Paper 2024/2010
Anonymous credentials from ECDSA
Abstract
Anonymous digital credentials allow a user to prove possession of an attribute that has been asserted by an identity issuer without revealing any extra information about themselves. For example, a user who has received a digital passport credential can prove their “age is $>18$” without revealing any other attributes such as their name or date of birth. Despite inherent value for privacy-preserving authentication, anonymous credential schemes have been difficult to deploy at scale. Part of the difficulty arises because schemes in the literature, such as BBS+, use new cryptographic assumptions that require system-wide changes to existing issuer infrastructure. In addition, issuers often require digital identity credentials to be *device-bound* by incorporating the device’s secure element into the presentation flow. As a result, schemes like BBS+ require updates to the hardware secure elements and OS on every user's device. In this paper, we propose a new anonymous credential scheme for the popular and legacy-deployed Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature scheme. By adding efficient zk arguments for statements about SHA256 and document parsing for ISO-standardized identity formats, our anonymous credential scheme is that first one that can be deployed *without* changing any issuer processes, *without* requiring changes to mobile devices, and *without* requiring non-standard cryptographic assumptions. Producing ZK proofs about ECDSA signatures has been a bottleneck for other ZK proof systems because standardized curves such as P256 use finite fields which do not support efficient number theoretic transforms. We overcome this bottleneck by designing a ZK proof system around sumcheck and the Ligero argument system, by designing efficient methods for Reed-Solomon encoding over the required fields, and by designing specialized circuits for ECDSA. Our proofs for ECDSA can be generated in 60ms. When incorporated into a fully standardized identity protocol such as the ISO MDOC standard, we can generate a zero-knowledge proof for the MDOC presentation flow in 1.2 seconds on mobile devices depending on the credential size. These advantages make our scheme a promising candidate for privacy-preserving digital identity applications.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Anonymous credentialsZKECDSAMDOC
- Contact author(s)
-
matteof @ google com
shelat @ google com - History
- 2024-12-20: revised
- 2024-12-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/2010
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/2010, author = {Matteo Frigo and abhi shelat}, title = {Anonymous credentials from {ECDSA}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/2010}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2010} }