Paper 2023/1957

Chosen Ciphertext Security via BARGs

Abstract

In this paper, we show a new set of cryptographic primitives that generically leads to chosen ciphertext secure (CCA secure) public-key encryption (PKE). Specifically, we show how a (non-interactive, publicly verifiable) batch argument (BARG) for NP can be combined with a chosen plaintext secure (CPA secure) PKE scheme to achieve a CCA secure one. The requirement of the succinctness of the proof size of a BARG used as a building block is arguably very mild: We require it to be only at most $(1-\frac{1}{p(\lambda ,n)})\cdot k+q(\lambda ,n)\cdot k^{ϵ}$ for some non-negative constant $ϵ<1$ and polynomials $p,q$, where $\lambda$ denotes the security parameter, $n$ denotes the statement size, and $k$ denotes the batch size (i.e. the number of statements whose correctness is simultaneously proved), and thus it can even be (slightly) linear in $k$. A BARG with such succinctness is so weak that it cannot be used in the recent constructions of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for NP based on a BARG (and a one-way function) by Bitansky et al. (STOC 2024) and Bradley, Waters, and Wu (TCC 2024). Therefore, our result gives a new building block that can upgrade CPA security into CCA security.

Note: (May 12, 2025) The proceedings version of this paper appears in PKC 2025. In this version, we weaken the succinctness of the proof size of the underlying BARG to one that is not known to imply NIZKs (even when combined with OWF or CPA secure PKE). (See Section 1.2 for details.) Furthermore, the proofs that were omitted in the proceedings version are contained.