Paper 2023/837

Faster coercion-resistant e-voting by encrypted sorting

Diego F. Aranha, Aarhus University
Michele Battagliola, Università degli Studi di Trento
Lawrence Roy, Aarhus University

Coercion-resistance is one of the most challenging security properties to achieve when designing an e-voting protocol. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed in 2005 by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson, is one of the first voting systems where coercion-resistance was rigorously defined and achieved, making JCJ the benchmark for coercion-resistant protocols. Recently, the coercion-resistance definition proposed in JCJ has been disputed and improved by Cortier, Gaudry, and Yang. They identified a major problem, related to leakage of the number of discarded votes by revoting; and proposed CHide, a new protocol that solves the issue and satisfies a stronger security notion. In this work we present an improved version of CHide, with complexity $O(n\log n)$ instead of $O(n^2)$ in the number $n$ of received ballots, that relies on sorting encrypted ballots to make the tallying phase faster. The asymptotic complexity of our protocol is competitive with other state-of-the-art coercion-resistant voting protocols satisfying the stronger notion for coercion resistance.

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dfaranha @ cs au dk
michele battagliola @ unitn it
lance roy @ cs au dk
2023-06-06: approved
2023-06-05: received
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      author = {Diego F. Aranha and Michele Battagliola and Lawrence Roy},
      title = {Faster coercion-resistant e-voting by encrypted sorting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/837},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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