Paper 2024/833

INDIANA - Verifying (Random) Probing Security through Indistinguishability Analysis

Christof Beierle, Ruhr University Bochum
Jakob Feldtkeller, Ruhr University Bochum
Anna Guinet, Ruhr University Bochum
Tim Güneysu, Ruhr University Bochum, German Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence
Gregor Leander, Ruhr University Bochum
Jan Richter-Brockmann, Ruhr University Bochum
Pascal Sasdrich, Ruhr University Bochum

Despite masking being a prevalent protection against passive side-channel attacks, implementing it securely in hardware remains a manual, challenging, and error-prone process. This paper introduces INDIANA, a comprehensive security verification tool for hardware masking. It provides a hardware verification framework, enabling a complete analysis of simulation-based security in the glitch-extended probing model, with cycle-accurate estimations for leakage probabilities in the random probing model. Notably, INDIANA is the first framework to analyze arbitrary masked circuits in both models, even at the scale of full SPN cipher rounds (e.g., AES), while delivering exact verification results. To attain precise and extensive verifiability, we introduce a partitionable probing distinguisher that enables rapid verification of probe tuples, outperforming state-of-the-art methods based on statistical independence. Most interestingly, our approach inherently facilitates extensions to the random probing model by leveraging Fast Fourier-Hadamard Transformations (FFTs). Benchmark results show that INDIANA competes effectively with leading probing model verification tools, such as maskVerif and VERICA. Notably, INDIANA the first tool that is capable to provide cycle-accurate estimations of random probing leakage probabilities for large-scale masked circuits.

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Publication info
INDIANASide-Channel AnalysisProbing SecurityRandom Probing SecuritySecurity Verification
Contact author(s)
christof beierle @ rub de
jakob feldtkeller @ rub de
anna guinet @ rub de
tim gueneysu @ rub de
gregor leander @ rub de
jan richter-brockmann @ rub de
pascal sasdrich @ rub de
2024-05-31: approved
2024-05-28: received
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial


      author = {Christof Beierle and Jakob Feldtkeller and Anna Guinet and Tim Güneysu and Gregor Leander and Jan Richter-Brockmann and Pascal Sasdrich},
      title = {{INDIANA} - Verifying (Random) Probing Security through Indistinguishability Analysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/833},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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