Paper 2024/873
Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions
, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg, Yale University, New Haven, USA, Ethereum Foundation, Bonn, Germany, INRIA, Paris, France, INRIA, Paris, FranceAbstract
Verifiable Delay Functions (VDF) are a class of cryptographic primitives aiming to guarantee a minimum computation time, even for an adversary with massive parallel computational power. They are useful in blockchain protocols, and several practical candidates have been proposed based on exponentiation in a large finite field: Sloth++, Veedo, MinRoot. The underlying assumption of these constructions is that computing an exponentiation $x^e$ requires at least $\log_2 e$ sequential multiplications. In this work, we analyze the security of these algebraic VDF candidates. In particular, we show that the latency of exponentiation can be reduced using parallel computation, against the preliminary assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2024
- Keywords
- Verifiable Delay FunctionsMinRootVeedoSloth++cryptanalysissmoothness
- Contact author(s)
-
gottfried herold @ ethereum org
gaetan leurent @ inria fr
maria naya_plasencia @ inria fr - History
- 2024-06-05: approved
- 2024-06-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/873
- License
-
CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/873,
author = {Alex Biryukov and Ben Fisch and Gottfried Herold and Dmitry Khovratovich and Gaëtan Leurent and María Naya-Plasencia and Benjamin Wesolowski},
title = {Cryptanalysis of Algebraic Verifiable Delay Functions},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/873},
year = {2024},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/873}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/873}
}
