Paper 2024/339
From Random Probing to Noisy Leakages Without Field-Size Dependence
Abstract
Side channel attacks are devastating attacks targeting cryptographic implementations. To protect against these attacks, various countermeasures have been proposed -- in particular, the so-called masking scheme. Masking schemes work by hiding sensitive information via secret sharing all intermediate values that occur during the evaluation of a cryptographic implementation. Over the last decade, there has been broad interest in designing and formally analyzing such schemes. The random probing model considers leakage where the value on each wire leaks with some probability
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2024
- Keywords
- Leakage resilienceLeakage models
- Contact author(s)
- gianluca brian @ inf ethz ch
- History
- 2024-03-04: revised
- 2024-02-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/339
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/339, author = {Gianluca Brian and Stefan Dziembowski and Sebastian Faust}, title = {From Random Probing to Noisy Leakages Without Field-Size Dependence}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/339}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/339} }