Paper 2026/2067

Maltese: Succinct Polynomial Commitment from Lattices

Katarina Cheng, University of Washington
Wilson Nguyen, Microsoft Research
Nirvan Tyagi, University of Washington
Abstract

Succinct polynomial commitment schemes are a key building block in succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs). Existing succinct lattice-based polynomial commitment schemes take a "split-and-fold" strategy making use of homomorphism to compress proof size to $O(\text{polylog} N)$ for polynomials of size $N$. Prior works either (1) incur superlogarithmic verifier work (e.g., $O(\sqrt{N})$), (2) incur concretely large proof sizes and verifier work (e.g., hundreds of MB), or (3) rely on non-standard lattice assumptions. We proprose a new succinct polynomial commitment scheme Maltese that operates over a Merkle tree commitment of the lattice-based Ajtai hash function. We employ a folding strategy and propose new sum-check-based reductions for managing norm growth of the tree commitment over folding rounds. Maltese is secure under the standard Module-SIS assumption and produces opening proofs of $335$KB for multilinear polynomials of size $N=2^{30}$; proofs are around $300\times$ smaller than prior work with polylogarithmic verifier complexity but between $2$-$6\times$ larger than prior work with larger verifier complexity or stronger structured assumptions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published by the IACR in ASIACRYPT 2026
Keywords
latticespolynomial commitment schemeSNARKsinteractive reductions
Contact author(s)
katch @ cs washington edu
wilsonnguyen @ microsoft com
nirvan tyagi @ gmail com
History
2026-09-19: approved
2026-09-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2067
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2067,
      author = {Katarina Cheng and Wilson Nguyen and Nirvan Tyagi},
      title = {Maltese: Succinct Polynomial Commitment from Lattices},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2067},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2067}
}
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