Paper 2024/1197
Optimizing Rectangle and Boomerang Attacks: A Unified and Generic Framework for Key Recovery
, Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, College of Cyber Security, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China, Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, Key Laboratory of Cyberspace Security Defense, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China, College of Cyber Security, Jinan University, Guangzhou, ChinaAbstract
The rectangle attack has shown to be a very powerful form of cryptanalysis against block ciphers. Given a rectangle distinguisher, one expects to mount key recovery attacks as efficiently as possible. In the literature, there have been four algorithms for rectangle key recovery attacks. However, their performance varies from case to case. Besides, numerous are the applications where the attacks lack optimality. In this paper, we delve into the rectangle key recovery and propose a unified and generic key recovery algorithm, which supports any possible attacking parameters. Not only does it encompass the four existing rectangle key recovery algorithms, but it also reveals five new types of attacks that were previously overlooked. Further, we put forward a counterpart for boomerang key recovery attacks, which supports any possible attacking parameters as well. Along with these new key recovery algorithms, we propose a framework to automatically determine the best parameters for the attack. To demonstrate the efficiency of the new key recovery algorithms, we apply them to \serpent, \aes-192, \craft, \skinny, and \deoxysbc-256 based on existing distinguishers, yielding a series of improved attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in JOC 2024
- Keywords
- Boomerang attackRectangle attackKey recovery algorithmserpentaes-192craftskinnydeoxysbc
- Contact author(s)
-
yangqianqian @ iie ac cn
zhangnana_mail @ 163 com
shidanping @ iie ac cn
wanglibo12b @ gmail com
zhaojiahao @ iie ac cn
hulei @ iie ac cn
cryptjweng @ gmail com - History
- 2024-07-25: approved
- 2024-07-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1197
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1197,
author = {Qianqian Yang and Ling Song and Nana Zhang and Danping Shi and Libo Wang and Jiahao Zhao and Lei Hu and Jian Weng},
title = {Optimizing Rectangle and Boomerang Attacks: A Unified and Generic Framework for Key Recovery},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1197},
year = {2024},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1197}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1197}
}
