Paper 2024/051
Limits on Authenticated Encryption Use in TLS
Abstract
This technical note presents limits on the security (as a function of the number of plaintext bytes encrypted and the number of forgery attempts made by an adversary) for the main Authenticated Encryption schemes available in TLS 1.2 and the draft of TLS 1.3. These limits are derived from security proofs for the considered schemes available in the literature. Our intention is to provide considered technical input to on-going discussions in the TLS Working Group of the IETF concerning, amongst other things, the necessity of adding a key update feature to the TLS 1.3 specification.
Note: This document was originally uploaded to the authors' websites in 2016, however it is no longer available there. The source code for the document is publicly available on github: https://github.com/atulluykx/securitybounds We're uploading this document to eprint to ensure the pdf is more easily accessible.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- AESGCMTLS
- Contact author(s)
- aluykx @ google com
- History
- 2024-01-15: approved
- 2024-01-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/051
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/051,
author = {Atul Luykx and Kenneth G. Paterson},
title = {Limits on Authenticated Encryption Use in TLS},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/051},
year = {2024},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/051}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/051}
}
