Paper 2024/296
Attacking ECDSA with Nonce Leakage by Lattice Sieving: Bridging the Gap with Fourier Analysis-based Attacks
Abstract
The Hidden Number Problem (HNP) has found extensive applications in side-channel attacks against cryptographic schemes, such as ECDSA and Diffie-Hellman. There are two primary algorithmic approaches to solving the HNP: lattice-based attacks and Fourier analysis-based attacks. Lattice-based attacks exhibit better efficiency and require fewer samples when sufficiently long substrings of the nonces are known. However, they face significant challenges when only a small fraction of the nonce is leaked, such as 1-bit leakage, and their performance degrades in the presence of errors.
In this paper, we address an open question by introducing an algorithmic tradeoff that significantly bridges the gap between these two approaches.
By introducing a parameter
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2024
- Keywords
- ECDSAHidden Number ProblemLattice SievingLattice-based Attacks
- Contact author(s)
-
qw1234567 @ mail ustc edu cn
liqing21 @ mail ustc edu cn
hghu2005 @ ustc edu cn
hebinang @ mail ustc edu cn - History
- 2024-09-18: last of 4 revisions
- 2024-02-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/296
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/296, author = {Yiming Gao and Jinghui Wang and Honggang Hu and Binang He}, title = {Attacking {ECDSA} with Nonce Leakage by Lattice Sieving: Bridging the Gap with Fourier Analysis-based Attacks}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/296}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/296} }