Paper 2026/1999

Revisiting Single-Color Initial Structures in Meet-In-The-Middle Attacks

Shiyao Chen, Shandong University
Jian Guo, Nanyang Technological University
Wenjie Nan, Nanyang Technological University
Danping Shi, Institute of Information Engineering
Tianyu Zhang, Nanyang Technological University
Abstract

The meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack framework is one of the most powerful cryptanalytic techniques with broad influence to preimage, key recovery, and collision attacks. In this paper, we present two generic techniques. First, we observe that the constant space in MITM attacks is an exploitable source of degrees of freedom: its value-independence enables MITM-style partition and acceleration of attack subprocesses. With this intuition in mind, we revisit the single-color initial structure technique by Chen et al. at Asiacrypt 2025, and find an improved algorithm that relaxes the canonical optimization objective in automatic search for MITM attacks. Second, we extend the partial-target-preimage-to-collision conversion by Li, Isobe, and Shibutani at FSE 2012 used in MITM-based collision attacks to the settings of chosen-prefix collision and diamond structure construction. We demonstrate the practical relevance of our techniques by presenting a number of improved results in (pseudo-)preimage, (chosen-prefix) collision, and herding attacks on AES-like constructions over the state-of-the-art.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published by the IACR in ASIACRYPT 2026
Keywords
Meet-in-the-MiddleSingle-Color Initial StructurePreimageChosen-Prefix CollisionDiamond StructureHerding
Contact author(s)
tianyu005 @ e ntu edu sg
History
2026-09-16: revised
2026-09-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1999
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1999,
      author = {Shiyao Chen and Jian Guo and Wenjie Nan and Danping Shi and Tianyu Zhang},
      title = {Revisiting Single-Color Initial Structures in Meet-In-The-Middle Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1999},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1999}
}
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