permutation obliviously, without any trusted entities in the system. In this paper, we propose the first (somewhat) practical design, which we call sPAR, that solves the above problems. Our design also relies on a one-time setup phase, however the setup phase does not take any specific permutation as input. Instead, our design can reuse the same setup for many rounds and generates a fresh permutation for every round based on the random values locally generated by the clients. Our design is implementable and deployable in practice; and this presents a new direction for designing anonymous communication systems. Unlike some existing systems like Tor, sPAR does not scale to millions of users, however, we demonstrate with a proof-of-concept implementation that sPAR supports around one hundred users, and show that an optimized variant of our algorithm reduces the latency to a few seconds per message.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
On the Round Complexity of Dishonest-Majority MPC
Ran Cohen, Daniel Collins, Pouyan Forghani, Juan Garay, and Vassilis Zikas
What is the round complexity of $n$-party secure multiparty computation (MPC) over point-to-point networks in the dishonest-majority setting with unanimous or identifiable abort? Despite decades of research, this foundational question remains open. While two-round MPC is achievable given a broadcast channel, and broadcast protocols with expected-constant rounds exist tolerating any constant fraction of corruptions, a naive combination of the two yields MPC with expected $O(\log n)$ rounds. The core obstacle lies in maintaining round efficiency under parallel composition without an honest majority. Moreover, existing lower bounds for standard broadcast do not apply to broadcast with abort, leaving the exact round complexity of this setting unknown. In this work, we systematically investigate the round complexity of MPC over point-to-point networks, providing positive and negative results: - We show that any broadcast protocol (and thus generic MPC) with unanimous abort tolerating super-constant corruptions requires super-constant rounds, ruling out strict-constant-round protocols. - We construct a round-preserving, black-box parallel composition compiler for broadcast with unanimous abort. This yields our main result: Expected-constant-round MPC with unanimous abort in the PKI model against any constant fraction of corruptions, assuming oblivious transfer (OT) and verifiable random functions (VRFs). - Finally, we prove that expected-constant round broadcast (and MPC) with identifiable abort is impossible against $n - o(n)$ corruptions.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
On Sparkle+ and its Security Claims
Andrea Gangemi, Massimiliano Sala, and Lorenzo Viganò
We revisit the security bounds of Sparkle+, the threshold Schnorr signature scheme which first appeared in 2023. This scheme has been updated and corrected in several versions and papers (also of other authors). However, no version or paper has checked in detail the final bounds of Theorem 1 and 2 of the June 2025 version, which have therefore, to the best of our knowledge, been taken for granted in the related literature. There, the derivation of the final bounds of its Theorems 1 and 2, on full static security under DL and on adaptive security up to $t/2$ corruptions under AOMDL, from the intermediate inequalities established by their proofs is left to the reader. Carrying it out, we obtain bounds that differ from the stated ones in three distinct algebraic respects: the terms produced by the two game hops precede the rewinding and therefore appear outside the square root rather than inside it; the whole game-hop aggregate, and not only its collision part, re-enters through the extraction inequality with coefficient $2q$ rather than $1$; and the exact inversion of the general forking lemma contributes $q/2p$ outside the root together with $q^2/4p^2$ inside it, with $q$ the number of queries and $p$ the group order, its standard relaxation combining the two into an additive $q/p$, and the statements carry none of this. We prove the bounds that do follow, for both theorems, and determine exactly when each of ours and the original is the tighter. Conditional on the correctness of the game transitions from which those inequalities come, the asymptotic security conclusions are unaffected.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Failure Is Not Silent: Attacks on Blind Signatures
Maksymilian Gorski and Lucjan Hanzlik
Blind signatures and OPRFs are widely used to build anonymous tokens and privacy-preserving protocols. This paper shows that several prior claims of blindness and request-privacy for such primitives are false under the standard security definitions. In particular, we give explicit malicious-signer/evaluator adversaries showing that the theorems claimed for several existing constructions, including the blind ECDSA scheme of Qin et al. and the verifiable Dark Matter OPRF, do not hold. The attacks exploit a simple but previously overlooked channel: a malicious signer can craft its response so that the honest user's final verification aborts if and only if the user's hidden message satisfies a chosen predicate. The abort/no-abort outcome, therefore, becomes a one-bit testing oracle on the hidden message. Importantly, this is not a failure of the standard blindness definition: our attacks win the standard blindness/request-privacy games. Rather, the flaw is that prior proofs implicitly used encryption hiding or commitment hiding in settings where the adversary also learns an input-dependent abort event. Our main attack applies to a general pattern of homomorphic-encryption-based blind signatures and OPRFs, in which the user encrypts its input, then decrypts and verifies the signer's homomorphic response. We also present two additional case studies, based on derandomization and selective use of signer components, which illustrate the same proof pitfall in other constructions. We identify a positive design criterion: schemes with publicly checkable signature derivation, in the sense of Fischlin-Schröder, do not leak extra information through such selective aborts. Finally, we discuss mitigations. Generic protection requires publicly verifiable honest evaluation, e.g., via zero-knowledge proofs. For random-token use cases of some HE-based blind signatures, we give a partial mitigation based on random unknown-message blindness RUMBL and a random-oracle transformation to standard blindness.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
On Solving Ideal-SVP and Ideal-BDD with Group Representations
Hongyuan Qu and Guangwu Xu
Ideal lattices over number fields play a central role in post-quantum cryptography, as evidenced by the NIST-standardized schemes Kyber and Dilithium. Understanding the hardness of ideal-lattice problems such as the Unique Shortest Vector Problem (Id-uSVP) and Bounded Distance Decoding (Id-BDD) is therefore essential. Recent works have shown that certain algebraic symmetries can significantly reduce the dimension of the Ideal-SVP problem. In particular, subfield attacks exploit the decomposition group to solve SVP in a smaller subfield. However, existing reductions are limited to SVP and rely on multiplicatively closed substructures. In this work, we introduce a representation-theoretic framework for solving Id-uSVP and Id-BDD. Let $K/\mathbb{Q}$ be an abelian extension whose Galois group $G$ is known, and let $I$ be an integral ideal of $K$ stabilized by a nontrivial subgroup $H\subseteq G$. We use the irreducible rational representations of $H$ to construct scaled projection operators $q_i$ that decompose $K$ into a direct sum of linear subspaces $V_i$. Applying these operators to $I$ yields low-dimensional lattices $I_i = q_i(I)$. We show that an Id-BDD instance $(t,I)$ can be solved by solving independent BDD instances on the $I_i$'s and recombining the solutions, provided the target is within a distance bounded by $\lambda_1(I)/(2|H|^2)$. For Id-uSVP, we prove that under mild uniqueness conditions a shortest vector of $I$ lies in at least one of the nonzero $I_i$. In cyclotomic fields, the rotation property gives two stronger results: (i) every nonzero $I_i$ contains a shortest vector of $I$, so solving SVP on the lowest-rank nonzero $I_i$ suffices; and (ii) BDD is further accelerated by reducing a single instance to $n$ low-rank instances on the same lowest-rank nonzero $I_i$. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first to employ group representation theory directly in lattice cryptanalysis. It addresses the limitation of previous subfield methods that they cannot solve BDD, removes the need for multiplicative closedness, and remains at least as efficient as prior SVP reductions. These results refine the understanding of the hardness of structured lattice problems and have implications for the security analysis of cryptosystems with additional algebraic structure.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
PikkuFold: Efficient Folding in a Few Kilobytes
Michał Osadnik
Folding is a powerful technique for constructing efficient succinct proof systems, especially for computations that are expressed in a streaming fashion. We present PikkuFold, a new lattice-based folding protocol that improves upon state-of-the-art folding schemes such as SALSAA (ePrint 2025/2124) and Cyclo (EUROCRYPT 2026). One folding step communicates $5.7$ KB beyond the commitments to its fresh inputs, against $\geq 30$ KB for Cyclo and $\geq 60$ KB for SALSAA on similar instances, with a prover more than an order of magnitude faster and the verifier in the millisecond range. At the heart of our construction are layered random projections, whose algebraic structure makes them fast to verify and whose final image is short enough to send to the verifier directly, cutting out the cost of auxiliary commitments. We use those techniques to replace the extensive and restrictive range proofs of Cyclo, while still achieving only a small additive increase in the accumulator norm across multiple folds. PikkuFold is the first lattice-based construction that does not require any in-protocol commitments beyond those of the fresh inputs. Such commitments are the heavy part of a folding transcript: every prior lattice-based scheme commits to a decomposed or otherwise transformed witness during the fold, immediately increasing the communication by dozens of kilobytes. On top of that, we provide two contributions of independent interest, applicable beyond the context of folding schemes: (i) a Johnson-Lindenstrauss theorem for biased ternary matrices modulo $q$ with certified concrete constants, which replaces the heuristic parametrisation of prior works, and (ii) a thorough analysis of the short-challenge sampler with fixed Hamming weight and operator-norm rejection, offering a wide range of parameter sets. Using this sampler as a drop-in replacement would lead to immediate improvements in a wide family of lattice-based protocols.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Noise-Tolerant Plaintext-Checking Oracle Attacks -- A Soft-Analytic Approach Applied to ML-KEM
Julius Hermelink, Erik Mårtensson, Maggie Tran, and Richard Petri
Plaintext-checking oracle (PCO) attacks are among the most prominent types of attacks against NIST's recently standardized ML-KEM. Previous works have drastically reduced the number of queries needed to recover the secret key. Although this number is now close to the information-theoretic bound, current attacks have not yet been adapted to settings with increased noise and highly imperfect oracles. In attacks targeting real-world protected implementations, noisy leakage may lead to oracles that only provide a small advantage over guessing. This work shows how to efficiently exploit imperfect oracles arising from highly noisy side channels. We present several soft-analytic techniques that enable highly noise-tolerant parallel PCO attacks. These techniques allow for successful attacks in relatively few traces from information that gives just a slight advantage over guessing. Additionally, we extend the generic framework for side-channel information from Eurocrypt 2025 and thereby relate our techniques to previous work. We then discuss several oracle instantiations that are based on the noisy Hamming weight model. These oracles rely on widely accepted assumptions, are easy to simulate, and allow for fair comparisons between different attacks. Furthermore, they allow taking countermeasures into account, and we evaluate the impact of masking. Our evaluations in these and previous models show that PCO attacks are noise-tolerant on an entirely different scale compared to previous work. These improvements are of an algorithmic nature and orthogonal to the fact that the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform in ML-KEM offers a large attack surface. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protected ML-KEM implementations.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
A Unified Framework for Statistical Side-Channel Distinguishers: From Leakage Assessment to Key Recovery
Quentin L. Meunier
Side-channel analysis (SCA) has historically developed along two parallel research avenues: key recovery attacks (e.g., CPA, MIA, Templates) and leakage assessment methodologies (e.g., TVLA, $t$-tests, $F$-tests, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests). While both paradigms fundamentally process trace distributions partitioned by intermediate values or key hypotheses, they are typically viewed as disparate techniques with distinct mathematical formulations. In this paper, we propose a unifying statistical framework that decomposes side-channel distinguishers into orthogonal building blocks: (i) a subkey-induced leakage partition, (ii) a distribution comparison statistic (categorized into binary (two-distribution) or multi-class (multi-distribution) comparison operators), (iii) an aggregation operator over pairwise distribution comparisons, and (iv) a global decision rule. This formalization proves that classical key distinguishers and leakage tests are instances of a single generic model. Furthermore, our framework transforms statistical leakage tests into fully functional key recovery attacks, naturally introducing novel distinguishers based on non-parametric statistics (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Anderson-Darling, MMD, Energy Distance) paired with suitable aggregation operators. We evaluate 18 statistical metrics across experimental configurations combining 8-bit AVR XMEGA and 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 targets, unmasked and masked AES, under both targeted and automated POI scenarios. Our results demonstrate that the vast majority of these newly introduced attacks successfully achieve complete key recovery. Crucially, no single metric consistently dominates across all targets and leakage conditions, highlighting the complementary nature of statistical distinguishers and paving the way for metric combination and ensemble strategies.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Shorter VOLE-in-the-Head-based Signatures from Vector Semi-Commitment
Seongkwang Kim, Byeonghak Lee, and Mincheol Son
The VOLE-in-the-Head (VOLEitH) paradigm compiles VOLE-based zero-knowledge proofs into publicly verifiable post-quantum signature schemes. A central component of VOLEitH is a GGM-style tree used to realize a vector commitment, whose size dominates the signature. In this work, we adapt vector semi-commitment (VSC)---previously developed for MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) by Kim et al. (\emph{Eurocrypt 2025})---to the VOLEitH paradigm and prove its security. While prior MPCitH analyses relied on assumption-specific, fragmented security proofs, we give a \emph{unified} treatment that characterizes which abstract property the underlying tree must satisfy, and instantiate it under the random oracle, Davies--Meyer, counter (CTR), and pseudorandom generator (PRG) models. Building on this, we construct reduced VOLE-in-the-Head (rVOLEitH) and apply it to FAEST, one of the NIST additional post-quantum signature candidates, obtaining signature sizes comparable to those of FAEST v2.0, ranging from 94.9\% to 102.8\% of the corresponding FAEST v2.0 sizes, while attaining 27.7--124.2\% faster signing and 28.3--115.3\% faster verification for 128-bit parameters. Finally, we describe a forgery attack on a recently proposed VOLEitH variant of the subfield bilinear collision (SBC) signature scheme by Huth and Joux (\emph{Asiacrypt 2025}) which replaces leaf commitments with a single global commitment, demonstrating the necessity of the commitment structure retained by VSC.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Formalizing and Strengthening the Security Proof of NTOR
François Dupressoir, Kristian Gjøsteen, Cameron Low, and Charlotte Mylog
We present a machine-checked security proof for the NTOR key exchange protocol, which is used to establish connections in the Tor onion routing system. It was previously studied by Goldberg et al. (DCC 2013) and the protocol ladder project, however there is no full proof including forward secrecy in the computational model. Our proof is formalized in EasyCrypt, adding to the still small set of cryptographic protocols verified using EasyCrypt. A key contribution is a systematic treatment of halting reductions involving failure events expressed as global properties of the execution. In the course of this work, we also contributed improvements to the EasyCrypt framework itself. We prove NTOR secure in a model for unilaterally authenticated key exchange (UAKE) similar to the maximum exposure model by Fiedler et al. (Crypto 2025). It captures forward secrecy concretely, and is intentionally close to established bilaterally authenticated key exchange models (such as eCK) while being simple to formalize. By examining more carefully how identities and public keys are used in key exchange protocols, we obtain simpler formal arguments and introduce several variants of the UAKE security model, connected by general reductions that, in the case of NTOR, are also verified in EasyCrypt. This allows us to carry out the main proof in a simpler setting and then derive the desired security guarantee for NTOR via these reductions.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Succinct Arguments for QMA from Collapsing Hash Functions
James Bartusek and Giulio Malavolta
We prove the existence of succinct arguments for QMA, assuming only the existence of collapsing hash functions. This is the first scheme that relies only on unstructured ``Minicrypt'' assumptions, which are not known to imply public-key encryption. Our main technical contribution is a quantum-succinct claw-state generation protocol that allows us to bootstrap a small number of quantum correlations into an arbitrarily large number of claw-state correlations, using classical communication only. This improves upon the work of [Zhang, STOC 2021], having better round complexity, a proof in the standard model, and being overall much simpler. This yields a quantum-succinct blind delegation of quantum computation protocol from one-way functions, which we plug into the communication-compression compiler of [Bartusek, Liu, and Malavolta, EUROCRYPT 2026] to obtain succinct arguments for QMA.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
ZK-JPEG: Zero-knowledge Image Editing and Compression
Samuel Dittmer, Steve Lu, Kimberlee Model, and Joseph Near
Tools for generating deep fake photographs are proliferating with greater ease of use and prominence in pop culture. Image authentication tools can defeat these deceitful developments by verifying that a digital image was actually produced by a physical camera. The challenge is that these tools must be robust to desirable image transformations. Camera attestation uses digital signatures to prove an image's provenance from a camera. Lossy compression makes minute changes in order to reduce an image's size, and blurring or redacting regions of an image can protect its subjects. These changes invalidate an image's signature. Prior works use zero-knowledge (ZK) to prove a published image's edit history, but they do not survive lossy encoding such as the JPEG format. We present \zkjpeg, a cryptographic tool for JPEG compression that proves an image was correctly compressed from a secret, committed input. In addition, our tool can verify a large family of image transformations by integrating them into JPEG compression with minimal cost. Our system is fast, flexible, and can be instantiated from off-the-shelf ZK tools. We use PicoZK to convert Python image editing code into a ZK circuit for the line-point zero knowledge (LPZK) proof system.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Seven Bindings: A Machine-Checked Map of the Assumptions Behind Lightning's BOLT 12
Rong Qian, Mengrun Chen, Yu Cheng, Yuchang Zhang, and Zengli Guo
Lightning's BOLT 12 (offers, onion messages, blinded paths) is the largest addition to the Lightning protocol suite, and it is rolling out now. The specification changed three times in 2026, the community is actively debating its privacy posture, and its newest mechanism, Payer Proofs, landed in July 2026 without any analysis. We give the offer family its first formal treatment, covering the full lifecycle from request to receipt, pinned to specification commits e20a924/1528972 and machine-checked in twenty-two ProVerif models that each converge within seconds. The results read as a map rather than a checklist: the family's privacy and integrity rest on seven bindings, removable assumptions whose removal consequences we check row by row. Receiver anonymity and payer-payee unlinkability hold under unbounded sessions and corrupted path nodes, and every protocol-level attack we exhibit lands on an assumption the specification already leans on out-of-band. The map's structure is itself the finding. The blinding key chain, designed for unlinkability, authenticates recipient-side transit for free, while the payer side's delivery binding rests on implementation discipline alone. The newest part of the specification, its payment receipts, turns out to hide a precise disclosure boundary. We close with six testable recommendations for the BOLTs repository.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Silent Payments, Formally: Security, Scanning Costs, and Blind Collaborative Payments
Rong Qian, Yu Cheng, Mengrun Chen, Yuchang Zhang, and Zengli Guo
Silent payments (BIP-352) let Bitcoin users publish one static address and receive at fresh, unlinkable outputs. The protocol already ships in major wallets, yet its own specification concedes it has no formal security proof—and 2026 brought a worst-case scanning attack, a funds-locking hardware-wallet disclosure, and an omitted-payment bug. We supply the missing analysis. Receiver and co-transactor unlinkability are proved under DDH, with the label system as a corollary that includes an executable linking attack and its fix. We then quantify what scanning costs and what an attacker can buy with it. The community's K_max cap turns quadratic attack amplification into linear; every compliant scanner needs Ω(N+KM) work; our set-probing scanner meets this bound and runs 39× faster in our measurements; and a year of fee data prices a full-block attack as low as 0.0015 BTC. For collaborative transactions we show what the specification's warning was about (the transaction assembler can always identify the recipient's output, and malformed partial secrets burn payer funds, the failure class disclosed in August 2026), and we construct the variant the warning called for: blind collaborative payments with information-theoretic payer privacy. Delegation, finally, offers no safe default: scanning servers either learn too much or can hide payments. A twelve-experiment benchmark suite accompanies the paper.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Efficient Pseudorandom Correlation Generators over Binary Extension Fields and More
Zhe Li, Hongqing Liu, Chaoping Xing, Yizhou Yao, and Chen Yuan
In this work, we construct highly efficient pseudorandom correlation generators (PCGs) over binary extension fields. PCGs allow for the distribution of a great amount of correlated randomness by having each party locally expand a short seed, enabling efficient multi-party computation (MPC) protocols with silent and sublinear preprocessing. Our PCGs achieve nearly linear time, both asymptotically and concretely, where expanding $N$ VOLEs (vector oblivious linear evaluations) over $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$ consists of $O(N)$ PRG calls, $O(N)$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$ and $O(kN\log{N})$ binary XORs. In fact, the $O(kN\log{N})$ XORs are insignificant in practical parameter regimes where $N\approx 2^{20}$. Concretely, we achieve a throughput of $\approx 5,000,000$ VOLEs per second over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$, which is at least $4.7$x, $1.9$x and $1.6$x faster than the state-of-the-art PCGs of Expand-Accumulate (EA), Block-Accumulate (BA) and Expand-Convolute (EC) codes, respectively. For oblivious linear evaluations (OLEs), expanding $N$ instances requires $O(\lambda N)$ PRG calls, $O(N)$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$ and $O(kN\log{N})$ binary XORs, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter. Based on the $\mathsf{libOTe}$ library, we also give the first full implementation of PCGs for OLEs over extension fields, which shows a throughput of $\approx 42,000$ OLEs per second over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$. At the heart of our technical contribution is an efficient multivariate FFT algorithm. It evaluates any $n$-variate polynomial $f(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$ of individual degree$\le2$ using exactly $\frac{5}{6}kN\log_3{N}$ additions and $\frac{1}{6}kN\log_3{N}$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_4$, where $N=3^n$ and $k$ is an arbitrary even integer. Note that this is considerably faster than normal FFT algorithms that require $O(N\log{N})$ multiplications in the underlying field $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$. Along the way, we generalize our approach to work over a degree-$k$ Galois extension of $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{\ell}}$, denoted by $\mathbb{GR}(2^{\ell},k)$. Similarly, our algorithm takes only $\frac{7}{6}kN\log_3{N}$ additions and $\frac{1}{6}kN\log_3{N}$ multiplications in $\mathbb{GR}(2^{\ell},2)$ to evaluate $f(x_1,\ldots,x_n)\in\mathbb{GR}(2^{\ell},k)[x_1,\ldots,x_n]_{\leq 2}$. This implies practically efficient PCGs for (V)OLE over Galois rings. As a side contribution of independent interest, we derive fast encoding algorithms for a family of Quasi-Abelian codes, which are even concretely $1.66$x faster than Repeat-Accumulate-Accumulate (RAA) codes over $\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$, whose encoding only involves a linear number of additions and two random permutations. As Quasi-Abelian codes have been proven to attain concretely large minimum distance in a recent work of Li et al. (CRYPTO 2026), this opens a door to building more efficient succinct arguments over extension fields.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
The Price of Time: Deterrence as the Third Pillar of Payment Channel Security
Rong Qian, Yu Cheng, Mengrun Chen, Yuchang Zhang, and Zengli Guo
Safety and liveness are the two classical pillars of payment channel security. Both price attacks that merely occupy channel resources, such as jamming, at zero. We propose a third pillar, deterrence: harm carries a provable price. We give its theory for occupied shared-state resources. Within a holding-cost framework, we characterize occupation pricing for lock-resolve channels. Time-dependence in the occupier's liability is necessary for any deterrence: today's time-independent pricing admits unbounded griefing, with damage-to-cost ratios above 10^7. Linear time-proportional liability achieves the tight rate. Its two faces, deadline-proportional upfront fees and hold-proportional penalty bonds, differ exactly in what they charge honest traffic. Our main theorem maps the landscape of four desiderata: deterrence against colluding sinks, penalty-only honesty, zero intermediary lockup, and path privacy. Three of them are jointly unachievable, and every remaining combination is achieved by a matching construction; onion-message fee-swallowing gives a second enforcement instance. Single-channel enforcement is characterized exactly: penalty-only pricing is unilaterally enforceable if and only if scripts expose time. The proof is a three-case exhaustion, and it explains why pre-BIP65 Bitcoin could not support trustless occupation pricing. Our flagship fused-bond construction runs on Bitcoin today, with no covenants, oracles, or miner assumptions; it improves slot-jamming deterrence by eight orders of magnitude at zero net cost to punctual honest payments. For multi-hop payments we prove the forwarding trilemma, settling a 2020 conjecture of the Lightning engineering community, and we quantify the price of privacy, including a new O(1/n) extreme-value side channel on the sender's path length.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Backdooring the AI-Native Air Interface: One Poisoned Supply Chain Hijacks CSI Feedback and Beam Management
Rong Qian, Yu Cheng, Hongbo Zhao, Yuchang Zhang, and Zengli Guo
The 5G-Advanced air interface is acquiring its first AI-native functions (AI/ML-based CSI feedback compression and beam management, studied by 3GPP since Release 18) and their models increasingly arrive through third-party supply chains. We present the first cross-use-case backdoor study of this interface. Poisoning as little as 0.5% of the training data implants an arbitrary trigger-to-target association into CRNet (and, at 5% poisoning, into CsiNet): attack success is 100% with no measurable clean cost, with physical triggers so weak that a 2-bit RIS suffices to launch them. The same trigger and pipeline hijack a second standardized function, beam prediction, with 99.5% success. Hijacked feedback steers gNB beamforming toward a phantom channel: a victim's rate falls by 98%, and the diverted beam concentrates 88% of the array-gain ceiling onto the attacker, raising interception probability to 100%. An adaptive attack that matches codeword statistics drives both statistical detectors from ≈1.0 to 0.53 AUC with attack strength unchanged, yet behavioral consistency still detects it: codewords can be disguised, behavior cannot.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Maliciously Secure Shuffled Distributed OPRF with Applications to Private Set Operations
Aron van Baarsen, Aarushi Goel, Lisa Kohl, Peihan Miao, Phuoc Van Long Pham, Peter Scholl, and Satvinder Singh
Private Set Intersection (PSI) enables two parties to compute the intersection of their private sets without revealing any additional information. For plain PSI, there exist extremely efficient solutions based on symmetric-key techniques for both the semi-honest and malicious settings. However, for more enriched set operations such as PSI-Cardinality, PSI-Sum, Circuit-PSI, and Private Set Union, the efficiency gap between the semi-honest and malicious settings is significant, often spanning orders of magnitude. A key bottleneck underlying these protocols is the need for a shuffled distributed oblivious pseudorandom function (SH-DOPRF) with malicious security. Existing constructions for this primitive are asympotically suboptimal and/or concretely inefficient. In this work, we present a new protocol for SH-DOPRF with malicious security that achieves linear computation and communication complexity. We present two instantiations: a DDH-based construction using the Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF (PKC 2005), and a plausibly post-quantum secure construction based on a variant of the Dark-Matter PRF (Aranha et al., S&P 2026). Our approach is almost entirely based on symmetric-key techniques, with public-key operations used only for evaluating PRF outputs. This primitive yields maliciously secure protocols for multi-query reverse private membership test (Zhang et al., USENIX Security 2023), which in turn can be used to realize the aforementioned private set operations. These protocols provide two-sided outputs while only additionally leaking the cardinality of the intersection. We implement and evaluate our construction to demonstrate concrete efficiency. Our DDH-based maliciously-secure SH-DOPRF achieves a 2--3 orders of magnitude improvement in total running time compared to the state-of-the-art (Miao et al., CRYPTO 2020 & Yang et al., PoPETs 2025), leading to a similar improvement for PSI-Cardinality. The resulting protocols for various other private set operations also achieve significant improvements over prior work; for example, our PSI-Sum and Circuit-PSI protocols are 1--2 orders of magnitude more efficient.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Wasp: Succinct Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs from VOLE
Zhanpeng Guo, Zhelei Zhou, Yun Li, Chenkai Weng, Cheng Hong, and Tao Wei
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) based on vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE) excel in prover efficiency but typically require linear communication and verification. Antman (Weng et al., CCS '22) introduced information-theoretic polynomial authentication codes (IT-PACs) to achieve sublinear communication: $O(B + C)$ for SIMD (single-instruction-multiple-data) circuits and $O(B^3 + C)$ for general circuits, where $N=B \cdot C$ is the total circuit size and $B,C$ are batch size and subcircuit size, respectively. Antman++ (Bui et al., J. Cryptol. '25) further reduced the general-case communication to $O(B + C)$. However, these protocols remain interactive and cannot be made non-interactive via traditional techniques like Fiat-Shamir, due to limited functionalities of IT-PACs; also, the verifier of Antman++ is not succinct for processing $N\times N$ public matrices. In this work, we present a succinct non-interactive ZKP system $\mathsf{Wasp}$. Specifically, (1) we enhance the IT-PAC primitive to a fully functional polynomial commitment scheme (PCS) with the support of generic evaluation openings. With this PCS, we construct $\mathsf{Wasp^S}$, a non-interactive ZKP for SIMD circuits based on Antman; also, we build $\mathsf{Wasp^G}$, a general zkSNARK with constant verifier time and proof size based on the Plonkish constraint system. (2) We optimize the SIMD-to-general compiler from Antman++ by exploiting sparse representation of matrices and extending preprocessing techniques to the SIMD setting, and achieve a sublinear verifier. All our protocols achieve non-interactivity in the VOLE-hybrid model (i.e., given preprocessed VOLE correlations). Experiments show the non-interactive verifier of our SIMD zkSNARK $\mathsf{Wasp^S}$ is $1\sim 2$ orders of magnitude faster than the interactive one of Antman; when compiled with our compiler, the general-case verifier is $2\sim 3$ orders of magnitude faster than the one in Antman++. Our general zkSNARK $\mathsf{Wasp^G}$ has a $1\sim 2$ orders of magnitude faster prover than pairing-based, coding-based and lattice-based zkSNARKs, with less than 1 ms verifier time and 122 KB proof size; compared to the non-succinct VOLE-based ZKP, $\mathsf{Wasp^G}$ is $3\sim22\times$ slower in proving but can be 4 orders of magnitude faster in verification with $3$ orders of magnitude smaller proof size.
Last updated:  2026-09-15
Barely Doubly-Efficient PIR from Quadratic Residuosity
Keewoo Lee
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme allows a client to retrieve data from a database hosted on a remote server without revealing which location is being accessed. In Doubly-Efficient PIR (DEPIR), the server preprocesses the database offline into a data structure that enables it to answer any client query in sublinear time with respect to the database size $n$. Lin, Mook, and Wichs (STOC 2023) presented the first DEPIR, from RLWE, and Lee (Crypto 2026) gave a barely doubly-efficient scheme from LWE in the CRS model, answering each query in $o(n/\log n)$ time. These are essentially the only constructions known, and both rest on lattices. Whether DEPIR could be realized from non-lattice-based foundations, particularly from number-theoretic assumptions, remained in doubt. In this work, we construct a DEPIR scheme from quadratic residuosity in the CRS model, answering each query in $o(n/\log n)$ time. As in Lee's LWE-based construction, our scheme leverages Williams's matrix-vector multiplication preprocessing (SODA 2007). Privacy follows from the pseudorandomness of Legendre symbols under quadratic residuosity, proved by Corrigan-Gibbs and Wu (TCC 2025). To cope with a new modulus at every query, we additionally develop a data structure that reduces a preprocessed integer modulo any modulus in sublinear time.
Last updated:  2026-09-14
Tricycle: Private Transformer Inference with Tricyclic Encodings
Lawrence Lim, Vikas Kalagi, Julia Novick, Jiaming Liu, Divyakant Agrawal, and Amr El Abbadi
The growing deployment of large language models (LLMs) in privacy-sensitive settings demands inference mechanisms that preserve data confidentiality. Homomorphic encryption (HE) offers a principled solution by enabling computation directly on encrypted data; however, existing solutions struggle to scale to full LLMs. We present Tricycle, a system for efficient private transformer inference. At its core, Tricycle introduces tricyclic encodings, a novel packing scheme that enables batch matrix multiplications with optimal multiplicative depth while naturally supporting multi-head attention. We demonstrate that Tricycle's matrix multiplications are particularly amenable for integration with other optimizations including Baby-Step Giant-Step optimizations, optimized block matrix multiplications, lazy relinearization, and complexification, which significantly improve performance. We further introduce statistical max estimation, a lightweight method for stabilizing softmax under HE. We implement Tricycle end-to-end on a GPU-accelerated CKKS pipeline and evaluate it on BERT models. For BERT-Base with 128 tokens, Tricycle achieves 100.5 seconds latency on a single GPU, yielding $6\times$ and $3.4\times$ speedups over prior state-of-the-art systems, Thor and Powerformer, respectively. These results demonstrate that careful design of packing, algorithms, and optimizations can significantly reduce the cost of private LLM inference, bringing practical deployment closer to reality.
Last updated:  2026-09-14
Tight Constants in Talagrand's Boolean Convolution Inequality
Zhao Song
We study the optimal dimension-free constant $C_*(a)$ in Talagrand's Boolean convolution inequality $\Pr_\mu[T_af\ge u]\le C_*(a)/(u\sqrt{\log u})$, where $T_a$ is the noise operator, $\mu$ is the uniform measure on the Boolean cube, $f\ge0$ satisfies $\mathbb{E}_\mu[f]=1$, and $u>1$. We establish explicit upper bounds for every $0<a<1$ and prove $\limsup_{a\uparrow1}C_*(a)/\sqrt{\kappa_a}<0.3577$, where $\kappa_a:=(1+a)/(1-a)$. We establish the lower bound $\liminf_{a\uparrow1}C_*(a)/\sqrt{\kappa_a}\ge0.3570$.
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