Paper 2023/482

Homomorphic Trapdoors for Identity-based and Group Signatures

Buvana Ganesh, University College Cork
Apurva Vangujar, University College Cork
Alia Umrani, University College Cork
Paolo Palmieri, University College Cork
Abstract

Group signature (GS) schemes are an important primitive in cryptography that provides anonymity and traceability for a group of users. In this paper, we propose a new approach to constructing GS schemes using the homomorphic trapdoor function (HTDF). We focus on constructing an identity-based homomorphic signature (IBHS) scheme using the trapdoor, providing a simpler scheme that has no zero-knowledge proofs. Our scheme allows packing more data into the signatures by elevating the existing homomorphic trapdoor from the SIS assumption to the MSIS assumption to enable packing techniques. Compared to the existing group signature schemes, we provide a straightforward and alternate construction that is efficient and secure under the standard model. Overall, our proposed scheme provides an efficient and secure solution for GS schemes using HTDF.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Homomorphic trapdoorsIdentity based homomorphic SignaturesMSISStandard modelGroup signatures
Contact author(s)
b ganesh @ cs ucc ie
a vangujar @ cs ucc ie
a umrani @ cs ucc ie
p palmieri @ cs ucc ie
History
2023-04-25: revised
2023-04-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/482
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/482,
      author = {Buvana Ganesh and Apurva Vangujar and Alia Umrani and Paolo Palmieri},
      title = {Homomorphic Trapdoors for Identity-based and Group Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/482},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/482}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/482}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.