Paper 2023/656
Formalizing Soundness Proofs of SNARKs
Abstract
Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs) have seen interest and development from the cryptographic community over recent years, and there are now constructions with very small proof size designed to work well in practice. A SNARK protocol can only be widely accepted as secure, however, if a rigorous proof of its security properties has been vetted by the community. Even then, it is sometimes the case that these security proofs are flawed, and it is then necessary for further research to identify these flaws and correct the record. To increase the rigor of these proofs, we turn to formal methods. Focusing on the soundness aspect of a widespread class of SNARKs, we formalize proofs for six different constructions, including the well-known Groth '16. Our codebase is written in the Lean 3 theorem proving language, and uses a variety of techniques to simplify and automate these proofs as much as possible.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- SNARKsFormal Methods
- Contact author(s)
-
boltonb2 @ illinois edu
soc1024 @ illinois edu - History
- 2023-05-11: approved
- 2023-05-09: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/656
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/656,
author = {Bolton Bailey and Andrew Miller},
title = {Formalizing Soundness Proofs of {SNARKs}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/656},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/656}
}
