Paper 2023/822

Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Primitives over Rings and a Key Recovery Attack on Rubato

Lorenzo Grassi, Ruhr University Bochum
Irati Manterola Ayala, Simula UiB
Martha Norberg Hovd, Simula UiB
Morten Øygarden, Simula UiB
Håvard Raddum, Simula UiB
Qingju Wang, Telecom Paris
Abstract

Symmetric primitives are a cornerstone of cryptography, and have traditionally been defined over fields, where cryptanalysis is now well understood. However, a few symmetric primitives defined over rings Z_q for a composite number q have recently been proposed, a setting where security is much less studied. In this paper we focus on studying established algebraic attacks typically defined over fields and the extent of their applicability to symmetric primitives defined over the ring of integers modulo a composite q. Based on our analysis, we present an attack on full Rubato, a family of symmetric ciphers proposed by Ha et al. at Eurocrypt 2022 designed to be used in a transciphering framework for approximate fully homomorphic encryption. We show that at least 25% of the possible choices for q satisfy certain conditions that lead to a successful key recovery attack with complexity significantly lower than the claimed security level for five of the six ciphers in the Rubato family.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2023
Keywords
Algebraic cryptanalysiscomposite modulusRubatoKey recovery attackArithmetization oriented primitives
Contact author(s)
lorenzo grassi @ ruhr-uni-bochum de
irati @ simula no
martha @ simula no
morten oygarden @ simula no
haavardr @ simula no
qingju wang @ telecom-paris fr
History
2023-06-06: approved
2023-06-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/822
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/822,
      author = {Lorenzo Grassi and Irati Manterola Ayala and Martha Norberg Hovd and Morten Øygarden and Håvard Raddum and Qingju Wang},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Primitives over Rings and a Key Recovery Attack on Rubato},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/822},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/822}
}
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