Paper 2023/1761

Guardianship in Group Key Exchange for Limited Environments

Elsie Mestl Fondevik, Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Britta Hale, Naval Postgraduate School
Xisen Tian, Naval Postgraduate School
Abstract

Post-compromise security (PCS) has been a core goal of end-to-end encrypted messaging applications for many years, both in one-to-one continuous key agreement (CKA) and for groups (CGKA). At its essence, PCS relies on a compromised party to perform a key update in order to `self-heal'. However, due to bandwidth constraints, receive-only mode, and various other environmental demands of the growing number of use cases for such CGKA protocols, a group member may not be able to issue such updates. In this work, we address the issue of devices functioning in limited mode through the introduction of guardianship, where a designated guardian can perform key updates on the behalf of its paired edge device. We introduce a Guardianship PCS (GPCS) security, and provide an associated security experiment. We investigate various architectural designs in the pursuit of GPCS, provide constructions and security analyses, and describe trade-offs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
CKACGKAMLSPCSFSGPCSGuardianshipGCGKALimitedConstrained
Contact author(s)
Elsie Fondevik @ kongsberg com
britta hale @ nps edu
xisen tian1 @ nps edu
History
2024-12-19: last of 2 revisions
2023-11-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1761
License
No rights reserved
CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1761,
      author = {Elsie Mestl Fondevik and Britta Hale and Xisen Tian},
      title = {Guardianship in Group Key Exchange for Limited Environments},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1761},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1761}
}
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