Chosen Ciphertext Security via BARGs

Takahiro Matsuda

Paper 2023/1957

Chosen Ciphertext Security via BARGs

Takahiro Matsuda, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)

Abstract

In this paper, we show a new set of cryptographic primitives that generically leads to chosen ciphertext secure (CCA secure) public-key encryption (PKE). Specifically, we show how a (non-interactive, publicly verifiable) batch argument (BARG) for NP can be combined with a chosen plaintext secure PKE scheme to achieve a CCA secure one. The requirement of the succinctness of the proof size of a BARG in our result is rather mild: The proof size is $O(k^{\epsilon})$ for some non-negative constant $\epsilon < 1$ when the correctness of $k$ statements is simultaneously proved.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: public key encryption chosen ciphertext security non-interactive batch argument
Contact author(s): t-matsuda @ aist go jp
History: 2023-12-25: approved; 2023-12-25: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1957
License: CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1957,
      author = {Takahiro Matsuda},
      title = {Chosen Ciphertext Security via BARGs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1957},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1957}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1957}
}