Paper 2023/562

Cryptanalysis of Strong Physically Unclonable Functions

Liliya Kraleva, imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Mohammad Mahzoun, Eindhoven University of Technology, Netherlands
Raluca Posteuca, imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Dilara Toprakhisar, imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Tomer Ashur, Cryptomeria, Belgium
Ingrid Verbauwhede, imec-COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
Abstract

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are being proposed as a low cost alternative to permanently store secret keys or provide device authentication without requiring non-volatile memory, large e-fuses or other dedicated processing steps. In the literature, PUFs are split into two main categories. The so-called strong PUFs are mainly used for authentication purposes, hence also called authentication PUFs. They promise to be lightweight by avoiding extensive digital post-processing and cryptography. The so-called weak PUFs, also called key generation PUFs, can only provide authentication when combined with a cryptographic authentication protocol. Over the years, multiple research results have demonstrated that Strong PUFs can be modeled and attacked by machine learning techniques. Hence, the general assumption is that the security of a strong PUF is solely dependent on its security against machine learning attacks. The goal of this paper is to debunk this myth, by analyzing and breaking three recently published Strong PUFs (Suresh et al., VLSI Circuits 2020; Liu et al., ISSCC 2021; and Jeloka et al., VLSI Circuits 2017). The attacks presented in this paper have practical complexities and use generic symmetric key cryptanalysis techniques.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE Xplore
Keywords
cryptanalysisPUF
Contact author(s)
Liliya Kraleva @ esat kuleuven be
m mahzoun @ tue nl
Raluca Posteuca @ esat kuleuven be
Dilara Toprakhisar @ esat kuleuven be
tomer @ cryptomeria tech
Ingrid Verbauwhede @ esat kuleuven be
History
2023-04-24: approved
2023-04-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/562
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/562,
      author = {Liliya Kraleva and Mohammad Mahzoun and Raluca Posteuca and Dilara Toprakhisar and Tomer Ashur and Ingrid Verbauwhede},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Strong Physically Unclonable Functions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/562},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/562}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/562}
}
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