Theoretical differential fault attacks on FLIP and FiLIP

Pierrick Méaux; Dibyendu Roy

Paper 2024/098

Theoretical differential fault attacks on FLIP and FiLIP

Pierrick Méaux

, University of Luxembourg

Dibyendu Roy

, Indian Institute of Information Technology Vadodara

Abstract

In this article, we examine Differential Fault Attacks (DFA) targeting two stream ciphers, FLIP and FiLIP. We explore the fault model where an adversary flips a single bit of the key at an unknown position. Our analysis involves establishing complexity bounds for these attacks, contingent upon the cryptographic parameters of the Boolean functions employed as filters and the key size. Initially, we demonstrate how the concept of sensitivity enables the detection of the fault position using only a few keystream bits. This represents an enhancement over previous DFA methodologies applied to these ciphers. Subsequently, we leverage the properties of the filter's derivatives to execute attacks. This approach is universally applicable to any filter, and we delineate specific attack strategies for the two function families previously implemented in these ciphers.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Cryptography and Communications Discrete Structures, Boolean Functions and Sequences
Keywords: Fault attacks FLIP FiLIP Boolean functions
Contact author(s): pierrick meaux lu @ gmail com
dibyendu roy @ iiitvadodara ac in
History: 2024-01-22: approved; 2024-01-22: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/098
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/098,
      author = {Pierrick Méaux and Dibyendu Roy},
      title = {Theoretical differential fault attacks on {FLIP} and {FiLIP}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/098},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/098}
}