Paper 2024/1135

Scalable and Lightweight State-Channel Audits

Christian Badertscher, IOG
Maxim Jourenko, Tokyo Institute of Technology & IOG
Dimitris Karakostas, University of Edinburgh
Mario Larangeira, Tokyo Institute of Technology & IOH
Abstract

Payment channels are one of the most prominent off-chain scaling solutions for blockchain systems. However, regulatory institutions have difficulty embracing them, as the channels lack insights needed for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) auditing purposes. Our work tackles the problem of a formal reliable and controllable inspection of off-ledger payment channels, by offering a novel approach for maintaining and reliably auditing statistics of payment channels. We extend a typical trustless Layer 2 protocol and provide a lightweight and scalable protocol such that: - every state channel is provably auditable w.r.t. a configurable set of policy queries, such that a regulator can retrieve reliable insights about the channel; - no information beyond the answers to auditing queries is leaked; - the cryptographic operations are inexpensive, the setup is simple, and storage complexity is independent of the transaction graph's size. We present a concrete protocol, based on Hydra Isomorphic State Channels (FC'21), and tie the creation of a state channel to real-world identifiers, both in a plain and privacy-preserving manner. For this, we employ verifiable credentials for decentralized identifiers, specifically verifiable Legal Entity Identifiers (vLEI) that increasingly gain traction for financial service providers and regulated institutions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CANS 2024
Keywords
BlockchainLayer-2State-channelScalabilityAudit
Contact author(s)
christian badertscher @ iohk io
jourenko m ab @ m titech ac jp
dkarakos @ ed ac uk
mario @ c titech ac jp
History
2024-07-15: approved
2024-07-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1135
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1135,
      author = {Christian Badertscher and Maxim Jourenko and Dimitris Karakostas and Mario Larangeira},
      title = {Scalable and Lightweight State-Channel Audits},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1135},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1135}
}
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