Paper 2023/837

Faster coercion-resistant e-voting by encrypted sorting

Diego F. Aranha, Aarhus University
Michele Battagliola, Università degli Studi di Trento
Lawrence Roy, Aarhus University
Abstract

Coercion-resistance is one of the most challenging security properties to achieve when designing an e-voting protocol. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed in 2005 by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson, is one of the first voting systems where coercion-resistance was rigorously defined and achieved, making JCJ the benchmark for coercion-resistant protocols. Recently, the coercion-resistance definition proposed in JCJ has been disputed and improved by Cortier, Gaudry, and Yang. They identified a major problem, related to leakage of the number of discarded votes by revoting; and proposed CHide, a new protocol that solves the issue and satisfies a stronger security notion. In this work we present an improved version of CHide, with complexity instead of in the number of received ballots, that relies on sorting encrypted ballots to make the tallying phase faster. The asymptotic complexity of our protocol is competitive with other state-of-the-art coercion-resistant voting protocols satisfying the stronger notion for coercion resistance.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
E-votingCoercion-resistanceSorting
Contact author(s)
dfaranha @ cs au dk
michele battagliola @ unitn it
lance roy @ cs au dk
History
2023-06-06: approved
2023-06-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/837
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/837,
      author = {Diego F. Aranha and Michele Battagliola and Lawrence Roy},
      title = {Faster coercion-resistant e-voting by encrypted sorting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/837},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/837}
}
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