Paper 2024/1621
PAKE Combiners and Efficient Post-Quantum Instantiations
Abstract
Much work has been done recently on developing password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) mechanisms with post-quantum security. However, modern guidance recommends the use of hybrid schemes—schemes which rely on the combined hardness of a post-quantum assumption, e.g., learning with Errors (LWE), and a more traditional assumption, e.g., decisional Diffie-Hellman. To date, there is no known hybrid PAKE construction, let alone a general method for achieving such. In this paper, we present two efficient PAKE combiners—algorithms that take two PAKEs satisfying mild assumptions, and output a third PAKE with combined security properties—and prove these combiners secure in the Universal Composability (UC) model. Our sequential combiner, instantiated with efficient existing PAKEs such as CPace (built on Diffie-Hellman-type assumptions) and CHIC[ML-KEM] (built on the Module LWE assumption), yields the first known hybrid PAKE.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- key agreementpassword-based cryptographyPAKEpost-quantum cryptography
- Contact author(s)
-
juliahesse2 @ gmail com
michael @ mrosenberg pub - History
- 2024-10-11: approved
- 2024-10-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1621
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1621,
author = {Julia Hesse and Michael Rosenberg},
title = {{PAKE} Combiners and Efficient Post-Quantum Instantiations},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1621},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1621}
}
