Paper 2023/454
Wireless-channel Key Exchange
Abstract
Wireless-channel key exchange (WiKE) protocols that leverage Physical Layer Security (PLS) techniques could become an alternative solution for secure communication establishment, such as vehicular ad-hoc networks, wireless IoT networks, or cross-layer protocols. In this paper, we provide a novel abstraction of WiKE protocols and present the first game-based security model for WiKE. Our result enables the analysis of security guarantees offered by these cross-layer protocols and allows the study of WiKE's compositional aspects. Further, we address the potential problem of the slow-rate secret-key generation in WiKE due to inadequate environmental conditions that might render WiKE protocols impractical or undesirably slow. We explore a solution to such a problem by bootstrapping a low-entropy key coming as the output of WiKE using a Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE). On top of the new security definition for WiKE and those which are well-established for PAKE, we build a compositional WiKE-then-PAKE model and define the minimum security requirements for the safe sequential composition of the two primitives in a black-box manner. Finally, we show the pitfalls of previous ad-hoc attempts to combine WiKE and PAKE.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. CT-RSA 2023
- Keywords
- WiKEwireless channelkey exchangePAKEPhysical Layer Securitycross-layer design
- Contact author(s)
-
afonso arriaga @ uni lu
petra sala @ ses com
marjan skrobot @ uni lu - History
- 2023-03-31: approved
- 2023-03-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/454
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/454, author = {Afonso Arriaga and Petra Sala and Marjan Škrobot}, title = {Wireless-channel Key Exchange}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/454}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/454} }