Paper 2023/1827
Key Exchange in the Post-Snowden Era: UC Secure Subversion-Resilient PAKE
Abstract
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) allows two parties to establish a common high-entropy secret from a possibly low-entropy pre-shared secret such as a password. In this work, we provide the first PAKE protocol with subversion resilience in the framework of universal composability (UC), where the latter roughly means that UC security still holds even if one of the two parties is malicious and the honest party's code has been subverted (in an undetectable manner). We achieve this result by sanitizing the PAKE protocol from oblivious transfer (OT) due to Canetti et al. (PKC'12) via cryptographic reverse firewalls in the UC framework (Chakraborty et al., EUROCRYPT'22). This requires new techniques, which help us uncover new cryptographic primitives with sanitation-friendly properties along the way (such as OT, dual-mode cryptosystems, and signature schemes). As an additional contribution, we delve deeper in the backbone of communication required in the subversion-resilient UC framework, extending it to the unauthenticated setting, in line with the work of Barak et al. (CRYPTO'05).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- PAKEsubversion resilienceuniversal composability
- Contact author(s)
-
suvradip1111 @ gmail com
magliocco @ di uniroma1 it
bernardo magri @ manchester ac uk
venturi @ di uniroma1 it - History
- 2023-11-28: approved
- 2023-11-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1827
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1827,
author = {Suvradip Chakraborty and Lorenzo Magliocco and Bernardo Magri and Daniele Venturi},
title = {Key Exchange in the Post-Snowden Era: {UC} Secure Subversion-Resilient {PAKE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1827},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1827}
}
