Paper 2025/286

Verifiable Computation for Approximate Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

Abstract

We address the problem of proving the validity of computation on ciphertexts of homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes, a feature that enables outsourcing of data and computation while ensuring both data privacy and integrity. We propose a new solution that handles computations in RingLWE-based schemes, particularly the CKKS scheme for approximate arithmetic. Our approach efficiently handles ciphertext arithmetic in the polynomial ring $R_q$ without emulation overhead and manages ciphertexts maintenance operations, such as modulus switching, key switching, and rescaling, with small cost. Our main result is a succinct argument that efficiently handles arithmetic computations and range checks over the ring $R_q$. To build this argument system, we construct new polynomial interactive oracle proofs (PIOPs) and multilinear polynomial commitments supporting polynomials over $R_q$, unlike prior work which focused on finite fields. We validate the concrete complexity of our approach through implementation and experimentation. Compared to the current state-of-the-art on verifiable HE for RNS schemes, we present similar performance for small circuits while being able to efficiently scale to larger ones, which was a major challenge for previous constructions as it requires verifying procedures such as relinearization.

Note: Fixed a flaw in the proof of Theorem 4.8. Minor editorial improvements.