Paper 2023/1957
Chosen Ciphertext Security via BARGs
Abstract
In this paper, we show a new set of cryptographic primitives that generically leads to chosen ciphertext secure (CCA secure) public-key encryption (PKE). Specifically, we show how a (non-interactive, publicly verifiable) batch argument (BARG) for NP can be combined with a chosen plaintext secure PKE scheme to achieve a CCA secure one. The requirement of the succinctness of the proof size of a BARG in our result is rather mild: The proof size is $O(k^{\epsilon})$ for some non-negative constant $\epsilon < 1$ when the correctness of $k$ statements is simultaneously proved.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- public key encryptionchosen ciphertext securitynon-interactive batch argument
- Contact author(s)
- t-matsuda @ aist go jp
- History
- 2023-12-25: approved
- 2023-12-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1957
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1957, author = {Takahiro Matsuda}, title = {Chosen Ciphertext Security via {BARGs}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1957}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1957} }