Paper 2024/879

Consistency-or-Die: Consistency for Key Transparency

Joakim Brorsson, Hyker
Elena Pagnin, Chalmers University of Technology, University of Gothenburg
Bernardo David, IT University of Copenhagen
Paul Stankovski Wagner, Lund University
Abstract

In this paper we point out the problem of insufficient tools for protecting against split-view attacks in Key Transparency protocols, and propose a solution to fill the void. We discuss why current approaches are not suitable and then propose a novel notion, GOD-less broadcast, that solves the issue. Like conventional notions of broadcast, GOD-less broadcast guarantees consistency. However, it does not provide Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD). We provide an efficient realization of this new notion using a hidden committee of randomly selected and initially undisclosed users which endorse the current view. We also introduce and analyze a new concept of a quorum which ensures consistency among all honest active users. Our GOD-less broadcast protocol is practical and applicable to existing large scale Key Transparency systems, e.g. the Key Transparency used in WhatsApp.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Key TransparencyConsistencyTransparency LogsBroadcast
Contact author(s)
joakim @ hyker io
elenap @ chalmers se
bernardo @ bmdavid com
paul stankovski_wagner @ eit lth se
History
2024-06-05: approved
2024-06-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/879
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/879,
      author = {Joakim Brorsson and Elena Pagnin and Bernardo David and Paul Stankovski Wagner},
      title = {Consistency-or-Die: Consistency for Key Transparency},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/879},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/879}
}
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