Paper 2023/1957

Chosen Ciphertext Security via BARGs

Takahiro Matsuda, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
Abstract

In this paper, we show a new set of cryptographic primitives that generically leads to chosen ciphertext secure (CCA secure) public-key encryption (PKE). Specifically, we show how a (non-interactive, publicly verifiable) batch argument (BARG) for NP can be combined with a chosen plaintext secure PKE scheme to achieve a CCA secure one. The requirement of the succinctness of the proof size of a BARG in our result is rather mild: The proof size is $O(k^{\epsilon})$ for some non-negative constant $\epsilon < 1$ when the correctness of $k$ statements is simultaneously proved.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
public key encryptionchosen ciphertext securitynon-interactive batch argument
Contact author(s)
t-matsuda @ aist go jp
History
2023-12-25: approved
2023-12-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1957
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1957,
      author = {Takahiro Matsuda},
      title = {Chosen Ciphertext Security via {BARGs}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1957},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1957}
}
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