Paper 2024/964
Malicious Security for PIR (almost) for Free
Abstract
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) enables a client to retrieve a database element from a semi-honest server while hiding the element being queried from the server. Maliciously-secure PIR (mPIR) [Colombo et al., USENIX Security '23] strengthens the guarantees of plain (i.e., semi-honest) PIR by ensuring that even a misbehaving server (a) cannot compromise client privacy via selective-failure attacks, and (b) must answer every query *consistently* (i.e., with respect to the same database). These additional security properties are crucial for many real-world applications.
In this work we present a generic compiler that transforms any PIR scheme into an mPIR scheme in a black-box manner, minimal overhead, and without requiring additional cryptographic assumptions. Since mPIR trivially implies PIR, our compiler establishes the equivalence of mPIR and PIR. By instantiating our compiler with existing PIR schemes, we immediately obtain mPIR schemes with
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Private Information RetrievalPIRLocally Decodable CodesLDCsMalicious Security
- Contact author(s)
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fbrett @ cis upenn edu
prat @ upenn edu
matan shtepel @ gmail com - History
- 2024-06-18: last of 3 revisions
- 2024-06-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/964
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/964, author = {Brett Falk and Pratyush Mishra and Matan Shtepel}, title = {Malicious Security for {PIR} (almost) for Free}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/964}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/964} }