Paper 2024/512
Single Trace is All It Takes: Efficient Side-channel Attack on Dilithium
Abstract
As we enter 2024, the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm Dilithium, which emerged from the National Institute of Standards and Technology post-quantum cryptography competition, has now reached the deployment stage. This paper focuses on the practical security of Dilithium. We performed practical attacks on Dilithium2 on an STM32F4 platform. Our results indicate that an attack can be executed with just two signatures within five minutes, with a single signature offering a 60% probability of recovering the private key within one hour. Specifically, we analyze the polynomial addition
Note: We will continue to revise the paper.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- DilithiumLattice-based CryptographyCNNSide-channel Attacks
- Contact author(s)
-
qiaozehua @ iie ac cn
liuyuejun @ njust edu cn - History
- 2024-04-14: last of 2 revisions
- 2024-04-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/512
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/512, author = {Zehua Qiao and Yuejun Liu and Yongbin Zhou and Yuhan Zhao and Shuyi Chen}, title = {Single Trace is All It Takes: Efficient Side-channel Attack on Dilithium}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/512}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/512} }