Yuval Ishai, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology
Dakshita Khurana, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Amit Sahai, University of California, Los Angeles
Akshayaram Srinivasan, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Abstract
We revisit the problem of {\em reusable} non-interactive secure computation (NISC). A standard NISC protocol for a sender-receiver functionality enables the receiver to encrypt its input such that any sender, on input , can send back a message revealing only . Security should hold even when either party can be malicious. A {\em reusable} NISC protocol has the additional feature that the receiver's message can be safely reused for computing multiple outputs . Here security should hold even when a malicious sender can learn partial information about the honest receiver's outputs in each session.
We present the first reusable NISC protocol for general functions that only makes a {\em black-box} use of any two-message oblivious transfer protocol, along with a random oracle. All previous reusable NISC protocols either made a non-black-box use of cryptographic primitives (Cachin et al., ICALP 2002) or alternatively required a stronger arithmetic variant of oblivious transfer and were restricted to in or similar classes (Chase et al., Crypto 2019). Our result is obtained via a general compiler from standard NISC to reusable NISC that makes use of special type of honest-majority protocols for secure multiparty computation.
Finally, we extend the above main result to reusable {\em two-sided} NISC, in which two parties can encrypt their inputs in the first round and then reveal different functions of their inputs in multiple sessions. This extension either requires an additional (black-box) use of additively homomorphic commitment or alternatively requires the parties to maintain a state between sessions.
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/514,
author = {Yuval Ishai and Dakshita Khurana and Amit Sahai and Akshayaram Srinivasan},
title = {Black-Box Reusable {NISC} with Random Oracles},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/514},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/514}
}
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