Paper 2024/1168
Time is not enough: Timing Leakage Analysis on Cryptographic Chips via Plaintext-Ciphertext Correlation in Non-timing Channel
Abstract
In side-channel testing, the standard timing analysis works when the vendor can provide a measurement to indicate the execution time of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we find that there exists timing leakage in power/electromagnetic channels, which is often ignored in traditional timing analysis. Hence a new method of timing analysis is proposed to deal with the case where execution time is not available. Different execution time leads to different execution intervals, affecting the locations of plaintext and ciphertext transmission. Our method detects timing leakage by studying changes in plaintext-ciphertext correlation when traces are aligned forward and backward. Experiments are then carried out on different cryptographic devices. Furthermore, we propose an improved timing analysis framework which gives appropriate methods for different scenarios.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Timing analysisSide-channel analysisTiming leakagePlaintext-ciphertext correlation
- Contact author(s)
-
cmwei06 @ 163 com
honggz @ bit edu cn
wanganl @ bit edu cn
wangjing_9624 @ 163 com
sfsun @ bit edu cn
dyl19 @ bit edu cn
liehuangz @ bit edu cn
mawenrui @ zjgsu edu cn - History
- 2024-07-22: approved
- 2024-07-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1168
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1168, author = {Congming Wei and Guangze Hong and An Wang and Jing Wang and Shaofei Sun and Yaoling Ding and Liehuang Zhu and Wenrui Ma}, title = {Time is not enough: Timing Leakage Analysis on Cryptographic Chips via Plaintext-Ciphertext Correlation in Non-timing Channel}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1168}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1168} }