Paper 2024/1413

The Black-Box Simulation Barrier Persists in a Fully Quantum World

Abstract

Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols have been a subject of intensive study due to their fundamental importance and versatility in modern cryptography. However, the inherently different nature of quantum information significantly alters the landscape, necessitating a re-examination of ZK designs. A crucial aspect of ZK protocols is their round complexity, intricately linked to $$, which forms the foundation of their formal definition and security proofs. In the $$ setting, where honest parties and their communication channels are all classical but the adversaries could be quantum, Chia, Chung, Liu, and Yamakawa [FOCS'21] demonstrated the non-existence of constant-round $$ ZK arguments (BBZK) for $$ unless $$. However, this problem remains widely open in the full-fledged quantum future that will eventually arrive, where all parties (including the honest ones) and their communication are naturally quantum. Indeed, this problem is of interest to the broader theory of quantum computing. It has been an important theme to investigate how quantum power fundamentally alters traditional computational tasks, such as the $$ security of Quantum Key Distribution and the incorporation of Oblivious Transfers in MiniQCrypt. Moreover, quantum communication has led to round compression for commitments and interactive arguments. Along this line, the above problem is of great significance in understanding whether quantum computing could also change the nature of ZK protocols in some fundamentally manner. We resolved this problem by proving that only languages in $$ admit constant-round $$ BBZK. This result holds significant implications. Firstly, it illuminates the nature of quantum zero-knowledge and provides valuable insights for designing future protocols in the quantum realm. Secondly, it relates ZK round complexity with the intriguing problem of $$ vs $$, which is out of the reach of previous analogue impossibility results in the classical or post-quantum setting. Lastly, it justifies the need for the $$ simulation techniques or the relaxed security notions employed in existing constant-round fully-quantum BBZK protocols.