Paper 2024/1219

Foldable, Recursive Proofs of Isogeny Computation with Reduced Time Complexity

Krystal Maughan, University of Vermont
Joseph Near, University of Vermont
Christelle Vincent, University of Vermont
Abstract

The security of certain post-quantum isogeny-based cryptographic schemes relies on the ability to provably and efficiently compute isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves without leaking information about the isogeny other than its domain and codomain. Earlier work in this direction give mathematical proofs of knowledge for the isogeny, and as a result when computing a chain of $n$ isogenies each proceeding node must verify the correctness of the proof of each preceding node, which is computationally linear in $n$. In this work, we empirically build a system to prove the execution of the circuit computing the isogeny rather than produce a proof of knowledge. This proof can then be used as part of the verifiable folding scheme Nova, which reduces the complexity of an isogeny proof of computation for a chain of $n$ isogenies from $O(n)$ to $O(1)$ by providing at each step a single proof that proves the whole preceding chain. To our knowledge, this is the first application of this type of solution to this problem.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)
Keywords
post-quantumisogenieszero-knowledge
Contact author(s)
Krystal Maughan @ uvm edu
jnear @ uvm edu
Christelle Vincent @ uvm edu
History
2024-07-31: approved
2024-07-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1219
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1219,
      author = {Krystal Maughan and Joseph Near and Christelle Vincent},
      title = {Foldable, Recursive Proofs of Isogeny Computation with Reduced Time Complexity},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1219},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1219}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1219}
}
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