Paper 2024/1910
Stealth Software Trojan: Amplifying Hidden RF Side-Channels with Ultra High SNR and Data-Rate
Abstract
Interconnected devices enhance daily life but introduce security vulnerabilities, new technologies enable malicious activities such as information theft. This article combines radio frequency (RF) side-channel attacks with software Trojans to create a hard-to-detect, stealthy method for extracting kilobytes of secret information per millisecond over record distances with a single measurement in the RF spectrum. The technique exploits Trojan-induced electrical disturbances in RF components originating from peripherals, buses, memories and CPUs to achieve high SNR data leakage schemes. Experimental results show negligible acquisition time and stealth. The research introduces optimized modulation, demodulation schemes, and specialized synchronization symbols to minimize error rates and maximize data rates. It highlights the need for advanced detection and defense mechanisms to ensure the security and privacy of interconnected devices.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- ModulationRemote AttacksRadio FrequencyRFSide Channel AnalysisSCASingle TraceSoftwareSpectrumTrojans.
- Contact author(s)
-
coheng15 @ biu ac il
tamar levi @ biu ac il - History
- 2024-11-25: approved
- 2024-11-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1910
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1910,
author = {Gal Cohen and Itamar Levy},
title = {Stealth Software Trojan: Amplifying Hidden {RF} Side-Channels with Ultra High {SNR} and Data-Rate},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1910},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1910}
}
