Paper 2024/1640
Maximizing the Utility of Cryptographic Setups: Secure PAKEs, with either functional RO or CRS
Abstract
For Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), an idealized setup such as random oracle (RO) or a trusted setup such as common reference string (CRS) is a must in the universal composability (UC) framework (Canetti, FOCS 2001). Given the potential failure of a CRS or RO setup, it is natural to consider distributing trust among the two setups, resulting a CRS-or-RO-setup (i.e., CoR-setup). However, the infeasibility highlighted by Katz et al. (PODC 2014) suggested that it is impossible to construct UC-secure PAKE protocols with a straightforward CoR-setup (i.e., either the CRS is functional but the RO is compromised, or the RO is functional but the CRS is compromised). To circumvent this impossibility result, we investigate how to design UC-secure PAKE protocols with a fine-grained CoR-setup, where either the CRS is functional but the RO is non-functional, or vice versa. Different from the straightforward CoR-setup, a fine-grained non-functional setup is not necessarily completely compromised and fully controlled by the adversary; Instead, we consider this non-functional setup may still offer certain security properties. Certainly, the non-functional setup alone should be useless for achieving UC-security. We present a UC-secure PAKE protocol under two conditions: either the CRS is functional while the RO is non-functional (falling back to a collision-resistant hash function), or the RO is functional while the CRS is non-functional (falling back to a global CRS). Before presenting our construction, we first prove that a global CRS setup alone is insufficient for achieving UC-secure PAKE. This impossibility result highlights the non-triviality of our approach. To obtain our construction, we introduce several techniques as follows: (1) We propose a new variant of Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE), called homomorphic NIKE with associated functions, which captures key properties of existing RO-based PAKE protocols. This new primitive serves as an important component in our construction. (2) We develop a ``Brute Force'' extraction strategy which allows us to provide security analysis for our UC-secure PAKE with a fine-grained CoR-setup for polynomial-sized password spaces. (3) We introduce a novel password space extension technique that enables the expansion of PAKE protocols from polynomial-sized to arbitrary-sized password spaces. (4) Finally, to ensure provable security for our password space extension in UC-secure PAKEs, we modify existing PAKE functionalities to prevent responses that reveal the correctness of password guesses. This is a reasonable adjustment, as our protocol provides only implicit authentication. We further present a PAKE protocol in the BPR framework (Bellare, Pointcheval, Rogaway, EuroCrypt 2000), assuming either the CRS is functional while the RO falls back to a collision-resistant hash function, or the RO is functional but the CRS trapdoor is allowed to be learned by the adversary.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Contact author(s)
-
xiaoyuting @ dgut edu cn
r-zhang @ iie ac cn
hszhou @ vcu edu - History
- 2024-10-22: revised
- 2024-10-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1640
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1640, author = {Yuting Xiao and Rui Zhang and Hong-Sheng Zhou}, title = {Maximizing the Utility of Cryptographic Setups: Secure {PAKEs}, with either functional {RO} or {CRS}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1640}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1640} }