Fault Attacks on UOV and Rainbow

Juliane Krämer; Mirjam Loiero

Paper 2024/277

Fault Attacks on UOV and Rainbow

Juliane Krämer

, University of Regensburg

Mirjam Loiero

Abstract

Multivariate cryptography is one of the main candidates for creating post-quantum public key cryptosystems. Especially in the area of digital signatures, there exist many practical and secure multivariate schemes. The signature schemes UOV and Rainbow are two of the most promising and best studied multivariate schemes which have proven secure for more than a decade. However, so far the security of multivariate signature schemes towards physical attacks has not been appropriately assessed. Towards a better understanding of the physical security of multivariate signature schemes, this paper presents fault attacks against SingleField schemes, especially UOV and Rainbow. Our analysis shows that although promising attack vectors exist, multivariate signature schemes inherently offer a good protection against fault attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Published elsewhere. COSADE 2019
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography fault attack side-channel attack multivariate cryptography signature schemes UOV Rainbow
Contact author(s): juliane kraemer @ ur de
History: 2024-02-19: approved; 2024-02-19: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/277
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/277,
      author = {Juliane Krämer and Mirjam Loiero},
      title = {Fault Attacks on UOV and Rainbow},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/277},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/277}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/277}
}