Among the various arithmetic operations required in implementing public key cryptographic algorithms, the elliptic curve point multiplication has probably received the maximum attention from the research community in the last decade. Many methods for efficient and secure implementation of point multiplication have been proposed. The efficiency of these methods mainly depends on the representation one uses for the scalar multiplier. In the current work we propose an efficient algorithm based on the so-called double-base number system. We introduce the new concept of double-base chains which, if manipulated with care, can significantly reduce the complexity of scalar multiplication on elliptic curves. Besides we have adopted some other measures to further reduce the operation count. Our algorithm compares favorably against classical and other similar approaches.

The need of software-flexible stream ciphers has led to several alternative proposals in the last few years. One of them is a new Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG), named N-adic Summation-Shrinking (NSumSG), which architecture is described in this paper. It uses N-1 parallel working slave summation generators and one N-adic summation generator, controlling the nonlinearity in the generator. The implementation, some properties and statistical tests of NSumSG are given. The results from statistical analysis show that the sequence generated by NSumSG is uniform, scalable, uncompressible, whit large period; consistent and unpredictable. This gives the reason consider the NSumSG as suitable for a particular cryptographic application.

We announce the construction of a pair of valid X.509 certificates with identical signatures.

In this paper we are interested in efficient and secure constant round multi-party protocols which provide unconditional security against so called honest-but-curious adversaries. In particular, we design a novel constant round protocol that converts from shares over Z_q to shares over the integers working for all shared inputs from Z_q. Furthermore, we present a constant round protocol to securely evaluate a shared input on a public polynomial whose running time is linear in the degree of the polynomial. The proposed solution makes use of Chebyshev Polynomials. We show that the latter two protocols can be used to design efficient constant round protocols for the following natural problems: (i) Equality: Computing shares of the bit indicating if a shared input value equals zero or not. This provides the missing building blocks for many constant round linear algebra protocols from the work of Cramer and Damgaard [CrDa01]. (ii) Comparison: Computing shares of a bit indicating which of two shared inputs is greater. (iii) Bits: Computing shares of the binary representation of a shared input value. (iv) Exponentiation: Computing shares of x^a mod q given shares of x, a and q. Prior to this paper, for all the above mentioned problems, there were in general no efficient constant round protocols known providing unconditional security.

In this paper the benefits of implementation of the Tate pairing computation in dedicated hardware are discussed. The main observation lies in the fact that arithmetic architectures in the extension field $$ are good candidates for parallelization, leading to a similar calculation time in hardware as for operations over the base field $$. Using this approach an architecture for the hardware implementation of the Tate pairing calculation based on a modified Duursma-Lee algorithm is proposed.

A class of efficient key agreement protocols proposed by Boyd is examined. An attack is demonstrated on a round-optimal example protocol of this class, and a simple countermeasure is suggested. The whole class is known to be vulnerable to an attack proposed by Bauer, Berson and Feiertag. A new class of key agreement protocols without this vulnerability but having the same advantages in efficiency is identified, and a number of concrete protocols are suggested.

In this article the author shows that for the block cipher Blowfish, the subkeys for the third and fourth round do not depend on the first 64 bits of the userkey

One fair e-cash system was proposed in [1]. In this paper, we show that the system is insecure. Besides, we point out that there are two drawbacks. One is that those integer intervals for $$ are unappropriate. The other is that the datum $$ in signature data is redundant. Moreover, we give a minute description of the technique to shun the challenge in the scheme. We think the method is a little interesting.

Key derivation refers to the process by which an agreed upon large random number, often named master secret, is used to derive keys to encrypt and authenticate data. Practitioners and standardization bodies have usually used the random oracle model to get key material from a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. However, proofs in the standard model require randomness extractors to formally extract the entropy of the random master secret into a seed prior to derive other keys. This paper first deals with the protocol $$, in which the key derivation phase is (deliberately) omitted, and security inaccuracies in the analysis and design of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE version 1) protocol, corrected in IKEv2. They do not endanger the practical use of IKEv1, since the security could be proved, at least, in the random oracle model. However, in the standard model, there is not yet any formal global security proof, but just separated analyses which do not fit together well. The first simplification is common in the theoretical security analysis of several key exchange protocols, whereas the key derivation phase is a crucial step for theoretical reasons, but also practical purpose, and requires careful analysis. The second problem is a gap between the recent theoretical analysis of HMAC as a good randomness extractor (functions keyed with public but random elements) and its practical use in IKEv1 (the key may not be totally random, because of the lack of clear authentication of the nonces). Since the latter problem comes from the probabilistic property of this extractor, we thereafter review some \textit{deterministic} randomness extractors and suggest the \emph{'Twist-AUgmented'} technique, a new extraction method quite well-suited for Diffie-Hellman-like scenarios.

This paper presents efficient off-line anonymous e-cash schemes where a user can withdraw a wallet containing 2^l coins each of which she can spend unlinkably. Our first result is a scheme, secure under the strong RSA and the y-DDHI assumptions, where the complexity of the withdrawal and spend operations is O(l+k) and the user's wallet can be stored using O(l+k) bits, where k is a security parameter. The best previously known schemes require at least one of these complexities to be O(2^l k). In fact, compared to previous e-cash schemes, our whole wallet of 2^l coins has about the same size as one coin in these schemes. Our scheme also offers exculpability of users, that is, the bank can prove to third parties that a user has double-spent. We then extend our scheme to our second result, the first e-cash scheme that provides traceable coins without a trusted third party. That is, once a user has double spent one of the 2^l coins in her wallet, all her spendings of these coins can be traced. We present two alternate constructions. One construction shares the same complexities with our first result but requires a strong bilinear map assumption that is only conjectured to hold on MNT curves. The second construction works on more general types of elliptic curves, but the price for this is that the complexity of the spending and of the withdrawal protocols becomes O(lk) and O(lk + k^2) bits, respectively, and wallets take O(lk) bits of storage. All our schemes are secure in the random oracle model.

Given a graph $$, a perfect secret sharing scheme based on $$ is a method to distribute a secret data among the vertices of $$, the participants, so that a subset of participants can recover the secret if they contain an edge of $$, otherwise they can obtain no information regarding the secret. The average information rate is the ratio of the size of the secret and the average size of the share a participant must remember. The information rate of $$ is the supremum of the information rates realizable by perfect secret sharing schemes. We construct a graph on $$ vertices with average information rate below $$. We obtain this result by determining, up to a constant factor, the average information rate of the $$/dimensional cube.

We extend the concept of key encapsulation mechanisms to the primitives of ID-based and certificateless encryption. We show that the natural combination of ID-KEMs or CL-KEMs with data encapsulation mechanisms results in encryption schemes which are secure in a strong sense. In addition, we give generic constructions of ID-KEMs and CL-KEMs, as well as specific instantiations, which are provably secure.

We derive some tight equivalence reductions between several Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumptions.

A deniable authentication scheme using RSA is described and proven secure in the random oracle model. A countermeasure to a well-known attack on efficient deniable authentication to multiple recipients is describe and proven secure.

A group signature scheme allows a group member of a given group to sign messages on behalf of the group in an anonymous fashion. In case of a dispute, however, a designated group manager can reveal the signer of a valid group signature. In the paper, we show the untraceability of two group signatures in [1, 5] by new and very simple attacks. Although those flaws, such as, forgeability, untraceability and linkability have been shown in [2, 7, 8, 9], we should point out that our attacks are more simple.

Recently, Xie and Yu proposed a forgery attack on the Tseng et al¡¦s authenticated encryption schemes and showed that their schemes are not secure in two cases: the specified verifier substitutes his secret key, or the signer generates the signature with these schemes for two or more specified verifiers. In addition, Xie and Yu made a small modification for the Tseng et al¡¦s schemes and claimed that the modified schemes can satisfy the security requirement. However, we show that the modified schemes are still insecure.

Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), Quisquater and Couvreur proposed an RSA variant, RSA-CRT, to speedup RSA decryption. According to RSA-CRT, Wiener suggested another RSA variant, Rebalanced RSA-CRT, to further speedup RSA-CRT decryption by shifting decryption cost to encryption cost. However, such an approach will make RSA encryption very time-consuming because the public exponent e in Rebalanced RSA-CRT will be of the same order of magnitude as £p(N). In this paper we study the following problem: does there exist any secure variant of Rebalanced RSA-CRT, whose public exponent e is much shorter than £p(N)? We solve this problem by designing a variant of Rebalanced RSA-CRT with d_{p} and d_{q} of 198 bits. This variant has the public exponent e=2^511+1 such that its encryption is about 3 times faster than that of the original Rebalanced RSA-CRT.

A contactless smartcard is a smartcard that can communicate with other devices without any physical connection, using Radio-Frequency Identifier (RFID) technology. Contactless smartcards are becoming increasingly popular, with applications like credit-cards, national-ID, passports, physical access. The security of such applications is clearly critical. A key feature of RFID-based systems is their very short range: typical systems are designed to operate at a range of ~10cm. In this study we show that contactless smartcard technology is vulnerable to relay attacks: An attacker can trick the reader into communicating with a victim smartcard that is very far away. A ``low-tech'' attacker can build a pick-pocket system that can remotely use a victim contactless smartcard, without the victim's knowledge. The attack system consists of two devices, which we call the ``ghost'' and the ``leech''. We discuss basic designs for the attacker's equipment, and explore their possible operating ranges. We show that the ghost can be up to 50m away from the card reader---3 orders of magnitude higher than the nominal range. We also show that the leech can be up to 50cm away from the the victim card. The main characteristics of the attack are: orthogonality to any security protocol, unlimited distance between the attacker and the victim, and low cost of the attack system.

It's well known that Shor[1] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for prime factorization by using quantum computers. For a given number $$, he gave an algorithm for finding the order $$ of an element $$ (mod $$) instead of giving an algorithm for factoring $$ directly. The indirect algorithm is feasible because factorization can be reduced to finding the order of an element by using randomization[2]. But a point should be stressed that the order of the number must be even. Actually, the restriction can be removed in a particular case. In this paper, we show that factoring RSA modulus (a product of two primes) only needs to find the order of $$, whether it is even or not.

In this document, we provide an exposition of David Chaum's voter verification method that uses encrypted paper receipts. This document provides simply an exposition of the protocol, and does not address any of the proofs covered in Chaum's papers.

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems aim to identify objects in open environments with neither physical nor visual contact. They consist of transponders inserted into objects, of readers, and usually of a database which contains information about the objects. The key point is that authorised readers must be able to identify tags without an adversary being able to trace them. Traceability is often underestimated by advocates of the technology and sometimes exaggerated by its detractors. Whatever the true picture, this problem is a reality when it blocks the deployment of this technology and some companies, faced with being boycotted, have already abandoned its use. Using cryptographic primitives to thwart the traceability issues is an approach which has been explored for several years. However, the research carried out up to now has not provided satisfactory results as no universal formalism has been defined. In this paper, we propose an adversarial model suitable for RFID environments. We define the notions of existential and universal untraceability and we model the access to the communication channels from a set of oracles. We show that our formalisation fits the problem being considered and allows a formal analysis of the protocols in terms of traceability. We use our model on several well-known RFID protocols and we show that most of them have weaknesses and are vulnerable to traceability.

Two identification schemes based on the Maurer-Yacobi ID-based cryptosystem are analysed and shown to suffer from serious security problems.

In this paper we analyse an anonymous wireless authentication and conference key distribution scheme which is also designed to provide mobile participants with user identification privacy during the conference call. The proposed scheme consists of three sub-protocols: the Call Set-Up Authentication Protocol, the Hand-Off Authentication Protocol, and the Anonymous Conference Call Protocol. We show that the proposed scheme suffers from a number of security vulnerabilities.

Deniable Authentication protocols allow a Sender to authenticate a message for a Receiver, in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third party that such authentication (or any authentication) ever took place. We present two new approaches to the problem of deniable authentication. The novelty of our schemes is that they do not require the use of CCA-secure encryption (all previous known solutions did), thus showing a different generic approach to the problem of deniable authentication. These new approaches are practically relevant as they lead to more efficient protocols. In the process we point out a subtle definitional issue for deniability. In particular we propose the notion of "forward deniability", which requires that the authentications remain deniable even if the Sender wants to later prove that she authenticated a message. We show that a simulation-based definition of deniability, where the simulation can be computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol does not imply forward deniability. Thus for deniability one needs to restrict the simulation to be perfect (or statistically close). Our new protocols satisfy this stricter requirement.

We present, for the first time, an algorithm to choose parameter sets for NTRUEncrypt that give a desired level of security. Note: This is an expanded version of a paper presented at CT-RSA 2005.

We consider cubic boolean bent functions, each cubic monomial of which contains the same variable. We investigate canonical forms of these functions under affine transformations of variables. In particular, we refine the affine classification of cubic bent functions of 8 variables.

We proposed a two-round protocol for solving the Millionaires' Problem in the setting of semi-honest parties. Our protocol uses either multiplicative or additive homomorphic encryptions. Previously proposed protocols used additive or XOR homomorphic encryption schemes only. The computation and communication costs of our protocol are in the same asymptotic order as those of the other efficient protocols. Nevertheless, since multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme is more efficient than an additive one practically, our construction saves computation time and communication bandwidth in practicality.

We are using the group-theory methods for justification of algebraic method in cryptanalysis. The obtained results are using for investigation of Boolean functions cryptographic properties.

A group signature scheme allows a group member of a given group to sign messages on behalf of the group in an anonymous and unlinkable fashion. In case of a dispute, however, a designated group manager can reveal the signer of a valid group signature. Many applications of group signatures require that the group manager can be split into a membership manager and a revocation manager. Such a group signature scheme with strong separability was proposed in paper [1]. Unfortunately, the scheme is insecure which has been shown in [2][3][4]. In this paper we show that the scheme is untraceable by a simple and direct attack. Besides, we show its universal forgeability by a general attack which only needs to choose five random numbers. We minutely explain the technique to shun the challenge in the scheme.

Recently, Nenadić \emph{et al.} (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others. In this paper, we demonstrate how this protocol cannot achieve fairness by presenting a severe attack and also pointing out some other weaknesses.

This paper presents a new type of distinguisher for the shrinking generator and the alternating-step generator with known feedback polynomial and for the multiplexor generator. For the former the distinguisher is more efficient than existing ones and for the latter it results in a complete breakdown of security. The distinguisher is conceptually very simple and lends itself to theoretical analysis leading to reliable predictions of its probability of success.

In 2003, Tseng et al. proposed a self-certified public key signature with message recovery, which gives two advantages: one is that the signer¡¦s public key can simultaneously be authenticated in verifying the signature and the other one is that only the specified verifier can recover the message. Lately, Xie and YU proposed an attack to the Tseng et al.¡¦s scheme under the cases: the specified verifier substitutes his secret key or two or more specified verifiers cooperatively forge the signer¡¦s signature. About the same time, Shao also proposed another insider forgery attack to break the Tseng et al.¡¦s scheme. In addition, he claimed the Tseng et al.¡¦s scheme without the properties of non-repudiation and forward security. Therefore, he proposed an improved scheme to overcome the weakness. In this paper, we will show that the Shao¡¦s improved scheme is still insecure against the insider forgery attack. A specified verifier can forge many different valid signatures with the same message to the other verifiers who cooperatively provide their secret keys. Furthermore, we give a small modification to overcome this weakness.

Much of today's distributed computing takes place in a client/server model. Despite advances in fault tolerance -- in particular, replication and load distribution -- server overload remains to be a major problem. In the Web context, one of the main overload factors is the direct consequence of expensive Public Key operations performed by servers as part of each SSL handshake. Since most SSL-enabled servers use RSA, the burden of performing many costly decryption operations can be very detrimental to server performance. This paper examines a promising technique for re-balancing RSA-based client/server handshakes. This technique facilitates more favorable load distribution by requiring clients to perform more work (as part of encryption) and servers to perform commensurately less work, thus resulting in better SSL throughput. Proposed techniques are based on careful adaptation of variants of Server-Aided RSA originally constructed by Matsumoto, et al. Experimental results demonstrate that suggested methods (termed Client-Aided RSA) can speed up processing by a factor of between 11 to 19, depending on the RSA key size. This represents a considerable improvement. Furthermore, proposed techniques can be a useful companion tool for SSL Client Puzzles in defense against DoS and DDoS attacks.

In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to securely compute some joint function of their inputs. In the stand-alone case, it has been shown that {\em every} efficient function can be securely computed. However, in the setting of concurrent composition, broad impossibility results have been proven for the case of no honest majority and no trusted setup phase. These results hold both for the case of general composition (where a secure protocol is run many times concurrently with arbitrary other protocols) and self composition (where a single secure protocol is run many times concurrently). In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of obtaining security in the concurrent setting, assuming that each party has a local clock and that these clocks proceed at approximately the same rate. We show that under this mild timing assumption, it is possible to securely compute {\em any} multiparty functionality under concurrent \emph{self} composition. We also show that it is possible to securely compute {\em any} multiparty functionality under concurrent {\em general} composition, as long as the secure protocol is run only with protocols whose messages are delayed by a specified amount of time. On the negative side, we show that it is impossible to achieve security under concurrent general composition with no restrictions whatsoever on the network (like the aforementioned delays), even in the timing model.

At Eurocrypt'03, Goh and Jarecki showed that, contrary to other signature schemes in the discrete-log setting, the EDL signature scheme has a tight security reduction, namely to the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, in the Random Oracle (RO) model. They also remarked that EDL can be turned into an off-line/on-line signature scheme using the technique of Shamir and Tauman, based on chameleon hash functions. In this paper, we propose a new signature scheme that also has a tight security reduction to CDH but whose resulting signatures are smaller than EDL signatures. Further, similarly to the Schnorr signature scheme (but contrary to EDL), our signature is naturally efficient on-line: no additional trick is needed for the off-line phase and the verification process is unchanged. For example, in elliptic curve groups, our scheme results in a 25% improvement on the state-of-the-art discrete-log based schemes, with the same security level. This represents to date the most efficient scheme of any signature scheme with a tight security reduction in the discrete-log setting.

In the society increasingly concerned with the erosion of privacy, privacy-preserving techniques are becoming very important. This motivates research in cryptographic techniques offering built-in privacy. A secret handshake is a protocol whereby participants establish a secure, anonymous and unobservable communication channel only if they are members of the same group. This type of ``private" authentication is a valuable tool in the arsenal of privacy-preserving cryptographic techniques. Prior research focused on 2-party secret handshakes with one-time credentials. This paper breaks new ground on two accounts: (1) it shows how to obtain secure and efficient secret handshakes with reusable credentials, and (2) it represents the first treatment of group (or {\em multi-party}) secret handshakes, thus providing a natural extension to the secret handshake technology. An interesting new issue encountered in multi-party secret handshakes is the need to ensure that all parties are indeed distinct. (This is a real challenge since the parties cannot expose their identities.) We tackle this and other challenging issues in constructing GCD -- a flexible framework for secret handshakes. The proposed framework lends itself to many practical instantiations and offers several novel and appealing features such as self-distinction and strong anonymity with reusable credentials. In addition to describing the motivation and step-by-step construction of the framework, this paper provides a thorough security analysis and illustrates two concrete framework instantiations.

This paper describes an adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack on the Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode of encryption as used in OpenPGP. In most circumstances it will allow an attacker to determine 16 bits of any block of plaintext with about $$ oracle queries for the initial setup work and $$ oracle queries for each block. Standard CFB mode encryption does not appear to be affected by this attack. It applies to a particular variation of CFB used by OpenPGP. In particular it exploits an ad-hoc integrity check feature in OpenPGP which was meant as a "quick check" to determine the correctness of the decrypting symmetric key.

We investigate the definition of statistical security (i.e., security against unbounded adversaries) in the framework of reactive simulatability. This framework allows to formulate and analyze multi-party protocols modularly by providing a composition theorem for protocols. However, we show that the notion of statistical security, as defined by Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner for the reactive simulatability framework, does not allow for secure composition of protocols. This in particular invalidates the proof of the composition theorem. We give evidence that the reason for the non-composability of statistical security is no artifact of the framework itself, but of the particular formulation of statistical security. Therefore, we give a modified notion of statistical security in the reactive simulatability framework. We prove that this notion allows for secure composition of protocols. As to the best of our knowledge, no formal definition of statistical security has been fixed for Canetti's universal composability framework, we believe that our observations and results can also help to avoid potential pitfalls there.

The group of m-torsion points on an elliptic curve, for a prime number m, forms a two-dimensional vector space. It was suggested and proven by Yoshida that under certain conditions the vector decomposition problem (VDP) on a two-dimensional vector space is at least as hard as the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) on a one-dimensional subspace. In this work we show that even though this assessment is true, it applies to the VDP for m-torsion points on an elliptic curve only if the curve is supersingular. But in that case the CDHP on the one-dimensional subspace has a known sub-exponential solution. Furthermore, we present a family of hyperelliptic curves of genus two that are suitable for the VDP.

This paper develops a cryptanalysis of the pairing based Diffie Hellman (DH) key exchange schemes which have found important applications as in the tripartite exchange scheme proposed in \cite{joux}. The analysis of \emph{weak keys} of the standard DH scheme proposed in \cite{kas1} is applied to show existence of weak sessions for tripartite schemes over super-singular curves. It is shown that for such sessions the associated Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDHP) is solvable in polynomial time, without computing the private keys i.e. without solving the discrete logarithms. Similar applications of the analysis to Decisional Diffie Hellman Problem (DDHP)and the Identity Based DH scheme (IBS) are also developed. The tripartite key exchange scheme is analyzed in detail and it is shown that the number of weak keys increases in this scheme as compared to the standard two party DH scheme. It is shown that the random choice of private keys by the users independent of each other's knowledge is insecure in these schemes. Algorithms are suggested for checking weakness of private keys based on an order of selection. A modified tripartite key exchange scheme is presented in which detection of weak keys is incorporated.

We present a formal model and a simple architecture for robust pseudorandom generation that ensures resilience in the face of an observer with partial knowledge/control of the generator's entropy source. Our model and architecture have the following properties: 1 Resilience: The generator's output looks random to an observer with no knowledge of the internal state. This holds even if that observer has complete control over data that is used to refresh the internal state. 2 Forward security: Past output of the generator looks random to an observer, even if the observer learns the internal state at a later time. 3 Backward security/Break-in recovery: Future output of the generator looks random, even to an observer with knowledge of the current state, provided that the generator is refreshed with data of sufficient entropy. Architectures such as above were suggested before. This work differs from previous attempts in that we present a formal model for robust pseudo-random generation, and provide a formal proof within this model for the security of our architecture. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at a rigorous model for this problem. Our formal modeling advocates the separation of the *entropy extraction* phase from the *output generation* phase. We argue that the former is information-theoretic in nature, and could therefore rely on combinatorial and statistical tools rather than on cryptography. On the other hand, we show that the latter can be implemented using any standard (non-robust) cryptographic PRG. We also discuss the applicability of our architecture for applications such as /dev/(u)random in Linux and pseudorandom generation on smartcards.

In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss (BBS) proposed an application called atomic proxy re-encryption, in which a semi-trusted proxy converts a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob without seeing the underlying plaintext. We predict that fast and secure re-encryption will become increasingly popular as a method for managing encrypted file systems. Although efficiently computable, the wide-spread adoption of BBS re-encryption has been hindered by considerable security risks. Following recent work of Ivan and Dodis, we present new re-encryption schemes that realize a stronger notion of security and we demonstrate the usefulness of proxy re-encryption as a method of adding access control to the SFS read-only file system. Performance measurements of our experimental file system demonstrate that proxy re-encryption can work effectively in practice.

This paper presents a novel framework for the generic construction of hybrid encryption schemes which produces more efficient schemes than the ones known before. A previous framework introduced by Shoup combines a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and a data encryption mechanism (DEM). While it is sufficient to require both components to be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA-secure), Kurosawa and Desmedt showed a particular example of KEM that is not CCA-secure but can be securely combined with a specific type of CCA-secure DEM to obtain a more efficient, CCA-secure hybrid encryption scheme. There are also many other efficient hybrid encryption schemes in the literature that do not fit Shoup's framework. These facts serve as motivation to seek another framework. The framework we propose yields more efficient hybrid scheme, and in addition provides insightful explanation about existing schemes that do not fit into the previous framework. Moreover, it allows immediate conversion from a class of threshold public-key encryption to a hybrid one without considerable overhead, which may not be possible in the previous approach.

A new technique for Boolean random masking of the logic AND operation in terms of NAND logic gates is presented and its potential for masking arbitrary cryptographic functions is pointed out. The new technique is much more efficient than a previously known technique, recently applied to AES. It is also applied for masking the integer addition. In addition, new techniques for the conversions from Boolean to arithmetic random masking and vice versa are developed. They are hardware oriented and do not require additional random bits. Unlike the previous, software-oriented techniques showing a substantial difference in the complexity of the two conversions, they have a comparable complexity being about the same as that of one integer addition only. All the techniques proposed are in theory secure against the first-order differential power analysis on the logic gate level. They can be applied in hardware implementations of various cryptographic functions, including AES, (keyed) SHA-1, IDEA, and RC6.

By walsh transform, autocorrelation function, decomposition, derivation and modification of truth table, some new invariants are obtained. Based on invariant theory, we get two results: first a general algorithm which can be used to judge if two boolean functions are affinely equivalent and to obtain the affine equivalence relationship if they are equivalent. For example, all 8-variable homogenous bent functions of degree 3 are classified into 2 classes; second, the classification of the Reed-Muller code $$ which can be used to almost enumeration of 8-variable bent functions.

This paper investigates the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme over the group $$ of nonzero elements of finite fields and shows that there exist exponents $$, $$ satisfying certain conditions called the \emph{modulus conditions}, for which the Diffie Hellman Problem (DHP) can be solved in polynomial number of operations in $$ without solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). These special private keys of the scheme are termed \emph{weak} and depend also on the generator $$ of the cyclic group. More generally the triples $$ with generator $$ and one of private keys $$ weak, are called \emph{weak triples}. A sample of weak keys is computed and it is observed that their number may not be insignificant to be ignored in general. Next, an extension of the analysis and weak triples is carried out for the Diffie Hellman scheme over the matrix group $$ and it is shown that for an analogous class of session triples, the DHP can be solved without solving the DLP in polynomial number of operations in the matrix size $$. A revised Diffie Hellman assumption is stated, taking into account the above exceptions.

In this paper, we present a new class of public-key cryptosystem (PKC) using algebraic coding on the basis of superimposition and randomness. The proposed PKC is featured by a generator matrix, in a characteristic form, where the generator matrix of an algebraic code is repeatedly used along with the generator matrix of a random code, as sub-matrices. This generator matrix, in the characteristic form, will be referred to as $$-matrix. We show that the $$-matrix yields the following advantages compared with the conventional schemes: \begin{description} \item [(i)] It realizes an abundant supply of PKCs, yielding more secure PKCs. \item [(i\hspace{-.1em}i)] It realizes a fast encryption and decryption process. \end{description}

Recently new types of differential power analysis attacks (DPA) against elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) and RSA systems have been introduced. Most existing countermeasures against classical DPA attacks are vulnerable to these new DPA attacks which include refined power analysis attacks (RPA), zero-value point attacks (ZPA), and doubling attacks. The new attacks are different from classical DPA in that RPA uses a special point with a zero-value coordinate, while ZPA uses auxiliary registers to locate a zero value. So, Mamiya et al proposed a new countermeasure against RPA, ZPA, classical DPA and SPA attacks using a basic random initial point. His countermeasure works well when applied to ECC, but it has some disadvantages when applied to general exponentiation algorithms (such as RSA and ElGamal) due to an inverse computation. This paper presents an efficient and improved countermeasure against the above new DPA attacks by using a random blinding concept on the message different from Mamiya's countermeasure and show that our proposed countermeasure is secure against SPA based Yen's power analysis which can break Coron's simple SPA countermeasure as well as Mamiya's one. The computational cost of the proposed scheme is very low when compared to the previous methods which rely on Coron's simple SPA countermeasure. Moreover this scheme is a generalized countermeasure which can be applied to ECC as well as RSA system.

This paper explores the idea of partially exposing sections of the private key in public-key cryptosystems whose security is based on the intractability of factorising large integers. It is proposed to allow significant portions of the private key to be publicly available, reducing the amount of data which must be securely hidden. The ``secret'' data could be XORed with an individual's biometric reading in order to maintain a high level of security, and we suggest using iris templates for this purpose. Finally, we propose an implementation of this system for RSA, and consider the potential risks and advantages associated with such a scheme.

The main result of this paper is that the Dolev-Yao model is a safe abstraction of the computational model for security protocols including those that combine asymmetric and symmetric encryption, signature and hashing. Moreover, message forwarding and private key transmission are allowed. To our knowledge this is the first result that deals with hash functions and the combination of these cryptographic primitives. A key step towards this result is a general definition of correction of cryptographic primitives, that unifies well known correctness criteria such as IND-CPA, IND-CCA, unforgeability etc.... and a theorem that allows to reduce the correctness of a composition of two cryptographic schemes to the correctness of each one.

We prove that security in the Universal Composability framework (UC) is equivalent to security in the probabilistic polynomial time calculus ppc. Security is defined under active and adaptive adversaries with synchronous and authenticated communication. In detail, we define an encoding from machines in UC to processes in ppc and show it is fully abstract with respect to UC-security and ppc-security, i.e., we show a protocol is UC-secure iff its encoding is ppc-secure. However, we restrict security in ppc to be quantified not over all possible contexts, but over those induced by UC-environments under encoding. This result is not overly-simplifying security in ppc, since the threat and communication models we assume are meaningful in both practice and theory.

We describe two new public key broadcast encryption systems for stateless receivers. Both systems are fully secure against any number of colluders. In our first construction both ciphertexts and private keys are of constant size (only two group elements), for any subset of receivers. The public key size in this system is linear in the total number of receivers. Our second system is a generalization of the first that provides a tradeoff between ciphertext size and public key size. For example, we achieve a collusion resistant broadcast system for n users where both ciphertexts and public keys are of size O(sqrt(n)) for any subset of receivers. We discuss several applications of these systems.

The present survey deals with the recent research in side channel analysis and related attacks on implementations of cryptographic primitives. The focus is on software contermeasures for primitives built around algebraic groups. Many countermeasures are described, together with their extent of applicability, and their weaknesses. Some suggestions are made, conclusion are drawn, some directions for future research are given. An extensive bibliography on recent developments concludes the survey.

T-functions were introduced by Klimov and Shamir in a series of papers during the last few years. They are of great interest for cryptography as they may provide some new building blocks which can be used to construct efficient and secure schemes, for example block ciphers, stream ciphers or hash functions. In the present paper, we define the narrowness of a T-function and study how this property affects the strength of a T-function as a cryptographic primitive. We define a new data strucure, called a solution graph, that enables solving systems of equations given by T-functions. The efficiency of the algorithms which we propose for solution graphs depends significantly on the narrowness of the involved T-functions. Thus the subclass of T-functions with small narrowness appears to be weak and should be avoided in cryptographic schemes. Furthermore, we present some extensions to the methods of using solution graphs, which make it possible to apply these algorithms also to more general systems of equations, which may appear, for example, in the cryptanalysis of hash functions.

We present a Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) system where the ciphertext consists of just three group elements and decryption requires only two bilinear map computations, independent of the hierarchy depth. Encryption is as efficient as in other HIBE systems. We prove that the scheme is selective-ID secure in the standard model and fully secure in the random oracle model. Our system has a number of applications: it gives very efficient forward secure public key and identity based cryptosystems (where ciph ertexts are short), it converts the NNL broadcast encryption system into an efficient public key broadcast system, and it provides an efficient mechanism for encrypting to the future. The system also supports limited delegation where users can be given restricted private keys that only allow delegation to certain descendants. Sublinear size private keys can also be achieved at the expense of some ciphertext expansion.

In this paper, we present a chosen ciphertext attack against a public key cryptosysten based on Lyndon words \cite{sm}. We show that, provided that an adversary has access to a decryption oracle, a key equivalent to the secret key can be constructed efficiently, i.e. in linear time.

Recently, Cheng et al. proposed two tripartite key agreement protocols from pairings: one is certificate-based and the other is identity-based (ID-based). In this article, we show that the two schemes are vulnerable to the insider impersonation attack and the ID-based scheme even discloses the entities¡¦ private keys. Solutions to this problem are discussed.

In [3] Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the notion of "Certificateless Public Key Cryptography" and presented an instantiation. In this paper, we revisit the formulation of certificateless public key encryption and construct a more efficient scheme and then extend it to an authenticated encryption.

Hash chains are widely used in various cryptographic systems such as electronic micropayments and one-time passwords etc. However, hash chains suffer from the limitation that they have a finite number of links which when used up requires the system to re-initialize new hash chains. So system design has to reduce the overhead when hash chains are re-initialized. Recently, Vipul Goyal proposed an elegant one-time-signature-based method to re-initialize hash chains, in this efficient method an infinite number of finite length hash chains can be tied together so that hash chains can be securely re-initialized in a non-repudiable manner. Vipul Goyal¡¯s method is improved in this paper to reach a little more efficient method, which, more importantly, is a natural extension of the concept of conventional hash chains.

We report on the experiments we performed in order to assess the security of SHA-1 against the attack by Chabaud and Joux. We present some ideas for optimizations of the attack and some properties of the message expansion routine. Finally, we show that for a reduced version of SHA-1, with 53 rounds instead of 80, it is possible to find collisions in less than $$ operations.

The purpose of this note is to show that Markov chains induced by non-singular triangular feedback shift registers and non-degenerate sources are rapidly mixing. The results may directly be applied to the post-processing of random generators and to stream ciphers in CFB mode.

In IEEE INFOCOM 2004, Chan proposed a distributed key management scheme for mobile ad hoc networks, and deduced the condition under which the key sets distributed to the network nodes can form a cover-free family (CFF), which is the precondition that the scheme can work. In this paper, we indicate that the condition is falsely deduced. Furthermore, we discuss whether CFF is capable for key distributions in ad hoc networks.

In this report, we point out a serious security flaw in Microsoft Word and Excel. The stream cipher RC4 with key length up to 128 bits is used in Microsoft Word and Excel to protect the documents. But when an encrypted document gets modified and saved, the initialization vector remains the same and thus the same keystream generated from RC4 is applied to encrypt the different versions of that document. The consequence is disastrous since a lot of information of the document could be recovered easily.

Elliptic Curves over finite field have found application in many areas including cryptography. In the current article we define a metric on the set of elliptic curves defined over a prime field $$.

The notion of key privacy for encryption schemes was defined formally by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai and Pointcheval in Asiacrypt 2001. This notion seems useful in settings where anonymity is important. In this short note we describe a (very simple) sufficient condition for key privacy. In a nutshell, a scheme that provides data privacy is guaranteed to provide also key privacy if the distribution of a *random encryption of a random message* is independent of the public key that is used for the encryption.

In~\cite{AV96}, W. Aiello and R. Venkatesan have shown how to construct pseudo-random functions of $$ bits $$ bits from pseudo-random functions of $$ bits $$ bits. They claimed that their construction, called ``Benes'', reaches the optimal bound ($$) of security against adversaries with unlimited computing power but limited by $$ queries in an adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA-2). However a complete proof of this result is not given in~\cite{AV96} since one of the assertions of~\cite{AV96} is wrong. Due to this, the proof given in~\cite{AV96} is valid for most attacks, but not for all the possible chosen plaintext attacks. In this paper we will in a way fix this problem since for all $$, we will prove CPA-2 security when $$. However we will also see that the probability to distinguish Benes functions from random functions is sometime larger than the term in $$ given in~\cite{AV96}. One of the key idea in our proof will be to notice that, when $$ and $$, for large number of variables linked with some critical equalities, the average number of solutions may be large (i.e. $$) while, at the same time, the probability to have at least one such critical equalities is negligible (i.e. $$). \textbf{Key Words}: Pseudo-random functions, unconditional security, information-theoretic primitive, design of keyed hash functions.

In this paper, we show several known-plaintext attacks on the stream cipher HBB which was proposed recently at INDOCRYPT 2003. The cipher can operate either as a classical stream cipher (in the B mode) or as an asynchronous stream cipher (in the SS mode). In the case of the SS mode, we present known-plaintext attacks recovering 128-bit key with the complexity 2^66 and 256-bit key with the complexity 2^67. In the case of B mode with 256-bit key, we show a known-plaintext attack recovering the whole plaintext with the complexity 2^140. All attacks need only a small part of the plaintext to be known.

Logcrypt provides strong cryptographic assurances that data stored by a logging facility before a system compromise cannot be modified after the compromise without detection. We build on prior work by showing how log creation can be separated from log verification, and describing several additional performance and convenience features not previously considered.

We study the problem of obfuscation in the context of point functions (also known as delta functions). A point function is a Boolean function that assumes the value 1 at exactly one point. Our main results are as follows: - We provide a simple construction of efficient obfuscators for point functions for a slightly relaxed notion of obfuscation - wherein the size of the simulator has an inverse polynomial dependency on the distinguishing probability - which is nonetheless impossible for general circuits. This is the first known construction of obfuscators for a non-trivial family of functions under general computational assumptions. Our obfuscator is based on a probabilistic hash function constructed from a very strong one-way permutation, and does not require any set-up assumptions. Our construction also yields an obfuscator for point functions with multi-bit output. - We show that such a strong one-way permutation - wherein any polynomial-sized circuit inverts the permutation on at most a polynomial number of inputs - can be realized using a random permutation oracle. We prove the result by improving on the counting argument used in [GT00]; this result may be of independent interest. It follows that our construction yields obfuscators for point functions in the non-programmable random permutation oracle model (in the sense of [N02]). Furthermore, we prove that an assumption like the one we used is necessary for our obfuscator construction. - Finally, we establish two impossibility results on obfuscating point functions which indicate that the limitations on our construction (in simulating only adversaries with single-bit output and in using non-uniform advice in our simulator) are in some sense inherent. The first of the two results is a consequence of a simple characterization of functions that can be obfuscated against general adversaries with multi-bit output as the class of functions that are efficiently and exactly learnable using membership queries. We stress that prior to this work, what is known about obfuscation are negative results for the general class of circuits [BGI01] and positive results in the random oracle model [LPS04] or under non-standard number-theoretic assumptions [C97]. This work represents the first effort to bridge the gap between the two for a natural class of functionalities.