Paper 2025/181

Improved NTT and CRT-based RNR Blinding for Side-Channel and Fault Resistant Kyber

Max Duparc, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Mounir Taha, Kudelski (Switzerland)
Abstract

In this paper, we build upon the blinding methods introduced in recent years to enhance the protection of lattice-based cryptographic schemes against side-channel and fault injection attacks. Specifically, we propose a cost-efficient blinded Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) that impedes the convergence of Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks (SASCA), even with limited randomness sampling. Additionally, we extend the blinding mechanism based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and Redundant Number Representation (RNR) introduced by Heiz and Pöppelmann by reducing the randomness sampling overhead and accelerating the verification phase. These two blinding mechanisms are nicely compatible with each other's and, when combined, provide enhanced resistance against side-channel attacks, both classical and soft analytical, as well as fault injection attacks, while maintaining high performance and low overhead, making the approach well-suited for practical applications, particularly in resource-constrained IoT environments.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
KyberBlindingNTTRNRSide-Channel AttacksFault Attacks
Contact author(s)
max duparc @ epfl ch
mounir taha @ nagra com
History
2025-02-13: revised
2025-02-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/181
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/181,
      author = {Max Duparc and Mounir Taha},
      title = {Improved {NTT} and {CRT}-based {RNR} Blinding for Side-Channel and Fault Resistant Kyber},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/181},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/181}
}
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